It is shown that the famous quote from Fontenelle in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, “I bow before an eminent man, but my spirit does not bow,” comes from the book On Principles of Morality, written by Abbé Mably. The Fontenelle quote is found in a review of this very book in the Allgemeine Literaturzeitung (No. 21, 1785). This review should further be considered Kant’s source.

Kant was among the first[i] to break decisively with the eudaimonistic tradition of classical ethics by declaring that the moral principle is entirely distinct and divergent from the principle of happiness (G 4:393, KpV 5:21-27).[ii] I am going to argue that what is at issue in Kant’s rejection of eudaimonism is not fundamentally any question of ethical value or the priority among values. On the contrary, on these matters Kant shares the views which led classical ethical theory from Socrates onward (...) to embrace eudaimonism. Instead, where Kant breaks with classical ethics is in the conception of human nature. Kant’s conception of human nature so altered the application of moral principles that it forced a change in the way happiness was conceived, leading to a reversal of what had earlier been thought about the relation of the principle morality to the pursuit of happiness. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag soll gezeigt werden, dass, inwiefern und wieso Rudolf Carnap die Möglichkeit sinnvoller Theologie anerkannt hat. Die These ist, kurz gesagt: Es gibt nach Carnap sinnvolle Theologie. Es lohnt sich, das zu zeigen, da oberflächliche Rezeption der Legende Vorschub leistet, nach Carnap sei alle Theologie Unsinn. Kant und Frege hielten sinnvolle Theologie klarerweise für möglich. Kant zweifelte nicht daran, mit dem Satz „Gott ist“ oder „Es ist ein Gott“ (KrV, B 627) sagen zu können, was er für nachweislich (...) unwissbar (KrV, B 668f.) und für wahr (KpV, AA 5, 125) hielt. Carnaps Ansicht hingegen ist bemerkenswert, wenn man an die wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung des Wiener Kreises und den Versuch ihrer semantischen Fundierung denkt. Man kann diese Ansicht nachweisen durch aufmerksame Lektüre eines Ausschnitts aus Carnaps berühmtem Aufsatz „Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache“ (1931). (shrink)

RESUMENEste trabajo describe y examina críticamente la obra mencionada, cuya tesis final es la infinitud del hombre y su divinización por el Kant maduro. Su mérito consiste en (i) realizar una minu- 1 «Existe Dios en nosotros. La identidad de Dios y la razón pura práctica en la Crítica de la razón práctica de Kant». En lo que sigue abrevio el nombre del autor con las siglas «GS», y el de esta obra con las siglas «TGS». ciosa lectura de los (...) postulados de la KpV, que permite descubrir una interna problematicidad no considerada antes, y (ii) proponer como solución a ella la existencia de una naturaleza dual en el hombre (homo phänomenon - homo noumenon). Aunque la obra adolece de ambigüedades tanto en las nociones básicas como en la tesis propuesta, eso no obsta para que sus aportaciones, de gran relevancia, deban ser tenidas seriamente en cuenta.PALABRAS CLAVEHISTORIA DE LA FILOSOFÍA MODERNA; I. KANT; POSTULADOS DE LA RAZÓN PRÁCTICA; DIOS; INFINITUD DEL HOMBRE; ANTROPONOMÍA.ABSTRACTThis note reviews and critically examines the book mentioned in its title. The main thesis of this book is the infiniteness and divinization of human being that can be found in the writings of the late Kant. The book examined has two merits: (i) by means of an exhaustive reading of the postulates of Kant’s «Critique of Practical Reason», it manages to bring to light an internal inconsistency in these postulates; (ii) it proposes the existence of a dual nature in human being (homo phänomenon - homo noumenon) as the solution to that inconsistency. Though the book suffers from ambiguities and inaccuracy both in the basic notions employed and the main thesis advanced, it makes significant contributions that must be seriously taken into account.KEY WORDSHISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY, I. KANT, PRACTICAL REASON’S POSTULATES, GOD, HUMAN BEING’S INFINITENESS, ANTROPONOMY. (shrink)

The chapter of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason entitled “Table of the categories of liberty, in relation to the concepts of good and evil”, to which this year the Bonn conference “Kant und die ‘Kategorien der Freiheit’” was devoted, today still arouses many questions: is the table of the categories of liberty sufficient to cover the whole practical domain, including that of the empirically conditioned? And if this is the case, what is the meaning of the genitive “of liberty”, and (...) to which Kantian concept of liberty do the categories owe their name? Are they concepts of autonomous volition, referable exclusively to good and evil as Gut and Böse or also to Wohl and Weh? And since “practical concepts a priori … soon become knowledge” (KpV A 116), in what does practical knowledge consist, and what is its relationship with the practical conscience of the subject, with Gewissen? In the present panorama of German research on Kant, Heiner F. Klemme, Jochen Bojanowski, Dieter Sturma, José M. Torralba, Christian Krijnen, Stephen Zimmermann and Hans F. Fulda endeavour to give an answer to such issues and make an important contribution to present-day research on Kantian problems of practical judgment and the meanings of liberty and of the logical functions of the categories. (shrink)

: Kant speaks of our capacity to be “self-determining […] in certain […] laws holding firm a priori”. Here the “laws” refer to the categories of freedom introduced in KpV. The categories of freedom, then, are necessary for self-determination. I first explain how Kant employs the notion of determination in his theoretical philosophy. I then explain how the notion is utilized also in his practical philosophy, particularly in connection to the act of determining the forms of willing that make morality (...) possible. I conclude by answering the question, Why are the categories of freedom necessary for self-determination? Understanding why the categories of freedom are required for self-determination will also help clarify the nature and function of Kant’s categories of freedom, which have puzzled many scholars. (shrink)

Supererogation seems to be an important concept of common sense morality. However, assuming the existence of such a category seems to pose a serious problem for Kantian Ethics, given the all-encompassing role of duty. In fact, Kant seems to deny the possibility of such acts when he states in the second critique that “[b]y exhortation to actions as noble, sublime, and magnanimous, minds are attuned to nothing but moral enthusiasm and exaggerated self-conceit; [...] they are led into the delusion that (...) it is not duty […] which constitutes the determining ground of their actions […]”. (KpV, AA V, 84f.). This paper’s aim is to show that even though it is not possible to include a category of supererogation within Kantian Ethics, the recognition of alleged supererogatory acts is not only a source of self-deception, as Kant seems to fear, but can also serve as a source of self-knowledge. Starting from the premise that within Kantian Ethics self-knowledge is indispensable to aspire to the duties of moral self-perfection, I will argue that supererogation is only a plausible concept regarding the observer-perspective: thus it describes an act that, given the observer's own moral development, seems to be beyond duty but for the agent herself is not. Given an observer has the insight that her judgment relies on her own deficiencies to act accordingly, this fulfills an epistemic function in the process of developing one’s own moral capacities. This seems to be a fairly proper phenomenological account of supererogation as it can, on the one hand, explain the common moral intuition that certain acts are supererogatory. While on the other hand, it can capture the empirical observation that agents of alleged supererogatory acts usually do not perceive their actions as supererogatory because the differing perspectives of the agent and the observer constitute an integral part of the given account. (shrink)