Meno’s Paradox is an Epistemic Regress Problem

Logos and Episteme 10 (1):107-120 (2019)
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Abstract

I give an interpretation according to which Meno’s paradox is an epistemic regress problem. The paradox is an argument for skepticism assuming that (1) acquired knowledge about an object X requires prior knowledge about what X is and (2) any knowledge must be acquired. (1) is a principle about having reasons for knowledge and about the epistemic priority of knowledge about what X is. (1) and (2) jointly imply a regress-generating principle which implies that knowledge always requires an infinite sequence of known reasons. Plato’s response to the problem is to accept (1) but reject (2): some knowledge is innate. He argues from this to the conclusion that the soul is immortal. This argument can be understood as a response to an Eleatic problem about the possibility of coming into being that turns on a regress-generating causal principle analogous to the regress-generating principle presupposed by Meno’s paradox.

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Andrew Cling
University of Alabama, Huntsville

Citations of this work

Why Are There Two Versions of Meno’s Paradox?Douglas A. Shepardson - 2022 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):465-486.

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The epistemic regress problem.Andrew D. Cling - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):401 - 421.

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