"The Problem of Epistemic Regress" in Contemporary Epistemology and The Adequacy of Improved Solution Suggestions

Felsefe Dünyasi 71 (2020)
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Abstract

The Problem of Epistemic Regress in Contemporary Epistemology and The Adequacy of Improved Solution Suggestions One of the main problems of epistemology; whether our beliefs about the world are correct or not, that is to say, it’s the problem of whether we have suitable reasons or not to think that we have the enough knowledge. The value of our beliefs and its epistemic justifiability are being examined through this problem. In this respect, Undoubtedly; one of the greatest problem of contemporary epistemology is the problem of epistemic regress that is a problem of justification. On the other hand the solution suggestions developed for this problem, which is shown as a threat factor for the knowledge in point, don’t seem sufficient. In this article, the problem of epistemic regress which is emerging in the contemporary period will be discussed by examining the perspectives of tradition and contemporary epistemology. Four different and similar basic approaches that arise resulting from the problem of regress solution proposals brought by foundationalism, compatibilism, externalism and internalism will be analyzed.

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Yunus Kalkan
Ankara University (PhD)

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Ernest Sosa ve gettier problemi.Kemal Batak - 2016 - Ethos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 9 (2).
Gerekçelendirilmiş Doğru İnanç Bilgi Midir?E. Gettier - 1999 - Felsefe Tartismalari 24:141-143.

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