Thomas Hobbes's doctrine of space is here considered as an example of the Nachzuirkung of Jesuit commentaries on Aristotle's natural philosophy in seventeenth-century mechanistic science. Hobbes's doctrine of space can be reconstructed in terms of his intensive dialogue with late scholasticism, as represented in the works of several important Jesuit authors. Although he presents his concept of space as an alternative to the Aristotelian notion of place, there are some remarkable similarities between Hobbes's alternative notion of space and the concept (...) of spatium imaginarium, found in the Jesuit commentaries. While Hobbes adopts many scholastic elements, he employs these to his own purposes. Thus, on the one hand, this article does not so much challenge Hobbes's "modernity", but rather tries to put it in its proper perspective. On the other hand, it tries to show the vitality and importance of Jesuit natural philosophy in non- or even anti-Aristotelian contexts. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 30, Issue 1, pp 4 - 27 The _Animadversiones in Elementorum Philosophiae_ by a little known Flemish scholar G. Moranus, published in Brussels in 1655 was an early European response to Hobbes’s _De Corpore_. Although it is has been referred to by various Hobbes scholars, such as Noel Malcolm, Doug Jesseph, and Alexander Bird it has been little studied. Previous scholarship has tended to focus on the mathematical criticisms of André Tacquet which Moranus included in the form (...) of a letter in his volume. Moranus’s philosophical objections to Hobbes’s natural philosophy offer a fascinating picture of the critical reception of Hobbes’s work by a religious writer trained in the late Scholastic tradition. Moranus’s opening criticism clearly shows that he is unhappy with Hobbes’s exclusion of the divine and the immaterial from natural philosophy. He asks what authority Hobbes has for breaking with the common understanding of philosophy, as defined by Cicero ‘the knowledge of things human and divine’. He also offers natural philosophical and theological criticisms of Hobbes for overlooking the generation of things involved in the Creation. He also attacks the natural philosophical underpinning of Hobbes’s civil philosophy. In this paper I look at a number of philosophical topics which Moranus criticised in Hobbes’s work, including his mechanical psychology, his theory of imaginary space, his use of the concept of accidents, his blurring of the distinction between the human being and the animal, and his theories of motion. Moranus’s criticisms, which are a mixture of philosophical and theological objections, gives us some clear indications of what made Hobbes’ natural philosophy controversial amongst his contemporaries, and sheds new light on the early continental reception of Hobbes’s work. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that Deleuze’s ideas on space and extension are heavily in debt to Leibniz. The focus is on chapter five, ‘the Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible’, of Difference and Repetition. Concepts such as ‘intensive magnitude’, ‘distance’, ‘order’ and most importantly ‘spatium’ are shown to have their origin in Leibniz’s philosophy. In order to do so, the article starts with Leibniz’s critique on Cartesian mechanics and how this leads Leibniz to a conception of space that goes (...) beyond the Cartesian concept of extension. The latter lacks difference, potentiality and individuality. Leibniz argues that the Cartesian homogeneous plenum should therefore be grounded in a deeper more substantial space: the spatium. Understood as such, space is not an absolute substance but a structure of relations between substances. Although Leibniz’s texts offer enough to understand this spatium, they do not explain how the genesis of extension out of space should be understood. It is on this point that Deleuze offers a fruitful interpretation of Leibniz by conceptualizing such a genesis in terms of difference. Extension is understood as a homogenization and externalization of the internal and pure differences in space. In the end, Leibniz helps us to understand Deleuze’s theory, while Deleuze offers us an enriching interpretation of Leibniz that succeeds where authors such as Yvon Belaval and Martial Gueroult have failed. (shrink)

Brand image constitutes one of the most salient, over-defined, heavily explored and multifariously operationalized conceptual constructs in marketing theory and practice. In this Chapter, definitions of brand image that have been offered by marketing scholars will be critically addressed in the context of a culturally oriented discussion, informed by the semiotic notion of iconicity. This cultural bend, in conjunction with the concept’s semiotic contextualization, are expected both to dispel terminological confusions in the either inter-changeable or fuzzily differentiated employment of such (...) terms as brand image, symbol, icon, as well as to address the function of brand image at a deeper level than a mere construct to be operationalized in quantitative studies of purchase drivers. This shift in focus is coupled with a critical turn from the cogito-centric view of the consuming subject through the cognitivist lens of the AI metaphor as decision-making centre at the origin of largely conscious meaning-making, in favor of a psychoanalytically informed approach that considers figurativity as an essential process whereby brand image is formed. In these terms, brand image will be intimately linked to brand images as figurative multimodal expressive units and rhetorical tropes, as figurative syntax, that are responsible for shaping an idiolectal brand language, as well as to distinctive levels of iconicity as textual condition of possibility of a brand language. In order to understand the role of iconicity as fundamental condition of brand textuality, rather than just a procedure for spawning brand images, the discussion is contextualized in a wider framework involving the culturally situated source of brand images, how they become correlated with brand image concepts and how correlations between brand images and brand image result in brand knowledge structures (Keller 1998). This opening up of the discussion on iconicity is enacted against the background of what I call the Brand Imaginarium which involves: (i) a critical engagement with the dominant cognitivist perspective in branding research that prioritizes individual memory in brand knowledge formation, through a cultural branding lens that involves two additional types of memory, viz. communicative and cultural (ii) a critical engagement with the cognitivist perspective on brand knowledge formation that prioritizes conscious processing of stimuli (as ‘brute facts’, rather than as already semiotized expressive units) in a cognitive mechanism from which the faculty of imagination has been expelled, by restoring the importance of imagination in brand knowledge formation, and, concomitantly, by showing that the highly figurative language of brands may not be researched thoroughly unless imagination is posited anew as processing correlate (iii) the adoption of an expansionist approach to the role of the imaginary in brand knowledge formation, from cognitive (or psychic) faculty, to a more sociologically inclined process of inter-subjective mirroring, and concomitantly as imaginary social significations (Castoriades 1985) that are shared by culturally conditioned and habituated subjects that engage in meaningful cultural practices, rather than individual processing monads. (shrink)

This article examines Gerald Odonis' view on the nature of place as found in his commentary on the Sentences and in an anonymous question extant in manuscript Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, 4229. Both texts defend a thoroughly un-Aristotelian conception of place as three-dimensional space. Odonis not only deviates from Aristotle's definition of place as the inner surface of a surrounding body, but also from the positions of his contemporaries, including fellow Franciscans. Despite some remarkable doctrinal similarities between Odonis' view and that (...) of Renaissance innovators like Francesco Patrizi and Bernardino Telesio, it seems unlikely that Gerald played a role in the rise of new conceptions of place in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. An edition of the anonymous Quaestio de loco is given in an appendix. (shrink)

This article examines Gerald Odonis' view on the nature of place as found in his commentary on the Sentences (Sent. II, d. 2, qq. 3-5) and in an anonymous question (Utrum locus sit ultima superficies corporis ambientis immobile primum) extant in manuscript Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, 4229. Both texts defend a thoroughly un-Aristotelian conception of place as three-dimensional space. Odonis not only deviates from Aristotle's definition of place as the inner surface of a surrounding body, but also from the positions of (...) his contemporaries, including fellow Franciscans. Despite some remarkable doctrinal similarities between Odonis' view and that of Renaissance innovators like Francesco Patrizi and Bernardino Telesio, it seems unlikely that Gerald played a role in the rise of new conceptions of place in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. An edition of the anonymous Quaestio de loco is given in an appendix. (shrink)

This paper discusses the roots of fascist ideas, which were anchored in the aesthetic heritage of Romanticism, later developed by the Nietzschean vitalism and the modernist avant-garde. From the perspective of twentieth-century intellectual history, special attention should be given to the theme of violence committed in the name of beauty, as well as the relations between the initial romantic idea of art as Sturm und Drang, the concept of the artistic avantgarde attacking the world of bourgeois values and fascist shock (...) troops. (shrink)

This paper examines the Leibnizian influence in Deleuze's theory of the spatium. Leibniz's critique of Cartesian extension and Newtonian space leads him to a conception of space in terms of internal determination and internal difference. Space is thus understood as a structure of individual relations internal to substances. Making some Nietzschean corrections to Leibniz, Deleuze understands the spatium in terms of individuating differences instead of individual relations. Leibnizian space is thus transformed into a genetic space producing both extension (...) (quantity) and quality. (shrink)

The article tries to prove that the famous formula "epekeina tês ousias" has to be understood in the sense of being beyond being and not only in the sense of being beyond essence. We make hereby three points: first, since pure textual exegesis of 509b8–10 seems to lead to endless controversy, a formal proof for the metaontological interpretation could be helpful to settle the issue; we try to give such a proof. Second, we offer a corollary of the formal proof, (...) showing that not only self-predication of the form of the Good, but of any form is not possible, that is: no form of F has the form of F. Third, we apply Spinoza’s distinction between an ens imaginarium and a chimaera to Plato’s Idea of the Good. (shrink)

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest nie tylko przybliżenie określonych obrazów raju i utopii, które ukazują się w różnych odsłonach w domenach imaginariów europejskich na przestrzeni dziejów, lecz także ukazanie powiązań owych obrazów z domeną dyskursów politycznych dążących do zmiany status quo oraz ukonstytuowania doskonałej, harmonijnej i nieantagonistycznej wspólnoty. Stworzenie takiej wspólnoty – pomimo uniwersalistycznych wizji, które imaginaria raju i utopii implikują – niejednokrotnie opiera się na mechanizmach inkluzji i ekskluzji. Mechanizmy tego typu są charakterystyczne przede wszystkim dla maksymalistycznych wizji i idei (...) politycznych, które dążą do rozwiązania wszelkich ludzkich problemów w sposób ostateczny i całkowity. Z takimi dążeniami należy wiązać nade wszystko rewolucyjne próby realizacji utopii, czy też budowy królestwa Bożego na ziemi. (shrink)

There are two links that stand in the foreground of Deleuze’s treatment of Epicurus and Lucretius: the themes of immanent naturalism and of the externality of ontological relations. However, the links are problematised in Difference and Repetition, which presents an important critique of the concept of the atom. I will argue that this critique reveals the limits of the intellectual affinity between ancient atomism and Deleuzian metaphysics; in particular, that Deleuze’s notions of relationality and spatium respond to problems raised (...) by the relations between atoms and by the not-being of the atomists’ vacuum. In this sense, Deleuze’s treatment of atomism is significant because it makes clear Deleuze’s aim in shifting the mereological vocabulary from points to lines; it shows what, in Deleuze’s sense, it means to unfound and sets down the conditions for a successful Deleuzian critique of essentialist varieties of the metaphysics of structure. (shrink)

Podjęta w artykule problematyka dotyczy słynnej figury Wielkiego Inkwizytora, z którą spotykamy się w filozoficznych rozważaniach Józefa Tischnera; oczywiście, figury wprost zaczerpniętej z kart powieści Fiodora Dostojewskiego. Nie są to zresztą jedyne nawiązania myśli Tischnera do „imaginarium filozoficznego” twórcy Braci Karamazow. Warto zatem przyjrzeć się bliżej temu, co kryje się w „cieniu”, jaki roztacza wokół siebie Wielki Inkwizytor. Rozważania, nolens volens, muszą zatem dotyczyć „darów” Wielkiego Inkwizytora: pozornego dobra i pozornej wolności. Innymi słowy: zapytamy o postać Wielkiego Inkwizytora jako (...) – niepokojącą, wciąż groźną – „centralną postać nowożytnej filozofii władzy”. I Dostojewski, i Tischner przywołują bowiem pytania, które nie dają się prostym sposobem odsunąć i gestem tym niejako unieważnić, nadal stawiają nas przed niebezpieczeństwem „iluzji” politycznej, w której stawką pozostają najwyższe wartości. (shrink)

À partir d’éléments théoriques situés au fondement de sa conception des atmosphères (espace pensé à partir de la présence charnelle vs conception géométrique de l’espace comme topos ou spatium ; notion de Befindlichkeit ou « disposition affective » ; réflexions sur la perception), le présent texte de Gernot Böhme offre une synthèse tout à fait remarquable de ses réflexions tissées entre architecture et atmosphères. Il s’agit dès lors, pour le philosophe allemand, de chercher tout autant à penser la spécificité (...) esthétique de l’architecture que de permettre de situer celle-ci de manière adéquate face aux enjeux du monde contemporain, ou encore d’inciter les architectes à réfléchir leur pratique dans et par le type de rapport à l’espace, au monde et aux hommes qui se manifeste dans la méditation de la notion d’« atmosphères ». (shrink)

Das Buch besteht aus zehn Essays, die sich mit den fur die postmoderne Wende relevanten Mechanismen auseinandersetzen. Indem die Autorin die Moderne als -mannlich-, und die Postmoderne als -weiblich- bestimmt, widmet sie sich auch modernen feminisierten Mannerfiguren und den Typen literarischen Wissens in der avantgardistischen und postmodernen Poetik. Zwei Essays handeln von den kulturellen Stereotypen moderner Nationen sowie vom sozialistischen Imaginarium des Titoistischen Jugoslawiens. Die Autorin bewegt sich souveran und zugleich spielerisch durch die europaische Kultur - von der antiken (...) Philosophie bis zu den neuesten kroatischen Prosaisten. Das essayistische Buch uberzeugt durch seine wissenschaftliche Ernsthaftigkeit, Innovativitat und argumentative Kraft.". (shrink)

Cette contribution se propose de caractériser le personnage de Superman au travers du prisme de la série télévisée Smallville. Prioritairement adressée aux adolescents, elle se consacre largement à représenter les rites de passages, qu’ils soient ceux du jeune garçon appelé à devenir un homme parmi les siens, ou ceux du héros en quête de ses origines, devenu une légende inscrite dans l’imaginaire collectif depuis plus de sept décennies. Notre approche s’appuie sur la possibilité d’une lecture de cette série sur deux (...) plans : celui de la biologie imaginée, cerveau imaginé compris ; et celui du cerveau imaginant. Smallville s’offre, de manière quasi immédiate, à une approche mythopoïétique du parcours super-héroïque donné au cours des dix saisons, jouant sur les thématiques de la mémoire, celle des origines comme celle de la génétique imaginée. Elle permet aussi par sa mise en images insistante des capacités spectaculaires du futur Superman, de mieux comprendre dans quel incubateur neural d’ontologies fantastiques le récit puise cette composante génératrice de son célèbre pouvoir de vol aptère, les expériences « hors-du-corps ». Nous avons pu ainsi distinguer dans les « imaginaires du cerveau », aussi clairement que possible, les apports du cerveau imaginant au cerveau imaginé chez notre super-héros. This contribution aims at unveiling—through episodes of television series Smallville —the complementarity of apparently dissociated aspects of Superman character. Primarily targeted at teenagers, rites of passage are pervasive in Smallville, whether for the young boy to become a man, or for the hero to succeed in the quest of his origins—as he became a legend in the collective imagination over more than seven decades. Our approach dwells on the potentiality to read Smallville on two levels: as so-called “naïve” or intuitive biology, including the imagined brain; as the imagining brain, with its neural correlates of imagination, i.e. biology as counter-intuitive as science may be. Smallville lends itself to a mythopoïetic reading, for the life course of our superhero, focussing on his personal memory issues, deeply concerned both with his origins and what is imagined about his own genetics. Smallville allows also, by the dramatic pageantry of Superman supernatural powers by design, to inquire about the neural incubator of such marvel ontologies, over-intuitively gifted, in Superman mainly his airworthiness for wingless flight, like in so-called oneiric out-of-body experiences. Thus in the brain imaginarium we ended with disentangling what of the over-intuitive sensori-motor experience of the imagining brain was tapped into the imagined brain of our superhero. (shrink)

The modal argument for the existence of a Cartesian human soul proposed by Richard Swinburne more than thirty years ago, if slightly adjusted and interpreted correctly, becomes a plausible argument for anyone who accepts modal arguments. The difficulty consists in a relatively weak justification of the second premise, of the real possibility of a disembodied existence, as a result of which the argument does not provide a real proof. The argument is best understood in the following terms: Special divine action (...) is excluded from the metaphysical possibilities and only the natural possibilities are considered; the “conceivable” possibility of the existence of a person without a body is interpreted as a metaphysical possibility, and inductive support for its reality is provided by apparent first-person-conceivability of a disembodied existence, detailed descriptions of out-of-body and near-death experiences, a priori trust in introspection in psychology and the cognitive sciences, and by the unity of consciousness and the possibility of its extension to peripersonal space; statements about having a soul or being a material substance are excluded from the domain of the premises; and finally, one accepts the Kripkean principle that having a body or a soul is an essential component of a person. If these conditions are met, the argument is valid, and the conclusion is made more plausible by Swinburne’s modal argument than it would be without it.Argumentum modale pro animae humanae “Cartesianae” existentia, quod R. Swinburne ante plures quam 30 annos proposuit, acceptabile reddi potest cuicumque argumenta modalia non generatim respuenti, si paululum emendetur recteque intelligatur. Omnis huius argumenti diffi cultas consistit in iustifi catione debiliore secundae eius praemissae, quo pacto argumentum ineffi cax redditur. Argumentum vero optime intelligetur his quattuor punctis animadversis: Primo, possibilitas metaphysica non nisi possibilitates naturales comprehendere intelligatur, omni speciali Dei ingerentia exclusa. Secundo, personae possibilitas “conceptibilis” sine corpore existendi intelligatur ut realis possibilitas metaphysica. Cui realitati argumenta favent inductiva tum ex possibilitate imaginandi existentiam sine corpore; tum ex minutatim enarratis testimoniis experiendi status “extra corpus” et “prope mortem”; tum ex fi de fundamentali veritatis introspectionis in psychologia scientiis que cognitivis; tum ex unitate conscientiae ac possibilitate eam in spatium extra corpus extendendi. Tertio, e praemissarum congerie assertiones excludantur quibus homo animam habere vel substantiam materialem esse assumeretur. Quarto, principium S. Kripkii accipiatur, scil. corporis vel animae habitum personae essentialem esse debere. His omnibus servatis argumentum Swinburnii validum evadit, conclusionem suam plus credibilem reddens quam secus esset. (shrink)

A key moment in the development of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition is signaled by the introduction, during the discussion of the asymmetric synthesis of the sensible, of the concepts of spatium and intensive quantities. The description of the characteristics of this field of individuation and the type of entities that inhabit it is necessary for thinking the relationship between the differential elements that compose ideas and the state of affairs in which they become incarnated. In other words, in order (...) to define the passage between the virtual and the actual, it is necessary to make use of a “non-divisible transcendental principle” that works as a stage in which certain agents—the spatio-temporal dynamisms—play the role of the genetic principle behind extended reality and its quantitative and qualitative determinations. This dynamic process is what Deleuze calls “the method of dramatisation”. However, even if this reference to theater is crucial in the book’s conceptual economy, it is particularly obscure and elliptical. The aim of this article is to clarify the sense of this reference and the reach of the link between individuation and theater. To achieve this purpose, we will examine closely the use that Deleuze makes of some of Friedrich Hölderlin’s poetological categories in his description of the third passive synthesis of time. (shrink)

En este texto se desarrollan algunas ideas que Kant plantea sobre la ontología de los objetos geométricos. En primer lugar, una vez que se abstraen ciertos componentes de la intuición empírica, queda como resultado la intuición pura. Aquello ocurre porque la intuición pura es la forma de la intuición empírica, es decir, no corresponde a un componente que podría presentarse al margen de aquella. En segundo lugar, las partes del espacio son posteriores a éste, dado que éstas son limitaciones del (...) mismo. A partir de ello, puede afirmarse que las partes del espacio comparten el mismo estatus ontológico que éste. En tercer lugar, el espacio propiamente no existe, aunque se le atribuye una cierta forma de realidad, el ser un ens imaginarium, en virtud de ser forma de los fenómenos, de los cuales sí es posible afirmar que realmente existen. Por lo tanto, a partir de lo anterior puede afirmarse que los objetos geométricos son entia imaginaria. (shrink)

With the rising influence of digitalization and its immense penetration intoeven everyday life, the last decade of the 20th Century addressed to a critical threshold in the successive transformation process of the spatiality in its long-term run. The advanced digital technologies of ubiquitous computing and generative design, as well as the invention of smart materials in late 90’s have all provoked the fluid characteristics of spatiality, and strengthen the transformative capacities of the architectural space through the emergence of computer-augmented territories. (...) Additionally, while they are becoming as the body extensions, the advent of novel apparatuses and gadgets further enhanced the inte- gration of the corporal and incorporal bodies with the spatio-temporal multiplicities, where the hyperdimensionality of the space has been triggered to its outmost range, in relation to the “soft and smart technologically augmented immanent millieu”, in Spuybroek terms. Thus, like Spuybroek points out as the “haptonomist” presence of the body merges itself with these diverse bodily extensions on one hand; and on the other hand, as the rising influence of nomadic view of the world further stimulates the unboundedness and endless fluidity of space, so that the spatiality becomes a landscape of successive transformations, a topology of emergence or a plane of becoming, which is merely defined by lines of forces, and occures as an alive territory rather than a limited space of predefined boarders. Therefore, this evolvable territory which is affectable and being affected by the lines of forces –inner and outer forces–, emerges as an animated existence, an interactive organism. So, by interacting with the Deleuzian Philosophy and their notions like lines of forces, folding, becoming, smooth space, territory, spatium, this article aims to reveal the relevance of these notions in architectural discourse, as well as the emergence of the smooth space in the contemporary architectural practice, by magnifiying one of the very initial examples of its kind; in terms of unfolding the Fresh Water Pavilion of NOX Architecture by Lars Spuybroek into question to reveal the essences of thecontemporary transformable-evolvable architectural spatiality. (shrink)

Ubi Varro de uilla rustica facienda agit, de culina haec monet: in primis culina uidenda ut sit admota, quod ibi hieme antelucanis temponbus aliquot res conficiuntur, cibus paratur ac capitur. Hunc locum legentes sponte nosmet ipsos rogamus, quid sibi uelit illud admota. ‘Prope cellam uilici,’ inquit Keilius , de qua paulo ante sermo est: uilici proximum ianuam cellam esse oportet eumque scire, qui introeat aut exeat noctu quidue ferat, praesertim si ostianus eat nemo. Sed si locum ita interpretamur, quomodo intellegenda (...) est sententia, quae sequitur, causalis: quod ibi hieme cet. ? Num uilicus in cella iacens uel sedens moderari debebat opera, quae mane in culina fiebant ? An idcirco culinam proximam cellae uilici esse oportebat, ut inter utramque paruum spatium interesset, si uilicus ab altera ad alteram commeare uellet ? Et hoc et illud uix credibile est Varronem significare uoluisse. (shrink)

Wprowadzenie -- Platon mitotwórca -- Mit Księcia -- Imaginarium rewolucyjne -- Mit w postkomunistycznej Europie -- Mit i słowo -- Zakonczenie.

The human world is in a state in statu nascendi. Man is emocionaly suspended between history, past, memory and the future. His activity is always the result of the four pillars supporting his existence. He draws his energy from the social imaginarium of which he is a part. The foundations dynamic social space are religion and politics as well as the past and memory.

VBI Varro de uilla rustica facienda agit, de culina haec monet: in primisculina uidenda ut sit admota, quod ibi hieme antelucanis temporibus aliquot res conficiuntur, cibus paratur ac capitur. Hunc locum legentes sponte nosmet ipsos rogamus, quid sibi uelit illud admota. ‘Prope cellam uilici,’ inquit Keilius , de qua paulo ante sermo est: uilici proximum ianuam cellam esse oportet eumque scire, qui introeat aut exeat noctu quidue ferat, praesertim si ostiarius est nemo. Sed si locum ita interpretamur, quomodo intellegenda est (...) sententia, quae sequitur, causalis: quod ibi hieme cet.? Num uilicus in cella iacens uel sedens moderari debebat opera, quae mane in culina fiebant ? An idcirco culinam proximam cellae uilici esse oportebat, ut inter utramque paruum spatium interesset, si uilicus ab altera ad alteram commeare uellet? Et hoc et illud uix credibile est Varronem significare uoluisse. Accedit, quod in uilla rustica culina non prope ianuam est, sed in parte interiore cohortis, quemadmodum docent fundamenta aperta uillae rusticae Pompeianae , et probatur uerbis Vitruuii , qui ita praecipit: ‘in corte culina quam calidissimo loco designetur.’ Quae cum ita se habeat, apud Varronem legendum esse puto: in primis culina uidenda ut sit admota, h.e.ad meridiem spectans . Nam si ita legimus, neque admota suo caret datiuo,1 et perspicuum fit, quid sententia causalis quod ibi hieme cet. sibi uelit. Diligenti enim domino ‘prouidendum’ est, ‘familia ubi uersetur, si fessi opere aut frigore aut calore, ubi commodissime possint se quiete reciperare’ . Talis dominus etiam curabit, ut ‘hieme antelucanis temporibus’ serui ‘aliquot res conficere et cibum parare et capere’ possint loco calidissimo uillae , sed situe hie locus longe an prope a cella uilici, nihil ad rem pertinet. (shrink)