A common feature of scientific and ethical debates is that clones are generally described and understood as “copies” or, more specifically defined, as “genetic copies.” The attempt of this paper is to question this widespread definition. It first argues that the terminology of “clone as copy” can only be understood as a metaphor, and therefore, a clone is not a “genetic copy” in a strict literal sense, but in a figurative one. Second, the copy metaphor has a normative component that (...) is problematic in the context of descriptive science and may support or indicate the ethically relevant phenomenon of objectification of animals. In order to support the argument against the common conception of a clone as a copy, the biotechnological principles of somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning will be examined. On this basis, it will be shown that the metaphor is valid because of similarities between the phenotype, the genotype, or the nuclear DNA sequence of the clone and its progenitor by using three prominent levels of comparison. Focusing on the process of SCNT, it will be shown that cloning as copying or doubling has to be redefined for scientific purposes because it is neither necessary nor does it fit to the biotechnological principles of cloning. It is more accurate to understand SCNT cloning as a process of splitting rather than of doubling or copying. In the second part, a deconstructivist analysis based on Jacques Derrida’s description in Positions will reveal the normative potential of the original–copy dichotomy. I will be showing that it includes an asymmetrical power structure between the original and the copy and that this structure can be reversed or at least considered unstable. Therefore, arguments that build on that metaphor must be reconsidered. Moreover, the analysis reveals that applying a terminology to humans and animals that is commonly used for things becomes the language of objectification. Two selected examples, fungibility and violability, based on Martha Nussbaum’s notion of objectification will support the thesis of objectification, display its normative consequences, and put the clone as a copy metaphor in a broader range of ethically questionable research tendencies. (shrink)

Instrumentalisierung ist zu einer zentralen moralischen Kategorie geworden, die über die Philosophie hinaus auch in Gesetzestexte und ethische Richtlinien eingegangen ist. Die vorliegende moralphilosophische Untersuchung beschäftigt sich mit der Instrumentalisierung von Tieren.0Anlehnend an Immanuel Kant wird argumentiert, dass Instrumentalisierung nicht per se eine negative Kategorie ist, sondern dass zwischen moralisch zulässigen und moralisch unzulässigen Formen unterschieden werden muss. In einer kritischen Würdigung zeitgenössischer kantianischer Positionen, der Tierrechtstheorie und dem Konzept der Tierwürde werden die Schwierigkeiten und Möglichkeiten einer Übertragung von Immanuel (...) Kants Verbot der vollständigen Instrumentalisierung auf die Mensch-Tier-Beziehung herausgearbeitet. Im Rahmen einer vergleichenden Analyse wird gezeigt, wie die Phänomene Instrumentalisierung, Verdinglichung und Ausbeutung von Tieren zueinanderstehen. Darüber hinaus wird ein Vorschlag unterbreitet, wie zwischen zulässigen und unzulässigen Instrumentalisierungsmodi bei empfindungsfähigen Tieren unterschieden werden kann. (shrink)

Over the past fifty years numerous ethical and political traditions, and positions and sub-positions, have emerged in the fields of animal and environmental ethics. In combination with inconsistent terminology and axiological variation, this has made it difficult for both novices and professional scholars to maintain an overview of these fields. Referring to the preliminary work of Kenneth Goodpaster, William Frankena and Kirsten Schmidt, this paper describes and explains a workable 3D method in which advantageous use is made of three dimensions (...) in ethical argumentation: “moral considerability”, “moral significance” and “moral practice”. The method is a useful research tool for at least three reasons: it allows us to systematically analyze, reconstruct, compare and criticize different normative positions in animal and environmental ethics; it helps ethical theorists to reflect on, and define, their distinctive positions; and it leads to the construction and development of a moral position with the desirable qualities of clarity, transparency, comprehensibility and completeness. First, the 3D method is introduced, and its historical context and origins outlined. Then the three dimensions of the method (moral considerability, moral significance, and moral practice) and their interrelations are considered. The paper concludes with some critical remarks and discusses the limits of the method. (shrink)