Nous défendons ici l’hypothèse que l’irruption de la langue du vouloir ( uelle ) chez Sénèque n’est pas sans effet sur la représentation stoïcienne du telos, contre un certain nombre d’interprétations qui dénient à cette innovation lexicale la moindre originalité par rapport à la psychologie stoïcienne hellénistique. Le telos est réinscrit dans la perspective de la traversée de la conflictualité psychique dont le vouloir ( uelle ), dans sa constance, constitue la résolution. C’est dire combien la subjectivation engage le destin (...) du désir, celui d’un conflit porté par la uoluntas, envisagée donc dans toute son historicité, et à ce titre devenue principe d’identité personnelle. Le telos fait apparaître plus explicitement qu’avant un sujet du vouloir, tout à la fois comme principe et comme effet du processus de subjectivation. (shrink)

Approaching the study of literature as a unique form of the philosophy of language and mind--as a study of how we produce nonsense and imagine it as sense--this ...

The academic dominance of cultural studies and the increasing interest and significance of cultural conflict in our world has encouraged various theories of culture, the most pervasive being theories of transculture and hybrid cultural forms and entities. In this guest column, Bourbon argues that all such trans theories are fundamentally flawed and distort the very idea of culture. His essay analyzes the concept of transobjects and transcultures, looking both at the assumptions supporting such objects and ideas and at their explanatory (...) uses. This discussion leads to one on the relationship between texts and contexts. Most cultural theories, and all transcultural theories, confuse the relationship between texts and contexts, specifically misusing the idea of the conditions of possibility, while relying on various forms of personification. Bourbon both criticizes these ideas and also offers a more modest idea of culture, along with specific suggestions on how to study and understand what we call “products of culture,” including fictions and ourselves. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Wittgenstein’s PrefaceBrett BourbonIn his preface to Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein admits his failure to make his book anything more than an interrelated collection of remarks: "After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into... a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks." The fragmented character of Investigations is matched by its other formal oddities and difficulties: (...) its metaphors, its cryptic evocative obscurity about some things and its linguistic precision about others, its dramatization of philosophical positions in stories, in hypothetical worlds, and in the role of the interlocutor(s). Our initial and continual problem in reading Investigations is to understand the reason for its form, and to justify this form relative to its philosophical concerns and methods. I will argue that the justification of the form of Investigations comes down to a single question: how do we take up Wittgenstein's example—in thinking and in confusion—without mimicking him?IThe justification pursued in the preface bears affinities with theological justification, defined as our becoming righteous relative to God, as Calvin characterizes it, "an acceptation, whereby God receiving us into [End Page 428] favour, taketh us for righteous" (Institutes III. xi. §2).1 Righteousness as a mark of acceptation, the very tone of "righteousness" and God's power of acceptation, have no direct counterparts in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Philosophical justification does not have a doctrinal foundation that would establish any particular content nor any special relation between the pursuit of that justification (through philosophy) and its fulfillment, even hypothetically, in some possible acknowledgment of righteousness. The seriousness betrayed by Investigations need for justification, however, is expressed in the moral fervor of Wittgenstein's philosophizing. It is also his philosophical goal to encourage a kind of acceptation that the ground of our involvement in the world, in what constrains and confuses us, is no more than how we live and what we are: "Instead of the unanalyzsable, specific, indefinable; the fact that we act in such-and-such ways, e.g. punish certain actions, establish the state of affairs thus and so, give orders, render accounts, describe colours, take an interest in other's feelings. What has to be accepted, the given—it might be said—are facts of living" (Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, §630; c.f. PI, p. 226d).2 The translators comment in a footnote that a variant for "facts of living" in Wittgenstein's manuscript is "forms of life." What has to be accepted are forms of life.The form of Investigations is justified as part of a discovery, with or without a supporting theology, of how to move ourselves toward some greater form of perfection (although not to reach it). The Protestant cast of this justification, in Wittgenstein's case, is just (and I wouldn't want to extend it further) that while this justification is achieved by virtue of our effort, it is not effort towards the world, but towards our intransigent will, and that the grace that might enable our work is less a gift, than a condition within which we can struggle.3 Thus, "what has to be overcome," in philosophy, "is not the difficulty of the understanding but of the will" (CV, p.17).4 Philosophy for Wittgenstein is a form of self-education. One works on the will in order to see differently: but the will is neither a thing nor a faculty. Working on the will is not a psychological project of self-reform, but a reconstitution of our attitude toward what we take as necessary. We can describe such attitudes with the vocabulary of the passions by which express or curb our will: devotion, derision, hope, fear, confidence, indignation, pride, repentance, emulation, gratitude, consternation, daring, timidity, and so on. And thus "philosophy is a work on the will" is kind of maxim to help us remember a kind of attitude, purpose, and justification.I will derive an agnostic notion of justification from its Protestant [End Page 429] theological form, retaining its moral force and claim on our person, but without psychologizing it, with minimal doctrinal content, and without God. This is... (shrink)

This paper focuses on the materialistic account of the blending and the way it shapes an original organism model. I aim to shed light on the threads of connections we can gather between the Presocratic and the Stoic views on the physical krasis of the body. The Stoics share with Parmenides and Empedocles the idea of a single material cosmic continuum in which thought and perception depend on the various blendings of the physical constituents of the body. Both of these (...) naturalistic traditions are committed to the view that substance is continuous and undergoes constant and qualitative change. My point is to underline how this view of a sympathetic cosmos presupposes a model of the individuality that is radically open. Thus, by taking off the notion of the krasis, the Stoics take off a problem – namely, that of the organism – that is first fleshed out by the Presocratics – Parmenides and Empedocles in particular – philosophers. In this respect, the Stoic view of relational identity indebts to the Presocratic account, beyond and against the Aristotelian one. (shrink)

Jane Austen and the powers of description. Disciplines of description -- Reading ignorance into sense -- Elizabeth Bennet, the Socrates of descriptive reason -- Frank and impertinent: paradiastolic descriptions -- An excursus on Richard Rorty and Lady Catherine -- Fanny's garden thoughts -- Reasoning by description -- Coda: "Part hawk, part man" -- The apprehension of power and life. The cook and the count: a psychological anthropology of tyranny -- Is power coercive? -- A parable of action and event -- (...) The afflictions of life: Montale's poetic description of flux -- What is a life? -- A concluding postscript. (shrink)

Marion Bourbon Que l’activité philosophique chez la plupart des philosophes antiques ait prétendu disposer d’une fonction thérapeutique, psychothérapeutique, nous le savons bien, tant cette dernière s’est explicitement pensée sur le modèle médical. Il ne faut néanmoins pas oublier qu’alors, dans le même temps, c’est la médecine elle-même qui s’est trouvée apparentée à la philosophie en ce qu’elle suppose intrinsèquement un usage du logos, ce que Platon le premier pose sans ambages. Cette métaphore de la philosophie comme thérapie a aussi ressurgi (...) plus récemment en philosophie analytique, sous la plume de Wittgenstein pour lequel « la philosophie traite une question comme une maladie ». Mais jusqu’à quel point s’agit-il de dire la même chose? (shrink)

A poem is not particular in the way a painting is particular. A copy of a poem is still the poem, while a copy of a painting is not the painting. But a poem is still particular, since it seems to be constituted by a specific set of words in a specific order such that to alter that order or any of those words is to make a new poem. Marianne Moore begins her poem “An Egyptian Pulled Glass Bottle in (...) the Shape of a Fish” in the following way: She might have revised this and replaced “perpendicularity” with “verticality.” This says the same thing, but it is not the same poem. The particularity of a poem, relative to the words that make it up, constitutes a... (shrink)

Music’s original philosophical problem is ontological: what is it? In this paper, I argue that music has a better philosophical beginning; philosophical accounts of music should begin as philosophical accounts of listening to music. What distinguishes listening to music from hearing sound? My aim is to give a philosophical account of music by means of a description of a particular kind of interactive relationship we sometimes have to sound. Music, I shall argue, is not distinguished from sound because it has (...) a special metaphysical status or because of the psychological reactions it produces in us; musical sound is distinctive because we listen to it in a certain way. I explore some of the ontological implications of my account, both for music broadly speaking and for the ontology of musical works. (shrink)

This paper aims to shed light on Plato’s myth of Er contribution to the emergence of a conception of choice as a principle of identity. Our hypothesis is that this myth brings out what is a real choice and that only philosophy enable us to make it. Philosophy as a way of life is that according to it our choice of life become a free choice and a principle of identity — because this first choice determines all the others in (...) the entire life. From this view, I propose to assign Cicero’s voluntas and Epictetus’s prohairesis — as faculty of choice and principle of personal identity — to this point of the myth : philosophy appears as the way to make the choice to choose. In this regard, we are our choices. (shrink)