Theravada Buddhist Philosophy

In “On the Teachings of Gotama Buddha” (1925) and “Socrates-Buddha” (1926), Edmund Husserl claims that the Buddha achieves a transcendental view of consciousness by performing the epoché. Yet, states Husserl, the Buddha fails to develop a purely theoretical and universal science of consciousness, i.e., phenomenology, because his purely practical goal of Nibbāna limits knowledge of consciousness. I evaluate Husserl’s claims by examining the Buddha’s Majjhima Nikāya. I argue that Husserl correctly identifies an epoché and transcendental viewpoint in the Buddha’s teachings. (...) However, I contend that Husserl’s distinction between pure theory and pure praxis leads him to misconstrue the function of the Buddha’s epoché, the extent of knowledge that the Buddha gains from the transcendental viewpoint, and the nature of Nibbāna. I finally suggest that the Buddha presents a way of studying consciousness that is a way of life, meaning that any distinction between pure theory and pure praxis is dissolved. (shrink)

An accessible introduction to early Buddhist ethical theory and its relationship to virtue ethics.

Riflessione sulla felicità come esito dialettico della dinamica concettuale tra pieno e vuoto.

According to Arti Dhand, it can be argued that all Indian ethics have been primarily virtue ethics. Many have indeed jumped on the virtue bandwagon, providing prima facie interpretations of Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist canons in virtue terms. Others have expressed firm skepticism, claiming that virtues are not proven to be grounded in the nature of things and that, ultimately, the appeal to virtue might just well be a mere façon de parler. In this paper, we aim to advance the (...) discussion of Indian virtue ethics. Our intent is not to provide a catch-all interpretation of the different Indian schools. Our goal is, more modestly, to offer a theory of virtues in Indian philosophies, as a framework for theorists and interpreters who see these diverse traditions as amenable to systematic virtue analysis. Our theory grounds virtues in the reality of genuine moral dispositions and in a system of beliefs where morality is understood as transformative in nature. (shrink)

Psychische Krankheiten werden im Oxford Handbook of Psychiatry (2019) als Erkrankungen der Gehirnfunktion betrachtet. In DSM-5 und ICD-11, den Haupthandbüchern der Psychiatrie, gelten sie als (schädliche) Dysfunktionen. Beide Ansichten sind mit Problemen behaftet, weshalb es bisher keinen Konsens darüber gibt, was es eigentlich bedeutet, psychisch krank zu sein. In der Philosophie der Psychiatrie hat es viele Versuche gegeben, dies zu klären. Im vorliegenden Buch wird das Problem aus spinozistisch-abhidhammischer Perspektive in zwei Schritten angegangen: Zunächst wird festgestellt, dass die Psyche aus (...) dieser Perspektive keine Gehirnfunktion ist, sondern die Beziehung eines Körpers zu seiner Umwelt. Es wird vorgeschlagen, den Gehirnreduktionismus durch die Ansicht zu ersetzen, dass das Gehirn der letzte Baustein ist, in dem sich die Berührungen des Körpers widerspiegeln. Aber noch bevor sie sich im Gehirn widerspiegeln, rufen die Berührungen eine Psyche in die Existenz. Anschließend wird die Krankheit als eine fortschreitende Beeinträchtigung der Kraft des Körpers definiert, seine Essenz zu manifestieren, und zwar bis zu dem Punkt, an dem sein Überleben bedroht ist. Daraus ergibt sich ein alternativer Ansatz, der einige Gemeinsamkeiten mit der Psychiatrie aufweist, teilweise aber auch zu Modifikationen ihrer aktuellen Nosologie und Praxis anregt. (shrink)

In classical South Asia, most philosophers thought that the self (if it exists at all) is what the first-person pronoun ‘I’ stands for. It is something that persists through time, undergoes conscious thoughts and experiences, and exercises control over actions. The Buddhists accepted the ‘no self’ thesis: they denied that such a self is substantially real. This gave rise to a puzzle for these Buddhists. If there is nothing substantially real that ‘I’ stands for, what are we talking about when (...) we speak of ourselves? In this paper, I present one Buddhist answer to this question, an answer that emerges from the work of the Abhidharma thinker Vasubandhu (4th to 5th century CE). (shrink)

Extant discussions of Buddhist mereology give minimal attention to the soteriological significance of denying the reality of wholes. This is unfortunate, because the connection between mereology and soteriological is both significant and problematic. The connection is significant, because it supports an argument for the unreality of composite wholes that does not depend upon any claim about the nature of wholes. The connection is also problematic, because some Buddhists endorse the soteriological relevance of mereology despite admitting that composite wholes are real. (...) I address these issues by reviewing early Pāli Buddhist attitudes toward the soteriological significance of mereology, developing an argument for the unreality of wholes from the work of Buddhaghosa, and explicating an alternative approach from the Chinese tradition of Huayan 華嚴 Buddhism that calls into question some common assumptions about parts and wholes. (shrink)

A natural way to think of epistemic virtue is by analogy with an archer. Just as a skilled archer is able to take aim and hit a target, a skilled epistemic agent will aim at truth and, if things go well, get things right. Here we highlight aspects of epistemic virtue that do not fit this model, particularly ways in which epistemic virtues can be non-voluntary and not goal-directed. In doing so, we draw on two important figures in the history (...) of philosophy: the 6th-century Indian Buddhist Buddhaghosa and the 20th-century French philosopher Simone Weil. Despite many differences, both thinkers emphasize the importance of attention in moral and epistemic virtue. Their work highlights ways in which attention that is neither voluntary nor goal-directed can nevertheless play an important role in moral and epistemic life. (shrink)

Ajahn Sona, Bloom: Buddhist Reflections on Serenity and Love. Ottawa, Ontario: Sumeru Press Inc, 2020. 144 pp. CAN $24.95 (pb). ISBN 978-1-89655-960-5.

Superiority Conceit in Buddhist Traditions: A Historical Perspective, by Bhikkhu Analayo. Wisdom Publications, 2021. 184pp. Hb. $24.95, ISBN-13: 9781614297192; Ebook $12.99, ISBN-10:1614297193.

In this article, I argue that the Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna of the Ratnamālāvadāna presents six key aspects of the development of Buddhist thought from the Pāli canon to the Sarvāstivāda tradition: childlessness, the arrival of a fetus through the propitiation of gods, presence of heretics, the impact of Buddha’s intervention and a child bodhisattva, soteriological elements of the story’s didactics, and the Buddha’s peculiar smile. These six key aspects were chosen to reflect and explore the content of Sarvāstivādin society and teachings concerning (...) its source narratives of the Kusīdāvadāna of Avadānaśataka and the Pāli canon. This helps us to understand the composition of Sarvāstivāda doctrine as recounted in the Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna, which varies from its source the Kusīdāvadāna of Avadānaśataka. It also aids in the identification of the avadāna and avadānamālā forms of Sarvāstivāda, as well as the impact of the Pāli canon and Brahmanical thought on them. The Kusīdāvadāna of Avadānaśataka, which is the source of the Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna and the Pāli canon, will be utilized to examine the six aspects of the societal and doctrinal development of the Buddhist thought of Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna. The final portion is the very first annotated translation of Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna based on Takahata’s 1954 original version. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the Great Ideas are integral to Mortimer J. Adler’s Great Books Movement in much the same way that the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path are integral to Buddhism. Both use ‘Great’ and ‘Noble’ to point toward human excellence. For Adler, the Great Ideas are the metaphysical and moral concepts out of which Western civilization developed. They are the main topics in an ongoing great conversation that shapes Western culture. Precisely because these Great Ideas (...) are great, insofar as they point toward human excellence (virtue), they ought not be considered the exclusive property of the West. Instead, as Adler recognized, they should be utilized in the analysis of other cultural traditions. This chapter uses two of Adler’s Great Ideas, freedom and religion, to analyze Buddhism as it is encountered in the early Indian Buddhist texts. It asserts all human philosophy and culture, including that of Buddhism, is ultimately based in religion, thereby making religion the greatest of Adler’s and the Buddha’s Great philosophical and cultural ideas. (shrink)

The Buddhist Nikāya Suttas frequently mention the concept of fear (bhaya) and related synonyms. This concept does not receive much scholarly attention by subsequent Buddhist philosophers. Recent scholars identify a ‘paradox of fear’ in several traditions of classical Indian Buddhism (Brekke 1999, Finnigan 2019, Giustarini 2012). Each scholar points out, in their respective textual contexts, that fear is evaluated in two ways; one positive and the other negative. Brekke calls this the “double role” of fear (1999: 443). Each also identify (...) fear as purposely elicited to motivate acts aimed at achieving fearlessness, where freedom from fear is characteristic of nibbāna. They all find this puzzling. Finnigan asks: “Why would one purposefully incite fear if one’s goal is its elimination?” (2019: 221). Giustarini says that fear has a “contradictory nature” (2012: 513); Brekke calls it “the paradox of fear” (1999: 442). This article introduces the ‘paradox of fear’ as it appears in the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva and the Nikāya suttas. It then critically examines Brekke and Giustarini’s proposed solutions. It argues that they get some things right in ways that are both supported by the Nikāyas and relevant to Śāntideva but that they leave some important questions unanswered. The article contends that these questions are best answered if fear is analysed as appropriate when its objects are related to karma and rebirth. (shrink)

The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Treasury of Metaphysics with Self-Commentary) is a pivotal treatise on early Buddhist thought composed around the fourth or fifth century by the Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu. This work elucidates the Buddha’s teachings as synthesized and interpreted by the early Buddhist Sarvāstivāda school (“the theory that all [factors] exist”), while recording the major doctrinal polemics that developed around them, primarily those points of contention with the Sautrāntika system of thought (“followers of the scriptures”). Employing the methodology and terminology of (...) the Buddhist Abhidharma system, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya offers a detailed analysis of fundamental doctrines, such as early Buddhist theories of mind, cosmology, the workings of karman, meditative states and practices, and the metaphysics of the self. One of its unique features is the way it presents the opinions of a variety of Buddhist and Brahminical schools that were active in classical India in Vasubandhu’s time. The work contains nine chapters (the last of which is considered to have been appended to the first eight), which proceed from a description of the unawakened world via the path and practices that are conducive to awakening and ultimately to the final spiritual attainments which constitute the state of awakening. In its analysis of the unawakened situation, it thus covers the elements which make up the material and mental world of sentient beings, the wholesome and unwholesome mental states that arise in their minds, the structure of the cosmos, the metaphysics of action (karman) and the way it comes into being, and the nature of dispositional attitudes and dormant mental afflictions. In its treatment of the path and practices that lead to awakening, the treatise outlines the Sarvāstivāda understanding of the methods of removing defilements through the realization of the four noble truths and the stages of spiritual cultivation. With respect to the awakened state, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya gives a detailed description of the different types of knowledge and meditational states attained by practitioners who reach the highest stages of the path. (shrink)

Classical presentations of the Buddhist path prescribe the cultivation of various good qualities that are necessary for spiritual progress, from mindfulness and loving-kindness to faith and wisdom. Examining the way in which such qualities are described and classified in early Buddhism—with special reference to their treatment in the Visuddhimagga by the fifth-century Buddhist thinker Buddhaghosa—the present article employs a comparative method in order to identify the Buddhist catalog of virtues. The first part sketches the characteristics of virtue as analyzed by (...) neo-Aristotelian theories. Relying on these accounts, the second part considers three lists from early Buddhism as possible catalogs of virtue: the components of ethical conduct, the 37 factors that contribute to awakening, and the wholesome or beautiful mental factors. I then raise the question of why the Buddhist tradition developed several classifications of virtue, whereas the Western tradition of virtue ethics used a single category. Appealing to the connection between the virtues and living well in the eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics, I propose that one of the reasons why Buddhism developed multiple lists of virtues is its pluralistic acceptance of different modalities of living well and associated practices, in MacIntyre’s sense of the term. These modalities and practices are not equal, but are ordered hierarchically. Accordingly, I conclude that Buddhist ethics ought to be seen as a pluralist-gradualist system rather than a universalist theory. (shrink)

Comparing Buddhist and contemporary analytic views about mereological composition reveals significant dissimilarities about the purposes that constrain successful answers to mereological questions, the kinds of considerations taken to be probative in justifying those answers, and the value of mereological inquiry. I develop these dissimilarities by examining three questions relevant to those who deny the existence of composite wholes. The first is a question of justification: What justifies denying the existence of composite wholes as more reasonable than affirming their existence? The (...) second is a question of ontology: Under what conditions are many partless individuals arranged composite-wise? The third is a question of reasonableness: Why, if there are no composites available to experience, do “the folk” find it reasonable to believe there are? I motivate each question, sketch some analytic answers for each, develop in more detail answers from the Theravādin Buddhist scholar Buddhaghosa, and extract comparative lessons. (shrink)

Many of us, even on our happiest days, struggle to quiet the constant buzz of anxiety in the background of our minds. All kinds of worries--worries about losing people and things, worries about how we seem to others--keep us from peace of mind. Distracted or misled by our preoccupations, misconceptions, and, most of all, our obsession with ourselves, we don't see the world clearly--we don't see the world as it really is. In our search for happiness and the good life, (...) this is the main problem. But luckily there is a solution, and on the path to understanding it, we can make use of the rich and varied teachings that have developed over centuries of Buddhist thought. With clarity and compassion, Nicolas Bommarito explores the central elements of centuries of Buddhist philosophy and practice, explaining how they can improve your life and teach you to live without fear. Mining important texts and lessons for practical guidance, he provides a friendly guide to the very practical goals that underpin Buddhist philosophy. After laying out the basic ideas, Bommarito walks readers through a wide range of techniques and practices we can adopt to mend ingrained habits. Rare for its exploration of both the philosophy that motivates Buddhism and its practical applications, this is a compassionate guide to leading a good life that anyone can follow. (shrink)

The Qur’an frequently abhors blind faith based on tradition in its arguments against non-believers. Nonetheless, the Qur’an repeatedly asks people to believe in its message. How does the Qur’an distinguish between both kinds of faith? This article investigates the type of epistemology the Qur’an expects from its audience. Linguistically, the Qur’anic concept of īmān may be compared to taking refuge in Buddhism, in that it is through experience and insight (prajñā), as portrayed in the Kālāma Sutta, and not zeal. The (...) Qur’an differentiates between two types of conviction, that which is received through discernment and understanding, and that which is blind. The Qur’an shows cues of an attempt to harmonise faith and reason. It does not entertain non-believers in their request to have supernatural physical proofs, but frequently reminds them to use their reason and observation. This opens further avenues of interfaith dialogue between Buddhism and Islam. (shrink)

Is Buddhism’s attitude towards accepted forms of knowledge sceptical? Are Pyrrhonian scepticism and classical Buddhist scholasticism related in their respective applications and expressions of doubt? In what way and to what degree is Critical Buddhism an offshoot of modern scepticism? Questions such as these as well as related issues are explored in the present collection, which brings together examinations of systematic doubt in the traditions of Buddhism from a variety of perspectives. What results from the perceptive observations and profound analytical (...) insights of the seven essays is a rich and multi-faceted picture of two families of philosophical systems—scepticism and Buddhism—that seem both akin and at odds, both related and distant at the same time. (shrink)

The early Buddhist exegetical text, the Nettippakarana, apparently uniquely, describes the stages of the path as ‘transcendental dependent arising’ (lokuttara paticca-samuppada), in contrast with the twelve nidanas, called ‘worldly dependent arising’ (lokiya paticca-samuppada). A close reading of the Nettippakarana in relation to another, related, exegetical text, the Petakopadesa, reveals that the latter interprets the same stages of the path in a different way. More broadly, while the Petakopadesa takes paticca-samuppada to refer only to the twelve nidanas, the Nettippakarana’s exegetical strategy (...) takes paticca-samuppada to refer to an over-arching principle of conditionality, both ‘worldly’ and ‘transcendental’. This exegesis has proved popular with modern western Buddhist exegetes. (shrink)

I propose an account of generous action in the Pāli Buddhist tradition, whereby generous actions are instances of giving in which the donor has esteem for the recipient of their giving. The account differs from recent Anglophone accounts of generous action. These tend to construe generous actions as instances of a donor freely offering a gift to the recipient for the sake of benefiting the recipient. Unlike the Buddhist account I propose, these accounts do not require donors to esteem their (...) recipient. Accordingly, I also offer a partial account of esteem, whereby one esteems another only if they refrain from noticing the other’s faults and they encounter the other as someone who is superior in virtue and goodness. Taken together, the Buddhist accounts of generous action and esteem offer insight into certain ways in which different philosophical traditions tend to characterize generous action. (shrink)

A doutrina do renascimento transmite a ideia de uma perspectiva temporal mais extensa, que abarca múltiplas vidas. Mas a medida em que o buddhismo chega à modernidade, outras interpretações começam a aparecer. Um exemplo é a interpretação psicológica de Ajahn Buddhadāsa, segundo a qual o termo “renascimento" se refere ao surgimento sucessivo da ideia do “eu" a cada instante de consciência. Esta interpretação diminui consideravelmente a extensão da perspectiva temporal ligada ao renascimento. Contra esta interpretação, Thānissaro Bhikkhu argumentou que uma (...) perspectiva temporal mais extensa é necessária para a compreensão de conceitos centrais do buddhismo como kamma ou dukkha. O objetivo principal deste artigo será investigar o papel da temporalidade na compreensão desses conceitos. Aliviando as preocupações de Thānissaro Bhikkhu, irei argumentar que uma perspectiva temporal mais restrita parece ser igualmente capaz de prover os elementos necessários para a compreensão profunda e completa dos principais ensinamentos buddhistas. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide a philosophical analysis of Pāli texts that treat of a special kind of mental event called bhavaṅga citta. This mental event is a primal sentient consciousness, a passive form of basal awareness that individuates sentient beings as the type of being that they are. My aims with this analysis are twofold, one genealogical and reconstructive, the other systematic. On the genealogical and reconstructive side, I argue for a distinction between two kinds of continuity that are (...) at work in explaining the temporal structure of experience in Pāli Buddhist philosophy. Call these two forms of continuity ‘diachronic’ and ‘affective-motivational’ continuity, respectively. In my analysis of these two forms of continuity, I will focus on the coherence of bhavaṅga citta in its Abhidhammic context. My contention is that the commentarial account of bhavaṅga citta has the resources to explain diachronic continuity but struggles to give a fully workable account of affective-motivational continuity. I argue that the novel view of mental continuity offered by the early twentieth century Burmese monastic exegete Ledi Sayadaw (1846–1923) offers another intriguing account of mental continuity, one that can help to explain affective-motivational continuity. Systematically speaking, in spelling out the dynamics of this distinction between types of mental continuity in connection with bhavaṅga, I offer a cross-cultural philosophical analysis of the deep structure of the mind and how affective processes below the threshold of ordinary habits of attention have a profound conditioning effect on our conscious relationship with the world. (shrink)

Contemporary engaged Buddhist scholars typically claim either that Buddhism always endorsed social activism, or that its non-endorsement of such activism represented an unwitting lack of progress. This article examines several classical South Asian Buddhist texts that explicitly reject social and political activism. These texts argue for this rejection on the grounds that the most important sources of suffering are not something that activism can fix, and that political involvement interferes with the tranquility required for liberation. The article then examines the (...) history of engaged Buddhism in order to identify why this rejection of activism has not yet been taken sufficiently seriously. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é sugerir que os ensinamentos Buddhistas sobreanattā(não-eu) não devem ser entendidos como uma negação categórica do eu, mas fazem parte de uma estratégia soteriológica comumente empregada pelo Buddha, de utilizar algo como ferramenta para o seu próprio fim. Tomando o kamma(ação) como o elemento central que estrutura todos os ensinamentos, podemos pensar na identificação do eu como um tipo de ação. Algumas instâncias desta ação serão hábeis e condutoras à libertação, e outras inábeis e condutoras ao (...) sofrimento. Com isso em mente, este artigo irá analisar algumas ações inábeis do eu e do não-eu em suttasselecionados do Cânone Pali, mostrando como se encaixam na estratégia do Buddha de se utilizar de elementos como ferramentas para o abandono desses próprios elementos. Nessa perspectiva, o eu não é negado em absoluto desde o início do caminho, mas aprende-se a usa-lo de forma hábil como um meio de abandoná-lo. (shrink)

Indian philosophy is a term that refers to schools of philosophical thought that originated in the Indian continent. Buddhism is one of the important school of Indian philosophical thought. Happiness is much pursued by individuals and society in all cultures. Eastern and western cultures have understood well-being and evolved ways and means to promote well-being over the years. Buddhism pursues happiness by using knowledge and practice to achieve mental equanimity. In Buddhism, equanimity, or peace of mind, is achieved by detaching (...) oneself from the cycle of craving that produces dukkha. So by achieving a mental state where you can detach from all the passions, needs and wants of life, you free yourself and achieve a state of transcendent bliss and well-being. The journey to attain a deeper form of happiness requires an unflinching look into the face of a reality where all life is seen as dukkha or mental dysfunction. Buddhism is a philosophy and practice that is extremely concerned with the mind and its various delusions, misunderstandings and cravings but, happily for us, sees a way out through higher consciousness and mindful practice. Perhaps it is because of this seemingly dim view of reality that happiness in Buddhism is so tremendously full; the ideas contained in Buddha's teachings point to a thorough engagement with lived reality. Ironically, it is through such an engagement with one's self, the world and reality that one is able to achieve a transcendent happiness. Equanimity, a deep sense of wellbeing and happiness, is attainable through proper knowledge and practice in everyday life. The objective of this paper is to the study the conception of happiness Buddhist philosophy. This paper is divided into four parts (i) meaning of Indian philosophy and its relation with Indian psychology, (ii) Buddhist philosophy, (iii) Buddhist conception of happiness and (iv) relevance of Buddhism in present day world. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a debate between some Indian Buddhist schools regarding the nature of the underlying tendencies or anusaya-s. I focus here primarily on the ninth chapter of Kathāvatthu’s representation of a dispute about whether an anusaya can be said to have intentional object. I also briefly treat of Vasubandhu’s defense of the Sautrāntika view of anuśaya in the opening section of the fifth chapter his Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam. Following Vasubandhu, I argue against the Thervādin Abhidharmikas that the underlying tendencies (...) (anusaya-s) can be identified with their active manifestations (pariyuṭṭhāna). Etymologically, the notion of anusaya denotes a kind of latency, dormancy or otherwise ‘below the surface’ propensity. It can literally be translated as ‘that which lies or dwells beneath or alongside’. I will translate the term as ‘underlying tendency’, but philosophically speaking, it is most important to understand that the notion of anusaya refers to dispositions that condition current experience in a tacit way. The task of a philosophical account of the anusaya-s is to explain how their implicit conditioning influence shapes occurrent mental activity. The Indian Buddhist philosophers exercised an enormous amount of energy in attempting to explain this relation. A thorough examination of this dialectic has two important fruits to bear. The first is that the Buddhists can help us explain in precise detail how the mind is affectively layered. That is, they have a plausible account of how the mind is both responsive in real time to the objects it encounters in the world, while at the same time being tacitly conditioned by its own history of affective bias. Indeed, as we will see, the Buddhists were deeply concerned with how processes of affective bias were operating at the deepest levels of the mind and how we ought to conceive of their influence on our ordinary processes of perception and cognition. Second, this local position within the Buddhist milieu is indicative of a wider propensity in Buddhist philosophy to blend analyses of affectively-biased intentions and causation. I submit that this blending could be helpful in a more global for contemporary discussions of the mind in philosophy and science. (shrink)

In the Visuddhimagga, there is movement from an early Buddhist phenominalist epistemology towards essentialist ontology based in rationality and abstraction. The reductionist methodology of the Abhidhamma and reactions to it brought forth a theory of momentariness not found in early Buddhism. Abhidhamma reductionism and the concept of phenomenal dhammas led to a conception of momentary time-points and the incorporation of a cinematic model of temporal consciousness as a direct consequence of momentariness. Essentialism was incorporated into the Visuddhimagga precisely because of (...) Buddhaghosa’s commitment to momentariness. This is seen in Buddhaghosa’s treatment of karma and rebirth. Karma, particularly death-threshold karma, receives more emphasis in the Visuddhimagga than was previously found in the Suttas. This is due to the need to explain the continuity of the process of karmic rebirth in light of the theory of momentariness, making it necessary for Buddhaghosa to synthesise momentariness with the tri-temporal existence of the Sarvāstivādins. (shrink)

This brief article presents a Buddhist answer to the question of whether self-transformation possible and, if so, how it can be achieved.

A collection of essays on the ways in which the work of Wilfrid Sellars and the Buddhist philosophical tradition can illuminate each other.

Motivated by recent controversies concerning the relationship between modern mindfulness-based interventions and Buddhism, this article discusses the relationship between mindfulness and dogmatism in general, and dogmatism in ethics in particular. The point of view taken is primarily that of the psychology of judgment and deci-sion making: Various cognitive illusions affect the feelings of righteousness and certainty that tend to accompany ethical and moral judgments. I argue that even though there is some evidence that mindfulness practice im-proves judgment and decision making, (...) thisimprovement is rarely as strong as is implied in various contributions to the above-mentioned controversies. In addition, I reflect on claims that “the original teachings of the Buddha” jus-tify the moral stances taken. I argue that these stances likely arise, at least in part, due to the cultural transmission of cognitive dissonance of early Christianity rather than being inherent in the Buddha’s teachings. (shrink)

Современный перевод "Абхидхамматтха-сангахи" ("Руководства по Абхидхамме") предлагает введение в фундаментальную философскую психологию буддизма. Начиная со времени своего написания в XI или XII веке, "Сангаха" служит ключом к мудрости, содержащейся в Абхидхамме. В книге исследуются основные вопросы Абхидхаммы, включая состояния сознания и ментальные факторы, функции и процессы ума, материальный мир, взаимозависимое происхождение, а также методы и стадии медитации. Данная работа представляет собой точный перевод "Сангахи", сопровождающийся оригинальным текстом на пали и комментариями. Этот детальный путеводитель с более чем 40 таблицами и диаграммами (...) успешно проводит читателей через все сложности Абхидхаммы. (shrink)

In the development of Indian Buddhism we begin to see a shift away from the early Buddhist epistemology based in phenomenology and process metaphysics toward a type of event-based metaphysics. This shift began in the reductionist methodology of the Abhidhamma and culminated in a theory of momentariness based in rationalism and abstraction, rather than early Buddhist empiricism. While early Buddhism followed an extensional model of temporal consciousness, when methodological reductionism was applied to the concept of time, it necessarily resulted in (...) a cinematic model of temporal consciousness like that of the Sautrāntikas or in an idea of the tri-temporal existence of dhammas, like that of the Sarvāstivādins. It is in the accounting of the process of karmic rebirth that we can most clearly see the effects of this shift. -/- The development of a theory of momentariness was incorporated into the Visuddhimagga by Buddhaghosa. In Buddhaghosa’s treatment of karmic rebirth, karma, particularly death-threshold karma, receives more emphasis in the process of rebirth than was previously found in the Suttas. The incorporation of “duration-less duration” via tritemporal existence by Buddhaghosa became necessary in order to explain karmic continuity in the rebirth process while retaining the concept of momentariness. (shrink)

This book could be seen as a novel method of tracing the history of a scripture. Jacob P. Dalton does this by “tracing the vicissitudes of a single ritual system—that of the Gathering of Intentions Sutra (Dgongs pa ’dus pa’i mdo)—from its ninth-century origins to the present day” (xv). This tantra is referred to as the “root tantra” and is vital for understanding the history of Tibetan Buddhism, particularly the Nyingma school. This book is divided into seven chapters focusing on (...) the various forms of the traditions surrounding this text. (shrink)

I argue that the Buddha did not discuss the free will and determinism problem because he only considered issues relating to overcoming suffering and his teaching about this did not raise the problem. As represented in the Nikāyas, the heart of his teaching was an empirically based account of the causes of suffering and how to modify these to end suffering. It was primarily a practical teaching about how to achieve this goal, more a craft knowledge than a philosophical theory (...) of causality. Similarly, the no-self teaching was more about living selflessly than about developing a theoretical analysis of agency. (shrink)

Review of Amber Carpenter's "Indian Buddhist Philosophy.".

General opinion holds that the Abhidhamma treats the Buddha’s teachings in terms of ultimate realities, i.e. dhammas, and that conventional constructs such as persons fall outside the primary concern of the Abhidhamma. The present paper re-examines this ultimate-conventional dichotomy drawn between dhammas and persons and argues that this dichotomy does not hold true for the canonical Abhidhamma in Pali. This study explores how various types of persons are interpreted and approached by the Abhidhamma material, including Abhidhamma texts such as the (...) Puggalapaññatti and a number of suttas in the Aṅguttara Nikāya that are identified in this paper as proto- Abhidhamma. (shrink)

The giving up of the body or suicide for spiritual reasons has been dealt with by James Benn and D Max Moermane. The relationships of the dead and the living are discussed by Bryan J Cuevas, John Cliff ord Holt, and Matthew T Kapstein, while Hank Glassman, Mark Rowe, and Jason A Carbine talk about different funeral practices. With glossaries for Chinese, Japanese, and Korean characters and an elaborate index, this book is a unique peek into Buddhist practices regarding the (...) dead and deserves attention by researchers, students, and admirers of this religion. (shrink)

This article deals with the meaning and function of saññā in perception according to the Suttapiṭaka. As regards its meaning, the discussion stresses the fact that the renderings “perception” and “apperception” seem to overinterpret the actual function/activity of saññā. Also the translations “idea” and “ideation” should be used cautiously, in order to avoid misunderstandings, since these terms are fraught with very specific philosophical and psychological implications in the Western context. Moreover, though “cognition” could be a good rendering, “recognition” seems to (...) be a more adequate translation for saññā, because it conveys the meaning of both cognizing and naming, which are the two main activities carried out by saññā. In this sense, cognition should be envisaged as a recording process that labels (and gives names to) the data coming from the senses. As regards its role in perception, saññā takes place after contact (phassa) and sensation (vedanā). Its task is to collect the not yet well-defined information provided by phassa and vedanā, and to organize this information into a datum that can be made available to, and handled by, the consciousness (viññāṇa). The task of viññāṇa, in its turn, is to interpret this datum according to sujbective “values”. The present study stresses also the fact that the recognition carried out by saññā can be either simple (colors, tastes, etc.) or complex (danger, death, etc.). For this reason, after having dealt with simple perceptions, a section is devoted to the analysis and possible explanation of complex recognitions. Moreover, since the textual sources record the fact that saññā can fail its task to recognize things, another section is added, in which incorrect recognitions are taken into consideration. (shrink)

This article highlights the central importance of Pāli phonetics in Theravāda Buddhism. In doing so, I focus on a single yet fundamental point of contention regarding the number of sounds in the Pāli language from the twelfth to fifteenth century. I argue that this debate on the number of sounds was of central concern due to the importance of Pāli pronunciation in the ritual sphere, the development of new regional monastic identities, and the introduction of regional scripts. In tracing this (...) debate between two competing systems of Pāli grammar I show that these developments in the phonetic description of the Pāli language reveal the use and adaptation of Sanskritic phonetics in order to differentiate Pāli from Sanskrit, the Prakrits, and its surrounding vernaculars. (shrink)

The first book of its kind, Buddhist Moral Philosophy: An Introduction introduces the reader to contemporary philosophical interpretations and analyses of Buddhist ethics. It begins with a survey of traditional Buddhist ethical thought and practice, mainly in the Pali Canon and early Mahāyāna schools, and an account of the emergence of Buddhist moral philosophy as a distinct discipline in the modern world. It then examines recent debates about karma, rebirth and nirvana, well-being, normative ethics, moral objectivity, moral psychology, and the (...) issue of freedom, responsibility and determinism. The book also introduces the reader to philosophical discussions of topics in socially engaged Buddhism such as human rights, war and peace, and environmental ethics. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary collection of essays highlights the relevance of Buddhist doctrine and practice to issues of globalization. From philosophical, religious, historical, and political perspectives, the authors show that Buddhism—arguably the world’s first transnational religion—is a rich resource for navigating todays interconnected world.

Some philosophers of mind, cognitive scientists, phenomenologists as well as Buddhist philosophers have claimed that an awareness of an object is not just an experience of that object but also involves self-awareness. It is sometimes argued that being aware of an object without being aware of oneself is pathological. As anyone who has been involved in martial arts, as well as any sports requiring quick responses such as cricket and tennis, can testify, however, awareness of the self at the time (...) of acting becomes problematic: you would not be able to respond to the slight movement of your opponent if you were aware of yourself responding to it. This suggests that it must be possible for us to be aware without being aware of ourselves. The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of self-awareness and its relation to the self by investigating the phenomenology of the martial artist who is ‘in the act’. I shall argue that we can make sense of self-awareness without invoking awareness of oneself. (shrink)