Critiques of Western feminists’ attempts to extend claims about gender injustice to the global context highlighted a dilemma facing Western feminists, what I call the global gender justice dilemma. In response to this dilemma, Alison M. Jaggar argues that Western feminists should turn our attention away from trying to resolve it and, instead, toward examination of our own complicity in the processes that produce injustice. I suggest that this kind of approach is helpful in responding to an additional dilemma that (...) confronts the Western feminist, namely the epistemic dilemma. Western feminists can speak for women of the global South and run the risk of distorting those women’s experience and further silencing their voices, or we can refuse to speak and abdicate our responsibilities to address injustice. I argue that we should address this dilemma not by trying to resolve it but by examining our role in the reproduction of epistemically unjust practices. To explain this response, I offer a preliminary account of epistemic injustice as epistemic oppression. I conclude by claiming that our own epistemic complicity in epistemically oppressive social practices is a weighty reason for us to work to transform those practices. (shrink)

In Women’s Activism, Feminism, and Social Justice, Margaret McLaren develops and argues for a new theoretical framework, the feminist social justice approach, that can guide ongoing feminist transnational solidarity projects. I briefly map out the main lines of argumentation in McLaren’s book and highlight some of the valuable contributions these arguments make to the intersecting sub-fields of global ethics, global justice, development ethics, and feminist philosophy. I then note two critical thoughts on the book. First, I argue that McLaren’s concessions (...) to rights discourse as a valuable tool for transformative activism undermine and potentially even contradict her own strong critique of rights discourse. Second, I argue that McLaren doesn’t explicitly or develop the latent social epistemology of her feminist social justice approach and discussions of “training” and “education” potentially run counter to this promising but again latent social epistemology. (shrink)