The treatment of pregnant women addicted to drugs provides an especially important and illustrative example of how political and popular demands can successfully challenge professional ethical norms associated with clinical medicine — norms such as confidentiality, patient autonomy, and the right to consent to and to refuse treatment. One increasingly popular policy approach is to limit patient autonomy by coercing women in an attempt to change their behavior, either by involuntary civil commitment or by imprisoning them for drug abuse or (...) child neglect. Thirty-five states have criminally prosecuted women for substance abuse or alcohol use during pregnancy. Other states aggressively use involuntary civil commitment as a means to protect the yet-to-be-born from harm during pregnancy. Medical professionals have been forced to participate in these programs by mandatory reporting requirements. (shrink)

The treatment of pregnant women addicted to drugs provides an especially important and illustrative example of how political and popular demands can successfully challenge professional ethical norms associated with clinical medicine — norms such as confidentiality, patient autonomy, and the right to consent to and to refuse treatment. One increasingly popular policy approach is to limit patient autonomy by coercing women in an attempt to change their behavior, either by involuntary civil commitment or by imprisoning them for drug abuse or (...) child neglect. Thirty-five states have criminally prosecuted women for substance abuse or alcohol use during pregnancy. Other states aggressively use involuntary civil commitment as a means to protect the yet-to-be-born from harm during pregnancy. Medical professionals have been forced to participate in these programs by mandatory reporting requirements. (shrink)

The conflict between pregnant women freely using cocaine and the well-being of fetuses presents a difficult social problem. Since 1985, at least 200 women, in thirty states, have been criminally prosecuted for using illicit drugs or alcohol during pregnancy. Such policies enjoy considerable public and political support. Nonetheless, treatment programs that include referral to law enforcement officials raise serious ethical and legal issues for hospitals and health care providers. In this paper, we assess the development of one medical university's controversial (...) treatment program for pregnant women addicted to cocaine.In October 1989, the Medical University of South Carolina instituted a new program, called the Interagency Policy on Management of Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, designed “to ensure appropriate management of patients abusing illegal drugs during pregnancy.” This program required some pregnant women to seek drug counseling and prenatal care under the threat of criminal sanctions. (shrink)

The conflict between pregnant women freely using cocaine and the well-being of fetuses presents a difficult social problem. Since 1985, at least 200 women, in thirty states, have been criminally prosecuted for using illicit drugs or alcohol during pregnancy. Such policies enjoy considerable public and political support. Nonetheless, treatment programs that include referral to law enforcement officials raise serious ethical and legal issues for hospitals and health care providers. In this paper, we assess the development of one medical university's controversial (...) treatment program for pregnant women addicted to cocaine.In October 1989, the Medical University of South Carolina instituted a new program, called the Interagency Policy on Management of Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, designed “to ensure appropriate management of patients abusing illegal drugs during pregnancy.” This program required some pregnant women to seek drug counseling and prenatal care under the threat of criminal sanctions. (shrink)

The contribution of Octavia Butler's fiction to utopian studies is becoming more widely recognized, particularly in the wake of a special issue of Utopian Studies (vol. 19, no. 3) devoted to her work. The Parable of the Sower and Parable of the Talents provide an especially effective exploration of perennial issues in political philosophy, cultural studies, and psychology.1 Civil society and the cultural norms that underlay social and political institutions have crumbled. Crime, violence, and addiction are rampant. Environmental degradation and (...) economic collapse have pushed most to roam about the country searching for food, while others take refuge in walled compounds run by corporations whose power is unchecked. .. (shrink)

Wars and crises worldwide force millions of people to flee and seek refuge, often outside their countries of origin. What moral responsibilities do states have towards refugees? In this Ethical Annotation, Dr Jos Philips and his co-authors zoom in on the responsibilities of EU countries. They consider arguments in favour of and against admitting refugees and argue that EU countries must do at least at much as they can do at little cost, and perhaps even more.

Osteoclasts, the multinucleated cells primarily responsible for dissolution of bone tissue, form by fusion of precursors that circulate in the bloodstream. A variety of factors have been shown to affect the mature osteoclast and its progenitor cell, such as calcium‐regulating hormones, products of the immune system, and constituents of the arachidonic acid cascade. To date, however, the osteoclast precursor has not been identified. Furthermore, there is limited information on the factors that influence osteoclast development and regulation, reflecting in part the (...) paucity of data on the osteoclast cell surface. Recent progress in understanding osteoclasts formation and function is discussed. (shrink)

This book argues that ultimately human rights can be actualized, in two senses. By answering important challenges to them, the real-world relevance of human rights can be brought out; and people worldwide can be motivated as needed for realizing human rights. Taking a perspective from moral and political philosophy, the book focuses on two challenges to human rights that have until now received little attention, but that need to be addressed if human rights are to remain plausible as a global (...) ideal. Firstly, the challenge of global inequality: how, if at all, can one be sincerely committed to human rights in a structurally greatly unequal world that produces widespread inequalities of human rights protection? Secondly, the challenge of future people: how to adequately include future people in human rights, and how to set adequate priorities between the present and the future, especially in times of climate change? The book also asks whether people worldwide can be motivated to do what it takes to realize human rights. Furthermore, it considers the common and prominent challenges of relativism and of the political abuse of human rights. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of human rights, political philosophy, and more broadly political theory, philosophy and the wider social sciences. **Open access**, Table of contents: 1. Introduction: Two New Challenges to Human Rights and the Question of Motivation Part I: Preparing the Ground 2. Human Rights: A Conception 3. Common Challenges to Human Rights: The Relativist and the Political Pawns Challenge Part II: Novel Challenges to Human Rights 4. The Challenge of Global Inequality 5. The Challenge of Future People Part III: Getting to Realization 6. The Question of Motivation: Can People Be Motivated as Needed for Realizing Human Rights? 7. Conclusion. (shrink)

One very important question about poverty is what rich people like us should do to fight it. In this article, I argue that we can, at little cost to ourselves, give tithes of our money and live within our so-called ‘ecological footprint’. At the end of the article, it is argued that we should, morally, do these things.

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

Should conflicts among human rights be dealt with by including general principles for priority setting at some prominent place in the practice of human rights? This essay argues that neither setting prominent and principled priorities nor a case-by-case approach are likely to be defensible as general solutions. The main reasons concern how best to realize all human rights for all. Conflicts among human rights are more defensibly addressed by checking whether the conflict has been correctly diagnosed: Do human rights as (...) a whole get due priority? Have feasibility considerations inherent in human rights been considered, and the possibility of bringing in additional dutybearers? If a conflict among human rights is genuine, formal principles for priority setting are of some help. Sometimes, it is clear that these should be “upgraded” to substantive principles and sometimes that they should not. Many cases, however, are as yet unclear and will need further investigation. (shrink)

This paper critically discusses three studies about the question of how much morality may demand of moral agents. These studies may together constitute the most prominent literature about this question to emerge in recent years. In reverse order, they are: Garrett Cullity’s The Moral Demands of Affluence , Tim Mulgan’s The Demands of Consequentialism , and Liam Murphy’s Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory . The paper’s first part very briefly presents the position that these studies defend, and in addition it (...) is argued that all three studies risk denying, for unconvincing reasons, an intuitively very plausible statement, namely that moral agents morally ought to do great good whenever they can do so at little cost to themselves. The second part of the paper then considers the critical position that the three mentioned books take towards an ‘appeal to cost to the moral agent’. Such an appeal, the details of which will be discussed in the paper, has often been prominent in arguments for limiting the demands made on moral agents. I argue that the doubts that the threestudies have about this appeal, are unwarranted. (shrink)

PhD thesis published with Amsterdam University Press. -/- ***Back cover: -/- In this time of mass communication, rich people like us know very well the horrible conditions in which many poor people must live. Therefore, the question of what should we do about poverty, which is the central question of this study, readily arises. This book also asks more specific questions such as: How much money should wealthy individuals like us spend on fighting poverty? and, What restrictions should we place (...) on the extent and orientation of our expenditure in the light of poverty? The question of what rich individuals like us should do morally about poverty, first of all requires clarity about some relatively general issues: Must we always do whatever does the most good, or should we only do the most good possible while avoiding great cost to ourselves? Or, do we only need to do our fair share in a cooperative scheme which would eradicate poverty if everyone else also does their share? A large part of this study focuses on such issues. The book argues that if we can do great good at little cost to ourselves, we ought to do so – and perhaps we ought to do great good even if the cost to ourselves of doing so, is not small. Also, it is argued that rich individuals like us can often, at little cost to ourselves, undertake a number of concrete actions which help to fight poverty, and that we are morally obligated to undertake acs such as giving tithes, living within our ecological footprint, and frequently buying fair trade products. (shrink)

This article argues that universities have duties to negotiate contracts with the pharmaceutical industry that are favourable to the world’s poor, and to do more research into diseases which disproportionately strike the global poor. It is argued that these duties are related to human rights (in particular to a human right to health) and that they are therefore very weighty. Furthermore, these duties are in line with some of the most important things that Universities Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM), a (...) worldwide group of students and academics, wants universities to do. A number of objections are discussed, among other things to do with safeguarding pharmaceutical innovation, and it is argued that the aforementioned duties should, as UAEM also advocates, often be combined with efforts on the part of universities to work towards more long-term, large-scale institutional arrangements to ensure access to and availability of essential medicines for the global poor. -/- . (shrink)

Can human rights incorporate future people and their interests, considering all the risks and uncertainties by which these interests are surrounded? Given problems such as climate change, resource depletion and pollution, human rights cannot afford not to be able to do this if they are to remain relevant. On the other hand, taking future people on board may lead to (another) multiplication of human rights claims, and this is hardly good news either. Therefore, an adequate account of how to incorporate (...) the interests of future people into human rights is much needed. It should also tell us about the weight of protecting these interests compared with that of providing other human rights protections. This chapter aims to give the first outlines of such an account. I will call it sufficientarian, because it understands human rights as articulating a ‘threshold of enough’. (shrink)

Could there be a moral duty for consumers to buy fair trade products? Even more dramatically, could there be a moral duty for governments to support fair trade products? This essay argues that the answer to both questions may well be affirmative – where I am thinking of consumers and governments of (relatively) affluent countries such as Western countries. In relation to the first question, the existence of a moral duty to buy fair trade products goes against the idea that, (...) in their consumer behavior, individuals are morally free to choose as they please or prefer. In relation to the second question, the existence of a moral duty for governments to support fair trade products goes against the idea that governments should not interfere with markets, among other things because these markets are thought of as devices that give voice to consumer preferences. In this essay, I will try to show why despite such doubts, there may still be a moral duty for consumers to buy and for governments to support fair trade products. By fair trade products I shall mean products that take account of some minimal standard of protection for producers, and possibly also for the environment. (shrink)

This paper investigates the moral duties that human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International, and development NGOs, such as Oxfam, have in relation to human rights – especially in relation to the human right to a decent standard of living. The mentioned NGOs are powerful new agents on the global scene, and according to many they might be duty-bearers in relation to human rights. However, until now their moral duties have hardly been investigated. The present paper investigates NGO duties in (...) relation to human rights by looking in particular to a moral theory recently proposed by Leif Wenar, a theory which has some similarities to utilitarianism. In applying this theory, a case for human-rights duties of NGOs is developed mainly by considering the indispensable role that civil society plays in protecting human rights. The paper concludes that, at least, NGOs bear duties with regard to human rights when, as in certain real-life cases, NGO involvement is the only way to achieve acceptable protection against standard threats to certain goods, such as a decent standard of living. (shrink)

This chapter outlines and defends a number of key conceptual choices with regard to poverty: poverty is regarded as material; as related to a lack of real freedoms; as involuntary; as multidimensional; as objective; and as in important respects absolute, yet time-relative. The chapter also considers the resulting links between poverty on the one hand and justice and human rights on the other.

The 2008 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) provides a landmark articulation of the universality of human rights. It affirms in strong terms that all human beings have a claim to full inclusion and equal participation in society, something denied to many because of disability. The CRPD is an ambitious document with far-reaching and fundamental implications. This interdisciplinary collection of essays takes up pressing philosophical, legal, and practical issues raised by the CRPD and the ongoing process (...) of its implementation. Combining clear legal and philosophical overviews with ground-breaking conceptual analyses, the collection aims to advance the academic debate about human rights and disability and to serve as a useful resource for policymakers, ethicists, disability activists, jurists, and all those interested in the human rights of persons with disabilities. With contributions by Jackie Leach Scully, Marcus Düwell, Jenny Goldschmidt, Sigrid Graumann, Caroline Harnacke, Jan Vorstenbosch, Esther van Weele, Joel Anderson, Jos Philips. (shrink)

Background People who are at elevated risk of suicide stand to benefit from internet-based interventions; however, research in this area is likely impacted by a range of ethical and practical challenges. The aim of this study was to examine the ethical issues and practical barriers associated with clinical studies of internet-based interventions for suicide prevention. Method This was a mixed-methods study involving two phases. First, a systematic search was conducted to identify studies evaluating internet-based interventions for people at risk of (...) suicide, and information pertaining to safety protocols and exclusion criteria was extracted. Second, investigators on the included studies were invited to complete an online survey comprising open-ended and forced-choice responses. Quantitative and qualitative methods were used to analyse the data. Results The literature search identified 18 eligible studies, of which three excluded participants based on severity of suicide risk. Half of the 15 suicide researchers who participated in the survey had experienced problems obtaining ethics approval, and none had encountered adverse events attributed to their intervention. Survey respondents noted the difficulty of managing risk in online environments and the limitations associated with implementing safety protocols, although some also reported increased confidence resulting from the ethical review process. Respondents recommended researchers pursue a collaborative relationship with their research ethics committees. Conclusion There is a balance to be achieved between the need to minimise the risk of adverse events whilst also ensuring interventions are being validated on populations who may be most likely to use and benefit from them. Further research is required to obtain the views of research ethics committees and research participants on these issues. Dialogue between researchers and ethics committees is necessary to address the need to ensure safety while also advancing the timely development of effective interventions in this critical area. (shrink)

This book chapter shows how the early Heidegger’s philosophy around the period of Being and Time can address some central questions of contemporary social ontology. After sketching “non-summative constructionism”, which is arguably the generic framework that underlies all forms of contemporary analytic social ontology, I lay out early Heidegger’s conception of human social reality in terms of an extended argument. The Heidegger that shows up in light of this treatment is an acute phenomenologist of human social existence who emphasizes our (...) engagement in norm-governed practices as the basis of social reality. I then defuse a common and understandable set of objections against invoking the early Heidegger as someone who can make any positive contribution to our understanding of social reality. Lastly, I explore the extent to which the early Heidegger’s philosophy provides insights regarding phenomena of collective intentionality by showing how the intelligibility of such phenomena traces back to individual agents’ common understanding of possible ways of understanding things and acting with one another. With the early Heidegger, I argue that this common understanding is the fundamental source and basis of collective intentionality, not the non-summativist constructionism on which contemporary analytic social ontology has sought to focus with much effort. The lesson about social ontology that we should learn from the early Heidegger is that there is a tight connection between the social constitution of the human individual and his or her capacity to perform actions or activities that instantiate collective intentionality. (shrink)

In recent years a growing number of philosophers in the analytic tradition have focused their attention on the significance of human sociality. An older point of departure of analysis, which actually precedes this current tide of accounts of sociality, has revolved around the debate between “holism” and “individualism” in the philosophy of the human or social sciences and social theory. The more recent point of departure for various accounts of sociality has centered on the nature of conventions, social groups, shared (...) intentions, or collective intentionality. Putting aside the disagreements among these accounts, they all take for granted an antecedently intelligible notion of individual agency as explanatorily primitive and seek to explain the possibility of plural or collective agency in terms of the former. By contrast, other philosophers who have worked at the intersection of analytic and "continental" philosophy have emphasized the primacy of practice as the proper starting point for philosophical reflections on the nature of human sociality. In the analytic tradition this emphasis is typically framed in terms of the possibility of rule-following, a topic put on the philosophical agenda by the later Wittgenstein. Peter Winch’s and Saul Kripke’s influential but controversial readings of Wittgenstein explicitly thematize the issue of rule-following, readings which have in turn generated critical reflection in various disciplines for which this issue is relevant. -/- I begin by briefly explicating the positions of Pettit and Brandom on the issue of rule-following (putting aside any specific differences between them for the moment). Next I connect Pettit’s and Brandom’s views on rule-following, and more generally on normativity and its necessarily social basis, with the views of Theodore Schatzki and Joseph Rouse, whose conceptions of the significance of practice and its inherent sociality are indebted as much to the early Heidegger as well as the later Wittgenstein. I suggest that Pettit’s and Brandom’s views of the necessarily social nature of rule-following (i.e., practice) ought to acknowledge and integrate the shared insight of Schatzki and Rouse that practices are not only modes of activity, but constitute more basically the concrete setting or world within which practices qua modes of activity are intelligible (verständlich) at all. I conclude the paper by suggesting how an integrated account of the significance of the necessarily social nature of practice undermines the assumptions of those philosophers who seek to analyze human sociality solely on the basis of modes of interactions among individual agents. (shrink)

The article focuses in a particular way on two Jesuits of the XVII Century, Philips van Winghe e Jean l'Heureux . It describes their active participation in the scientific life of their time, as well as their own contributions to science.

This volume republishes sixty-two of Dewey’s writings from the years 1942 to 1948; four other items are published here for the first time. A focal point of this volume is Dewey’s introduction to his collective volume _Problems of Men. _Exchanges in the _Journal of Philosophy _with Donald C. Mackay, Philip Blair Rice, and with Alexander Meiklejohn in _Fortune _appear here, along with Dewey’s letters to editors of various publications and his forewords to colleagues’ books. Because 1942 was the centenary of (...) the birth of William James, four articles about James are also included in this volume. (shrink)

This volume republishes sixty-two of Dewey⿿s writings from the years 1942 to 1948; four other items are published here for the first time. A focal point of this volume is Dewey⿿s introduction to his collective volume Problems of Men. Exchanges in the Journal of Philosophy with Donald C. Mackay, Philip Blair Rice, and with Alexander Meiklejohn in Fortune appear here, along with Dewey⿿s letters to editors of various publications and his forewords to colleagues⿿ books. Because 1942 was the centenary of (...) the birth of William James, four articles about James are also included in this volume. (shrink)

This volume republishes sixty-two of Dewey’s writings from the years 1942 to 1948; four other items are published here for the first time. A focal point of this volume is Dewey’s introduction to his collective volume _Problems of Men. _Exchanges in the _Journal of Philosophy _with Donald C. Mackay, Philip Blair Rice, and with Alexander Meiklejohn in _Fortune _appear here, along with Dewey’s letters to editors of various publications and his forewords to colleagues’ books. Because 1942 was the centenary of (...) the birth of William James, four articles about James are also included in this volume. (shrink)

The _Platform Sutra_ records the teachings of Hui-neng, the Sixth Patriarch, who is revered as one of the two great figures in the founding of Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism. This translation is the definitive English version of the eighth-century Ch'an classic. Phillip B. Yampolsky has based his translation on the Tun-huang manuscript, the earliest extant version of the work. A critical edition of the Chinese text is given at the end of the volume. Dr. Yampolsky also furnishes a lengthy and detailed (...) historical introduction which contains much information hitherto unavailable even to scholars, and provides the context essential to an understanding of Hui-neng's work. He gives an account of the history and legends of Ch'an Buddhism, with particular attention to the traditions associated with Hui-neng, quoting or summarizing the most important narratives. He then discusses the various texts of the _Platform Sutra_, and analyzes its contents. (shrink)

Husserlian phenomenology, as the study of conscious experience, has often been accused of solipsism. Husserl’s method, it is argued, does not have the resources to provide an account of consciousness of other minds. This chapter will address this issue by providing a brief overview of the multiple angles from which Husserl approached the theme of intersubjectivity, with specific focus on the details of his account of the concrete interpersonal encounter – “empathy.” Husserl understood empathy as a direct, quasi-perceptual form of (...) intentionality through which the sense of the Other is constituted. Furthermore, his account of empathy is holistically integrated with his overall theory of intersubjectivity, including his discussions of the objectivity of nature, and the social, historical, and communal aspects of subjectivity. Husserl’s theory of empathy continues to cast a long shadow, influencing both the analytic and continental approaches to the problem of other minds, as well as contemporary account of social cognition in the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

This article draws on the antebellum political thought of Black abolitionists Frederick Douglass and Martin Delany in critically assessing the efficacy of reasonableness in advancing the aims of emancipatory politics in political discourse. I argue, through a reading of Douglass and Delany, that comporting oneself reasonably in the face of oppressive ideology can be counterproductive, if one’s aim is to undermine such ideology and the institutions it supports. Douglass and Delany, I argue, also provide us with a framework for evaluating (...) alternative discursive strategies we might wish to employ in light of the limited value of reasonableness for emancipatory politics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Constitutive panpsychism is the doctrine that macro-level consciousness—that is, consciousness of the sort possessed by certain composite things such as humans—is built out of irreducibly mental features had by some or all of the basic physical constituents of reality. On constitutive panpsychism, changes in macro-level consciousness amount to changes in either the way that micro-conscious entities ‘bond’ or the way that micro-conscious qualities ‘blend’. I pose the ‘Selection Problem’ for constitutive panpsychism—the problem of explaining how high-level functional states of (...) the brain ‘select’ micro-conscious qualities for bonding or blending. I argue that there are no empirically plausible solutions to this problem. (shrink)

The questions -- The purpose of morality and law -- The past and the future -- What is religion? -- What is the rule of law? -- The families of religion : western religions -- The families of religion : eastern religions -- The families of law -- A brief tour of secular law -- Money, banks and corporations -- Secularisation and religious decline -- Reasons for the decline of religiosity -- Secularisation of government -- The rise of the lawyers (...) -- Who rules the world : lawyers or economists? -- What is wrong with the law? -- Scientific progress and the law -- A way of living -- A billion years from now. (shrink)

For liberal contractarians, moral and political principles are justified if agreeable to persons as free and equals. But for critics of liberal contractarianism, this justification applies only to those capable of agreement. Understanding why contractarianism suffers from the problem of exclusion helps up understand the distinctive character of contractarianism and the importance of agreement in particular. I suggest contractarianism need not be objectionably exclusive. I first consider why agreement is important in contractarianism, and then introduce the main versions of contemporary (...) contractarianism and their different understandings of agreement. I discuss how agreement results in exclusion in each, and distinguish two kinds of response to the problem of exclusion: differential inclusion and permissive inclusion. Differential inclusion is unsuccessful because it offers those not fully capable of agreement unequal status. Permissive inclusion may either make the circumstances of agreement more open, or characterize the capacities required for inclusion more permissively. I advocate the latter as the most promising response to the problem of exclusion. I outline a more inclusive contractualism based on the capacity to share goals. (shrink)

English summary: According to a current prejudice, the God of reason does not have a home in Protestantism. On the basis of model studies on the connection between biblical, Platonic and Aristotelian themes in the development of the Christian concept of God in late antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the authors of this volume show that the reformers did not at all flatly dismiss the rationality of faith. The articles focus on the modern transformations of the concept of (...) God in the 18th and 19th centuries. The volume, a collection of case studies of the history of the problem of the Christian concept of God, concludes with prominent syntheses of revelation and reason in the 20th century. German description: Einem gangigen Vorurteil zufolge hat der Gott der Vernunft im Protestantismus keine Heimat. Nach exemplarischen Studien zur Verbindung von biblischen mit platonischen und aristotelischen Motiven bei der Entfaltung des christlichen Gottesgedankens in Spatantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance zeigt der vorliegende Band aber, dass die Reformatoren der Vernunft des Glaubens keineswegs pauschal den Abschied gaben. Der Schwerpunkt der Beitrage liegt auf den neuzeitlichen Transformationen des Gottesgedankens im 18. und 19. Jh. Prominente Synthesen von Offenbarung und Vernunft im 20. Jh. schliessen den Band ab, der Fallstudien zu einer Problemgeschichte des christlichen Gottes-Denkens versammelt. Mit Beitragen von: Martin Arneth, Christine Axt-Piscalar, Ulrich Barth, Markus Buntfuss, Jorg Dierken, Douglas Hedley, Thomas Kaufmann, Dietrich Klein, Dietrich Korsch, Martin Laube, Jorg Lauster, Friederike Nussel, Bernd Oberdorfer, Joachim Ringleben, Friedemann Voigt, Dorothea Wendebourg, Gunther Wenz. (shrink)

It is intuitive that free action depends on consciousness in some way, since behavior that is unconsciously generated is widely regarded as un-free. But there is no clear consensus as to what such dependence comes to, in part because there is no clear consensus about either the cognitive role of consciousness or about the essential components of free action. I divide the space of possible views into four: the Constitution View (on which free actions metaphysically consist, at least in part, (...) in phenomenally conscious episodes of a special sort), the Causal-Dependence View (on which free actions are necessarily caused by conscious episodes), the Counterfactaul-Dependence View (on which free actions necessarily counterfactually dependent on conscious episodes of certain types), and the Independence View (on which there are no necessary dependence-relations that hold between free action and conscious episodes). After surveying recent empirical literature that purports to show that consciousness plays a smaller role in generating action than is usually supposed, I conclude that it is plausible that free action depends on consciousness in two ways. First, free action causally depends on consciousness control. Second, free action counterfactually depends on the agent's being responsive to certain reasons. (shrink)

Breaking off the ordinary flow of experience, the passions create a state of exception. In their suddenness and intensity, they map a personal world, fix and qualify our attention, and impel our actions. Outraged anger drives us to write laws that will later be enforced by impersonal justice. Intense grief at the death of someone in our life discloses the contours of that life to us. Wonder spurs scientific inquiry. The strong current of Western thought that idealizes a dispassionate world (...) has ostracized the passions as quaint, even dangerous. Intense states have come to be seen as symptoms of pathology. A fondness for irony along with our civic ideal of tolerance lead us to prefer the diluted emotional life of feelings and moods. Demonstrating enormous intellectual originality and generosity, Philip Fisher meditates on whether this victory is permanent-and how it might diminish us. From Aristotle to Hume to contemporary biology, Fisher finds evidence that the passions have defined a core of human nature no less important than reason or desire. Traversing the Iliad, King Lear, Moby Dick, and other great works, he discerns the properties of the high-spirited states we call the passions. Are vehement states compatible with a culture that values private, selectively shared experiences? How do passions differ from emotions? Does anger have an opposite? Do the passions give scale, shape, and significance to our experience of time? Is a person incapable of anger more dangerous than someone who is irascible? In reintroducing us to our own vehemence, Fisher reminds us that it is only through our strongest passions that we feel the contours of injustice, mortality, loss, and knowledge. It is only through our personal worlds that we can know the world. (shrink)

I discuss three tiers of technological innovation: mild innovation, or the acceleration by technology of a human activity aimed at a good; moderate innovation, or the obviation by technology of an activity aimed at a good; and radical innovation, or the altering by technology of the human condition so as to change what counts as a good. I argue that it is impossible to morally assess proposed innovations within any of these three tiers unless we rehabilitate a natural-law ethical framework. (...) And I offer some moral starting points within such a framework, in connection with innovations of each of the three types. (shrink)