The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure -- Corrected

Mind 121 (482):457-466 (2012)
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Abstract

This essay corrects an error in the presentation of the Paradox of the Knowledge-Plus Knower, which is the variant of Kaplan and Montague’s Knower Paradox presented in C. Cross 2001: ‘The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure,’ MIND, 110, pp. 319–33. The correction adds a universally quantified transitivity principle for derivability as an additional assumption leading to paradox. This correction does not affect the status of the Knowledge-Plus paradox as a rebuttal to an argument against epistemic closure, since the quantified transitivity principle is true in the standard model of arithmetic and therefore innocuous.

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Charles B. Cross
University of Georgia