Die Frage nach dem Individuationsprinzip. Eine vergleichende Analyse der Diskussionslage in der analytischen Ontologie und bei Duns Scotus

Philosophisches Jahrbuch 123 (1):3-22 (2016)
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Abstract

The question of the principle of individuation in current analytical philosophy was the subject of medieval discussions, too, in which not only similar proposals of solutions emerged, but also dilemmas invoked by the set of then-discussed proposals appeared. Duns Scotus criticizes the previous theories of individuation and suggests that the difficulties could be avoided by changing the viewpoint from the categorical-quiditative to the transcendental-modal understanding of the principle of individuation. Scotus’ solution is close to the theory of naked substrates, because the substrate and “thisness” act as individuators with modal character. From the relecture of Scotus’ modal understanding of the principle of individuation may arise inspirations that need to be considered in comparison with modern analytical theories of individuation and thus they can be enriched.

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