At the end of the opening chapter of his Second Treatise of Government , Locke describes political power in the following terms: ‘Political Power then I take to be a Right of making Laws with Penalties of Death, and consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving of Property, and of employing the force of the Community, in the Execution of such Laws, and in the defence of the Common-wealth from Foreign Injury, and all this only for the Publick (...) Good.’. (shrink)

For a number of years, in the not too distant past, there was a lively debate between Plato's defenders and critics over the question of whether his Republic contained slaves. However, since the appearance of an article by Gregory Vlastos1 some twenty years ago, it seems to have been generally felt that the issue has been resolved, and the controversy has died down. Vlastos argued that the evidence admits of no doubt - Plato included slaves in his ideal state. In (...) this paper, I wish to have the case reopened, and to revive interest in what I believe should continue to be a matter of debate. In opposition to what has become the standard view, I am inclined to think, on balance, that his Republic could not contain slaves. Vlastos begins by reminding us that, on those occasions when Plato wants to propose a radical change from existing institutions, he argues for such a change. If he had intended to abolish slavery from his ideal society, this would have been a radical change, and we should have expected him to indicate clearly such an intention, and to justify it. Since no justification is forthcoming, we may presume that no change is envisaged. This line of argument I shall call the presumptive argument. One version of it is mentioned by R. B. Levinson,2 namely that the rough and dirty work, carried on behind the scene by slaves, will take place as usual, and the continuance of slavery is assumed without question. (shrink)

For a number of years, in the not too distant past, there was a lively debate between Plato's defenders and critics over the question of whether his Republic contained slaves. However, since the appearance of an article by Gregory Vlastos1 some twenty years ago, it seems to have been generally felt that the issue has been resolved, and the controversy has died down. Vlastos argued that the evidence admits of no doubt - Plato included slaves in his ideal state. In (...) this paper, I wish to have the case reopened, and to revive interest in what I believe should continue to be a matter of debate. In opposition to what has become the standard view, I am inclined to think, on balance, that his Republic could not contain slaves. Vlastos begins by reminding us that, on those occasions when Plato wants to propose a radical change from existing institutions, he argues for such a change. If he had intended to abolish slavery from his ideal society, this would have been a radical change, and we should have expected him to indicate clearly such an intention, and to justify it. Since no justification is forthcoming, we may presume that no change is envisaged. This line of argument I shall call the presumptive argument. One version of it is mentioned by R. B. Levinson,2 namely that the rough and dirty work, carried on behind the scene by slaves, will take place as usual, and the continuance of slavery is assumed without question. (shrink)

This article examines the three works of Jeremy Bentham on capital punishment dating Irom 1775, 1809, and 1831. Besides Hugo Bedau’s analysis of Bentham’s 1775 and 1831 works and James Crimmins’s assessment of Bentham’s 1809 work, little attention has been paid to his abolitionist arguments on this contentious issue. I review some of the developments in Bentham’s position, noting where the later work corrects some deficiencies in the earlier work, and I assess the cogency of the position as it evolves. (...) I concentrate on deterrence and irremissibility, though I also comment on his discussion of popularity in his 1831 address and his 1775 essay.Cet article se penche sur les trois textes qu’a écrits Jeremy Bentham sur la peine capitale (ils datent de 1775, 1809 et 1831). Hormis l’analyse qu’a faite Hugo Bedau des textes de 1775 et 1831 et la prise en compte, par Benjamin Crimmins, de celui de 1809, la position abolitionniste de Bentham sur cette question controversée ne s’est méritée que très peu d’attention de la part des spécialistes. Je passe en revue le développement de quelques-unes des argumentations de Bentham, en soulignant sur quels points les ouvrages publiés plus tard corrigent certains délauts de ceux publiés auparavant, et j’évalue la cohérence de son argumentation dans le cadre de cette évolution. Je concentre mon attention sur les notions de dissuasion et d’irrémissibilité, tout en commentant le traitement qu’il fait de la question de lapopularité dans son discours de 1831 et dans son texte de 1775. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to revive interest among philosophers, and particularly philosophers of religion, in Descartes’ Fourth Meditation. Two recent works on Descartes1 make virtually no mention of it, and this omission seems to reflect a fairly general feeling that it is of relatively little philosophical significance. In philosophy of religion textbooks, the Fifth Meditation is often discussed in connection with the ontological proof, but in sections devoted to the problem of evil, no reference is made to (...) the Fourth. Even in John Hick’s admirable study of the problem,2 Descartes’ contribution is relegated to a single sentence in a single footnote. (shrink)