This paper examines the soul-turning metaphor in Book 7 of Plato’s Republic. It argues that the failure to find a consistent reading of how the metaphor is used has contributed to a number of long-standing disagreements, especially concerning the more famous metaphor with which it is intertwined, the Cave allegory. A full reading of the metaphor, as it occurs throughout Book 7, is offered, with particularly close attention to what is one of the most difficult and stubbornly divisive passages in (...) Book 7, 532b6–d1. (shrink)

This paper defends a reading of eikasia—the lowest kind of cognition in the Divided Line—as a kind of empirical cognition that Plato appeals to when explaining, among other things, the origin of ethical error. The paper has two central claims. First, eikasia with respect to, for example, goodness or justice is not different in kind to eikasia with respect to purely sensory images like shadows and reflections: the only difference is that in the first case the sensory images include representations (...) of value properties. Second, eikasia is not the bare awareness of images or simply a label for an error (mistaking image for original) but a kind of empirical, image-confined cognition, and one that has an important part to play in characterising the cognitive abilities of the non-rational parts of the soul. (shrink)

In book 10 of the Republic we find a new argument for the division of the soul. The argument’s structure is similar to the arguments in book 4 but, unlike those arguments, it centres on a purely cognitive conflict: believing and disbelieving the same thing, at the same time. The argument presents two interpretive difficulties. First, it assumes that a conflict between a belief and an appearance—e.g. disbelieving that a stick partially immersed in water is, as it appears, bent—entails a (...) conflict between beliefs. Prima facie, there is only one belief, the belief that contradicts the appearance. Second, it is unclear what parts of the soul Plato intends to divide between: some argue that it is, as in book 4, a partition between a rational and a non-rational part; others argue that it is a new partition between a higher and a lower subdivision of the rational part. This paper offers solutions to both difficulties through an analysis of what Plato means by φαινόμενα, ‘appearances’, and δόξαι, ‘beliefs’. It is argued, first, that the relevant appearances are entirely sensory but nonetheless sufficiently belief-like to (a) warrant being called δόξαι and (b) oppose, by themselves, our beliefs; there is no need for a third mental state, a belief that assents to the appearance. A second claim concerns a central line in the argument, 602e4–6, that has served as the primary evidence that the partition is within the rational part of the soul. Those who wish to avoid this conclusion generally resort to alternative, and less natural, translations of 602e4–6. It is argued that this is unnecessary: once we have correctly understood sensory appearances, we see that the standard translation of 602e4–6 in fact entails a division between a rational and a non-rational part of the soul. (shrink)

This paper takes a detailed look at the Republic’s Divided Line analogy and considers how we should respond to its most contentious implication: that pistis and dianoia have the same degree of ‘clarity’ (σαφήνεια). It argues that we must take this implication at face value and that doing so allows us to better understand both the analogy and the nature of dianoia.

This paper presents an account of the ethical and conceptual relationship between free speech and press freedom. Many authors have argued that, despite there being some common ground between them, these two liberties should be treated as properly distinct, both theoretically and practically. The core of the argument, for this “unbundling” approach, is that conflating free speech and press freedom makes it too easy for reasonable democratic regulations on press freedom to be portrayed, by their opponents, as part of a (...) programme of illiberal censorship. While we acknowledge the important grain of truth in that argument, we try to show how the alternative, “unbundling” approach can also be used to undermine or mischaracterise democratically justifiable opposition to media regulations in despotic regimes. In light of the problems on both sides, we defend a contextually-variable account of the relation between these two liberties. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the translation of a line in Plato's description of the ‘greatest accusation’ against imitative poetry, Republic 606a3–b5. This line is pivotal in Plato's account of how poetry corrupts its audience and is one of the Republic's most complex and interesting applications of his partite psychology, but it is misconstrued in most recent translations, including the most widely used. I argue that an examination of the text and reflections on Platonic psychology settle the translation decisively.

I offer a reading of the two conceptions of the good found in Plato’s Protagoras: the popular conception—‘the many’s’ conception—and Socrates’ conception. I pay particular attention to the three kinds of goods Socrates introduces: (a) bodily pleasures like food, drink, and sex; (b) instrumental goods like wealth, health, or power; and (c) virtuous actions like courageously going to war. My reading revises existing views about these goods in two ways. First, I argue that the many are only ‘hedonists’ in a (...) very attenuated sense. They do not value goods of kind (b) simply as means to pleasures of kind (a); rather, they have fundamentally different attitudes to (a) and (b). Second, the hedonism that Socrates’ defends includes a distinction between kinds of pleasures: (a) bodily pleasures and (c) the pleasures of virtuous actions. This distinction between kinds of pleasures—some that do and some that do not exert the ‘power of appearance’—allows Socrates to address one of the central beliefs in the popular conception of akrasia, namely that it involves a special kind of unruly desire: non-rational appetites for pleasures like food, drink, or sex. Socrates replaces the motivational push of non-rational appetites with the epistemic pull of the appearance of immediate pleasures like food, drink, and sex. (shrink)

We argue that ritual is not a by-product as Boyer & Lienard (B&L) claim, but rather an evolved adaptation for social communication that facilitates non-agonistic social interactions among non-kin. We review the neurophysiological effects of ritual and propose neural structures and networks beyond the cortical-striato-pallidal-thalamic circuit (CSPT) likely to be implicated in ritual. The adaptationist approach to ritual offers a more parsimonious model for understanding these effects as well as the findings B&L present. (Published Online February 8 2007).

Part 1 What Do Teachers Need to Know? Part 2 What Makes a Good Teacher? Part 3 Being a Teacher?

The article starts by offering a definition of fake kindness focused on the dissociation between the behavioural components of kindness and the intent to sincerely pay some heed to the needs of others. Using the sociological theory of Pierre Bourdieu, this definition is then used to articulate how fake kindness can be conceptualized as a specific form of symbolic violence. Such a view allows explanations as to how and why the prevalence and effectiveness of fake kindness vary according to microsociological (...) norms and values. The generic definition and conceptualization of fake kindness as a form of symbolic violence are then used to discuss how nursing’s enthrallment with the concept of caring and its operationalization as a moral compass likely fosters the growth of fake kindness within the profession. In this view, the institutional enforcement of propriety and well-behaved professionalism is more likely to lead to toxic environments than to healthy workplaces. We hope that being able to understand how professional norms and institutional rules are sometimes turned into social tools to enforce obedience and existing hierarchies can empower victims of those phenomena to resist them more effectively. It might also contribute to increasing the awareness of well-meaning nurses or people in position of authority who have been socialized in environments where fake kindness is normalized. (shrink)

Thinking and acting in favor of sustainable development is internationally recognized; it is necessary but societies and individuals are slow to adopt an appropriate behavior. International organizations such as World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology recommend to opt for frugality, a principle emphasized to avoid over-consumption and consequently the depletion of natural resources. This article thus examines the principle of frugality by proving that it is not necessarily related to consumption as it is understood since the (...) Enlightenment: we have to take into account the Asian perspective that changes the relationship between humankind and nature, first taking into consideration the good of the whole community. I argue that frugality is not necessarily in conflict with economy but certainly challenging it as expressed by the Indian terms Jugaad or Gandhian: a way of thinking and creating new projects that lead to fruitful solutions for the majority. Therefore I intend to provide a positive definition of frugality as a way of creating new projects that lead to fruitful solutions for the majority. (shrink)

In this book the author considers data from both early and later schools of Buddhism in an attempt to provide an overall characterization of the structure of Buddhist ethics. The importance of ethics in the Buddha's teachings is widely acknowledged, but the pursuit of ethical ideals has up to now been widely held to be secondary to the attainment of knowledge. Drawing on the Aristotelian tradition of ethics the author argues against this intellectualization of Buddhism and in favour of a (...) new understanding of the tradition in terms of which ethics plays an absolutely central role. In the course of this reassessment many basic concepts such as karma, nirvana, and the Eightfold Path, are reviewed and presented in a fresh light. The book will be of interest to readers with a background in either Buddhist studies or comparative religious ethics. (shrink)

This essay extends the observations made in E. Johanna Hartelius’ The rhetoric of expertise about the nature of expertise in digital contexts. I argue that digital media introduce a scale of communication—many-to-many—that reshapes how the invention of knowledge occurs. By examining how knowledge production on Wikipedia occurs, I illustrate how many-to-many communication introduces a new model of “participatory expertise.” This model of participatory expertise challenges traditional information routines by elevating procedural expertise over subject matter expertise and opening up knowledge production (...) to the many. Additionally, by hosting multiperspectival conversations on Wikipedia, the participatory model of expertise introduces epistemic turbulence into traditionally tranquil encyclopedia culture. (shrink)

La théorie des transferts culturels permet de penser la circulation et la mutation des messages entre les cultures. Elle a élargi son horizon notamment grâce à l’émergence de quatre théories élaborées au tournant des années 2004-2006 : l’histoire croisée, la médiation artistique, le champ culturel transnational et les transfer studies. Ces dernières peuvent contribuer à repenser les aires culturelles par une étude des imbrications et les tensions qui existent entre les aires culturelles, les espaces et les territoires.

La théorie des transferts culturels permet de penser la circulation et la mutation des messages entre les cultures. Elle a élargi son horizon notamment grâce à l’émergence de quatre théories élaborées au tournant des années 2004-2006 : l’histoire croisée, la médiation artistique, le champ culturel transnational et les transfer studies. Ces dernières peuvent contribuer à repenser les aires culturelles par une étude des imbrications et les tensions qui existent entre les aires culturelles, les espaces et les territoires.

This paper discusses ethical issues related to social work practice in the area of mental health. It does so via the use of a case study taken from my practice whilst I was on placement. Ethical issues are explored within a practice context that is becoming increasingly proceduralised and risk averse, and where protectionist responses contribute to undermining the rights of service users to self-determination. The paper explores the relationship between utilitarian and Kantian ethical theory and ethical decision-making as well (...) as commenting on the usefulness of an anti-oppressive ethical perspective. (shrink)

Burt's critique of using polygenic scores in social science conflates the “scientific costs” of sociogenomics with “sociopolitical and ethical” concerns. Furthermore, she paradoxically enlists recent advances in controlling for environmental confounding to argue such confounding is scientifically “intractable.” Disinterested social scientists should support ongoing efforts to improve this technology rather than obstructing progress and excusing genetically confounded research.

Existing predominant approaches within virtue ethics (VE) assume humans as the typical agent and virtues as dispositions that pertain primarily to human–human interpersonal relationships. Similarly, the main accounts in the more specific area of environmental virtue ethics (EVE) tend to support weak anthropocentric positions, in which virtues are understood as excellent dispositions of human agents. In addition, however, several EVE authors have also considered virtues that benefit non-human beings and entities (e.g., environmental or ecological virtues). The latter correspond to excellent (...) character dispositions that would extend moral consideration and care for the benefit of non-human beings, entities, or entire ecosystems. In this direction, a few authors have argued that EVE could be considered non-anthropocentric insofar as it could: (a) promote non-human ends, well-being, and the flourishing of non-human beings and entities; (b) involve significant relations to non-humans. Drawing from different traditions, including ecofeminism and care ethics, we argue for a broader notion of self and a decentered notion of virtues. The broader notion of selfhood corresponds to the “ecological self”, one that can be enacted by both human and non-human beings, is embedded in a network of relations, and recognizes the more-than-human world as fundamental and yet indispensable otherness. We suggest that this broader notion of agency allows for an expansive understanding of virtues that includes a-moral functional ecological virtues, which can be exercised not only by humans but also by certain non-human beings. This alternative understanding of selfhood and ecological virtues within EVE could have several theoretical and practical implications, some of which may enable different types of agencies and transform collective action. (shrink)

Dans la galerie des monstres que l’histoire tératologique de la politique développera, une dimension constamment rémane : la sursexualisation du Prince, la déification de et par la puissance virile. Le membre dressé du Prince devient la métaphore euphorique de l’érection d’un pouvoir, son porte-bonheur. Symbole de sa toute-puissance, lieu privilégié de son affirmation, le sexe..

The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed a growing interest in Buddhism, and it continues to capture the imagination of many in the West who see it as either an alternative or a supplement to their own religious beliefs. Numerous introductory books have appeared in recent years to cater to this growing interest, but almost none devotes attention to the specifically ethical dimensions of the tradition. For various complex cultural and historical reasons, ethics has not received as much attention (...) in traditional Buddhist thought as it has in the West. Written by Damien Keown, one of the few experts worldwide who specializes in the area, Buddhist Ethics illustrates how Buddhism might approach a range of contemporary morals ranging from abortion to euthanasia, sexuality to cloning, and even war and economics. (shrink)

Harmony is a generally agreed-upon idea in international and diplomatic discourse. A common theme in multiple traditions of thought, Platonist and Confucian among others, it underlies today’s significant investments in musical activism, cultural diplomacy, conflict resolution and peace building. Yet despite this wide currency and long history, the idea of harmony seldom receives more than liminal attention in political theory. In the context of Western thought, an essay written in the 1830s by the French philosopher Jean Reynaud offers a striking (...) point of departure: Reynaud defines diplomacy as ‘the science of harmony among states’. This article, drawing from Reynaud’s text as well from the wider history of music, art and political thought, maps a series of conceptual fault lines that touch on the concept’s function in international thought; the inscription of difference, dissonance, conflict and even war within the idea of harmony; the hegemonic and imperial temptations harmony encompasses and legitimizes; and the theoretical sources of harmony in nature and artifice. In effect, the concept of harmony offers less a blueprint than a forum for imagining peace. (shrink)

Michel Serres a été l’un des premiers philosophes à reconnaître, dès les années 1990, l’enjeu planétaire des crises écologiques et la rupture anthropologique que constitue ce que l’on nomme aujourd’hui l’Anthropocène. Sa philosophie offre des ressources précieuses non seulement pour penser mais aussi pour imaginer cette nouvelle condition terrestre. Cet article s’attache précisément aux dimensions imaginantes des crises écologiques, aux niveaux phénoménologique, épistémique et pragmatique. Suivant Serres, l’article montre que la philosophie ne peut plus négliger le monde et qu’elle doit (...) contribuer à inventer de nouvelles relations avec la nature-Biogée, notamment en déployant les puissances critiques et créatives de l’imagination. (shrink)

The author had had a plan for a kind of melodrama constructed around two orders of motivation. In the foreground of the stage, there was to be a series of realistic incidents, dealing with typical human situations, such as family quarrels, scenes at a business office, lovers during courtship, a public address by a spell-binder, etc. In the background, like a set of comments on this action, there was to be a primeval forest filled with mythically prehistoric monsters, marauding and (...) fighting in silent pantomime. These two realms were to have no overt connection with each other. The monsters in the "prehistoric" background would pay no attention to the everyday persons of the... (shrink)

In Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, the playwright depicts the punishment of Prometheus by the tyrannical Zeus. Zeus’ subordinates understand his tyranny to be characterized by an absolute freedom of action. Yet the tyrant’s absolute freedom as ruler is called into question by insecurity of his position and by his dependence on Prometheus’ knowledge. We find in the Prometheus Bound a model of tyrannical rule riddled with contradictions: The tyrant’s claim to total control and absolute freedom is in tension with a reality (...) characterized by insecurity, impotence, and constraint. We contrast this model of rule with the model found in Aeschylus’ Suppliant Maidens, in which the King, agreeing to be bound by the wishes of his subjects, nevertheless preserves for himself a certain freedom of action that the tyrannical ruler lacks. (shrink)

This paper proposes a deep analysis of the latest research of digital humanities scholar Beatrice Fazi, and especially her critique of computational automation, to understand the roles of digital creative technologies, and more specifically of creative software. After a close analysis of Fazi’s main contribution to a new understanding of computational aesthetics, we will briefly outline the potential implications of her work to understand the contemporary evolution of creative software, and especially the implementation of machine learning algorithms in these kinds (...) of software. This will lead us to contextualise the contemporary anxieties regarding how machines could replace humans in the act of artistic creation. (shrink)

Summary‘Among the fine arts, I clearly see something to say only about architecture, sculpture, painting. As for music, dance […], I see nothing’. Tocqueville's observation in the Rubish for the second volume of Democracy in America is not only startling, but theoretically important: it ratifies the liberal (and nowadays oft-assumed) separation between musical life and political constitution. This, however, should give us cause to wonder. While in America, Tocqueville and Beaumont had multiple occasions to hear music in public festivals and (...) private spaces. Though other European and highbrow observers also declared American music to be ‘in its infancy’, music nonetheless played a significant part in antebellum social and political life. Nor was Tocqueville insensitive to sound in his relation to others. Indeed, Tocqueville perhaps saw in the demise of music as the art of ‘making harmony’ a symptom of the democratic era. However, like Montesquieu, Tocqueville refused to consider music a constitutive principle of democratic regimes—including in the context of Ancient Greek political theory. In doing so, Tocqueville sharply dissociated himself from republican political theory, but failed to raise the question of music's contribution to the culture and exercise of freedom in the modern era. (shrink)

L’utopie politique et artistique des Méditateurs s’est concrétisée à travers les habits de la liberté qu’ils et elles ont portés, sur fond d’évènements politiques postrévolutionnaires. Quelles étaient leurs pratiques performatives visant à réunir l’art et la vie, pour se réinventer soi-même. Guidés par l’idéal antique, les artistes Maurice Quay et Lucile Franque deviennent les héros romantiques d’un nouvel âge, dont le vêtement est la plus parfaite expression.

This paper reports on a rhetorical analysis of interviews with fifteen white Australian citizens who had undertaken offshore commercial surrogacy in India. Extending previous research, the findings suggest that genetic relatedness was valorized, and surrogacy constructed as a less tenuous route to family formation. The paper concludes with a discussion of the need for further research on 1) how the contentious nature of offshore commercial surrogacy may prevent full consideration of its ethical implications, 2) the differing belief systems between India (...) and Australia in terms of children as alienable objects, and 3) ongoing consideration of how and when genetic-relatedness is made to matter. (shrink)

Harmony is a generally agreed-upon idea in international and diplomatic discourse. A common theme in multiple traditions of thought, Platonist and Confucian among others, it underlies today’s significant investments in musical activism, cultural diplomacy, conflict resolution and peace building. Yet despite this wide currency and long history, the idea of harmony seldom receives more than liminal attention in political theory. In the context of Western thought, an essay written in the 1830s by the French philosopher Jean Reynaud offers a striking (...) point of departure: Reynaud defines diplomacy as ‘the science of harmony among states’. This article, drawing from Reynaud’s text as well from the wider history of music, art and political thought, maps a series of conceptual fault lines that touch on the concept’s function in international thought; the inscription of difference, dissonance, conflict and even war within the idea of harmony; the hegemonic and imperial temptations harmony encompasses and legitimizes; and the theoretical sources of harmony in nature and artifice. In effect, the concept of harmony offers less a blueprint than a forum for imagining peace. (shrink)

Since the 1990s, there has been a growing tendency to interpret Diderot as a radical who first put into question absolutism in the Encyclopédie and then became a fierce opponent of any kind of ‘despotism’, even the ‘enlightened’ one, and a fervent partisan of democratic revolutions in the 1770s. It is argued here that the narrative that cuts Diderot’s life into different phases obscures continuities in his political thought, and misrepresents partly the political vision he had in the 1770s. Diderot’s (...) political thought may have been more coherent than usually acknowledged, and this coherence is to be found in his ideal of a paternalistic monarchy taking advice from its subjects and respecting their rights, that is the constitution of the realm. This idea is not to be mixed up with a democratic programme of government by the people, nor with the endorsement of political change via a revolution. Rather, when towards the end of his life Diderot lost hope that the constitutional order of the French monarchy would be respected, he both feared civil war and hoped that these tumults might bring about the regeneration of the French monarchy. This vision derived from a classical cyclic view of history. (shrink)

Notre entreprise consiste à comparer la théorie cartésienne de l’admiration avec une théorie neuroscientifique de l’évaluation cognitive afin d’établir les filiations et les ruptures conceptuelles et doctrinales qui existent sur ce point avec le cartésianisme. Nous questionnons plus largement le passage de la pure évaluation cognitive au déclenchement des réactions corporelles dans le cadre du processus émotionnel : à quelles difficultés Descartes s’est-t-il confronté dans la description neurologique du passage de la cognition à l’émotion? Et les neurosciences parviennent-elles, dans le (...) rapport qu’elles entretiennent avec les sciences cognitives, à surmonter ces difficultés? Nous comparons ainsi l’articulation entre l’évaluation cognitive et le déclenchement des émotions que développe le neurobiologiste Joseph LeDoux dans son ouvrage The Emotional Brain et les passages où Descartes articule l’admiration avec le déclenchement des autres passions dans les Passions de l’âme et le Traité de l’homme. Cette étude nous conduira finalement à montrer ce que le philosophe peut trouver dans les théories neuroscientifiques pour surmonter certaines difficultés ouvertes par le cartésianisme. (shrink)

Notre entreprise consiste à comparer la théorie cartésienne de l’admiration avec une théorie neuroscientifique de l’évaluation cognitive afin d’établir les filiations et les ruptures conceptuelles et doctrinales qui existent sur ce point avec le cartésianisme. Nous questionnons plus largement le passage de la pure évaluation cognitive au déclenchement des réactions corporelles dans le cadre du processus émotionnel : à quelles difficultés Descartes s’est-t-il confronté dans la description neurologique du passage de la cognition à l’émotion? Et les neurosciences parviennent-elles, dans le (...) rapport qu’elles entretiennent avec les sciences cognitives, à surmonter ces difficultés? Nous comparons ainsi l’articulation entre l’évaluation cognitive et le déclenchement des émotions que développe le neurobiologiste Joseph LeDoux dans son ouvrage The Emotional Brain et les passages où Descartes articule l’admiration avec le déclenchement des autres passions dans les Passions de l’âme et le Traité de l’homme. Cette étude nous conduira finalement à montrer ce que le philosophe peut trouver dans les théories neuroscientifiques pour surmonter certaines difficultés ouvertes par le cartésianisme. (shrink)

Despite the very obvious differences between looking at Manet’s _Woman with a Parrot_ and listening to Elgar’s Cello Concerto, both experiences provoke similar questions in the thoughtful aesthete: why does the painting seem to express reverie and the music, nostalgia? How do we experience the reverie and nostalgia in such works of art? Why do we find these experiences rewarding in similar ways? As our awareness of emotion in art, and our engagement with art’s emotions, can make such a special (...) contribution to our life, it is timely for a philosopher to seek to account for the nature and significance of the experience of art’s emotions. Damien Freeman develops a new theory of emotion that is suitable for resolving key questions in aesthetics. He then reviews and evaluates three existing approaches to artistic expression, and proposes a new approach to the emotional experience of art that draws on the strengths of the existing approaches. Finally, he seeks to establish the ethical significance of this emotional experience of art for human flourishing. Freeman challenges the reader not only to consider how art engages with emotion, but how we should connect up our answers to questions concerning the nature and value of the experiences offered by works of art. (shrink)

How is that artistic works have the power to move the human heart? Why does Manet's Woman with a Parrot evoke reverie, and an Edward Elgar cello concerto, nostalgia? What is the value of such experiences? Art's Emotions is a reflective, thought-provoking exploration of the significance that experiencing emotion through art has upon our lives. Damien Freeman reviews and evaluates three traditional approaches to understanding artistic expression and moves on to develop a new theory of emotion that resolves key (...) questions in aesthetics. In a novel philosophical project, Freeman also establishes the ethical importance of art in nurturing humans and helping them flourish. Art's Emotions challenges readers to consider not only how art engages with emotion, but also the ways in which art can answer fundamental questions about the value and nature of experience. (shrink)