Does ‘remembering that p’ entail ‘knowing that p’? The widely-accepted epistemic theory of memory answers affirmatively. This paper purports to reveal the tension between ETM and the prevailing anti-luck epistemology. Central to my argument is the fact that we often ‘vaguely remember’ a fact, of which one plausible interpretation is that our true memory-based beliefs formed in this way could easily have been false. Drawing on prominent theories of misremembering in philosophy of psychology, I will construct cases where the subject (...) vaguely remembers that p while fails to meet the safety condition, which imply either that ETM is false or that safety is unnecessary for knowledge. The conclusion reached in this paper will be a conditional: if veritic epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge, then ‘remembering that p’ does not entail ‘knowing that p’. (shrink)

Memory is ordinarily taken to be one of the most fundamental sources of knowledge. However, memory sceptics argue that memory is unable to provide us with knowledge about the past. In the existing literature, there are two most discussed forms of memory sceptical arguments, namely, the argument from memory reliability and the argument from underdetermination. Correspondingly, the two most representative anti-sceptical proposals nowadays attempt to disarm the two sceptical arguments by employing explanationism and disjunctivism respectively. This paper will first illustrate (...) their defects: The explanationist response fails to explain why the common-sense explanation is preferable. Besides, it succumbs to the petitio principii fallacy. The disjunctivist response fails to establish that memorial experiences are factive in paradigmatic cases. After that, a novel solution will be proposed, according to which memory sceptical arguments are self-hollowing, viz, their conclusions deprive their premises of the foundation of plausibility. (shrink)

Relearning and remembering are usually seen as two distinct cognitive processes in contemporary philosophy of memory. In particular, relearning is sometimes regarded as a kind of memory error. This paper aims to address two questions. First, is relearning a kind of memory error? Second, how to draw a distinction (if any) properly between relearning and remembering? My answer to the first question is a conditional ‘yes’—it depends on whether relearning can be falsidical and whether metacognitive monitoring counts as a part (...) of memory process. My answer to the second question appeals to a gradualist account, according to which the distinction between relearning and remembering is not an absolute yes-or-no affair, but a matter of degrees. (shrink)

本书对深刻影响了20世纪美国社会的著名神学家尼布尔的基督教伦理学思想进行研究,梳理其思想观点的变迁,并在介绍其伦理思想基础上分析比较基督教伦理学与一般伦理学的异同。.

孙子一书,即孙子兵法,该书以其睿智而富有思辨性,反映了春秋末期,战国初年社会变革的历史,总结了一套科学,实用的系统军事理论.

本书作者直握生命的本质,着眼于道德对生命的提升和超越,论证道德教化对生命的提升与激励,抓住了道德教化的灵魂。.

I argue against mnemic reliabilism, an influential view that successful remembering must be produced by a reliable memory process. Drawing on empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience, I refute mnemic reliabilism by demonstrating that: (1) patients with memory impairments (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease) can also successfully remember the past despite the unreliability of their corresponding memory processes; (2) some reliability-affecting factors (e.g., stress, divided attention, and insufficient encoding time) can render the memory processes of healthy individuals unreliable without preventing them from (...) occasionally resulting in successful remembering. Potential responses available for mnemic reliabilism are also evaluated. I show that those responses are susceptible to a challenge akin to the generality problem for process reliabilism. (shrink)

The core thesis of anti-luck epistemology is the incompatibility thesis, that is, knowledge is incompatible with veritic epistemic luck. Traditionally, anti-luck epistemologists hold that there are two distinct types of veritic epistemic luck, viz, intervening luck and environmental luck. The former occurs when something luckily intervenes between the subject’s belief and the target fact, which renders the subject’s belief luckily true. The latter can be found in cases where the subject’s belief is luckily true when she is in an unfriendly (...) epistemic environment. This paper purports to show that there is another long-neglected type of veritic epistemic luck—I name it ‘interpretative luck’. It refers to the type of luck occurring when the subject accidentally chooses the correct interpretation of evidence and thus her belief is luckily true. I will demonstrate that no proper reasons can support the incompatibility between interpretative luck and knowledge. Instead, the price for insisting this incompatibility would be unacceptably high. Therefore, the existence of interpretative luck falsifies the incompatibility thesis of anti-luck epistemology. (shrink)

This paper purports to disprove an orthodox view in contemporary epistemology that I call ‘the epistemic conception of memory’, which sees remembering as a kind of epistemic success, in particular, a kind of knowing. This conception is embodied in a cluster of platitudes in epistemology, including ‘remembering entails knowing’, ‘remembering is a way of knowing’, and ‘remembering is sufficiently analogous to knowing’. I will argue that this epistemic conception of memory, as a whole, should be rejected insofar as we take (...) into account some putative necessary conditions for knowledge. It will be illustrated that while many maintain that knowing must be (1) anti-luck and (2) an achievement, the two conditions do not apply to remembering. I will provide cases where the subject successfully remembers that p but lacks knowledge that p for failing to meet the two putative conditions for knowledge. Therefore, remembering is not a kind of knowing but a sui generis cognitive activity. (shrink)

Epistemic absolutism is an orthodox view that propositional knowledge is an ungradable concept. Absolutism is primarily grounded in our ungradable uses of “knows” in ordinary language. This paper advances a thorough objection to the linguistic argument for absolutism. My objection consists of two parts. Firstly, arguments for absolutism provided by Jason Stanley and Julien Dutant will be refuted respectively. After that, two more general refutation-strategies will be proposed: counterevidence against absolutism can be found in both English and non-English languages; the (...) linguistic argument for absolutism is subject to a methodological mistake as the linguistic usages of “knows” cannot accurately reflect its conceptual nature. Therefore, we should give epistemic gradualism, as opposed to absolutism, a more serious consideration. (shrink)

The surface grammar of reports such as ‘I have a pain in my leg’ suggests that pains are objects which are spatially located in parts of the body. We show that the parallel construction is not available in Mandarin. Further, four philosophically important grammatical features of such reports cannot be reproduced. This suggests that arguments and puzzles surrounding such reports may be tracking artefacts of English, rather than philosophically significant features of the world.

本书从教师职业素质和专业发展的角度出发,参考借鉴了网络上颇为流行的《做教师的22条军规》的部分条款,分成运筹职业:三尺讲台与你一生有约;决胜课堂:让你的教学充满激情与诗意;倾情心田:让爱做主,剑指未来 :让你的教师生涯洒满阳光四个部分。.

本书主要对东西文化和中西印哲学作了相当广泛的讨论,涵摄科学哲学、文化哲学、人生哲学、宗教哲学、历史哲学、比较哲学等方面的内容,表现出超越式的融合趋向。.

Epistemological disjunctivism argues that one can have perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of factive and reflectively accessible rational support, e.g., one’s ‘seeing that p’. A well-known challenge to this view is the so-called basis problem of epistemological disjunctivism, which argues that one’s ‘seeing that p’ cannot constitute the rational support for one’s knowledge that p, as ‘seeing that p’ is just a way of ‘knowing that p’. The basis problem is taken to be based on (...) the entailment thesis, viz, ‘seeing that p’ entails ‘knowing that p’. Mainstream solutions to the basis problem take an approach rejecting the entailment thesis. This paper purports to reveal a common defect of those extant solutions. That is, they all fail to address the basis problem in the central domain of discussion of epistemological disjunctivism, i.e., what Pritchard refers to as ‘paradigmatic cases’. Moreover, even if they succeed in rejecting the entailment thesis in paradigmatic cases, they would also backfire on epistemological disjunctivism. (shrink)

Compiled by scholars at the court of Liu An, king of Huainan, in the second century B.C.E, _The Huainanzi_ is a tightly organized, sophisticated articulation of Western Han philosophy and statecraft. Outlining "all that a modern monarch needs to know," the text emphasizes rigorous self-cultivation and mental discipline, brilliantly synthesizing for readers past and present the full spectrum of early Chinese thought. _The Huainanzi_ locates the key to successful rule in a balance of broad knowledge, diligent application, and the penetrating (...) wisdom of a sage. It is a unique and creative synthesis of Daoist classics, such as the _Laozi_ and the _Zhuangzi_; works associated with the Confucian tradition, such as the _Changes_, the _Odes_, and the _Documents_; and a wide range of other foundational philosophical and literary texts from the _Mozi_ to the _Hanfeizi_. The product of twelve years of scholarship, this remarkable translation preserves _The Huainanzi_'s special rhetorical features, such as parallel prose and verse, and showcases a compositional technique that conveys the work's powerful philosophical appeal. This path-breaking volume will have a transformative impact on the field of early Chinese intellectual history and will be of great interest to scholars and students alike. (shrink)

As the_number of clinical trials continues to grow, there is an increasing need for education and training in the field. The clinical research climate is less forgiving of errors and oversights and therefore requires more knowledge of regulations and requirements. This brand new edition details new laws and regulations in protecting children participating in clinical trials and how a new focus on privacy of individual health information in the United States has changed how medical records are handled. Includes a manual (...) for investigators, research nurses and study coordinators with minimal experience or who are new to clinical research An easy-to-read and open text design using ‘sidebars’ of examples and information boxes related to the main text Includes a list of Frequently Asked Questions and Glossary Duke Clinical Research Institute is the world’s largest academic clinical research organisation and is well known and respected within the clinical research community. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to provide a new solution to the radical sceptical paradox. A sceptical paradox purports to indicate the inconsistency within our fundamental epistemological commitments that are all seemingly plausible. Typically, sceptics employ an intuitively appealing epistemic principle (e.g., the closure principle, the underdetermination principle) to derive the sceptical conclusion. This paper will reveal a dilemma intrinsic to the sceptical paradox, which I refer to as the self-hollowing problem of radical scepticism. That is, on the one (...) hand, if the sceptical conclusion turns out to be true, then the epistemic principle employed by sceptics would lose its foundation of plausibility; on the other hand, if the sceptical conclusion does not follow, then the sceptical problem would not arise. In either case, the so-called sceptical paradox cannot be a genuine paradox. This new solution has three theoretical merits: it is undercutting, less theory-laden, and widely applicable. (shrink)

Epistemic absolutism holds that knowledge‐that is ungradable, while epistemic gradualism argues the opposite. This paper purports to remodel the gradualism/absolutism debate. The current model initiated by Stephen Hetherington fails to capture the genuine divergence between the two views, which makes the debate equivocal, and the gradualist side lacks appeal. I propose that the remodeled debate should focus on whether knowledge‐that is a ‘threshold concept’ or a ‘spectrum concept’. That is, whether there is a threshold distinguishing knowledge from non‐knowledge. The reconstructed (...) model enjoys significant advantages as it enables the debate to be more balanced and philosophically interesting. (shrink)

本书内容包括:四岳之后、姓氏称谓、东海上人、早年坎坷、时定入周、为文王师、封建齐国、强国方略、政略特色等。.

This is a collection of papers by Prof. Liu Shuhsien, Chinese University of Hong Kong, on his recent research in contemporary Chinese Philosophy. The first volume Personagestudies the following five figures who exerted a great influence on contemporary Chinese philosophy: Hu Shi (westernisation), Mao Zedong (Marxism), Feng Youlan, Xiong Shili and Mou Songsan (New Confucianism).

In dem allgemeinen Denkmodus des antiken Platonismus (Platon und Plotin) und Kants wird das Sein der sinnlichen, in der Zeit existierenden Dinge apriorisch von dem als „zeitlos“ verstandenen Denken bestimmt und erfasst. Mit der Untersuchung der Grundgedanken Platons, Plotins und Kants kommt das Buch zur Konklusion, dass die apriorische Bestimmung und Erfassung des Seins in diesem Denkmodus erst durch diejenige Zeit möglich ist, die von der Autorin als „ontologische Zeit“ bestimmt wird. Die Art und Weise, wie die ontologische Zeit zu (...) diesem Zweck dient, wird in diesem Buch erforscht. Während für den antiken Platonismus die Zeit, indem sie das Intelligible auf das Sinnliche überträgt, als das bestimmende Prinzip des Seins der sinnlichen Dinge gilt, ist der Fall bei Kant aber komplizierter, da hier die verschiedenen Aspekte des Seins unterschiedlich begründet werden müssen: die ontologische Zeit fungiert mit ihrer strukturellen Affinität zu den Kategorien als das Prinzip des Was-Seins der sinnlichen Gegenstände, während der Raum das Prinzip des Dass-Seins derselben ist, sofern die Äußerlichkeit der Raum-Zeit-Anschauungsformen in Beziehung auf den Verstand mit dem Argumentationsversuch der Autorin beseitigt wird. (shrink)

刘如瑛(1924~ ),江苏铜山人,扬州大学师范学院中文系古代文学教授,硕士研究生指导教师.

Ignorance is commonly assumed to be a lack of knowledge in Plato’s Socratic dialogues. I challenge that assumption. In the Protagoras, ignorance is conceived to be a substantive, structural psychic flaw—the soul’s domination by inferior elements that are by nature fit to be ruled. Ignorant people are characterized by both false beliefs about evaluative matters in specific situations and an enduring deception about their own psychic conditions. On my interpretation, akrasia, moral vices, and epistemic vices are products or forms of (...) ignorance, and a person who lacks knowledge is not necessarily ignorant. (shrink)

An epistemological orthodox view holds that knowing that p is an absolute ‘yes-or-no’ affair rather than something that comes in degrees. The rising epistemic gradualist theory challenges this orthodoxy by arguing that knowledge-that is a gradable concept. The predominant form of argument for gradualism in the current literature is the argument from component, according to which knowledge is gradable because its various components (e.g., justification, belief, truth) are gradable. I will show that the argument from components involves a non-sequitur: the (...) alleged gradability of knowledge’s components cannot ensure the gradability of knowledge per se. The crux of this logical lacuna lies in that the argument neglects the external gradability of knowledge, viz, there is no clear-cut threshold between knowledge and lack thereof. The lacuna can be mended by seeing knowledge-that as a spectrum concept such that a more complete gradualist picture can be achieved. (shrink)

Recently there has been extensive debate over whether “belief is weak”, viz, whether the epistemic standard for belief is lower than for assertion or knowledge. While most current studies focus on notions such as “ordinary belief” and “outright belief”, this paper purports to advance this debate by investigating a specific type of belief; memory belief. It is argued that (outright) beliefs formed on the basis of episodic memories are “weak” due to two forms of “entitlement inequality”. My key argument is (...) thus twofold. First, by rejecting the epistemic theory of memory, I argue that one can be entitled to belief but not to knowledge. Second, by scrutinising a recent defence of the belief norm of assertion, it will be demonstrated that belief is weaker than assertion, as long as we expect one to match words with deeds. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

A large portion of our knowledge seems to rest on our memories, while memory scepticism poses challenges to our memory knowledge. This paper will delve into different forms of memory scepticism. The goal of this paper is twofold: First, drawing on Moon (2017) and Frise (2022), I compare and criticize various forms of sceptical arguments provided by them. Meanwhile, the two most threatening arguments are picked out: the Russellian argument and the argument from doubtful reliability. Second, I demonstrate that the (...) two arguments are essentially based on the closure principle and the underdetermination principle, respectively, and hence, Pritchard’s biscopic anti-sceptical proposal is applicable. A Pritchardean solution to the problem of memory scepticism will then be sketched out. (shrink)

本书辑录了国务院领导同志在历次国务院反腐败工作会议和廉政工作会议上的重要讲话及有关部门负责同志的发言;国务院领导关于依法行政、从严治政、转变政府职能等方面的重要讲话等内容。.

本书共分十二章,内容包括刑事法理论的逻辑形态;刑事法哲学的理论特征;刑事法本体论范式辨证以及活的刑事法的历史起源等。.