Abstract

In his discussion of causation, Hume classified four prima facie conditions for causation: namely, contiguity, succession, constant conjunction, and necessary connection. The first three chapters are devoted to the analysis of those four conditions, and in the final chapter an attempt is made to examine the controversial notion of natural necessity in the context of Hume's own philosophy. The content of each chapter can be summarized as follows: ;Chapter I: Contiguity and Succession. According to Hume, contiguity and succession are individually necessary conditions for causation. First we ask what is meant by 'contiguity' and 'succession', and then try to show that both of them may not be necessary conditions for causation. ;Chapter II: Constant Conjunction. What we principally question in this chapter is what Hume really meant by 'constant conjunction' and whether or not the distinction between causation and non-causation can be mde in terms of constant conjunction. The major conclusion of this chapter is that since it is not made clear in Hume's theory of causation how a resemblance class relevant to causation can be determined, it is not clear, either, in Hume's theory how causation could be distinguished from mere chance, and consequently, constant conjunction is not a sufficient, though a necessary, condition for causation. ;Chapter III: Necessary Connection. If the distinction is made between causation and non-causation in Hume's theory, it must be only in terms of the notion of necessary connection. What we want to do in this chapter is to ask what necessity really is, in Hume's view, and to show that a certain inconsistency follows from Hume's view of necessity. ;Chapter IV: Natural Necessity. Hume's official theory of causation involves a dilemma: either it can make the distinction between causation and mere chance but at the cost of its being a mere psychological theory, or if it wants to get rid of psychologism, it cannot successfully make the distinction in question. This dilemma arises mainly because Hume did not make it precise how a relevant resemblance class can be determined, and because necessity in his official theory is a psychological necessity. In this final chapter an attempt is made to give a new interpretation of Hume's view of necessity, and thus, to propose a possible way of constructing a theory of causation which will remedy the defects of Hume's official theory of causation