Hyōburon -- Kyōmonron -- Jinsei sanpōsetsu -- Chisetsu.

A nineteenth-century aristocrat, Nishi Amane (1829-1897) was one of the first Japanese to assert the supremacy of Western culture. He was sent by his government to Leiden to study the European social sciences; on his return to Japan shortly before the climactic Meiji Restoration of 1868 he introduced and adapted European utilitarianism and positivism to his country's intellectual world. To modernize, Nishi held, Japan must cast off the bonds of the Confucian world-view in order to adopt new (...) principles of empirical scholarly investigation and new standards of self-improvement. Though a Confucian by upbringing, Nishi became thoroughly committed to Western intellectual values in his programs for the new Japanese society. In his roles of teacher, writer, and government administrator, he was influential at one of the most critical times in Japan's history. Originally published in 1970. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

徳川慶喜のブレーンにして明治政府の高級官僚。翻訳論、日本語論、軍事論。知の百面相・西周初の入門書。.

The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by considering recent philosophical literature on various backward‐looking emotions, such as regret, grief, resentment, and anger. I articulate the general problem these accounts grapple with: a certain diminution in backward‐looking emotions seems fitting while the reasons for these emotions seem to persist. The problem, I argue, rests on the assumption that if the facts that give reason for an emotion remain unchanged, the emotion remains fitting. However, (...) I argue there are rationally self‐consuming attitudes: affective attitudes that become less fitting the longer they endure while the facts that give reason for them persist. A widely held synchronic view of fitting affective attitudes denies that fittingness at a time depends on the agent's attitudes at different times and therefore denies that the fittingness of an affective attitude can depend on its duration. Once we reject the synchronic view, we may see that affective attitudes are often fitting due to the fitting processes of which they are part. These fitting processes explain the fitting diminution of backward‐looking emotions as well as other diachronic aspects of the fittingness of emotions. -/- . (shrink)

Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue (...) that the second half of this claim, according to which the concept of belief includes a standard of correctness, is required to explain the fact that the deliberative question whether to believe that p is transparent to the question whether p. This argument raises various questions. Is there such a thing as deliberating whether to believe? Is the transparency of the deliberative question whether to believe that p the same as the transparency of the factual question whether I do believe that p? We will begin by answering these questions and then turn to a series of possible objections to our argument. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has shaken the world. After liberalization in 1991, microfinance became a panacea for poor people without collateral and information asymmetry. The higher cost of microfinance and debt traps highlighted the need for the state to intervene in resource redistribution. In addition, national lockdowns and COVID-19 restrictions have made it difficult for emerging economies like India to achieve this sustainable development goal. The Reserve Bank of India introduced self-help group (SHG) bank linkage to ensure the financial inclusion of (...) the poor. The difference-in-difference method examined how SHGs affect entrepreneur households’ income. CMIE Consumer Pyramid dx data were used for analysis. The data establish that SHGs have increased the income of the households, and demographic factors such as education, income level and gender also impact the financial inclusion of the poor. (shrink)

Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that (...) it is good (in whichever sense of good one likes, moral, prudential, aesthetic, allthings-considered, etc.) to believe the truth with respect to p. But there is no such gap between the two questions within the first-personal deliberative perspective; the question whether to believe that p seems to collapse into the question whether p is true. (shrink)

L'impôt sous son angle colonial en Afrique était perçu comme un instrument de pression, d'oppression et d'appauvrissement du citoyen contribuable par l'impôt dit, de capitation. Ce lourd passé historique pèse encore sur les systèmes fiscaux d'Afrique et d'ailleurs, systèmes au sein desquels les citoyens se sentent encore victimes parce que spoliés de leurs biens par les puissances publiques. Dans cet ouvrage, Docteur Célestin Amané DAGO propose un changement de paradigme du système de la fiscalité à travers la philosophie politique normative (...) et l'éthique économique appliquée du philosophe américain John Rawls, en introduisant une part de volontariat dans l'accomplissement de l'obligation fiscale, afin de changer le rapport du contribuable à l'Etat. L'ouvrage vu sous cet angle, est un appel aux pouvoirs publics pour inscrire le contribuable au coeur du système fiscal afin que, le paiement de l'impôt soit un acte spontané et volontaire. L'acte volontaire, s'entend comme la réponse à la justice et à l'équité fiscales dans la redistribution sociale des richesses nationales. Au commencement était la philosophie en tant que mère de toutes les sciences et, naturellement M. Amané Célestin DAGO, embrassa cette discipline prestigieuse à l'Université de BOUAKE ; mais, cet eudémoniste toujours souriant et généreux, est un monomane de l'application des savoirs, un citoyen rivé au credo selon lequel le bonheur de la cité ne viendra que d'un gouvernement de philosophes. Voilà le principe d'intelligibilité de toutes ses activités théoriques et pratiques. Etonné par la ruée automatique des politiciens négro-africains vers la démocratie comme régime politique idéal, parce que le maître blanc en domination l'a dit, Monsieur DAGO prépara et soutint un mémoire de maîtrise en philosophie politique et sociale sur le thème suivant : Du procès de la démocratie dans la République de PLATON ; à la suite de quoi, un mémoire de DEA de philosophie intégrale intitulé : La République comme médiation de la justice chez PLATON ; puis, voulant être différent du philosophe THALES de Milet, il prépara son second DEA en philosophie politique normative, qui a eu pour thème : La justice et la répartition fiscale dans la philosophie de JOHN RAWLS. Il est admis au Cycle Supérieur de l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA) où il obtient le Diplôme option Impôts, promotion 2004-2005. Depuis novembre 2011, Monsieur DAGO a été nommé Receveur des Impôts Divers par Arrêté du Ministre en charge de l'Economie et des Finances. Malgré ses nombreuses charges administratives, Monsieur DAGO a su réaliser sa passion en soutenant une thèse unique de Doctorat de philosophie politique normative, option éthique économique appliquée. Cette thèse a été sanctionnée par la mention très honorable à l'unanimité du jury. Ajoutons que Monsieur DAGO est l'actuel Président de la Mutuelle de Développement de HIRE (MUDH), mission de développement qui l'a contraint à écrire le livre blanc de la sous-préfecture de HIRE intitulé : Besoin de développement et Exploitation minière à HIRE. Aujourd'hui, Dr DAGO est Administrateur Principal des Sces Financiers à la Direction Générale des Impôts de Côte d'ivoire. (shrink)

When we deliberate whether to believe some proposition, we feel immediately compelled to look for evidence of its truth. Philosophers have labelled this feature of doxastic deliberation 'transparency'. I argue that resolving the disagreement in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the correct explanation of transparency. My hypothesis is that it reflects a conceptual truth about belief: a belief that p is correct if and only if p. This normative truth entails that only evidence can be (...) a reason for belief. Although evidentialism does not follow directly from the mere psychological truth that we cannot believe for non-evidential reasons, it does follow directly from the normative conceptual truth about belief which explains why we cannot do so. (shrink)

Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that (...) it is good to believe the truth with respect to p. But there is no such gap between the two questions within the first-personal deliberative perspective; the question whether to believe that p seems to collapse into the question whether p is true. (shrink)

How can we explain the rational diminution of backward-looking emotions without resorting to pragmatic or wrong kind of reason explanations? That is to say, how can the diminution of these emotions not only be rational but fitting? In this paper, I offer an answer to this question by considering the case of anger. In Sect. 1, I examine Pamela Hieronymi’s account of forgiveness as the rational resolution of resentment. I argue that Hieronymi’s account rests on an assumption about the rationality (...) of emotions —namely, that a rational change in emotion entails a change in the fact that constitutes the reason for the emotion. Then, in Sect. 2, I consider Agnes Callard’s recent criticism of accounts like Hieronymi’s as well as Callard’s alternative account of the rational resolution of anger. I argue that Callard offers a promising account but fails to explain how it avoids the criticism she levels against Hieronymi and others. Finally, in Sect. 3, I reject Hieronymi’s assumption and argue that an emotion can cease to be fitting without any change in the fact that constitutes the reason for it. I also explain how my proposal can complement Callard’s account of the rational dissipation of anger. My discussion of anger leads to a solution to the general problem about backward-looking emotions: a fitting backward-looking emotion can fittingly diminish when it is part of a process that is itself a fitting response to the past occurrence. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the agent’s states or attitudes at an individual time [Hedden 2015, 2016; Moss 2015]; others argue that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with processes [Podgorski 2017]. This distinction is not drawn in discussions of emotional rationality. As a result, a widely held assumption in the literature on emotional rationality has gone unexamined. I employ Abelard Podgorski’s argument from rational delay to argue that many emotional norms are fundamentally (...) concerned with emotional processes. I also claim that the main response available to the synchronist about belief is not available to the synchronist about emotions and, therefore, fundamental process norms are more plausible than epistemologists tend to believe. (shrink)

Discussions of ethics within in-service teacher education tend to focus on microethical concerns (e.g., discipline) that deal with decision making at interpersonal levels. Issues concerning educational technology are no exception. Yet, as teachers choose and are expected to integrate technological devices (e.g., laptops) and sociotechnical systems (e.g., learning management systems) into pedagogical practices, their classrooms and schools may become implicated in macroethical issues (e.g., electronic waste) that reach beyond the local consequences of their direct actions. Necessitated by tight couplings of (...) technology and education, this article presents the concept of macroethics for teacher educators by grounding it in three areas of concern: obsolescence, automation, and big data. These three areas offer opportunities to make economic and environmental issues more central to case studies on technology in teacher education. At the same time, teacher educators will need to put emphasis on critical reflection and collective action in units on macroethics since the limited impact of individual decision-making on these issues may put teachers in double binds (i.e., dilemmas with contradictory demands). (shrink)

Why can't deliberation conclude in an intention except by considering whether to perform the intended action? I argue that the answer to this question entails that reasons for intention are determined by reasons for action. Understanding this feature of practical deliberation thus allows us to solve the toxin puzzle.

It is common for philosophers to claim that doxastic voluntarism, the view that an agent can form beliefs voluntarily, is false, and therefore that agents do not have the kind of control over their beliefs required for a straightforward application of deontological concepts such as obligation or duty in the domain of epistemology. The role that the denial of doxastic voluntarism plays in an argument to the effect that agents do not have obligations with respect to belief is simply this.

This present article explores the effects of cultural value, economic prosperity, and community mental wellbeing through multi-sectoral infrastructure growth projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. The implications of the social exchange theory are applied to observe the support of the local community for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. This study explores the CPEC initiative, it’s direct social, cultural, economic development, and risk of environmental factors that affect residents’ lives and the local community’s wellbeing. CPEC is a multibillion-dollar project to uplift (...) economic growth and free trade between Pakistan, China, and other regional stakeholders. Although CPEC is still in its initial phases with partial startups, policymakers and government officials claim this mega project as a “game-changer” in the region, mainly for Pakistan and China. This gigantic project offers the significant potential to generate business slews and employment opportunities with international outreach. Due to the term’s newness, numerous studies have recently explored the macro and microeconomic benefits of the CPEC initiatives; still, these projects are theoretical. The existing literature insufficiently explored how helpful CPEC would be to a specific group and how residents perceive its advantages. This study fills in the literature gaps and explores the likely advantageous potential of the CPEC for the regional states. The study applied a convenient sampling technique for the data collection process. It used a mixed-method approach to gain scientific results, with a standardized questionnaire survey of 459 people from five major cities of Pakistan. The study results designate that residents believe that CPEC infrastructure projects will significantly improve residents’ life quality through more job openings and community poverty reduction. Still, they raised their concerns regarding environmental protection issues in the region. The findings specified that residents had an optimistic approach to better educational productivity by adopting environment-oriented policies. Policymakers should establish new CPEC study centers in different areas, and investors should be encouraged to participate in the industrial sector. Officials can overwhelm community worries about environmental degradation. Government officials in both countries can utilize the findings to raise public awareness about CPEC’s social, economic, cultural, mental wellbeing, and ecological implications. (shrink)

Surprises are important in our everyday lives as well as in our scientific and philosophical theorizing—in psychology, information theory, cognitive-neuroscience, philosophy of science, and confirmation theory. Nevertheless, there is no satisfactory theory of what makes something surprising. It has long been acknowledged that not everything unexpected is surprising. The reader had no reason to expect that there will be exactly 190 words in this abstract and yet there is nothing surprising about this fact. We offer a novel theory that explains (...) when and why an unexpected fact is surprising. We distinguish between descriptive and normative notions of what is surprising; clarify the sense in which surprising facts are unexpected; and, finally, develop and defend the significance account of surprise, according to which a fact is surprising to an agent if and to the extent that it is both unexpected and significant to the agent. Since a surprising fact can be significant to an agent in various ways—personal, moral, epistemic, and aesthetic—surprise is not merely or primarily epistemic. Fitting surprise reflects more than a person’s view of what is; it reflects a person’s view of what is significant. (shrink)

A joke is amusing if and only if it’s fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and only if it’s fitting to regret it. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the _fit–value biconditionals_. The biconditionals give us a systematic way of recognizing the role of fit in our ethical practices; they also serve as the bedrock (...) of various metaethical projects, such as fitting-attitude analysis of value and the ‘fittingness first’ approach. Yet despite the importance of the biconditionals, there is very little discussion of their proper interpretation. This paper argues that any plausible interpretation of the fit_–_value biconditionals must disarm several kinds of apparent counterexample. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; and that a person is loveable doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because that person might be my sibling. We consider possible responses to such counterexamples and develop what we consider the most promising interpretation of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered. (shrink)

Our beliefs, intentions, desires, regrets, and fears are evaluable for fit—they can succeed or fail to be fitting responses to the objects they are about. Can our headaches and heartrates be evaluable for fit? The common view says ‘no’. This chapter argues: sometimes, yes. First, it claims that when a racing heart accompanies fear it seems to have the typical characteristics of fit-evaluable items. Then, it suggests that suspicion of this initial impression is explained by the assumption that whether an (...) item is ever fit-evaluable is determined by the type of item it is. Fear is the type of thing that can be fit-evaluable, a racing heart is not. The chapter then proposes an alternative whereby the same type of item can be fit-evaluable on one occasion but not on another. What explains the difference, it is argued, is that only in the former occasion the item is explained by the agent’s narrative as an element of a fit-evaluable response. (shrink)

Efficient identification of influential nodes is one of the essential aspects in the field of complex networks, which has excellent theoretical and practical significance in the real world. A valuable number of approaches have been developed and deployed in these areas where just a few have used centrality measures along with their concerning deficiencies and limitations in their studies. Therefore, to resolve these challenging issues, we propose a novel effective distance-based centrality algorithm for the identification of influential nodes in concerning (...) networks. EDBC algorithm comprises factors such as the power of K-shell, degree nodes, effective distance, and numerous levels of neighbor’s influence or neighborhood potential. The performance of the proposed algorithm is evaluated on nine real-world networks, where a susceptible infected recovered epidemic model is employed to examine the spreading dynamics of each node. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm outperforms the existing techniques such as eigenvector, betweenness, closeness centralities, hyperlink-induced topic search, H-index, K-shell, page rank, profit leader, and gravity over a valuable margin. (shrink)

Linked with existence of the almighty, the operation of division by zero which is considered as undefined or indeterminate or infinite sometimes, has been a topic of serious altercation among mathematicians and philosophers for so long. History is evident of the various attempts made to clearly define the algebra of zero, including the idea of division by zero. This includes the evolution of the idea of zero division and various insights from mathematicians like Euler, Craig and more. The realm of (...) the paper contains all such significant attempts and it deals with the idea of the history that wishes to explore the evolution of infinity and undefined. The prime aim of this paper is to clearly distinguish the three concepts of Undefined, Indeterminate and Infinity, along with the concept of division by zero. It strives to provide a notation to undefined expressions, along with citing justifications and results with the help of unpretentious examples from key branches. (shrink)

Mark Schroeder has recently presented apparent counterexamples to the standard account of the distinction between the right and the wrong kinds of reasons. We argue that these examples appear to refute the standard account only because they blur the distinction between two kinds of reasoning: reasoning about whether to intend or believe that p and reasoning about whether to take up the question of whether to intend or believe that p.

Two prejudices have hampered our understanding of John Stuart Mill’s central argument for free speech. One prejudice is that arguments for free speech can only be made in terms of values or rights. This prejudice causes us to miss the depth of Mill’s argument. He does not argue that silencing speech is harmful or violates rights, but instead that silencing speech is a uniquely self-undermining act; it undermines the ground upon which it is based. But even if we overcome this (...) prejudice and appreciate the self-undermining character of Mill’s argument, the prejudice that epistemic justification is a completable task blinds us to the role of open-mindedness in his argument; and failing to see this leads us to wrongly conclude that his argument is invalid. It is only once we have overcome both prejudices that we can appreciate the depth and power of Mill’s argument for free speech. (shrink)

I propose that shock can be morally significant independently of its consequences but only as part of an ongoing commitment to certain norms, in particular norms that constitute recognizing another as a person. When we witness others in agony, or being severely wronged, or when we ourselves severely wrong or mistreat others, our shock can reflect our recognition of them as persons, a recognition constituted by our commitment to certain moral norms. However, if we do not in fact respond to (...) the suffering or wrong in accordance with these norms—if, for example, we do not act to relieve their suffering or to properly address the wrong done, and do not avoid or prevent its recurrence—then our commitment to the relevant norms is undermined. When we consistently violate the norms whose violation initially shocked us, our lingering shock upon repeated violations gradually loses its significance and becomes a mere impulse—a fossil of a past commitment, so to speak—before it disappears completely. The failure to be shocked in such instances marks the failure of our moral commitments, which is the failure to recognize others as persons. (shrink)

George, feeling stressed and anxious about the criminal investigation into his firm’s accounting practices, decides that it would do him good to get away and take a long, relaxing vacation in Bermuda. According to popular informed-desire accounts of a person’s good, if George would desire to take a vacation to Bermuda upon being made fully aware of what his experience of the vacation would be like and of all the consequences therein, then this course of action would benefit him. This (...) does not mean that George must actually be privy to whether his fully informed self would desire to travel to Bermuda, but whether he would, according to such an account, determines whether going to Bermuda would benefit George, whether he or anyone else is capable of knowing it. (shrink)

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 115, Issue 3pt3, Page 315-322, December 2015.

As Descartes famously pointed out in the Second Meditation, the thought that someone is thinking is true anytime anyone thinks it. Furthermore, thinking it makes it true. Conversely, anytime anyone thinks that it is not the case that someone is thinking, this thought is false, and thinking it makes it false.l will argue that the propositions ‘There is at least one true normative proposition’ and ‘There are no true normative propositions’ have very similar properties. The proposition ‘There is at least (...) one true normative proposition,’ like the proposition ‘Someone is thinking,’ is true anytime anyone believes it, and, in an important sense, it is made true by someone's believing it. Conversely, anytime anyone believes that there are no true normative propositions, the proposition he believes is false and his believing it makes it false. (shrink)

First and primarily, I criticize Jay Wallace's account of the affirmation dynamic, which entails a willingness to bring about past occurrences that were necessary for one's present attachments. Specifically, I criticize his analysis of regret and affirmation as intention-like attitudes about the past. Second, I trace Wallace's notion of regret to a common but misguided model of retrospection as a choice between courses of history. Finally, I offer reason to think that the rationality of retrospection crucially differs from the rationality (...) of choice. (shrink)