This edited volume systematically addresses the connection between Wilfrid Sellars and the history of modern philosophy, exploring both the content and method of this relationship. It intends both to analyze Sellars’s position in relation to singular thinkers of the modern tradition, and to inquire into Sellars’s understanding of philosophy as a field in reflective and constructive conversation with its past. The chapters in Part I cover Sellars’s interpretation and use of Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant and Hegel. Part II features essays (...) on his relationship with Peirce, Frege, Carnap, Wittgenstein, American pragmatism, behaviorism and American realism, particularly his father, Roy Wood. Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy features original contributions by many of the most renowned Sellars scholars throughout the world. It offers an exhaustive survey of Sellars’s views on the historical antecedents and metaphilosophical aspects of his thought. (shrink)

Aim of this work is to dispel the myth of the "vagueness" of naturalism. Between the Thirties and the Forties, naturalism moves “from old Europe to dynamic America” (as the historian Larrabee said). The controversy with visionary and fascist European theories was indeed very strong in the academic culture of the Thirties and Forties. The idea was to oppose to the former the virtue of a liberal democracy, supported by the liberality of the scientific method.In short, the cultural fight was (...) between naturalism and metaphysics (considered as theology). Naturalizing the "spirit" was the great ambition of American naturalistic programs of the Forties. They culminated with the publication of the ideological manifesto “Naturalism and the Human Spirit” (New York, 1944), edited by the John Dewey's group of Columbia. From Ernest Nagel to Sydney Hook, Roy Wood Sellars, William Sheldon and Arthur E. Murphy, all prominent American philosophers took part, in one way or another, to the naturalistic project. This latter aimed to be more than a simple "doctrine", by presenting itself as an expression of a new “mental attitude”, a fresh way of considering traditional unsolved problems. All this lead to the production of a new form of rhetoric, which in turn carried with itself a hidden ideology. Objective rationality embodied by scientific procedures became the totem to play against everything that would present itself as “just-subjective”, metaphysical, all-encompassing. A new idea of philosophy began to emerge, one that was less metaphysical, more humanistic and democratic, and concerned itself with “restricted, but manageable questions” (E. Nagel). (shrink)

Leibniz can be counted among the remote, but still significant, sources of Sellars's philosophy. Such thesis, however, is meaningless unless its conceptual relevance is displayed. Therefore, it will be immediately added that Sellars's relation with Leibniz is focused on three main fundamental issues, which respectively concern (1) the concept of nature, (2) the concept of truth and (3) the concept itself of nominalism. Besides, there are other seemingly minor topics, which actually refers to the definition of abstract entities, of predicates, (...) of proper names and to the datum/factum distinction. Another challenge the paper is faced with, regards the fact that Sellars does not consider Leibniz only in himself, given that he very often positions him in a close relation to Kant: it is as though there were multifaceted issues brought forward by Leibniz and Kant together forming a complex theoretical unity (over and above their differences). According to Sellars, in fact, they both undermine some of the most solid epistemological principles of the early modern times (mainly founded upon the subject- object lexicon and the idea of veritas as adaequatio rei et intellectus) and they both reshape the meaning of expressions such as “being actual” or “being true”. (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to focus upon two things. The first concerns the intertwining of naturalism and religion, namely the fact that early American naturalism defined itself as a “secular religion”. This expression sounds like an oxymoron, but the analysis of a dazzling text by Francis Ellingwood Abbot will help us to clarify the concept of “godless religion”, which will be taken up in the following years by all the major naturalists of the time. The second concerns the (...) power of the symbolic dimension of naturalism, especially in the debates of the 1940s. In those years naturalism was engaged in a battle for the survival of democracy. “Science”, “democracy” and “freedom” were not only concepts debated on a theoretical level, but they outlined a system of archetypes by virtue of which post-war liberal and democratic America would build a relevant part of its self-image. (shrink)

The “Morbid Fear of the Subjective” (copyright by Roy Wood Sellars) represents a key-element of the American naturalist debate of the Mid-twentieth century. On the one hand, we are witnessing to the unconditional trust in the objectivity of scientific discourse, while on the other (and as a consequence) there is the attempt to exorcise the myth of the “subjective” and of its metaphysical privateness. This theoretical roadmap quickly assumed the shape of an even sociological contrast between the “democraticity” of natural (...) sciences and the fanaticism implicit in supernatural metaphysical systems. In between these two extremes stood phenomenology, in its early days on American soil. Its notion of “evidence”, which is less easily to naturalize than it might seem, was in fact hardly consistent with the widespread concept of “natural experience” of the world. (shrink)

This paper compares Kant’s and Leibniz’s views on the relation between knowing subjects and known objects. Kant discusses Leibniz’s philosophy in the ‘Amphiboly’ section of the first Critique. According to Kant, Leibniz’s main error is mistaking objects in space and time for mind-independent things in themselves, that is, for monads. The paper argues that, pace Kant, Leibniz regards objects in space and time as mind-dependent. A deeper divergence between the two philosophers concerns knowing subjects. For Leibniz, they are substances. For (...) Kant, we cannot know whether they are substances. Kant conceives of knowing subjects as complex systems of cognitive capacities. (shrink)

One of the most interesting aspects of Leibniz's philosophy is the distinction between "art" and "nature"; the core of this matter is the possibility (or even the impossibility) of distinguishing as clearly as possible between two ontological domains: on one hand the products of technique (such as "artificial machines"), on the other hand all the beings that can be defined as natural ("natural machines"). The question raised in this paper is if it is possibile to build ontological criteria which can (...) be clear enough to distinguish between the products of nature and those of technique in the field of the "res" that they are. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I would like to bring into the light the almost unexplored Sellars’s theory of particulars. Second, I would like to show its surprising degree of compatibility with the thesis supported by some contemporary tropists, Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind, Ontos Verlag, 2008; Moltmann, Mind 113:1–41, 2004 and Moltmann, Noûs 47:346–370, 2013). It is difficult to establish whether Sellars possessed an own theory of tropes, developed independently by the classical form it (...) took in Williams 1953, but as a matter of fact the peculiar features of his “complex particulars” model it is very much like Williams’s theory. So much so that to all intents and purposes it represents a tropes variation. One of its strengths is that it is not part of a constituent ontology, since it is essentially developed from a linguistic and phenomenological point of view. It is for these reasons that this theory manages to avoid some of the classic objections to tropes and it shows to be compatible with the argument of Jonathan Lowe’s “proper visibility” as well as with Friederike Moltmann’s exquisitely linguistic interpretation of tropes. (shrink)

The other aim of the volume is to show that there is a close semantic connection between the concepts of individual, mind and body in Leibniz.

The word “organism” represents an original keyword of the early-modern philosophical world. As it was first developed by Leibniz, it seems to blend together two different conceptual paradigms: the Cartesian model of the “machines” and the Aristotelian legacy of the “individual natures”. According to the first, nature represents itself the prototype of any good mechanical functioning, but at the same time its inner development is explained by the occurrence of a normative dimension that rules the world of primitive forces in (...) the dynamics. For such reasons, the “organism” lexicon is affected by an internal stress that is extremely interesting to analyze for it seems to posit a normative turn acting from the within of a mechanically conceived notion of life. (shrink)

It is certainly true that in early modern thought the emergence of a new science changed the image of the universe in a mechanistic way. It must be considered, though, that most of the main protagonists of this revolution (Kepler, Newton, Leibniz, ‘biologists’ like Leeuwenhoek, Hartsoeker, Hooke, Malpighi, Redi, etc.) still continued to consider the importance and the utility of a finalistic explanation of natural phenomena. Concepts like “function”, “self-organization”, “organism” have roots in early modern thought: not only from a (...) linguistic and semantic point of view. They were the basis of an epistemology in which different kinds of categories are strictly related. Aim of the paper is to take into account the relevance of the mechanical explanation of natural phenomena in Leibniz’s thought and at the same time to highlight the polarization between mechanical explanations and finalistic consideration that emerges in his philosophy. The specific aim of the paper is to analyze and to develop this kind of dialectic between “teleology” and "mechanism", with particular reference to the concept of “living being”. (shrink)

The doctrine of natural machines, of organisms, of composite substances, assumes a marked consistency in Leibniz starting from his mature years (let us say, from the publishing of New System in 1965 onwards). There is no doubt, therefore, that for a full explanation of the conceptual content of the reflection of Leibniz on the nature of living substances we must turn to the “classic” places in which it took form: from the letters to De Volder and Lady Masham of the (...) early 1700s, to the Nouveaux Essais, to Animadversiones contra Stahl and, naturally to Princìpes de la Nature et de la Grace and to the Monadologie. We can in any case ask what are the elements of specific difference are that emerge in this vast doctrinal corpus regarding those elements of the theory of the living being that had already appeared with a certain frequency in the texts of the early 1780s. Put in other words: what link of continuity subsists between the proto-theory of the living being of the ‘80s and that of the mature years (let us say from New System on)? Or, overturning the formulation of the problem: what elements of discontinuity suddenly break into Leibniz’s reflections from the second half of the ‘90s compared to the immediately preceding phases of his thought? Certainly, the monads, the machines of nature. But is it possibile to focus even more clearly the lens of our observations? I mean: after a decade of intense theoretical debate on the nature of corporeal substances, on organisms, on machines of nature, is it possibile to sketch a historical picture that accounts in a coherent manner for the development of Leibniz's thought in relation to the questions raised here? (shrink)

What kind of relationship subsists between an “organism” and a “monas dominans »? In some texts, Leibniz claims that the soul « actuat » the organic body and in the late debate with Stahl he describes the « monas dominans » as a « monas actuatrix ». But how does the monas « actualize » the organic body ? and what implies the semantic of the word « agere » here used by Leibniz ? Is it also possibile to describe (...) this event in terms of « whole/part » relationship ? The aim of this paper is to sketch out the status quaestionis of the topic by discussing some of the most recent studies. More specifically to propose an interpretation of the « monas dominans » as the « nota distinguens » of the whole organism. (shrink)

It is certainly true that in early modern thought the emergence of a new science changed the image of the universe in a mechanistic way. It must be considered, though, that most of the main protagonists of this revolution (Kepler, Newton, Leibniz, ‘biologists’ like Leeuwenhoek, Hartsoeker, Hooke, Malpighi, Redi, etc.) still continued to consider the importance and the utility of a finalistic explanation of natural phenomena. Concepts like “function”, “self-organization”, “organism” have roots in early modern thought: not only from a (...) linguistic and semantic point of view. They were the basis of an epistemology in which different kinds of categories are strictly related. The aim of the paper is to take into account the relevance of the mechanical explanation of natural phenomena in Leibniz’s thought and at the same time to highlight the polarization between mechanical explanations and finalistic consideration that emerges in his philosophy. The specific aim of the paper is to analyze and to develop this kind of dialectic between “teleology” and "mechanism", with particular reference to the concept of “living being”. (shrink)

Le Obiezioni contro la Teoria medica di G.E. Stahl, tradotte per la prima volta in italiano, rappresentano un documento di particolare interesse storico-filosofico. Da una parte Georg Ernst Stahl (1659-1734), medico, chimico, fisico, sostenitore di una fisiologia corporea a impronta “vitalista” e dall’altra Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), genio universale della matematica e della filosofia dell’età barocca. Il fulcro della polemica riguarda la possibilità di capire se e in che misura l’organizzazione meccanica di un corpo organico sia di per se sufficiente (...) a spiegare il fenomeno della vita “biologica”, o se invece si debba postulare la presenza di princìpi vitali capaci di integrare le leggi fisiologiche che strutturano la corporeità. A dispetto della lontananza storica, o anzi forse proprio in virtù di tale lontananza, la polemica tra Leibniz e Stahl ci aiuta a decifrare le radici di uno dei refrain più abusati di tanta filosofia contemporanea, il tema cioè della ‘naturalizzazione’ della vita e dello spirito. L’idea di espungere tutti gli elementi “soprannaturali” (l’anima, gli spiriti, etc.) dal novero delle spiegazioni scientifiche non è certo un’idea novecentesca e si confronta in questo caso non solo con la sua tesi opposta, ma soprattutto con una vasta gamma di soluzioni intermedie e di varianti non riduzioniste, di cui proprio la filosofia di Leibniz è uno splendido esempio. Il volume è accompagnato da un saggio di postfazione intitolato Vita e organismo tra filosofia e medicina: le ragioni di una polemica. (shrink)

The paper investigates the first occurrences of the term «phenomenology» in the United States, underlying as well the history of its progressive resemantization. The temporal frame 1939-1962 refers to the foundation of the two major American phenomenological societies: the International Phenomenological Society (IPS) and the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP). Accordingly, it will be described the shift of meanings of the word «phenomenology»: originally the term simply meant «Husserlian philosophy», but in the turn of a few decades it (...) ended up to de- note a plurality of different meanings, not always mutually compatible. The paper presents elements of historical reconstruction (the early institutional phases, the relationship between American and European phenomenologists, the «existential» turning-point of the Sixties, etc.) as well as elements of theoretical analysis. The main thesis is that the early-history of phenomenology in the US helps us to better understand the reasons that support the analytic-continental distinction and, at the same time, the unbearable tension of this distinction. (shrink)

One of the symbolic images to which Leibniz constantly entrusted the synthesis of his philosophy regards the idea of considering one and the same city from various visual perspectives. Such an image is diffused throughout all Leibniz’s writings and clearly reflects the philosopher’s interest for matters regarding perspective as well as optical phenomena. The point of view of its inhabitants can therefore be compared to a mirror that reflects some different portions of reality. But what do the city-viewers really see? (...) Do they all see exactly the same thing? And assuming the plurality of points of view, how one can be sure that they share the same representative content? The paper presented here tries to offer a plausible interpretation of this topic also by linking different and somehow remote Leibnizian doctrines together. (shrink)

In the following paper I would like to try to expound on a concept quite important in the philosophy of Leibniz – that of the “Monas Dominans”. In particular, I would like to approach this subject in the first place by means of considerations of a “historical-genetic” nature, while in the second part of my work I propose to put forward some possible interpretations of it. In both cases I will try to compare my ideas with those of recent studies (...) on this theme. The difficulties are numerous; first of all, the texts published to date in which Leibniz introduces and presents his doctrine of the “Monas Dominans” are relatively few, especially if compared to the space given to other elements of his philosophical system; secondly, if on the one hand the general intention put forward by Leibniz through the introduction of this doctrine is clear enough (the Monas Dominans renders “One” in the Machine the “corporeal substance”, that is the “Animal”, as found in the letter to De Volder of June 1703 to which scholars often make reference), on the other hand, when one tries to clarify its details and consider its implications one immediately runs into the same difficulties already pointed out in other studies (regarding, for example, the definition of “corporeal substance”, the relationship between the “Monas dominans” and the “innumerable subordinate monads” that form the “Organic Machine”, etc.). A primary idea I will try to present in this work regards the highlighting in the work of Leibniz of a close correlation between the appearance of the expression “organism” and that of the expression “Monas Dominans”. (shrink)

What kind of relationship subsists between an "organism" and a "monas dominans"? In some texts, Leibniz claims that the soul "actuat" the organic body and in the late debate with Stahl he describes the "monas dominans" as a "monas actuatrix". But how does the monas "actualize" the organic body? And what is implied by Leibniz's use of the word "agere" to describe this? Is it also possibile to describe this event in terms of "whole/part" relationship? The aim of this paper (...) is to sketch out the status quaestionis of the topic by discussing some of the most recent studies. More specifically to propose an interpretation of the "monas dominans" as the "nota distinguens" of the whole organism. (shrink)

Hegel, nell’Enciclopedia, definisce la filosofia leibniziana come “la contraddizione” completamente sviluppata. Da sempre questa affermazione ha suscitato l’attenzione degli interpreti e nel tempo si è consolidata l’immagine storiografica di uno Hegel poco attento nei confronti di Leibniz, o semplicemente iniquo nella sua valutazione. Approfondendo tuttavia i termini concettuali del giudizio hegeliano e ripercorrendone insieme la genesi storica e sistematica, la questione appare teoreticamente ancora aperta e stimolante. Il vibrante dialogo che Hegel fin dai primi anni di Jena instaura con Leibniz (...) supera le anguste barriere di un confronto di “filologia storica”, ma si pone piuttosto come un momento assolutamente significativo in rapporto a quel processo di auto-comprensione che il pensiero moderno attua nei propri confronti e che rappresenta uno dei lasciti più preziosi sui quali si è oggi chiamati a riflettere. (shrink)

Usually scholars think of Marvin Farber as an American pupil of Husserl and his figure is given historical and institutional credit. It is also said that his thought misrepresented the intentions of the master and that his idea of a naturalization of phenomenology was devoid of hermeneutical grounds. All this has fed the myth of his heresy, the idea that his philosophical proposal could be summarized as a deviation from the orthodox canon. In this paper the legitimacy of this perspective (...) is widely discussed. Is it really correct to think of him as a child of the phenomenological continental tradition transplanted on American soil? Or would it not be more fruitful to consider him, beyond the canon, as an American philosopher fully immersed in the epistemological debates of his time? The paper argues in favor of this way of interpretation, discussing Farber’s own theoretical proposal in conjunction with the ecosystem of the American philosophical history. (shrink)

The first part of the paper offers an historical reconstruction of the relationship between philosophy and neuroscience. The goal of this part is to show that such relationship has been generated on the basis of a theoretical common ground; that this common story was essentially tied to the American philosophical naturalism; that naturalism entails a metaphilosophical constraint, such that between philosophy and the natural sciences subsists a strong cognitive asymmetry. In the second part of the paper, it has been taken (...) into consideration the proposal of a “naturalized epistemology”. On the one hand, it has been examined the historical and theoretical consequences of it. But on the other hand, it is possible to show that in the very same quinean text there are conceptual resources that exceed the cages of reductionisms by restoring a broader and less hierarchical idea of philosophy. The fundamental claim of the work is that only assuming an idea of philosophy not already-naturalized it is possible to match the challenge for a new semantics of concepts brought forward by neurosciences. (shrink)

Il concetto di organismo rappresenta uno dei fuochi centrali del pensiero di Leibniz. Interrogarsi sul significato della sua definizione significa inoltrarsi su un terreno problematico particolarmente delicato della tradizione filosofico-scientifica occidentale, dal momento che tale concetto trova proprio nella filosofia leibniziana una delle sue prime esplicitazioni teoriche. Può infatti non essere banale ricordare come il termine "organismus", assente nelle lingue classiche, faccia una delle sue prime apparizioni proprio negli scritti di Leibniz, il quale lo impiega con la piena consapevolezza di (...) chi vuole contrassegnare un costrutto teorico preciso. Ricostruire la genesi storica di tale concetto significa allora riportare alla luce la complessità di strutture teoretiche entro cui esso è stato pensato da Leibniz e, al tempo stesso, consegnare all'attenzione del dibattito contemporaneo la radicale problematicità con cui il pensiero moderno, attraverso uno dei suoi maggiori interpreti, si è interrogato sulla nozione di "vita". (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to reconsider the controversial problem of the relationship between the philosophy of Hegel and Leibniz. Beyond the thick curtain of historical references (which have been widely developed by scholars), it is in fact possible to assume some guideline concepts (i.e. those of ‘singularity’ and ‘infinity’) to reconstruct the deep theoretical influence which Leibniz played in Hegel’s thought since the Jenaer Systementwurf of 1804/05.

Aim of this paper is to reconsider the controversial problem of the relationship between the philosophy of Hegel and Leibniz. Beyond the tick courtain of historical references (which have been widely developed by scholars), it is in fact possible to assume some guideline concepts (i.e. those of "singularity" and "infinity") to reconstruct the deep theoretical influence which Leibniz played in Hegel's thought since the Jaener Systementwurf of 1804/1805.

One of the symbolic images to which Leibniz constantly entrusted the synthesis of his own thought regards the idea of looking upon the same city from different perspectives. This is an image that is diffused throughout all Leibniz's writings and it clearly reflects the philosopher's passion for matters regarding perspective as well as optical phenomena. The point of view of the inhabitants who look at it can be therefore compared to a mirror which reflects a certain portion of reality, according (...) to its visual angle. But what do its inhabitants/observers really see? Do they all see exactly the same thing? And if the points of view are manifold and above all irreducible one to another, how can citizens be sure that they share the same representative content? The following paper tries to offer a plausible interpretation of this topic also by considering the most prominent works produced by scholars during the very last decades of the leibnitian-research. (shrink)