According to the main argument in favour of the practice of racial profiling as a low enforcement tactic, the use of race as a targeting factor helps the police to apprehend more criminals. In the following, this argument is challenged. It is argued that, given the assumption that criminals are currently being punished too severely in Western countries, the apprehension of more criminals may not constitute a reason in favour of racial profiling at all.

The justice of racial profiling is addressed in the original position first for a society without racism, then for a society marked by racism. In the first case, the practice is argued to be just if carried out respectfully and expeditiously and likely to contribute to effective crime control. Thus it is not intrinsically racist. Addressing the second case, the idea that the harms of racial profiling are modest because expressive is critiqued. The practice is shown to carry (...) the danger of producing rights-violations by increasing the incidence of racist attitudes and practices. It is argued to be just in a society marked by racism if done under special supervision, and only to aid in apprehending dangerous criminals. (shrink)

This essay begins with a current case involving racial profiling and DNA testing. The two combine to raise some troubling issues involving the use of each in police investigation. It is argued that racial profiling is unethical and ought to be avoided and that DNA testing on general populations of innocent people is fraught with dangers.

This essay begins with a current case involving racial profiling and DNA testing. The two combine to raise some troubling issues involving the use of each in police investigation. It is argued that racial profiling is unethical and ought to be avoided and that DNA testing on general populations of innocent people is fraught with dangers.

This essay will argue for ethical procedures governing criminal profiling. A model based upon psychological/behavioral data, witness data, and forensic profiling data is sketched out. This model fits the legitimate uses of criminal profiling as an investigation procedure. Racial profiling as a primary sorting factor does not fit the preferred model and has significant downsides and so is rejected as a primary sorting mechanism in criminal investigation procedure.

The rapid implementation and continuing expansion of forensic DNA databases around the world has been supported by claims about their effectiveness in criminal investigations and challenged by assertions of the resulting intrusiveness into individual privacy. These two competing perspectives provide the basis for ongoing considerations about the categories of persons who should be subject to non-consensual DNA sampling and profile retention as well as the uses to which such profiles should be put. This paper uses the example of the (...) current arrangements for forensic DNA databasing in England and Wales to discuss the ways in which the legislative and operational basis for police DNA databasing is reliant upon continuous deliberations over these and other matters by a range of key stakeholders. We also assess the effects of the recent innovative use of DNA databasing for “familial searching” in this jurisdiction in order to show how agreed understandings about the appropriate uses of DNA can become unsettled and reformulated even where their investigative effectiveness is uncontested. We conclude by making some observations about the future of what is recognized to be the largest forensic DNA database in the world. (shrink)

Current methods of forensic DNA profiling, based on Polymerase Chain Reaction amplifications of a varying number of Short Tandem Repeat loci found at different locations on the human genome, are regularly described as constituting the “gold standard for identification” in contemporary society. At a time when criminal justice systems in Europe and North America increasingly seek to utilize the epistemic authority of a variety of sciences in support of the apprehension and prosecution of suspects and offenders, genetic science (...) and recombinant DNA technology are often singled out for particular approbation. Indeed, the development and application of DNA profiling has been widely described as the “greatest breakthrough in forensic science since fingerprinting.”. (shrink)

In recent decades a number of criminal convictions have been reversed on appeal, partially on the basis of problems associated with the use of scientific evidence adduced by the prosecution during the trial. These miscarriage of justice cases have received considerable attention from news media, legal commentators, criminologists and in formal public inquiries. Most responses to these cases have been critical of the scientific evidence originally relied upon at trial. Few commentators have been critical of, or even reflective about, (...) the scientific evidence used to acquit. Generally, their analyses have utilized idealized images of science and scientists. In contrast, by importing the concept of methodological symmetry from science studies, this paper aims to identify and explore the conceptual disparity (or asymmetry) between the assessment of scientific evidence used to convict and the scientific evidence used to acquit. In order to illustrate some of the limits to conventional approaches to miscarriages of justice as well as examine the judicial use of scientific evidence this will be undertaken in relation to the successful appeal of the Birmingham Six. (shrink)

I argue that a compelling way to articulate what is wrong with racial profiling in policing is to view racial profiling as a violation of the presumption of innocence. I discuss the communicative nature of the presumption of innocence as an expression of social trust and a protection against the social condemnation of being undeservingly investigated, prosecuted, and convicted for committing a crime. I argue that, given its communicative dimension, failures to extend the presumption of innocence are an (...) expression of disrespect. I take the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk policy as an example of racial profiling and argue that its use of race-based forms of suspicion as reasons for making stops is a violation of the presumption of innocence. I maintain that this systemic failure to extend the presumption of innocence to profiled groups reveals the essentially disrespectful nature of the NYPD policy. (shrink)

How, if at all, should race figure in criminal trials with a jury? How far should attorneys be allowed or encouraged to probe the racial sensitivities of jurors and what does this mean for the appropriate way to present cases which involve racial profiling and, therefore, are likely to pit the words and actions of a white policeman against those of a young black man?

In the United States and elsewhere, there is substantial controversy regarding the use of race and ethnicity by police in determining whom to stop, question, and investigate in relation to crime and security issues. In the ethics literature, the debate about profiling largely focuses on the nature of profiling and when (if ever) profiling is morally justifiable. This essay addresses the related, but distinct, issue of whether states have a duty to collect information about the race and (...) ethnicity of persons stopped by police. I argue that states in the U.S. do have such a duty on the grounds that such information collection would help secure the value of persons’ human rights against discrimination and unfair policing. Nonetheless, a large number of states do not require it. I begin by distinguishing rights from the value of rights, and arguing that under certain conditions persons have claims to the value of rights themselves, and that states have duties to secure that value. I then turn to the issue of profiling and offer the value of rights argument in favor of information collection about the race and ethnicity of persons stopped by police. (shrink)

This paper uses argument diagrams, argumentation schemes, and some tools from formal argumentation systems developed in artificial intelligence to build a graph-theoretic model of relevance shown to be applicable as a practical method for helping a third party judge issues of relevance or irrelevance of an argument in real examples. Examples used to illustrate how the method works are drawn from disputes about relevance in natural language discourse, including a criminal trial and a parliamentary debate.

A number of philosophers argue that law enforcement officers may have good reasons to racially profile suspects under certain conditions. Their conclusions rest on a claim of epistemic rationality: if members of some races are at an increased risk of criminality, then it may be rational for law enforcement officers to subject them to increased scrutiny. In this paper I contest the epistemic rationality of racial profiling by appealing to recent work in criminology and the sociology of race and (...) crime. I argue that recent studies indicate that race is a comparatively poor baseline for judging criminality. Law enforcement officers are therefore not making a cognitive error by ignoring race to focus on other correlates of crime but are keeping up with our best social science. (shrink)

This paper offers the first philosophical analysis of a form of artificial intelligence (AI) which the author calls facial profiling technology (FPT). FPT is a type of facial analysis technology designed to predict criminal behavior based solely on facial structure. Marketed for use by law enforcement, face classifiers generated by the program can supposedly identify murderers, thieves, pedophiles, and terrorists prior to the commission of crimes. At the time of this writing, an FPT company has a contract with (...) the United States federal government. After recounting how FPT resurrects the same moral problems associated with the pseudoscience of physiognomy, the author of this manuscript develops and defends the ‘Liberal Argument Against Facial Discrimination’ (LAAFD), which concludes that government use of FPT poses a significant risk of violating the classical liberal value of equality before the law by committing unjust discrimination against groups of people whose faces happen to match FPT classifiers. A key move in the argument suggests how a future scenario that results in widespread discrimination based solely on facial structure could be as unjustified and harmful, mutatis mutandis, as similar discrimination based solely on racial background. In the final section, the author of this paper develops prima facie policy proposals designed to protect classical liberal values if FPT is to be utilized by governments in liberal democratic societies. (shrink)

Violence risk assessment tools are increasingly used within criminal justice and forensic psychiatry, however there is little relevant, reliable and unbiased data regarding their predictive accuracy. We argue that such data are needed to (i) prevent excessive reliance on risk assessment scores, (ii) allow matching of different risk assessment tools to different contexts of application, (iii) protect against problematic forms of discrimination and stigmatisation, and (iv) ensure that contentious demographic variables are not prematurely removed from risk assessment tools.

It is often thought that traditional recidivism prediction tools used in criminal sentencing, though biased in many ways, can straightforwardly avoid one particularly pernicious type of bias: direct racial discrimination. They can avoid this by excluding race from the list of variables employed to predict recidivism. A similar approach could be taken to the design of newer, machine learning-based (ML) tools for predicting recidivism: information about race could be withheld from the ML tool during its training phase, ensuring that (...) the resulting predictive model does not use race as an explicit predictor. However, if race is correlated with measured recidivism in the training data, the ML tool may ‘learn’ a perfect proxy for race. If such a proxy is found, the exclusion of race would do nothing to weaken the correlation between risk (mis)classifications and race. Is this a problem? We argue that, on some explanations of the wrongness of discrimination, it is. On these explanations, the use of an ML tool that perfectly proxies race would (likely) be more wrong than the use of a traditional tool that imperfectly proxies race. Indeed, on some views, use of a perfect proxy for race is plausibly as wrong as explicit racial profiling. We end by drawing out four implications of our arguments. (shrink)

Psychopathy is typically characterized as a constellation of deviant personality traits and behavioral tendencies. The link between psychopathic personality traits and pervasive antisocial behavior raises a crucial question concerning the legal accountability of offenders with psychopathy. Some argue that the unique clinical profile and neurobiological peculiarities of individuals with psychopathy mitigate their responsibility, while others maintain that current scientific knowledge does not support the use of psychopathy as an exculpatory condition for criminal offending. Our overview mainly centeres on whether (...) offenders with psychopathy can be considered legally insane. In this regard, our overview suggests that there is still an ongoing debate whether psychopathy should be used as a legally relevant construct for determining criminal responsibility. Moreover, our discussion indicates that careful attention should be put on empirical and conceptual issues surrounding the role of (neuro)scientific data for determining whether individuals with psychopathy should be considered criminally blameworthy for their wrongdoings. (shrink)

derick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2003. xiii + 359 pp.

In this paper I respond to Mathias Risse's objections to my critique of his views on racial profiling in Philosophy and Public Affairs. I draw on the work of Richard Sampson and others on racial disadvantage in the USA to show that racial profiling likely aggravates racial injustices that are already there. However, I maintain, clarify and defend my original claim against Risse that racial profiling itself is likely to cause racial injustice, even if we abstract from (...) unfair background conditions. I then respond to Levin's claims that there is no serious racial injustice in the contemporary USA and differentiate between Risse's attempt - albeit unsuccessful - to provide an egalitarian justification for racial profiling from the frankly inegalitarian assumptions that underpin the claims of Michael Levin. (shrink)

According to Mathias Risse and Richard Zeckhauser, racial profiling can be justified in a society, such as the contemporary United States, where the legacy of slavery and segregation is found in lesser but, nonetheless, troubling forms of racial inequality. Racial profiling, Risse and Zeckhauser recognize, is often marked by police abuse and the harassment of racial minorities and by the disproportionate use of race in profiling. These, on their view, are unjustified. But, they contend, this does not (...) mean that all forms of racial profiling are unjustified; nor, they claim, need one be indifferent to the harms of racism in order to justify racial profiling. In fact, one of the aims of their paper is to show that racial profiling, suitably understood, “is consistent with support for far-reaching measures to decrease racial inequities and inequality.” Hence, one of their most striking claims, in an original and provocative paper, is that one can endorse racial profiling without being in any way indifferent to the disadvantaged status of racial minorities. In an initial response to these claims, I argued that Risse and Zeckhauser tend to underestimate the harms of racial profiling. I suggested two main reasons why they did so. The first is that they tend to identify the more serious harms associated with profiling with background racism, and therefore to believe that these are not properly attributable to profiling itself. The second reason is that they ignore the ways in which background racism makes even relatively minor harms harder to bear and to justify than would otherwise be the case. Hence, I concluded, racial profiling cannot be a normal part of police practice in a society still struggling with racism, although under very special conditions and with special regulation and compensation in place, it might be justified as an extraordinary police measure. I want to stand by those claims. However, Risse’s response to my arguments persuades me that I misinterpreted his earlier position in one significant respect. So I will start by explaining what interpretive mistake I believe that I made. I will then argue that despite Risse’s patient and careful response to my arguments, my initial concerns with his justification of profiling remain valid. -/- . (shrink)

DNA profiling and databasing have become commonplace in criminal investigation and prosecution. There is a body of both state and federal legislation enabling the establishment and operation of profile databases for law enforcement purposes. Most legislation is specific as to who may be profiled for inclusion in a database. The majority of state laws permit DNA profile databasing of offenders convicted of certain defined crimes, of missing persons and their relatives, and of DNA profiles from criminal-case evidence (...) where the depositor is unknown. More recently, a few states have acted to permit databasing profiles of suspects of certain types of crimes, and there appears to be a trend toward wider adoption of this practice. The legislation adopted or proposed thus far defines whose DNA profiles can be databased, and under what circumstances. Less attention has been given to the matter of specimen retention following profiling and databasing. (shrink)

Law-enforcement agencies are increasingly able to leverage crime statistics to make risk predictions for particular individuals, employing a form of inference that some condemn as violating the right to be “treated as an individual.” I suggest that the right encodes agents’ entitlement to a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of the rule of law. Rather than precluding statistical prediction, it requires that citizens be able to anticipate which variables will be used as predictors and act intentionally to avoid (...) them. Furthermore, it condemns reliance on various indexes of distributive injustice, or unchosen properties, as evidence of law-breaking. (shrink)

Taking Hobbesian logic as my starting point, I argue that Hobbesian diffidence, one of the causes of quarrel in the state of nature, does not disappear once the citizens enter civil society. Rather, diffidence is merely contained by the sovereign. Following Alice Ristroph, I argue that diffidence comes to shape what citizens demand of the state/sovereign in the criminal law. However, I show that Ristroph does not fully appreciate that the concept of diffidence is a racialized one, and as (...) such, race underlies how the citizens understand their own diffidence, what citizens demand of the sovereign, and how they demand it. Further, because diffidence itself is racialized, criminal law need not make explicit appeals to race. Once racialized diffidence becomes embedded in the criminal law, it remains there regardless of any conscious racial animus. I show that racial profiling is a prime example of how this racialized diffidence manifests. Thus, I present Hobbesian diffidence as a framework from which to understand racial oppression. This paper is primarily an application of Hobbes to contemporary issues rather than an exegesis and analysis of Hobbes’s views. (shrink)

The discovery of the molecular structure of deoxyribonucleic acid and the science of molecular biology have profoundly changed medicine’s diagnostic capability and promise to transform the therapeutic realm. When some genetic disorders are diagnosed, physicians can intervene for prevention or treatment. While the basic structure of DNA is the same for all human beings, no two individuals, other than identical twins, have the same DNA sequence. This discovery has had important repercussions in the criminal justice system, where DNA can (...) serve as an identification tool.At the crossroads of these different uses of DNA, there are great concerns about potential misuses of genetic information. Preventing disease, curing illness, and convicting criminals are all seen as worthwhile uses of the technology, but concerns of potential misuse in medicine or in the criminal justice system are not unfounded. A 1998 American Medical Association study showed that 68 percent of patients had fears that their genetic test results would be used against them by their employers or insurers. Others, pointing to racial profiling, have suggested that we may now face genetic profiling. (shrink)

The discovery of the molecular structure of deoxyribonucleic acid and the science of molecular biology have profoundly changed medicine’s diagnostic capability and promise to transform the therapeutic realm. When some genetic disorders are diagnosed, physicians can intervene for prevention or treatment. While the basic structure of DNA is the same for all human beings, no two individuals, other than identical twins, have the same DNA sequence. This discovery has had important repercussions in the criminal justice system, where DNA can (...) serve as an identification tool.At the crossroads of these different uses of DNA, there are great concerns about potential misuses of genetic information. Preventing disease, curing illness, and convicting criminals are all seen as worthwhile uses of the technology, but concerns of potential misuse in medicine or in the criminal justice system are not unfounded. A 1998 American Medical Association study showed that 68 percent of patients had fears that their genetic test results would be used against them by their employers or insurers. Others, pointing to racial profiling, have suggested that we may now face genetic profiling. (shrink)

Over ten years have elapsed since Virginia passed the nation's first criminal DNA banking law, which authorized law enforcement authorities to collect DNA samples from certain categories of offenders for the purposes of performing profile analysis. Within nine years, Rhode Island became the fiftieth state to enact a similar statute. The passage of a decade since the first enactment provides a convenient opportunity to assess the strengths and weaknesses of ethical safeguards under present law as well as predict the (...) likely direction of future developments.DNA forensics are merely the latest in a long line of biologically based identifying law enforcement technologies that include fingerprints and serotyping. Nevertheless, DNA has properties that make it significantly different than its predecessors with respect to the ethical and social concerns it raises. (shrink)

Over ten years have elapsed since Virginia passed the nation's first criminal DNA banking law, which authorized law enforcement authorities to collect DNA samples from certain categories of offenders for the purposes of performing profile analysis. Within nine years, Rhode Island became the fiftieth state to enact a similar statute. The passage of a decade since the first enactment provides a convenient opportunity to assess the strengths and weaknesses of ethical safeguards under present law as well as predict the (...) likely direction of future developments.DNA forensics are merely the latest in a long line of biologically based identifying law enforcement technologies that include fingerprints and serotyping. Nevertheless, DNA has properties that make it significantly different than its predecessors with respect to the ethical and social concerns it raises. (shrink)

Traditional notions of crime control often position the police against an individual, known or not yet known, who is responsible for the commission of a crime. However, with increasingly sophisticated technology, policing increasingly prioritizes the prevention of crime, making it necessary to ascertain who, or what class of persons, may be the next likely criminal before a crime can be committed, termed predictive policing. This causes a shift from individualized suspicion toward predictive profiling that may sway the expectations (...) of a police patrol. Classically, where a patrol officer forms reasonable suspicion prior to a stop, it is based upon his/her analysis of the situation taken as a whole in context. However, where a predictive profile is employed, information available to the officer accordingly adjusts his/her perception of context and affects the application of the reasonable suspicion standard. This article addresses the way in which new approaches to forming reasonable suspicion affect the due process protection of individuals’ fundamental rights. It argues that while an officer still operates with good faith discretion, using predictive profiling causes reasonable suspicion to be based on an augmented understanding of reality and as a result, due process guarantees are weakened. The rights to non-discrimination and the presumption of innocence are assessed and argued as illustrative of this weakening and shift in policing standards. The article ultimately argues that while predictive policing cannot be categorically labeled as inconsistent with criminal justice, changes as seemingly moderate as the manner in which discretion operates have larger effects on individuals’ rights. (shrink)

In the wake of two recent high-profile, controversial cases involving the prosecution and conviction of Drs Bramhall and Bawa-Garba, this article considers when it is socially desirable to criminalise doctors’ behaviour, exploring how the matters of harm, public wrongs and the public interest can play out to justify—or not, as the case may be—the criminal law’s intervention. Dr Bramhall branded his initials on patients’ livers during transplant surgery, behaviour acknowledged not to have caused his patients any harm by way (...) of injury to their organs. Dr Bawa-Garba misdiagnosed and failed to properly assess a 6-year-old boy with pneumonia and sepsis under her care, who subsequently died. Taking account of contextual and public interest concerns, can and should there be exceptions to imposing criminal liability where a doctor’s behaviour is deemed grossly negligent and a significant contribution to a patient’s death? And is it really appropriate to subject a doctor to penal sanction where he may have committed a private wrong against a patient, but does not set back their interests? (shrink)

An increasingly long line of high-profile scientific misconduct cases raises the question of whether regulatory policy ought to incorporate more rigorous sanctions for investigators and their institutions. Broad and Wade graphically describe these cases through the early 1980s. They continue to recent times with the cases of Evan Dreyer, Kimon Angelides and Robert Liburdy, Justin Radolf, and others. In addition, recent Congressional investigation into conflict of interest concerns surrounding consulting by National Institutes of Health scientists has raised further questions about (...) ethical standards. The record of continuing scandal suggests that current policy may not be optimal for controlling scientific misconduct. Would an alternative policy better minimize its incidence and associated costs?What should we expect of public policy governing misconduct by American scientists? Surely the public has a right to presume that its tax money is being spent wisely and that any economic rewards from taxpayer funded research are used prudently and in the public interest. (shrink)

An increasingly long line of high-profile scientific misconduct cases raises the question of whether regulatory policy ought to incorporate more rigorous sanctions for investigators and their institutions. Broad and Wade graphically describe these cases through the early 1980s. They continue to recent times with the cases of Evan Dreyer, Kimon Angelides and Robert Liburdy, Justin Radolf, and others. In addition, recent Congressional investigation into conflict of interest concerns surrounding consulting by National Institutes of Health scientists has raised further questions about (...) ethical standards. The record of continuing scandal suggests that current policy may not be optimal for controlling scientific misconduct. Would an alternative policy better minimize its incidence and associated costs?What should we expect of public policy governing misconduct by American scientists? Surely the public has a right to presume that its tax money is being spent wisely and that any economic rewards from taxpayer funded research are used prudently and in the public interest. (shrink)

David A. Harris, Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work New York: The New Press, 2002, xi + 276 pp.

In Emotions, Values & Agency, Christine Tappolet develops a sophisticated, perceptual theory of emotions and their role in wide range of issues in value theory and epistemology. In this paper, we raise three worries about Tappolet's proposal.

DNA profiling is a well-established technology for use in the criminal justice system, both in courtrooms and elsewhere. The fact that DNA profiles are based on non-coding DNA and do not reveal details about the physical appearance of an individual has contributed to the acceptability of this type of evidence. Its success in criminal investigation, combined with major innovations in the field of genetics, have contributed to a change of role for this type of evidence. Nowadays DNA (...) evidence is not merely about identification, where trace evidence is compared to a sample taken from a suspect. An ever-growing role is anticipated for DNA profiling as an investigative tool, a technique aimed at generating a suspect where there is none. One of these applications is the inference of visible traits. As this article will show, racial classifications are at the heart of this application. The Netherlands and its legal regulation of 'externally visible traits' will serve as an example. It will be shown that, to make this technology work, a large number of actors has to be enrolled and their articulations invited. This indicates that instead of a 'silent witness', a DNA profile should rather be seen as an 'articulate collective'. Based on two cases, I argue that the normativity of visible traits is context-dependent. Taking into account the practices in which technology is put to use alerts us to novel ethical questions raised by their application. (shrink)

Beccaria’s penal philosophy hinges on the doctrinal paradigm of liberty through law. Inconceivable in the absence of laws and unattainable in the presence of arbitrary powers, liberty is profiled as the legal situation of the person who may act, within the sphere of what is not forbidden and not bound, without suffering illicit interference from private individuals or organs of the state. Thus, the form of law becomes an essential matter in the construction of the political space suitable for free (...) living. In the analysis proposed in this article, the notion of “political liberty”–which Beccaria takes from Montesquieu–is declined in relation to the legal order, criminal law and the social contract. (shrink)

In this paper we explore shifts in how the law and ethics allow European law enforcement officers to use forensic genetic technologies. We do so by reviewing three technologies, ‘traditional’ (STR-based) forensic DNA profiling, forensic DNA phenotyping and the searching of genetic genealogy databases. In particular, we discuss changes in how ethical boundaries have been placed around what is seen as an appropriate use of genetic technologies in European criminal justice systems. While the ‘type’ of DNA that law (...) enforcement officers are permitted to analyse offers a useful ethical reference point, for newer forensic genomic technologies, ethical scrutiny, we argue, would also look at the specific purpose or use of the technology. (shrink)

Although DNA profiling has been an important forensic research technique since the late 1980s, for a long time, it had not captured much attention from either academics or the public so far.In recent years, this neglect seems to have ended. Not only has wide-spread media coverage of events such as 9/11 and the 2004 tsunami brought about widespread knowledge of the usefulness of forensic DNA identification, the development of large databases containing DNA profiles of both suspected and convicted criminals (...) has in the last few years also triggered a discussion on the intrusiveness of these measures into a number of civil rights.Indeed, although the increasing use of DNA based techniques in the criminal justice system promises to offer some great benefits for a society that is permeated with risk-aversion, at the same time it also gives rise to some worrying ethical and social consequences.In this article, we confine ourselves to an analysis of the practice of DNA sample retention by government agencies that use these samples to derive digital storable DNA profiles. While this practice seems unnecessary for the purpose of criminal investigation, it carries some severe risks for genetic privacy rights which have hardly been explored so far. (shrink)

La personnalite de Robert Badinter se lit a travers la diversite de ses centres d'interets et de ses activites. Professeur de droit (sa vocation premiere), il marquera la seconde moitie du XXe siecle par bien des facettes de son action. Il fut l'artisan de progres sensibles accomplis dans la defense de la dignite de la personne humaine et de la victoire que constitua l'abolition de la peine de mort. Il a vecu l'engagement politique, l'exercice du pouvoir, les subtilites du controle (...) de constitutionnalite et l'eclat des debats parlementaires. Il a promu la creation de la Cour penale internationale, a ecrit livres, essais, articles, consultations, une piece de theatre, un livret d'opera. il a participe a nombre de colloques et de conferences. Intellectuel engage dans les debats de son temps, conscience morale aux yeux de ses contemporains, c'est avant tout un homme de droit et de justice, habite par la prescription biblique: - La justice tu chercheras ardemment -. Les contributions ici reunies emanent de profils et d'horizons divers: universitaires, juges, avocats, collaborateurs, amis, compagnons d'action, ont tenu a temoigner de leur attachement et leur estime. De la Faculte de Besancon aux lieux du pouvoir politique, il laissera, dans les lois comme dans la memoire de ceux qui l'ont approche, la trace d'un infatigable combat, rigoureux, altier, pour la justice et le droit. ". (shrink)

The paper presents the profiles of three American thinkers associated with the tradition of individualist anarchism. These will be: Lysander Spooner (1808–1887), Albert Jay Nock (1870–1945) and Murray Newton Rothbard (1926–1995). These thinkers were involved not only in writing, but were also active participants in the political life of the time. In their opinion, the state, whose genesis is based on violence and conquest, and the individual are the greatest enemies. The state was perceived as the greatest threat to the (...) freedom of the individual, as it violated the principles of natural law, which in turn was to constitute the moral foundation of society. The state was, therefore, in the opinion of these thinkers, something inherently unjust, because by force and against the will of its citizens it forced them to obey. They did not perceive history in terms of class struggle, but as a struggle between individuals and society against the state. Spooner compared the state to a gang of robbers and murderers (valuing them higher than the state, however) and argued that the constitution did not bind citizens in any way, as it had not been signed by them personally, and the government had no power over the one handed over to it by free units. Nock pointed to the gradual appropriation by the state (“professional criminals”) of competences belonging to society, and the opposing goals of both. He distinguished between a government that aims to protect individuals and justice, and a state that aims to plunder, based on a law it has created. Rothbard advocated the abolition of the state as a tax consumer and its replacement with an anarcho-capitalist order in which private property would be its foundation. Theories of Spooner, Nock and Rothbard, although directed against the state, were not only negative. At their roots was the good of individuals. For Spooner, they were primarily workers, for Nock, citizens, and for Rothbard, entrepreneurs and owners. This fact is worth emphasizing, as the criticism of anarchism often boils down to allegations of radicalism and utopianism, without taking into account its protectionist nature. Criticism of the state is always a consequence of the human vision and should be considered from this perspective. The concepts of Spooner, Nock and Rothbard, although directed against the state, were not only negative. At their root was the good of individuals. For Spooner, they were primarily workers, for Nock, citizens, and for Rothbard, entrepreneurs and owners. This fact is worth emphasizing, as the criticism of anarchism often boils down to allegations of radicalism and utopianism, without taking into account its protectionist nature. In the article, in addition to presenting the positions of American individualist anarchists, we will pay attention to the positive aspects of the criticism of the state and show that already in the nineteenth and twentieth century anarchists recognized certain mechanisms of power, which also occur with particular intensity today. (shrink)

What does it mean to forgive? The answer is widely assumed to be self-evident but critical analysis quickly reveals the complexities of the subject. Forgiveness has traditionally been the preserve of Christian theology, though in the last half century - and at an accelerating pace - psychologists, lawyers, politicians and moral philosophers have all been making an important contribution to questions about and our understanding of the subject. Anthony Bash offers a vigorous restatement of the Christian view of forgiveness in (...) critical dialogue with those both within and without the Christian tradition. Forgiveness is a much more complicated subject than many theologians recognize. Bash explores the relevance of the theoretical discussion of the topic to recent events such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, post-Holocaust trials, the aftermath of 9/11 and July 7 and various high-profile criminal cases. (shrink)

Mobsters and others engaged in risky forms of social coordination and coercion often communicate by saying something that is overtly innocuous but transmits another message ‘off record’. In both ordinary conversation and political discourse, insinuation and other forms of indirection, like joking, offer significant protection from liability. However, they do not confer blanket immunity: speakers can be held to account for an ‘off record’ message, if the only reasonable interpreta- tions of their utterance involve a commitment to it. Legal liability (...) for speech in the service of criminal behavior displays a similar profile of significant protection from indirection along with potential liability for reasonable interpretations. Specifically, in both ordinary and legal contexts, liability depends on how a reasonable speaker would expect a reasonable hearer to interpret their utterance in the context of utter- ance, rather than on the actual speaker’s claimed communicative intentions. (shrink)

Recently, the practice of deciding legal cases on purely statistical evidence has been widely criticised. Many feel uncomfortable with finding someone guilty on the basis of bare probabilities, even though the chance of error might be stupendously small. This is an important issue: with the rise of DNA profiling, courts are increasingly faced with purely statistical evidence. A prominent line of argument—endorsed by Blome-Tillmann 2017; Smith 2018; and Littlejohn 2018—rejects the use of such evidence by appealing to epistemic norms (...) that apply to individual inquirers. My aim in this paper is to rehabilitate purely statistical evidence by arguing that, given the broader aims of legal systems, there are scenarios in which relying on such evidence is appropriate. Along the way I explain why popular arguments appealing to individual epistemic norms to reject legal reliance on bare statistics are unconvincing, by showing that courts and individuals face different epistemic predicaments (in short, individuals can hedge when confronted with statistical evidence, whilst legal tribunals cannot). I also correct some misconceptions about legal practice that have found their way into the recent literature. (shrink)

Jury science is fraught with difficulty. Since legal and institutional hurdles render it all but impossible to study live criminal jury deliberation, researchers make use of various indirect methods to evaluate jury performance. But each of these methods are open to methodological criticism and, strikingly, some of the highest-profile jury research programmes in recent years have reached opposing conclusions. Uncertainty about jury performance is an obstacle for legal reform—ongoing debates about the ‘justice gap’ for complainants of sexual offences has (...) rendered these problems stark. This paper proposes a way to advance the debate. (shrink)

A popular informal argument suggests that statistics about the preponderance of criminal involvement among particular demographic groups partially justify others in making defensive mistakes against members of the group. One could worry that evidence-relative accounts of moral rights vindicate this argument. After constructing the strongest form of this objection, I offer several replies: most demographic statistics face an unmet challenge from reference class problems, even those that meet it fail to ground non-negligible conditional probabilities, even if they did, they (...) introduce new costs likely to cancel out any justificatory contribution of the statistic, but even if they didn’t, demographic facts are the wrong sort to make a moral difference to agents’ negative rights. I conclude that the popular argument should be rejected, and evidence-relative theories do not have the worrisome implication. (shrink)

Debates about effective responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have emphasized the paramount importance of digital tracing technology in suppressing the disease. So far, discussions about the ethics of this technology have focused on privacy concerns, efficacy, and uptake. However, important issues regarding power imbalances and vulnerability also warrant attention. As demonstrated in other forms of digital surveillance, vulnerable subpopulations pay a higher price for surveillance measures. There is reason to worry that some types of COVID-19 technology might lead to the (...) employment of disproportionate profiling, policing, and criminalization of marginalized groups. It is, thus, of crucial importance to interrogate vulnerability in COVID-19 apps and ensure that the development, implementation, and data use of this surveillance technology avoids exacerbating vulnerability and the risk of harm to surveilled subpopulations, while maintaining the benefits of data collection across the whole population. This paper outlines the major challenges and a set of values that should be taken into account when implementing disease surveillance technology in the pandemic response. (shrink)

Bernard Boxill has bought together eighteen contemporary articles to explore the nature of race and racism, and their far-reaching social and political implications. Both highly contested ideas, this new book covers a wide variety of viewpoints that make clear that the way we resolve them will determine whether we judge controversial social policies like affirmative action, racial profiling for potential criminals and current immigration policies to be justified and wise.

Moral philosophers, legal theorists, and psychologists who study moral judgment are remarkably agreed in prescribing how to blame people. A blameworthy act occurs when an actor intentionally, negligently or recklessly causes foreseen, or foreseeable, harmful consequences without any compelling mitigating or extenuating circumstances. This simple formulation conveniently forestalls intricacies about how to construe concepts such as will, causation, foresight, and mitigation, but putting that aside for the moment, it seems fair to say that blame “professionals” share compatible conceptions of how (...) to make fair and rational blame ascriptions. Blame “amateurs,” on the other hand, sometimes stretch these rational prescriptions for blame beyond the breaking point. Numerous psychological studies on blame and responsibility, as well as the perplexing outcomes of high-profile criminal and civil trials, demonstrate that everyday blamers are capable of violating virtually every rational prescription that moral philosophers, legal scholars, and rational decision theorists hold dear. (shrink)