Abstract

Hume is famous for having introduced a radical theory of the nature of causation. To say that A causes B is just to say that A is constantly conjoined with B and that experience of the conjunction determines the mind to expect the one on the appearance of the other. It was this theory that awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumbers and established Hume as a founding figure of the various forms of positivism that emerged from the nineteenth century. A. J. Ayer, for instance, records how the Vienna Circle in its manifesto of 1929 officially included Hume as a precursor of the movement: “Those who stand closest to the Vienna Circle in their general outlook are Hume and Mach. It is remarkable how much of the doctrine that is now thought to be especially characteristic of logical positivism was already stated, or at least foreshadowed by Hume.” But this interpretation is mistaken. Hume’s conception of causation is not positivistic but skeptical. Hume did present the above constant conjunction account of causation, but what is generally ignored is that he was dissatisfied and skeptical about it. In what follows I wish to explore the rationale of Hume’s skepticism about causation. I shall show that Hume understood the constant conjunction account to operate against the conceptual background of a theistic vision of the world. Hume does not think that any constant conjunction causal explanation is adequate because we do not and cannot understand the mind of God.