Štúdia interpretuje udalostnú hermeneutiku francúzskeho fenomenológa Clauda Romana, ktorú postuloval v publikáciách Udalosť a svet, Udalosť a čas a Tam je, a to cez prizmu umeleckej skúsenosti. Štúdia si kladie za cieľ interpretovať pojmy ako udalosť, advenant, ex-per-iancia, rekonfigurácia a ničota a poukázať na ich súvislosť s umením. Pracovná téza je: Advenant býva umelecky. Cieľom štúdie tak nie je len analýza a pred-stavenie Romanovho diela, ale aj vyzdvihnutie tendencií smerujúcich k chápaniu udalosti a advenanta v umeleckých kontúrach. Štúdia preto analyzuje (...) autorov kontext, ktorý tvorí fenomenologická hermeneutika, predovšetkým diela Martina Heideggera a Henriho Maldineya. V súvislosti s rekonfiguratívnym aspektom advenantovho bytia sa v štúdii stáva ústredným konceptom pojem figúry, z ktorého následne vyplýva problém herectva. (shrink)

Štúdia interpretuje udalostnú hermeneutiku francúzskeho fenomenológa Clauda Romana, ktorú postuloval v publikáciách Udalosť a svet, Udalosť a čas a Tam je, a to cez prizmu umeleckej skúsenosti. Štúdia si kladie za cieľ interpretovať pojmy ako udalosť, advenant, ex-per-iancia, rekonfigurácia a ničota a poukázať na ich súvislosť s umením. Pracovná téza je: Advenant býva umelecky. Cieľom štúdie tak nie je len analýza a pred-stavenie Romanovho diela, ale aj vyzdvihnutie tendencií smerujúcich k chápaniu udalosti a advenanta v umeleckých kontúrach. Štúdia preto analyzuje (...) autorov kontext, ktorý tvorí fenomenologická hermeneutika, predovšetkým diela Martina Heideggera a Henriho Maldineya. V súvislosti s rekonfiguratívnym aspektom advenantovho bytia sa v štúdii stáva ústredným konceptom pojem figúry, z ktorého následne vyplýva problém herectva. (shrink)

I examine different arguments that could be used to establish indeterminism of neurological processes. Even though scenarios where single events at the molecular level make the difference in the outcome of such processes are realistic, this falls short of establishing indeterminism, because it is not clear that these molecular events are subject to quantum mechanical uncertainty. Furthermore, attempts to argue for indeterminism autonomously (i.e., independently of quantum mechanics) fail, because both deterministic and indeterministic models can account for the empirically observed (...) behavior of ion channels. (shrink)

The recent literature on causality has seen the introduction of several distinctions within causality, which are thought to be important for understanding the widespread scientific practice of focusing causal explanations on a subset of the factors that are causally relevant for a phenomenon. Concepts used to draw such distinctions include, among others, stability, specificity, proportionality, or actual-difference making. In this contribution, I propose a new distinction that picks out an explanatorily salient class of causes in biological systems. Some select causes (...) in complex biological systems, I argue, have the property of enabling coherent causal control of these systems. Examples of such control variables include hormones and other signaling molecules, e.g., TOR (target of rapamycin), morphogens or the products of homeotic selector genes in embryonic pattern formation. I propose an analysis of this notion based on concepts borrowed from causal graph theory. (shrink)

Darwin famously held that his use of the term "chance" in evolutionary theory merely "serves to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the causes of each particular variation". Is this a tenable view today? Or should we revise our thinking about chance in evolution in light of the more advanced, quantitative models of Neo-Darwinian theory, which make substantial use of statistical reasoning and the concept of probability? Is determinism still a viable metaphysical doctrine about biological reality after the quantum revolution in (...) physics, or dowe have to abandon it in favor of an objective indeterminism? In light of such reflections, what is the relevant interpretation of probability in evolutionary theory? Do biologists use the concept of probability because they are finite cognitive agents or because the evolutionary process is fundamentally probabilistic? In this paper, I will show that we do not yet fully understand the nature of chance in evolution. (shrink)

I first characterize a moral mistake in coercion. The principle of independence with which I criticize coercion seems also to condemn exchange. I propose an account of exchange from which it follows that exchange upholds independence after all. In support of that account I argue that, of the accounts of exchange that occur to me, only this one has the consequence that, on general assumptions, a person can take part in exchange while acting, intending, and believing with sufficient reason. I (...) argue that the hiring of very poor people by very rich people for labor from which the rich draw a substantial surplus does not give rise to an exchange of this kind. These instances of the wage labor relation resemble coercion insofar as they violate independence. (shrink)

Several authors have used the notion of causal specificity in order to defend non-parity about genetic causes (Waters 2007, Woodward 2010, Weber 2017, forthcoming). Non-parity in this context is the idea that DNA and some other biomolecules that are often described as information-bearers by biologists play a unique role in life processes, an idea that has been challenged by Developmental Systems Theory (e.g., Oyama 2000). Indeed, it has proven to be quite difficult to state clearly what the alleged special role (...) of genetic causes consists in. In this paper, I show that the set of biomolecules that are normally considered to be information-bearers (DNA, mRNA) can be shown to be the most specific causes of protein primary structure, provided that causal specificity is measured over a relevant space of biological possibilities, disregarding physical as well as logically possible states of the causal variables. (shrink)

" Si, après Auschwitz, croire en un Dieu-raison n'est plus possible, reste, d'un côté, la foi simple - la foi qui n'est qu'un cri -, de l'autre la raison, pure de religion. Philosopher comme avant, on ne le peut, mais seulement mieux qu'avant - ou pas du tout. Refermée, pour la philosophie, la parenthèse judéo-chrétienne ; fini le temps des castors - des Descartes, Kant, Hegel, des bâtisseurs de digues pour dompter le flot de la Libre Pensée issu de la (...) source grecque. L'heure est aux philosophies du refus. Refus de toute logicisation philosophico-théologique du monde, où le mal absolu n'est plus qu'un détail. De là une vision a-théiste et a-cosmique du monde, une vision déréalisante du " réel ", mais aussi, devant la vie, l'appel à un nouveau courage. Car, dans la défaite des absolus sécurisants, reste, comme corrélat du mal absolu, l'absolu de la mort et du Temps. " M. C. (shrink)

According to the acousmatic thesis defended by Roger Scruton and others, to hear sounds as music is to divorce them from the source or cause of their production. Non-acousmatic experience involves attending to the worldly cause of the sound; in acousmatic experience, sound is detached from that cause. The acousmatic concept originates with Pythagoras, and was developed in the work of 20th century musique concrète composers such as Pierre Schaeffer. The concept yields important insights into the nature of musical experience, (...) but Scruton's version of the acousmatic thesis cannot overcome objections arising from timbral and spatial aspects of music, which seem to relate sounds to the circumstances of their production. These objections arise in part from music's status as a performing art rooted in human gesture and behaviour. Hence I defend a two-fold thesis of "hearing-in", which parallels Richard Wollheim's concept of "seeing-in": both acousmatic and.. (shrink)

La nature de la conscience est au centre de la discussion actuelle sur la personne humaine. Bien que certains philosophes fassent de la conscience la clef fondamentale et de toute l'épistémologie, la plupart des scientifiques la réduisent aux intéractions complexes du cerveau. Le présent article tire sa matière de l'analyse que saint Thomas d'Aquin fait de cette notion dans son De Veritate . Il caractérise la conscience en termes de connaissance et d'application de la connaissance à l'agir. L'A. cherche à (...) donner une définition pour montrer que la conscience dépend directement d'un syllogisme pratique. (shrink)

Philosophy of Experimental Biology explores some central philosophical issues concerning scientific research in experimental biology, including genetics, biochemistry, molecular biology, developmental biology, neurobiology, and microbiology. It seeks to make sense of the explanatory strategies, concepts, ways of reasoning, approaches to discovery and problem solving, tools, models and experimental systems deployed by scientific life science researchers and also integrates developments in historical scholarship, in particular the New Experimentalism. It concludes that historical explanations of scientific change that are based on local laboratory (...) practice need to be supplemented with an account of the epistemic norms and standards that are operative in science. This book should be of interest to philosophers and historians of science as well as to scientists. (shrink)

This article examines the role of experimental generalizations and physical laws in neuroscientific explanations, using Hodgkin and Huxley’s electrophysiological model from 1952 as a test case. I show that the fact that the model was partly fitted to experimental data did not affect its explanatory status, nor did the false mechanistic assumptions made by Hodgkin and Huxley. The model satisfies two important criteria of explanatory status: it contains invariant generalizations and it is modular (both in James Woodward’s sense). Further, I (...) argue that there is a sense in which the explanatory heteronomy thesis holds true for this case. †To contact the author, please write to: SNF‐Professorship for Philosophy of Science, University of Basel, Missionsstrasse 21, 4003 Basel, Switzerland; e‐mail: marcel[email protected]. (shrink)

Il y a ainsi, sur ce premier aspect de l'individualisme juridique, sur ce problème des fins individuelles ou sociales du droit, deux conceptions violemment opposées: la conception chrétienne à laquelle se rattachent finalement les régimes libéraux et même peut-être, malgré les apparences, le régime soviétique lui-même, d'une part, la conception fasciste et surtout national-socialiste, d'autre part. Entre ces deux conceptions, il ne m'appartient pas de prendre parti en tant que juriste, car, si c'est une question capitale pour la construction du (...) Droit, ce n'est pas moins, en soi, une question métajuridique.[...] Une autre question est celle de savoir laquelle de ces conceptions triomphera; la réponse se donnera sur les champs de bataille; c'est l'un des enjeux, et non le moindre, de la guerre actuelle. Ce que l'on peut dire, c'est que toute la conception traditionnelle imposée par le christianisme, des rapports sociaux, est aux prises avec une Weltanschauung radicalement opposée; le sens profond des combats actuels, c'est la lutte de la croix du Christ et de la croix gammée. (shrink)

Decision outcomes sometimes result in negative emotions. This can occur when a decision appears to be wrong in retrospect, and/or when the obtained decision outcome does not live up to expectations. Regret and disappointment are the two emotions that are of central interest in the present article. Although these emotions have a lot in common, they also differ in ways that are relevant to decision making. In this article we review theories and empirical findings concerning regret and disappointment. We first (...) discuss how regret and disappointment differ with respect to their antecedent conditions, appraisals, and phenomenology. We also discuss possible behavioural consequences of experiencing these emotions. Next, we consider how the anticipation of regret and disappointment may influence decision making. We use regret and disappointment theory, developed by the economists Bell (1982, 1985), and Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1986, 1987), as a framework for our discussion. Finally, we argue that combining the theoretical approaches and research paradigms of behavioural decision theory with emotion theories will significantly increase our knowledge of antecedents and consequences of emotions. (shrink)

Griffiths et al. (2015) have proposed a quantitative measure of causal specificity and used it to assess various attempts to single out genetic causes as being causally more specific than other cellular mechanisms, for example, alternative splicing. Focusing in particular on developmental processes, they have identified a number of important challenges for this project. In this discussion note, I would like to show how these challenges can be met.