As the #1 topic in bioethics, cloning has made big news since Dolly's announced birth in 1998. In a new book building on his classic Who's Afraid of Human Cloning?, pioneering bioethicist Gregory E. Pence continues to advocate a reasoned view of cloning. Beginning with his surreal experiences as an expert witness before Congressional and California legislative committees, Pence analyzes the astounding recent progress in animal cloning; the coming surprises about human cloning; the links between animal, stem cell, and human (...) cloning; embryo politics; and other hot topics like artificial wombs and transgenic animals. -/- Pence rebuts the growing chorus of naysayers headed by Leon Kass, chairman of the President's Council on Bioethics, who attack the biomedical sciences, and explains why cloning will save endangered species and beloved pets, and help future children and people with degenerative diseases. (shrink)

I evaluate a hypothetical society of human clones. Cloning implies the production of exact copies of an organism from a replication of one of the organism’s cells without any recourse to the genealogical protocol of male and female reproduction. I thus pose the question: Can we regard a cloned copy of Mr. James as a son of Mr. James or Mr. James once again? I consider certain implications of human cloning to the concepts of individual uniqueness, and thus of genealogical (...) family tree and the future of the naming and identification of humanity? (shrink)

Someday soon (if it hasn't happened in secret already), a human will be cloned, and mankind will embark on a scientific and moral journey whose destination cannot be foretold. In Copycats: The Science and Ethics of Cloning, Arlene Judith Klotzko describes the new world of possibilities that can be glimpsed over the horizon. In a lucid and engaging narrative, she explains that the technology to create clones of living beings already exists, inaugurated in 1996 by Dolly the sheep, the first (...) mammal cloned from a single adult cell. Dolly is the culmination of a long scientific quest to understand the puzzle of our development from one cell into a complex organism--the outcome of a "fantastic experiment" envisioned six decades before her birth. Scientists have since cloned mice, cows, goats, pigs, rabbits and cats. Using the same laboratory tools and techniques, they are trying to grow an embryo, cloned from a single cell of a human being. Their goal is not to make copies of existing people, but to design therapies for currently untreatable diseases and the afflictions of old age. Our fascination with cloning is about much more than science and its extraordinary medical implications. In riveting prose, full of illusions to art, music and the cinema, Klotzko shows why the prospect of human cloning triggers our dearest hopes and especially our darkest fears, forcing us to ponder anew what it means to be human. And what it would be like to have "a clone of your own.". (shrink)

Cloned organisms can be genetically altered so that they do not exhibit higher brain functioning. This form of therapeutic cloning allows for genetically identical organs and tissues to be harvested from the clone for the use of the organism that is cloned. “Spare parts” cloning promises many opportunities for future medical advances. What is the ontological and ethical status of spare parts, headless clones? This paper attempts to answer this question from the perspective of Aristotle’s view of the soul. Aristotle’s (...) metaphysics as applied to his view of biological essences generates an ethic that can contribute to moral reasoning regarding the use of headless spare parts clones. The task of this paper is to show the implications that Aristotle’s view of the soul, if it is true, would have on the ethics of headless, spare parts cloning. (shrink)

The author, a member of the U.S.President's Council on Bioethics, discussesethical issues raised by human cloning, whetherfor purposes of bringing babies to birth or forresearch purposes. He first argues that everycloned human embryo is a new, distinct, andenduring organism, belonging to the speciesHomo sapiens, and directing its owndevelopment toward maturity. He then distinguishesbetween two types of capacities belonging toindividual organisms belonging to this species,an immediately exerciseable capacity and abasic natural capacity that develops over time. He argues that it is the (...) second type ofcapacity that is the ground for full moralrespect, and that this capacity (and itsconcomitant degree of respect) belongs tocloned human embryos no less than to adulthuman beings. He then considers and rejectscounter-arguments to his position, includingthe suggestion that the capacity of embryos isequivalent to the capacity of somatic cells,that full human rights are afforded only tohuman organisms with functioning brains, thatthe possibility of twinning diminishes themoral status of embryos, that the fact thatpeople do not typically mourn the loss of earlyembryos implies that they have a diminishedmoral status, that the fact that earlyspontaneous abortions occur frequentlydiminishes the moral status of embryos, andthat his arguments depend upon a concept ofensoulment. He concludes that if the moralstatus of cloned human embryos is equivalent tothat of adults, then public policy should bebased upon this assumption. (shrink)

Cloning -- the process of creating a cell, tissue line or even a complete organism from a single cell -- or the strands that led to the cloning of a mammal, Dolly, are not new. Yet the media coverage of Dolly's inception raised a range of reactions from fear or moral repulsion, to cautious optimism. The implications for controlling human reproduction were clearly in the forefront, though many issues about animals emerged as well. On topics of public interest such as (...) cloning, historians of biology have the opportunity to make a unique contribution. Such debates are often aired as if they have no precedents, either in biology or in the ethical, moral, and social concerns arising in the public arena. The technology leading to Dolly draws on strands of research going back to the 1890s, and the cycle of public response has been repeated often in the past century. What can we learn from examining these events historically, and how can we -- or should we even try -- to inform public opinion? I think we should try and will outline briefly some of the ways that can work. (shrink)

Human cloning is a main focus of current bioethical discussion. Involving the self-understanding of the human species, it has become one of the most debated topics in biomedical ethics, not only on the national, but also on the international level. This book brings together articles by bioethicists from several countries who address questions of human cloning within the context of different cultural, religious and regional settings against the background of globalizing biotechnology. It explores on a cross-cultural level the problems and (...) opportunities of global bioethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 11.2 (2001) 205-209 [Access article in PDF] Bioethics Inside the Beltway Banning Human Cloning-Then What? Cynthia B. Cohen The public wonder and concern that accompanied the birth of Dolly, the cloned sheep, four years ago died down soon after her arrival. Little has been heard about human reproductive cloning since then in the public square. This silence was pierced recently when two groups each (...) announced its intention to clone a child from a human being within the next few years.The Raelians, a religious organization, disclosed in October 2000 that they had found a grieving American couple willing to pay $500,000 to clone their deceased child and that they would proceed with cloning in a secret laboratory within the United States. A few months later, an international consortium led by Pavos Zavos, Ph.D., a University of Kentucky emeritus professor of biology, and Severino Antinori, M.D., an Italian infertility specialist, declared that it intended to clone the first human within two years at an undisclosed location outside the United States. These announcements led Representative James Greenwood (R-PA), chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to convene a hearing on human cloning on 28 March 2001.Why did human reproductive cloning suddenly become of concern to the House of Representatives? What will the federal government do with regard to the development of human cloning at this point in time? And what should it do to address human cloning in the long-term? I will briefly highlight the major controversies that surfaced at the hearing and then consider the broader questions. Scientific Controversies The initial question of concern to the House subcommittee members was whether cloning science has now reached the point of application to humans. Scientists at the hearing offered widely diverging views about this. Zavos testified that only a small number of cloned animals has died after birth and declared that the key to avoiding impaired human clones is to engage in prenatal screening. Consequently, it is now safe to undertake human cloning, he maintained. He was supported in this view by Brigitte Boisselier, Ph.D., visiting assistant professor [End Page 205] of chemistry at Hamilton College and scientific director of the Raelians, who argued that human cloning would not give rise to the problems that have been encountered in nonhuman mammalian cloning.However, professor of veterinary medicine Mark Westhusin, Ph.D., of Texas A&M University, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology researcher Rudolf Jaenisch, Ph.D., maintained that the same sorts of problems that have appeared in nonhuman mammalian cloning would reappear in human cloning. Westhusin stated that mammals have incurred serious defects leading to spontaneous abortion and that mammalian newborns often display severe respiratory and circulatory problems. The most likely explanation for such abnormalities, Jaenisch hypothesized, is that in cloning, the genetic reprogramming that governs the way an organism develops must take place in a much shorter period of time than in coital or in vitro reproduction. This may result in faulty reprogramming leading to dysregulation of gene expression and consequent genetic defects in cloned animals. There is good reason to think that this also would occur in human cloning, Jaenisch maintained. Until reproductive cloning research has been carried out on several generations of primates and is better understood, he argued, human cloning should not be attempted. Even then, several generations of descendants of human clones would have to be observed before scientists could be sure that it would not have a destructive impact on humans. This process could take as long as a century. Ethical Controversy Bioethicists who testified focused on those aspects of the ethical controversy surrounding human cloning that are of particular interest to public policy makers. Thomas Murray, Ph.D., President of The Hastings Center and a member of NBAC, maintained that human cloning is still unsafe, as NBAC had predicted, and that, if carried out, would leave in its wake "damaged women, many dead fetuses, and children born with serious impairments." He expressed particular concern that couples suffering... (shrink)

The advent of cloning animals has created a maelstrom of social concern about the ethical issues associated with the possibility of cloning humans. When the ethical concerns are clearly examined, however, many of them turn out to be less matters of rational ethics than knee-jerk emotion, religious bias, or fear of that which is not understood. Three categories of real and spurious ethical concerns are presented and discussed: 1) that cloning is intrinsically wrong, 2) that cloning must lead to bad (...) consequences, and 3) that cloning harms the organism generated. The need for a rational ethical framework for discussing biotechnological advances is presented and defended. (shrink)

This is a Japanese translation my 1998 paper "The Moral Status of the Cloning of Humans" -/- This essay is concerned with two questions. First, is the cloning of humans beings morally acceptable, or not? Secondly, if it is acceptable, are there any significant benefits that might result from it? I begin by drawing a distinction between two very different cases in which a human organism is cloned: the first aims at producing a mindless human organism that will serve as (...) a living organ bank; the second, at producing a person. I then consider each of these in turn. The moral issues raised by the former are the same as those raised by abortion. For this reason, I do not discuss such cloning at length - though I do indicate, very briefly, the reasons for thinking that it is not morally problematic. The rest of the essay then focuses upon the question of the moral status of cloning in cases where the goal is to produce a human person. Here I begin by distinguishing between the question of whether such cloning is in principle morally acceptable, and the question of whether its use at the present time is morally defensible. The second of these questions I consider only briefly, but I do argue that the attempt to produce persons via cloning at the present time is open to serious moral objections. I then turn to the first question, and there I argue, first, that cloning that has the goal of producing persons is not intrinsically wrong; secondly, that such cloning would have a number of potential benefits; and thirdly, that none of the objections that have been directed against this sort of cloning can be sustained. My overall conclusion, accordingly, is that both sorts of cloning are in principle morally acceptable, and potentially beneficial to society. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with two questions. First, is the cloning of humans beings morally acceptable, or not? Secondly, if it is acceptable, are there any significant benefits that might result from it? I begin by drawing a distinction between two very different cases in which a human organism is cloned: the first aims at producing a mindless human organism that will serve as a living organ bank; the second, at producing a person. I then consider each of these in (...) turn. The moral issues raised by the former are the same as those raised by abortion. For this reason, I do not discuss such cloning at length - though I do indicate, very briefly, the reasons for thinking that it is not morally problematic. The rest of the essay then focuses upon the question of the moral status of cloning in cases where the goal is to produce a human person. Here I begin by distinguishing between the question of whether such cloning is in principle morally acceptable, and the question of whether its use at the present time is morally defensible. The second of these questions I consider only briefly, but I do argue that the attempt to produce persons via cloning at the present time is open to serious moral objections. I then turn to the first question, and there I argue, first, that cloning that has the goal of producing persons is not intrinsically wrong; secondly, that such cloning would have a number of potential benefits; and thirdly, that none of the objections that have been directed against this sort of cloning can be sustained. My overall conclusion, accordingly, is that both sorts of cloning are in principle morally acceptable, and potentially beneficial to society. (shrink)

An introduction to playing god -- The birth and explosive growth of GMOs -- Human cloning -- Messing with mother nature : the first GMO sapiens -- Build-a-baby better via genetics -- DIY guide to creating GMO sapiens -- Eugenics and transhumanism -- Cultural views on human genetic modification -- GMO sapiens today and tomorrow.

Is it permissible to use a human embryo in stem cell research, or in general as a means for benefit of others? Acknowledging each embryo as an object of moral concern, Louis M.Guenin argues that it is morally permissible to decline intrauterine transfer of an embryo formed outside the body, and that from this permission and the duty of beneficence, there follows a consensus justification for using donated embryos in service of humanitarian ends. He then proceeds to show how this (...) justification commands assent even within moral and religious views commonly thought to oppose embryo use. Beneath his moral reasoning lies a carefully constructed metaphysical foundation incorporating accounts of the ontology of development, embryos, and species. He also incisively discusses nonreprocloning, reprocloning, ectogenesis, and related scientific frontiers. This compelling philosophical study will interest all concerned to understand virtue and obligation in the relief of suffering. (shrink)

Details goverment, private, and international response to the policy recommendations of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission.

Cloning is a biological technique of producing any required number of individuals with identical properties as the parent organism from a single cell of the latter. Cloning of protozoa, plants and lower animals meets with no moral objections, but the as yet hypothetical but increasingly more realistic prospect of cloning human beings appears to be highly objectionable. The analysis of the arguments used in the discussion of cloning indicates that mass-scale or repeated replication of human individuals is unacceptable. Such a (...) practice would probably trigger an avalanche of psychological problems connected with the diluted identity of the cloned offspring, a possible social stigmatization of the clones and the negative effects of a narrowing of the genetic pool of the human species which would limit its ability of biological adaptation to the varying conditions of the environment. (shrink)

Selected by Choice Magazine as an Outstanding Academic Title What is so special about human life? What is the relationship between flesh and blood and the human soul? Is there a kind of life that is worse than death? Can a person die and yet the human organism remain in some real sense alive? Can souls become sick? What justifies cutting into a living human body? These and other questions, writes neurosurgeon and philosopher Grant Gillett, pervade hospital wards, clinical offices, (...) and operating rooms. In Bioethics in the Clinic: Hippocratic Reflections, Gillett brings the tools of philosophy to bear on some of the most pressing issues confronting bioethicists today. Gillett draws on many schools of thought, including analytic, moral, and postmodern philosophy; utilitarianism; classical ethical theory; phenomenology; and metaphysics. He engages the reasoning of such philosophers as Aristotle, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Foucault, Habermas, Levinas, and Martha Nussbaum, and offers both practical and clinical insights into such topics as the principle of "Do no harm," informed consent, confidentiality, cloning, and euthanasia. Opening with an explanation of the axioms to be traced throughout succeeding discussions, with special emphasis on Hippocratic principles, Gillett focuses on general and specific problems of clinical practice, particularly as they affect the physician-patient relationship. The author then goes on to address ethical problems related to both the end of life, including euthanasia, and the beginning of life, such as embryo and stem cell research. Rigorous and elegant, this book will be of interest to those in medical fields, to students and scholars of philosophy, and to lay readers interested in the profound ethical dramas played out in hospitals and doctors' offices every day. (shrink)

Arabidopsis thaliana (Thale cress, Arabidopsis) is an ideal model organism for the molecular genetic analysis of many plant processes. The availability of a complete physical map would greatly facilitate the gene cloning steps in these studies. The small genome size of Arabidopsis makes the construction of such a map a feasible goal. One of the approaches to construct an overlapping library of the Arabidopsis genome takes advantage of the many mapped markers and the availability of Arabidopsis yeast artificial chromosome (YAC) (...) libraries. Mapped molecular markers are used to identify corresponding YAC clones and thereby place them on the genetic map. Subsequently, these YAC clones provide the framework for directed walking experiments aimed at closing the gaps between the YAC contigs. Adopting this strategy, YAC clones comprising about 10% of the genome have been assigned to the top halves of Arabidopsis chromosomes 4 and 5. Extensive walking experiments in a 10 cM interval of chromosome 4 have resulted in two contiguous regions in the megabase size range. (shrink)

Annotation. "What is life? What does it means to be alive? Is the Earth a super-organism? Is God necessary? In Biology and the Riddle of Life Charles Birch confronts these fundamental questions at a time when such topics as genetic engineering, cloning and ecology have been prominent in the news. Birch confronts the impression that modern biology has answers to all that there is to be known about life. We need to move towards an understanding of living creatures as subjects, (...) and not only as objects, in order to probe life's hidden secrets - what it is to be alive, what it is to experience pain, and what it is to be in love. The answer must include the meaning of life for us as individuals. Birch proposes a new perspective to bring subject and object together. This is the black box he has opened."--BOOK JACKET. Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

Epithelial development dictates the shape of an organism. The metamorphic development of a Drosophila leg precursor into an adult leg is a well‐defined example of epithelial morphogenesis that can be analyzed from the perspectives of genetics and molecular and cell biology. The steroid hormone 20‐hydroxyecdysone induces and regulates the entire process. Mutants affecting Drosophila leg morphogenesis characteristically have short thick legs (the malformed phenotype) resulting from a failure to execute normal cell shape changes at a specific stage of development. Mutations (...) that cause the malformed phenotype have already led to the identification and cloning of genes encoding transcription factors, a transmembrane serine protease presumably required for modification of the apical extracellular matrix, and components of the contractile cytoskeleton and adherens junctions. All of these products are required for the execution of normal changes in leg cell shape. (shrink)

This essay aims to tell the story of the “altered nuclear transfer-oocyte assisted reprogramming,” or ANT-OAR, proposal—from its conception by Professor William Hurlbut of the President’s Council on Bioethics—to its adoption and promotion by a group of conservative, mostly Catholic philosophers, theologians and scientists—to its eventual demise in Congress. It also will give some reflections on how ANT-OAR promotes a genetically deterministic view of the human organism and can lead down a slippery slope into a future in which human cloning (...) and human genetic engineering are more acceptable. For these reasons, it will be argued, ANT-OAR should be opposed by all who are against human genetic modification regardless of their political orientation. (shrink)

Following the 1980 US Supreme Court decision to allow a patent on a living organism, debate has continued on the moral issues involved in biotechnology patents of many kinds and remains a contentious issue for those opposed to the use of biotechnology in industry and agriculture. Attitudes to patenting in the life sciences, including those of the research scientists themselves, are analysed. The relevance of morality to patent law is discussed here in an international context with particular reference to the (...) law of the European Patent Convention administered by the European Patent Office (EPO). The EPO has been the principal forum for opposition to such patents and the few cases under dispute in the EPO are reviewed, including patents for the onco-mouse, human relaxin gene, and the PGS herbicidally resistant plant (gmo). Morality provisions in the European Parliament and Council Directive 98/44/EC are also summarised. (shrink)

Chromosome ends have been implicated in the meiotic processes of the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans. Cytological observations have shown that chromosome ends attach to the nuclear membrane and adopt kinetochore functions. In this organism, centromeric activity is highly regulated, switching from multiple spindle attachments all along the chromosome during mitotic division to a single attachment during meiosis. C. elegans chromosomes are functionally monocentric during meiosis. Earlier genetic studies demonstrated that the terminal regions of the chromosomes are not equivalent in their meiotic (...) potentials. There are asymmetries in the abilities of the ends to recombine when duplicated or deleted. In addition, mutations in single genes have been identified that mimic the meiotic effects of a terminal truncation of the X chromosome. The recent cloning and characterization of the C. elegans telomeres has provided a starting point for the study of chromosomal elements mediating the meiotic process. (shrink)

In this article, Raphaël Larrère compares Agrostis, a genetically modified plant, and Lucifer, a clone of a bull. Based on these two examples, he reflects on the sociological and philosophical consequences of the introduction of artificial components into our environment. What both of these examples share is the belief in the Promethean power of genetic engineering. The border between nature and artifice is fading away, but a radical difference remains : the creation of a plant organism raises the issue of (...) the risk of proliferation and inopportune interaction with other ecosystems, and thus the principle of precaution, whereas the creation of an animal, a being with feelings, is an ethical or moral issue : it involves a decision on the life or death of a living being. If one denies the ethical dimension of these questions, one gives free rein to the monopolistic projects of global agro-business, or the Pentagon’s Promethean rhetoric of the « creation » of the soldier. (shrink)

Adaptations during phylogenesis or ontogenesis can occur either by maintaning constant or by increasing the informational content of the organism. In the former case the increasing adaptations to external perturbation are achieved by increasing the rate of genome replication; the increased amount of DNA reflects an increase of total but not of law informational content. In the latter case the adaptations are achieved by either istructionist or evolutionary mechanism or a combination of both. Evolutionary adaptations occur during ontogenesis mainly in (...) the brain-mind, immunological and receptor systems and involve a repertoire of receptors that are., clonally distributed, genome-conditioned and amplified by somatic mutation. Specificity and intensity of responses are achieved a posteriori as a result of natural selection of the clones. The major adaptations during phylogenesis are accompanied by increased complexity. They have been attributed to shifts, short in time and space, against the entropic drive and thus occur notwithstanding the entropic drive and the second law of thermodynamics. The alternative view, is that the generation of complexity is due to the second law of thermodynamics in its extended formulation which includes Prigogine's theorem of minimum entropy production. This view requires however that natural selection provides the biological system with structures that bring the reactions within Onsager's range. The hierarchical organization of the natural world thus reflects a stratified thermodynamic stability. As the evolutionary adaptations generate new information they may be assimilated to Marxwell demon type of processes. (shrink)

The paper deals with the concept of the identity of living organisms, a concept used up until now very ambiguously. The discussion rests on the combination of two concepts, one proposed by Munzer (1993) and another derived from the considerations of Riedl (1975). The first is the proposal that the identity of living organisms depends on the properties of their elementary constituents, such as cells and tissues, and that these properties, in turn, depend on those of their DNA and RNA. (...) It follows that the identity of a living organism remains constant or changes during life according to whether its DNA and RNA content also remains constant or changes. The second is the consideration that, during duplication of a cell population, the informational content of the population does not increase if the duplicated cells are identical (increase only of redundant DNA). On the other hand the informational content of the cell population increases if the duplicated cells are the result of a variation-selection process (increase of essential DNA). The changes of DNA and RNA content, occurring in the germinal cells during phylogenesis and in the somatic cells of the evolutionary systems during ontogenesis, lead, therefore, to the generation of new identities. Living organisms are suggested to reflect two types of identity, that of the deterministic and that of the evolutionary systems. Since the informational content of the deterministic systems (the essential DNA content) remains approximately constant during life, their identity also remains constant. The changes in the number of elementary constituents and cell volumes during the processes of hypertrophy and atrophy are accompanied only by changes in the amount of DNA (the redundant DNA). On the other hand the informational content of the evolutionary systems (the essential DNA), such as the brain-mind system, the immunological system and some receptor systems, undergo a marked increase during the ontogenic development: this leads to changes of identity of these systems. For example, in the immunological system the process of mutation and recombination of the DNA of the immunological cells leads to the generation of new proteins in the amount about 10,000 times larger than that produced through the decodification of the genome. Also the construction of the neural network, and of a number of synapses much larger than that of the neuronal cells, requires the generation of an amount of new information much larger than that contained in the genome. In short, the attribution of a double identity to living organisms reflects the simultaneous presence of systems developing either within strictly programmed limits or without programs and limits, say as closed or open projects. The difference between the two types of systems explains the different effects in the case of the transplants. The identity of the recipient of transplants is not altered in the case of transplants of a deterministic system but is so in case of transplants of evolutionary systems. There is now a widespread fear of the possibility of human cloning. It is argued that this fear is unjustified because a cloning process can never succeed in duplicating those parts which are essential for the characters of humans, namely those concerned with the properties of the evolutionary systems. (shrink)

This essay explores how the human biological self is socially constructed, and rejects various truisms that define our character. Rather than being stand-alone entities, the human biological self forms what biologists call “superorganisms” and what I call “poly-super-organisms.” Thus, along with prokaryotes , viruses, and other entities, we are combined in an inseparable menagerie of species that is spread across multiple bodies. Biologists claim that only males and females are organisms. As described here, however, human sperm and eggs are equally (...) entitled to that rank. Much about human reproduction is also socially constructed. For example, contrary to scientific wisdom, humans have always reproduced both sexually and asexually. Moreover, human life does not begin between conception and birth, and neither event creates new life. In addition, some cancer cells are organisms; they are contagious entities formed by asexual human reproduction. Finally, while science universally describes humans as being living entities, accumulating evidence makes clear that the life concept is failing. In fact, much that originates from human bodies does not fall under current biological or cultural classifications.How we construct the human biological self has consequences for understanding our health, how we reproduce, and what we are. These social constructions greatly influence our views on abortion, stem-cell research, human cloning, and our post-human future. A more accurate construction of the human biological self will help us better navigate these contentious issues. (shrink)

Sociologists have challenged the discipline to account for and incorporate biological factors in their analyses. Heeding this call, this article asks how chimeras, a particularly puzzling biological organism, are being officially classified in the interrelated sites of endangered species preservation and the zoo. Based on a qualitative study of endeavors to clone endangered animals, I contend that biology alone cannot determine the classification of these interspecies organisms. Rather, categorizing chimeras requires metaphoric, schematic references to more familiar entities. Here culture and (...) biology are tools for classification, which has consequences for preservation practices and the materiality of endangered wildlife. Drawing on the sociology of culture, I show that positions on classification represent an intermediary space for interpreting the relationship between meaning and action in discourse elaboration. Building on the sociology of science and technology, I show the epistemological limitations of understanding the biological as an a priori factor. (shrink)

The traditional divide between nature and culture restricts to the latter the use of information. Biosemiotics claims instead that the divide between nature and culture is a mere subdivision within the living world but that semiosis is the specific feature which distinguishes the living from the inanimate. The present paper is intended to reformulate this basic tenet in information-theoretic terms, to support it using information-theoretic arguments, and to show that its consequences match reality. It first proposes a ‘receiver-oriented’ interpretation of (...) semiosis. This interpretation implies that the means for recording, storing and processing information exclusively reside in the living world (extended so as to include the artefacts it produces). Then it may be argued that the main difference between the inanimate world and the living one lies in the fact that the very existence of the latter relies on information, which on the contrary is not relevant to the former. Thus, besides matter and energy, information is an entity irreducible to them which must be taken into account in any attempt for describing and understanding life. Information can interact with the real world only provided it is borne by some physical support: it must be ‘physically inscribed’. Contrary to matter and energy, information can be shared, not necessarily exchanged, so a same information can be borne by a number of distinct supports. Any living thing possesses means for recording, storing and processing information which are necessary for keeping it alive and securing its progeny. In particular, its genome contains hereditary information, can be replicated, and instructs the construction and maintenance of a phenotype. The simultaneous existence of a phenotype and of a genome, where the latter bears the symbolic description of the former, is mandatory for enabling the self-reproduction of an organism. Bearing and using information then endows a living thing with the ability to decrease the physical entropy, hence to act as Maxwell’s demon. Not only its own life is maintained against physical entropy, but its self-reproduction multiplies clones of the demon. Taking information as the entity which differentiates the living from the inanimate also supports Rovelli’s ‘relational’ interpretation of quantum physics. Experimental apparatuses then appear as information-theoretic channels from the inanimate world to a living observer. Besides having its own perspective (as stated by Rovelli), each of these channels has its own horizon because its capacity is necessarily finite. As another consequence, we may assert that the physicists’ quest of a ‘theory of everything’ is doomed to failure since, for lack of considering information as a relevant entity, physicists deny the living world, hence themselves. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Many people now believe that human reproductive cloning – once sufficiently safe and effective – should be permitted on the grounds that it will allow the otherwise infertile to have children that are biologically closely related to them. However, though it is widely believed that the possession of a close genetic link to our children is morally significant and valuable, we argue that such a view is erroneous. Moreover, the claim that the genetic link is valuable is pernicious; it (...) tends to give rise to highly undesirable consequences, and therefore should be combated rather than pandered to. The emphasis on the genetic is unwarranted and unfortunate; rather than giving us moral reason to support reproductive cloning in the case of infertility, the fact that cloning requests are likely to be motivated by the genetic argument gives us reason to oppose its availability. (shrink)

Human cloning until recently has been considered to belong to the domain of science fiction; now it is a tangible possibility, a hopeful as well as a fearsome one. One of the fears that necessarily come along with it is about the peril cloning might represent for human uniqueness, since the clones are expected to be identical to their prototypes; this would unavoidably compromise moral agents’ right to a unique identity. In this paper I will put under examination the argument (...) against cloning that is based upon the right to a unique identity; I will argue that cloning represents no actual threat for anybody’s unique identity, therefore this argument is futile. I will also support the view that the so-called right to a unique identity is not as indisputable as to serve as the basis of a moral argument against human reproductive cloning. (shrink)

. In the wake of the February 1997 announcement that Dolly the sheep had been cloned, Muslim religious scholars together with Muslim scientists held two conferences to discuss cloning from an Islamic perspective. They were organized by two influential Islamic international religioscientific institutions: the Islamic Organization of Medical Sciences and the International Islamic Fiqh Academy. Both institutions comprise a large number of prominent religious scholars and well‐known scientists who participated in the discussions at the conferences. This article gives a comprehensive (...) analysis of these conferences, the relation between science and religion as reflected in the discussions there, and the further influence of these discussions on Muslims living in the West. Modern discussions on Islamic bioethics show that formulating an Islamic perspective on these issues is not the exclusive prerogative of religious scholars. Formulating such perspectives has become a collective process in which scientists play an essential role. Such a collective approach strengthens the religious authority of Muslim scholars and makes it more influential rather than undermining it. (shrink)

In this paper I examine what I take to be the best case for reproductive human cloning, as a medical procedure designed to overcome infertility, and argue that it founders on an irresolvable tension in the attitude towards the importance of being ‘genetically related’ to our children implied in the desire to clone. Except in the case where couples are cloning a child they have previously conceived naturally, cloning is unable to establish the right sort of genetic relation to make (...) couples the parents of their cloned child. If anybody is the genetic parent of a cloned child it is the natural parent(s) of the DNA donor. Paradoxically, in order to resist the claims of the parents of the donor to the cloned child, the argument for human reproductive cloning must place more weight on the intention to parent a child, than we do in cases of ordinary reproduction. It must insist that the parental relation is established by the intentions of the couple who bring a clone into the world and not by their genetic relation to the child. The emphasis placed on intention as establishing the parental relationship works to undermine the justification for cloning in the first place. For cloning to play a useful role as a reproductive technology, it must allow couples to become parents who could do so no other way. However, to the extent that intention is sufficient to establish parenthood, adoption or surrogacy, which are existing alternatives to cloning, will serve equally well to allow couples to become parents. (shrink)

Cloning - few words have as much potential to grip our imagination or grab the headlines. No longer the stuff of science fiction or Star Wars - it is happening now. Yet human cloning is currently banned throughout the world, and therapeutic cloning banned in many countries. In this highly controversial book, John Harris does a lot more than ask why we are so afraid of cloning. He presents a deft and informed defence of human cloning, carefully exposing the rhetorical (...) and highly dubious arguments against it. He begins with an introduction to what a human clone is, before tackling some of the most common and frequently bizarre criticisms of cloning: Is it really wicked? Can we regulate it? What about the welfare of cloned children? Does it turn human beings into commodities? Dismissing one by one some of the myths about human cloning, in particular that it is degrading and unsafe, he astutely argues that some of our most cherished values, such as the freedom to start a family and the freedom from state control, actually support the case for human cloning. Offering a brave and lucid insight into this ethical minefield, John Harris at last shows that far from ending the diversity of human life or creating a race of super-clones, cloning has the power to improve and heal human life. (shrink)

After years of failure, in November 2007 primate embryonic stem cells were derived by somatic cellular nuclear transfer, also known as therapeutic cloning. The first embryo transfer for human reproductive cloning purposes was also attempted in 2006, albeit with negative results. These two events force us to think carefully about the possibility of human cloning which is now much closer to becoming a reality. In this paper we tackle this issue from two sides, first summarising what scientists have achieved so (...) far, then discussing some of the ethical arguments in favour and against human cloning which are debated in the context of policy making and public consultation. Therapeutic cloning as a means to improve and save lives has uncontroversial moral value. As to human reproductive cloning, we consider and assess some common objections and failing to see them as conclusive. We do recognise, though, that there will be problems at the level of policy and regulation that might either impair the implementation of human reproductive cloning or make its accessibility restricted in a way that could become difficult to justify on moral grounds. We suggest using the time still available before human reproductive cloning is attempted successfully to create policies and institutions that can offer clear directives on its legitimate applications on the basis of solid arguments, coherent moral principles, and extensive public consultation. (shrink)

Cloning research caught a great deal of attention when Dolly the sheep was born (§4). While some fear surrounded the attainment (§§14-15), Wilmutʼs research itself has grown well, providing a less vicious manner to gain ES cells (§12). In this article, we review the progress of cloning research along with the concern of medical circles about its application to reproductive cloning, that is to say, making replicas of human beings (§§16-21). Note that all the content is ascribed to the author (...) alone, not to Musashino University. (shrink)

Critics of human cloning allege that the results of the process are likely to suffer from compromised identities making it near impossible for them to live worthwhile lives. This paper uses the account of the metaphysics of personal identity offered by Derek Parfit to investigate and support the claim of identity-compromise. The cloned person may, under certain circumstances, be seen as surviving, to some degree, in the clone. However, I argue that rather than warranting concern, the potential for survival by (...) cloning ought to help protect against the misuse of the technology. (shrink)

Concern for “reproductive liberty” suggests that decisions about embryos should normally be made by the persons who would be the genetic parents of the child that would be brought into existence if the embryo were brought to term. Therapeutic cloning would involve creating and destroying an embryo, which, if brought to term, would be the offspring of the genetic parents of the person undergoing therapy. I argue that central arguments in debates about parenthood and genetics therefore suggest that therapeutic cloning (...) would be prima facie unethical unless it occurred with the consent of the parents of the person being cloned. Alternatively, if therapeutic cloning is thought to be legitimate, this undermines the case for some uses of reproductive cloning by implying that the genetic relation it establishes between clones and DNA donors does not carry the same moral weight as it does in cases of normal reproduction. (shrink)

The organism is neither a discovery like the circulation of the blood or the glycogenic function of the liver, nor a particular biological theory like epigenesis or preformationism. It is rather a concept which plays a series of roles – sometimes overt, sometimes masked – throughout the history of biology, and frequently in very normative ways, also shifting between the biological and the social. Indeed, it has often been presented as a key-concept in life science and the ‘theorization’ of Life, (...) but conversely has also been the target of influential rejections: as just an instrument of transmission for the selfish gene, but also, historiographically, as part of an outdated ‘vitalism’. Indeed, the organism, perhaps because it is experientially closer to the ‘body’ than to the ‘molecule’, is often the object of quasi-affective theoretical investments presenting it as essential, sometimes even as the pivot of a science or a particular approach to nature, while other approaches reject or attack it with equal force, assimilating it to a mysterious ‘vitalist’ ontology of extra-causal forces, or other pseudo-scientific doctrines. This paper does not seek to adjudicate between these debates, either in terms of scientific validity or historical coherence; nor does it return to the well-studied issue of the organism-mechanism tension in biology. Recent scholarship has begun to focus on the emergence and transformation of the concept of organism, but has not emphasized so much the way in which organism is a shifting, ‘go-between’ concept – invoked as ‘natural’ by some thinkers to justify their metaphysics, but then presented as value-laden by others, over and against the natural world. The organism as go-between concept is also a hybrid, a boundary concept or an epistemic limit case, all of which partly overlap with the idea of ‘nomadic concepts’. Thereby the concept of organism continues to function in different contexts – as a heuristic, an explanatory challenge, a model of order, of regulation, etc. – despite having frequently been pronounced irrelevant and reduced to molecules or genes. Yet this perpetuation is far removed from any ‘metaphysics of organism’, or organismic biology. (shrink)

No-cloning theorem says that there is no unitary operation that makes perfect clones of non-orthogonal quantum states. The objective of the present paper is to examine whether an imperfect cloning operation exists or not in a C*-algebraic framework. We define a universal \ -imperfect cloning operation which tolerates a finite loss \ of fidelity in the cloned state, and show that an individual system’s algebra of observables is abelian if and only if there is a universal \ -imperfect cloning operation (...) in the case where the loss of fidelity is less than \ . Therefore in this case no universal \ -imperfect cloning operation is possible in algebraic quantum theory. (shrink)

A common feature of scientific and ethical debates is that clones are generally described and understood as “copies” or, more specifically defined, as “genetic copies.” The attempt of this paper is to question this widespread definition. It first argues that the terminology of “clone as copy” can only be understood as a metaphor, and therefore, a clone is not a “genetic copy” in a strict literal sense, but in a figurative one. Second, the copy metaphor has a normative component that (...) is problematic in the context of descriptive science and may support or indicate the ethically relevant phenomenon of objectification of animals. In order to support the argument against the common conception of a clone as a copy, the biotechnological principles of somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning will be examined. On this basis, it will be shown that the metaphor is valid because of similarities between the phenotype, the genotype, or the nuclear DNA sequence of the clone and its progenitor by using three prominent levels of comparison. Focusing on the process of SCNT, it will be shown that cloning as copying or doubling has to be redefined for scientific purposes because it is neither necessary nor does it fit to the biotechnological principles of cloning. It is more accurate to understand SCNT cloning as a process of splitting rather than of doubling or copying. In the second part, a deconstructivist analysis based on Jacques Derrida’s description in Positions will reveal the normative potential of the original–copy dichotomy. I will be showing that it includes an asymmetrical power structure between the original and the copy and that this structure can be reversed or at least considered unstable. Therefore, arguments that build on that metaphor must be reconsidered. Moreover, the analysis reveals that applying a terminology to humans and animals that is commonly used for things becomes the language of objectification. Two selected examples, fungibility and violability, based on Martha Nussbaum’s notion of objectification will support the thesis of objectification, display its normative consequences, and put the clone as a copy metaphor in a broader range of ethically questionable research tendencies. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Cloning and Popular Culture: A Brief History Some Facts About Cloning Exact Copies and Zombies Is Cloning Humans Unnatural? Animal Cloning Originating the First Cloned Baby Preliminary Psychological‐Social Objections to Cloning Moral Objections Against Human Embryonic Cloning Conclusions References.

Cloning Trevor, a story about therapeutic cloning research, appeared in the June issue of The Atlantic Monthly. The story gives a human face to the people whom therapeutic cloning could benefit. It presents an argument for government funding and it puts the usual calls for a moratorium on embryonic stem cell research to allow for more debate, in a less favourable light. The story also highlights some problems with ethical oversight.

Foreword by Oliver Sacks Kurt Goldstein (1878-1965) was already an established neuropsychologist when he emigrated from Germany to the United States in the 1930s. This book, his magnum opus and widely regarded as a modern classic in psychology and biology, grew out of his dissatisfaction with traditional natural science techniques for analyzing living beings. It offers a broad introduction to the sources and ranges of application of the "holistic" or "organismic" research program that has since become a standard part of (...) biological thought. Goldstein was especially concerned with the breakdown of organization and the failure of central controls that take place in catastrophic responses to situations such as physical or mental illness. But he was equally attuned to the amazing powers of the organism to readjust to such catastrophic losses, if only by withdrawal to a more limited range that it could manage by a redistribution of its reduced energies, thus reclaiming as much wholeness as new circumstances allowed. Goldstein's theses in The Organism have had an important impact on philosophical and psychological thought throughout the twentieth century, as evidenced in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Georges Canguilhem, Ernst Cassirer, and Ludwig Binswanger. (shrink)

This study has a twofold objective: firstly, it aims to examine the main types of argument that have been formulated against human cloning, to identify their presuppositions and to evaluate their strength; secondly, it aims to argue that the most important objections against human cloning are philosophical and religious, in particular the objection that human cloning represents a radical form of disenchantment or an abuse of rationality. The birth of a cloned mammal, a sheep named Dolly, which was announced on (...) 23 February 23 1997, began a wide public debate on the morality of human cloning. I shall try to show that this debate should not be limited only to ethical and legal considerations, since it has more profound ramifications. The science of cloning is rooted in a certain metaphysical background, which, discreetly, but firmly, accompanies its spectacular promises, and which has profound consequences on our metaphysical and religious beliefs. This background needs to be openly discussed and evaluated. Moreover, it warrants the special attention of philosophers and religious thinkers alike. . (shrink)

The organism is neither a discovery like the circulation of the blood or the glycogenic function of the liver, nor a particular biological theory like epigenesis or preformationism. It is rather a concept which plays a series of roles, sometimes masked, often normative, throughout the history of biology. Indeed, it has often been presented as a key-concept in life science and its ‘theorization’, but conversely has also been the target of influential rejections: as just an instrument of transmission for the (...) selfish gene, but also, historiographically, as part of an outdated ‘vitalism’. Indeed, the organism, perhaps because it is experientially closer to the ‘body’ than to the ‘molecule’, is often the object of quasi-affective theoretical investments presenting it as essential, as the pivot of a science or a particular approach to nature, while other approaches reject or attack it with equal force, assimilating it to a mysterious ‘vitalist’ ontology of extra-causal forces, or other pseudo-scientific doctrines. I do not seek to adjudicate between these debates, either regarding scientific validity or historical coherence; nor do I return to the well-studied issue of the organism-mechanism tension in biology. Recent scholarship has begun to discuss the emergence and transformation of the organism concept, but has not emphasized the way the latter is a shifting, ‘go-between’ concept – invoked as ‘natural’ by some thinkers to justify their metaphysics, but then presented as value-laden by others, over and against the natural world. The organism as go-between concept is also a hybrid, a boundary concept or a limit case, which continues to function in different contexts – as a heuristic, an explanatory challenge, a model of order, of regulation, etc. – despite having frequently been pronounced irrelevant and reduced to molecules or genes. Yet this perpetuation is far removed from any ‘metaphysics of organism’, or organismic biology. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In previous articles I discussed the ethics of human reproductive cloning, focusing on a possible future scenario in which reproductive cloning can be accomplished without an elevated risk of anomalies to the children who are created. I argued that in such a scenario it would be ethically permissible for infertile couples to use cloning as a way to have genetically related children and that such use should not be prohibited. In ‘Reproductive Cloning and a (Kind of) Genetic Fallacy’, Neil (...) Levy and Mianna Lotz raise objections to my conclusions. They disagree with the view, for which I argued, that some couples can have defensible reasons for desiring genetically related children. They also offer several new arguments against reproductive cloning, including an argument that it would diminish the number of adoptions, thereby adversely affecting the welfare of children who need to be adopted. In this paper I point out that Levy and Lotz's criticisms misconstrue my arguments and that there are serious problems with their arguments for prohibiting infertile couples from using cloning, including their argument from adoption. (shrink)