Remembering seems, to philosophers and scientists, one of the most mystifying of human activities. Yet natural language users have no problem understanding what is meant by ‘memory’. Memory is simply the ability to recall personally experienced events and certain kinds of information such as facts, names, or faces; or how to perform certain actions, like riding a bike or playing chess. It is on this basis that people sometimes make claims about themselves or others having a good or bad memory, (...) especially for things like names, numbers, or faces. Why then is memory such a mystery? Because, firstly, of its diversity: memory enables us to perform a plethora of different tasks, including the continuous interpretation of every moment of consciousness. Secondly, different forms of memory have different standards of accuracy, and often dramatically different criteria for success. (shrink)

This remarkable book presents a rich and up-to-date view of evolution that explores the far-reaching implications of Darwin's theory and emphasizes the power, significance, and relevance of evolution to our lives today. After all, we ourselves are the product of evolution, and we can tackle many of our gravest challenges -- from lethal resurgence of antiobiotic-resistant diseases to the wave of extinctions that looms before us -- with a sound understanding of the science.

Carl F. Craver investigates what we are doing when we use neuroscience to explain what's going on in the brain. When does an explanation succeed and when does it fail? Craver offers explicit standards for successful explanation of the workings of the brain, on the basis of a systematic view about what neuroscientific explanations are.

Carl Craver investigates what we are doing when we sue neuroscience to explain what's going on in the brain.

The dominant neuroscientific theory of spatial memory is, like many theories in neuroscience, a multilevel description of a mechanism. The theory links the activities of molecules, cells, brain regions, and whole organisms into an integrated sketch of an explanation for the ability of organisms to navigate novel environments. Here I develop a taxonomy of interlevel experimental strategies for integrating the levels in such multilevel mechanisms. These experimental strategies include activation strategies, interference strategies, and additive strategies. These strategies are mutually reinforcing, (...) providing a kind of interlevel and intratheoretic robustness that has not previously been recognized. (shrink)

In his historical perspective on the changes in scientific thought over the last 100 years, Carl N. Degler explores the study of social evolution and the ongoing search for human nature. In Search of Human Nature provides a detailed perspective on the reasons behind the shifting emphasis in social thought from biology, to culture, and again to biology. Degler examines why these changes took place, the evidence and people fostering these changes and why students of human nature decided to (...) accept this momentous change in thought. He suggests varying ideologies as the underlying force behind this shift in the study of social science. From Darwin's theory that human social behaviour has drastically evolved from animals, to the belief that human experience serves as the basic differentiating factor in humans, Degler provides a thorough and captivating examination of the roots of human behaviour. (shrink)

The autonomy of biology is a consequence of the directedness governing vital processes. This directedness is not complete purposiveness, but only the coordination of the processes toward a definite end, which, in living organisms, we must define as the formation and continued maintenance of individuals of a definite form. But there are numerous instances of vital processes which do not serve a recognisable purpose. Such processes obey the rules of probability. Of these the Mendelian laws of heredity are an example. (...) The inheritance of variations, which are of no importance to the organism, occurs according to the law of probability, so far as concerns the number of possible combinations. If it should be possible to transform such indifferent variations into variations either useful or harmful to the race, it would be a splendid proof of the power of directedness in vital processes, if it could be demonstrated, that in these new conditions the individuals possessing favourable variations were more numerous than could be expected according to the Mendelian rules.L'autonomie de la biologie se repose sur la finalité qui gouverne le processus biologique. Cette finalité ne signifie pas une efficacité complète, mais seulement l'orientation du processus vers un but déterminé, qui est, chez les êtres vivants, le développement et la conservation d'individus de forme déterminée. Cependant il se produit dans le domaine de la vie de nombreux processus qui ne servent aucun but biologique apparent. De tels processus sont soumis aux règles de la probabilité. Nous citons comme exemple les lois de l'hérédité de Mendel. L'hérédité de variétés indifférentes pour les êtres vivants correspond, en ce qui concerne les combinaisons possibles, aux règles de la probabilité. Si l'on pouvait obtenir , que de telles variétés deviennent utiles ou nuisibles à ces races, la domination de la finalité dans le processus biologique serait prouvée de façon éclatante, s'il apparaissait, que sous des conditions ainsi transformées, il se produisait un plus grand nombre d'individus présentant la variation favorable, qu'il ne serait à prévoir d'après les lois de Mendel. (shrink)

Finality, the characteristic sign of vital processes, implies no opposition to causality; on the contrary the causal method of thinking must be applied to living nature. We must, however, distinguish between a final causality, one directed towards reaching a specific goal, and a causality which works mechanically without reference to a goal.A final or teleological treatment is applicable to inanimate nature as well, and is by many philosophers and physicists so applied. This teleology is however merely the inverse of causality. (...) According as we look forwards or backwards along the course of an event we can think of it in terms of means and end or of cause and effect . This method of interpretation can in the inorganic realm be applied to any stage of a process. In contradistinction therefrom the stages of the processes which occur in living nature are in no way equivalent, inasmuch as only one quite definite state can be regarded as the real and specific goal of the particular process. Only in this last sense can finality be regarded as the characteristic sign of the specific vital process.La finalité, indice caractéristique des processus vitaux, ne s'oppose pas à la causalité; la causalité en matière d'observation doit plutÔt s'étendre à la nature vivante également. Pourtant il faut distinguer une causalité finale, c.à.d. tendant à atteindre uncertain but, d'avec une causalité mécanique ne visant à aucun but.Une observation finale ou téléologique cependant peut s'appliquer aussi à la nature inanimée. Plusieurs philosophes et physiciens ont cherché en effet à l'appliquer. Cette téléologie cependant n'est autre chose que l'inverse de la causalité. Selon que nous considérons le cours d'un phénomène qui se produit, en regardant en avant ou bien en arrière, nous pouvons le concevoir au premier cas comme moyen et but, au second cas comme cause et effet. Cette manière de voir peut Être appliquée dans le domaine de la nature inanimée à chaque état d'un processus. Par opposition à cela, les processus qui se présentent dans la nature vivante sont, en ce qui concerne leurs états isolés, absolument non-équivalents, en tant qu'il n'y a qu'un état bien défini qui peut Être regardé comme le but véritable du processus en question. Ce n'est qu'en ce sens-à que la finalité peut Être regardée comme l'indice caractéristique des processus vitaux. (shrink)

Holistic biology, which during the last years has gained wide acceptance amoungst biologists and philosophers, aspires to a new point of view as regards the problem of life which transcends the opposing theories of mechanism and vitalism. The exponents of holism repudiate the purely mechanical theory, the principle of life is something more than a highly complicated physico-chemical process. At the same time, however, the characteristics of life should be traced to the principles of pure natural science, untroubled by the (...) introduction of metaphysical factors such as entelechy etc.This critical review endeavours to show that holism is often used by its exponents entirely in the sense of entelechy, that is to say as a metaphysical principle. On the other hand we seek to point out that where holism has been used in the sense of natural science it by no means bridges the gulf between mechanism and vitalism. The same comment applies to the holism ofMeyer, the foundation of which may be right after all and is worthy of consideration.La biologie totalitaire qui, ces dernières années, a pris une très grande extension chez les biologistes et les philosophes, requiert une attitude nouvelle vis à vis du problème de la vie, attitude qui puisse nous mener au-delà de l'opposition entre le mécanisme et le vitalisme. Le mécanisme est rejeté par les partisans de la biologie totalitaire; la vie est plus qu'un processus physico-chimique excessivement compliqué. D'autre part la nature spéciale du processus vital devra être expliquée par l'idée totalitaire, comprise uniquement de la façon dont on l'entend dans les sciences naturelles. Cette nature spéciale ne devra pas être expliquée, comme le fait le vitalisme, par l'introduction de facteurs métaphysiques comme par exemple l'entéléchie.Le but de la présente critique est de démontrer que l'idée totalitaire est employée souvent par les partisans de la biologie totalitaire purement dans le sens de l'entéléchie, c'est à dire comme un principe métaphysique. D'autre part notre critique cherche à démontrer que la totalité, comprise uniquement de la façon dont on l'entend dans les sciences naturelles, ne nous mène pas au-delà de l'opposition entre le mécanisme et le vitalisme. Cela est vrai aussi pour le holisme deMeyer, dont l'idée fondamentale n'est pas nécessairement fausse pourtant et est en tout cas très digne de considération. (shrink)

With In Search of Mechanisms, Carl F. Craver and Lindley Darden offer both a descriptive and an instructional account of how biologists discover mechanisms. Drawing on examples from across the life sciences and through the centuries, Craver and Darden compile an impressive toolbox of strategies that biologists have used and will use again to reveal the mechanisms that produce, underlie, or maintain the phenomena characteristic of living things. They discuss the questions that figure in the search for mechanisms, characterizing (...) the experimental, observational, and conceptual considerations used to answer them, all the while providing examples from the history of biology to highlight the kinds of evidence and reasoning strategies employed to assess mechanisms. At a deeper level, Craver and Darden pose a systematic view of what biology is, of how biology makes progress, of how biological discoveries are and might be made, and of why knowledge of biological mechanisms is important for the future of the human species. (shrink)

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections (...) in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. ++++ The below data was compiled from various identification fields in the bibliographic record of this title. This data is provided as an additional tool in helping to ensure edition identification: ++++ Uber Den Psychologischen Ursprung Der Raumvorstellung Carl Stumpf S. Hirzel, 1873 Space perception. (shrink)

Editor James Fetzer presents an analytical and historical introduction and a comprehensive bibliography together with selections of many of Carl G. Hempel's most important studies to give students and scholars an ideal opportunity to appreciate the enduring contributions of one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century.

In this systematic introduction to the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, the author focuses on four of Peirce's fundamental conceptions: pragmatism and Peirce's development of it into what he called 'pragmaticism'; his theory of signs; his phenomenology; and his theory that continuity is of prime importance for philosophy. He argues that at the centre of Peirce's philosophical project is a unique form of metaphysical realism, whereby continuity and evolutionary change are both necessary for our understanding of experience. In his final (...) chapter Professor Hausman applies this version of realism to contemporary controversies between anti-realists and anti-idealists. Peirce's views are compared to those of such contemporary figures as Davidson, Putnam, and Rorty. The book will be of particular interest to philosophers concerned with American philosophy and current debates on realism as well as linguists working in semiotics. (shrink)

According to one large family of views, scientific explanations explain a phenomenon (such as an event or a regularity) by subsuming it under a general representation, model, prototype, or schema (see Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36(2), 421–441; Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge: MIT Press; Darden (2006); Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of scientific (...) explanation. In C. G. Hempel (Ed.), Aspects of scientific explanation (pp. 331–496). New York: Free Press; Kitcher (1989); Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67(1), 1–25). My concern is with the minimal suggestion that an adequate philosophical theory of scientific explanation can limit its attention to the format or structure with which theories are represented. The representational subsumption view is a plausible hypothesis about the psychology of understanding. It is also a plausible claim about how scientists present their knowledge to the world. However, one cannot address the central questions for a philosophical theory of scientific explanation without turning one’s attention from the structure of representations to the basic commitments about the worldly structures that plausibly count as explanatory. A philosophical theory of scientific explanation should achieve two goals. The first is explanatory demarcation. It should show how explanation relates with other scientific achievements, such as control, description, measurement, prediction, and taxonomy. The second is explanatory normativity. It should say when putative explanations succeed and fail. One cannot achieve these goals without undertaking commitments about the kinds of ontic structures that plausibly count as explanatory. Representations convey explanatory information about a phenomenon when and only when they describe the ontic explanations for those phenomena. (shrink)

Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), Professor für Staats- und Völkerrecht, bewegt nach wie vor die Gemüter. Die Reaktion auf seine Schriften, Handlungen und Ausstrahlungen ist vielfältig; die Spanne reicht von entrüsteten, für die er der Teufel in Person bleibt, über viele Zwischenstufen bis zu jenen Lesern, die ihn für einen der subtilsten, noch keineswegs ausgeloteten Geistern dieses Jahrhunderts halten. Sein Leben lang war Carl Schmitt ein passionierter Schreiber von Briefen. Meist handelte es sich um handschriftlich verfasste, die für den Schreibenden (...) die Fortsetzung eines konkreten Gespräches mit anderen Mitteln war. Das macht das authentische und die Spontanität der Schmitt-Briefe aus. Als erste Edition einer umfangreichen Korrespondenz wird in dem Buch die Korrespondenz zwischen Carl Schmitt und Armin Mohler veröffentlicht. Der Briefwechsel umfasst die Zeit von 1947 bis 1980 und enthält 280 Briefe und Karten von Carl Schmitt an Armin Mohler. Von dem Briefpartner und Herausgeber wird in der Regel aus den eigenen Briefen nur auszugsweise zitiert, sofern es für das von Carl Schmitt Geschriebene notwendig ist. Armin Mohler (1920 bis 2003), ist einer der bekanntesten rechtskonservativen Schriftsteller, Kritiker und Historiker in Deutschland. Sein Handbuch zur Konservativen Revolution ist ein Standardwerk. In der Zeit des Briefwechsels war Mohler von 1949 bis 1953 Sekretär Ernst Jüngers, danach Korrespondent großer Zeitungen in Paris und von 1964 an Geschäftsführer der Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung, in der er sehr beachtete Symposien zu aktuellen wissenschaftlichen Themen organisierte. Der Briefwechsel ist für die Deutung Carl Schmitts in der Nachkriegszeit in seinem Sauerländer "Exil" grundlegend, gleichzeitig enthält er pointierte Schlaglichter auf das politische und kulturelle Geschehen der frühen und mittleren Bundesrepublik sowie auf Werk und Leben von Ernst Jünger. (shrink)

Reminiscences of Peter, by P. Oppenheim.--Natural kinds, by W. V. Quine.--Inductive independence and the paradoxes of confirmation, by J. Hintikka.--Partial entailment as a basis for inductive logic, by W. C. Salmon.--Are there non-deductive logics?, by W. Sellars.--Statistical explanation vs. statistical inference, by R. C. Jeffre--Newcomb's problem and two principles of choice, by R. Nozick.--The meaning of time, by A. Grünbaum.--Lawfulness as mind-dependent, by N. Rescher.--Events and their descriptions: some considerations, by J. Kim.--The individuation of events, by D. Davidson.--On properties, by (...) H. Putnam.--A method for avoiding the Curry paradox, by F. B. Fitch.--Publications (1934-1969) by Carl G. Hempel (p. [266]-270). (shrink)

This collection of articles and associated discussion papers focuses on a problem that has attracted increasing attention from linguists and psychologists throughout the world during the past several years. Reduced to essentials, the problem is that of discovering the character of the mental capacities that make it possible for human beings to attain knowledge of their language on the basis of fragmentary and haphazard early linguistic experience. A fundamental assumption running through all of these contributions is that people possess strong (...) innate predispositions that are critical for success in this task. (shrink)

In this systematic introduction to the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, the author focuses on four of Peirce's fundamental conceptions: pragmatism and Peirce's development of it into what he called 'pragmaticism'; his theory of signs; his phenomenology; and his theory that continuity is of prime importance for philosophy. He argues that at the centre of Peirce's philosophical project is a unique form of metaphysical realism, whereby continuity and evolutionary change are both necessary for our understanding of experience. In his final (...) chapter Professor Hausman applies this version of realism to contemporary controversies between anti-realists and anti–idealists. Peirce's views are compared to those of such contemporary figures as Davidson, Putnam, and Rorty. The book will be of particular interest to philosophers concerned with American philosophy and current debates on realism as well as linguists working in semiotics. (shrink)

Traces the development of the integral and the differential calculus and related theories since ancient times.

In what sense are the activities and properties of components in a mechanism explanatorily relevant to the behavior of a mechanism as a whole? I articulate this problem, the problem of constitutive relevance, and I show that it must be solved if we are to understand mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. I argue against some putative solutions to the problem of constitutive relevance, and I sketch a positive account according to which relevance is analyzed in terms ofrelationships of mutual manipulability between (...) the behavior of a mechanism as a whole and the properties and activities of its components. My account is a causal-mechanical account in the sense that it is a particular expression of the idea that constitutive explanation is a matter of showing how an explanandum phenomenon is situated within the causal structure of the world. It is thus offered as a rival to epistemic (argument-centered) and psychological accounts of interlevel explanation. (shrink)

Unlike exploitative exchanges, exchanges featuring externalities have never seemed to pose particular problems to liberal theories of justice. State interference with exchanges featuring externalities seems permissible, like it is for coercive or deceptive exchanges. This is because exchanges featuring negative externalities seem to be clear cases of the two exchanging parties harming a third one via the exchange—and thus of conduct violating the harm principle. This essay aims to put this idea into question. I will argue that exchanges featuring negative (...) externalities are not unjust in this straightforward way, i.e. because they would constitute an instance of wrongfully causing or risking a bodily or material harm. In fact, unless we are subscribing to particularly demanding variants of liberalism—e.g. perfectionist liberalism—or unless we are exclusively focusing on borderline cases of externalities—i.e. of effects of exchanges hardly to be called externalities—there is no liberal theory of how exchanges featuring externalities are unjust. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against one variety of contextualism about aesthetic predicates such as “beautiful.” Contextualist analyses of these and other predicates have been subject to several challenges surrounding disagreement. Focusing on one kind of contextualism— individualized indexical contextualism —I unpack these various challenges and consider the responses available to the contextualist. The three responses I consider are as follows: giving an alternative analysis of the concept of disagreement ; claiming that speakers suffer from semantic blindness; and claiming that (...) attributions of beauty carry presuppositions of commonality. I will argue that none of the available strategies gives a response which both satisfactorily explains all of the disagreement -data and is plausible independent of significant evidence in favor of contextualism. I conclude that individualized indexical contextualism about the aesthetic is untenable, although this does not rule out alternative contextualist approaches to the aesthetic. (shrink)

The fundamental tenet of modern empiricism is the view that all non-analytic knowledge is based on experience. Let us call this thesis the principle of empiricism. [1] Contemporary logical empiricism has added [2] to it the maxim that a sentence makes a cognitively meaningful assertion, and thus can be said to be either true or false, only if it is either (1) analytic or self-contradictory or (2) capable, at least in principle, of experiential test. According to this so-called empiricist criterion (...) of cognitive meaning, or of cognitive significance, many of the formulations of traditional metaphysics and large parts of epistemology are devoid of cognitive significance--however rich some of them may be in non-cognitive import by virtue of their emotive appeal or the moral inspiration they offer. Similarly certain doctrines which have been, at one time or another, formulated within empirical science or its border disciplines are so contrived as to be incapable of test by any conceivable evidence; they are therefore qualified as pseudo- [p. 42:] hypotheses, which assert nothing, and which therefore have no explanatory or predictive force whatever. This verdict applies, for example, to the neo-vitalist speculations about entelechies or vital forces, and to the "telefinalist hypothesis" propounded by Lecomte du Noüy. (shrink)