The notion of a law of nature is a central component of our scientific and philosophical conception of reality. The lawful character of our world makes natural phenomena predictable, understandable and manipulable in specific ways. This book provides a systematic overview of the most important philosophical conceptions of laws and concludes with a presentation of a novel version of the best systems theory.

Dieses Buch soll ein Bericht über den Prozess Einstein sein. Es enthält das Material über die Diskussion um die Relativitätstheorie in der UdSSR seit 1950. Von 1951 bis 1955 wurde Einstein durch die offizielle Parteiphilosophie der UdSSR in den Anklagezustand versetzt. Der Prozess gipfelte in der Aufforderung, die Relativitätstheorie zu verwerfen und durch eine materialistische 'Theorie schneller Bewegungen' zu ersetzen. Selbst der Name 'Relativitätstheorie' sollte aus den physikalischen Lehrbüchern verschwinden. Die Anklage wurde vertreten von der ideologischen Führungsschicht der gewaltigsten irdischen (...) Macht unseres Zeitalters. Der Angeklagte, in der Reife seines Lebens vor die vehementesten Angriffe gestellt, kam nur durch sein Werk zu Wort. Dies genügte jedoch, dass sich unter den sowjetischen Physikern und Philosophen noch zur Zeit Stalins mannhafte Stimmen der Verteidigung fanden. 1955 wurde der Prozess mit der offiziellen Anerkennung der Relativitäts theorie durch die Parteiphilosophie abgeschlossen. Es war ein Sieg der Wahrheit über die Gewalt. Die Folgen mussten das Ansehen der kommunistischen Ideologie erschüttern. Es hatte sich herausgestellt, dass zwischen der angeblich einzig wissenschaftlichen Philosophie und der exaktesten Naturwissen schaft, der Physik, ein Abgrund klafft, den zu überbrücken die Sowjet philosophie bis heute bemüht ist. Andererseits begannen die sowjetischen Physiker, wachgerufen durch die Appelle der Philosophen, ihr eigenes Weltbild mit adäquaten Methoden zu durchdenken. Diese ganze Ent wicklung ist von hohem Wert für eine Diagnose der geistigen Struktur der Sowjetgesellschaft. (shrink)

1. Bd. Die Grundlagen. Die spezielle Relativitätstheorie.- 2. Bd. Die allgemeine Relativitätstheorie.

BackgroundBiobanking biospecimens and consent are common practice in paediatric research. We need to explore children and young people’s (CYP) knowledge and perspectives around the use of and consent to biobanking. This will ensure meaningful informed consent can be obtained and improve current consent procedures.MethodsWe designed a survey, in co-production with CYP, collecting demographic data, views on biobanking, and consent using three scenarios: 1) prospective consent, 2) deferred consent, and 3) reconsent and assent at age of capacity. The survey was disseminated (...) via the Young Person’s Advisory Group North England (YPAGne) and participating CYP’s secondary schools. Data were analysed using a qualitative thematic approach by three independent reviewers (including CYP) to identify common themes. Data triangulation occurred independently by a fourth reviewer.ResultsOne hundred two CYP completed the survey. Most were between 16–18 years (63.7%, N = 65) and female (66.7%, N = 68). 72.3% had no prior knowledge of biobanking (N = 73).Acceptability of prospective consent for biobanking was high (91.2%, N = 93) with common themes: ‘altruism’, ‘potential benefits outweigh individual risk’, 'frugality', and ‘(in)convenience’.Deferred consent was also deemed acceptable in the large majority (84.3%, N = 86), with common themes: ‘altruism’, ‘body integrity’ and ‘sample frugality’. 76.5% preferred to reconsent when cognitively mature enough to give assent (N = 78), even if parental consent was previously in place. 79.2% wanted to be informed if their biobanked biospecimen is reused (N = 80).ConclusionProspective and deferred consent acceptability for biobanking is high among CYP in the UK. Altruism, frugality, body integrity, and privacy are the most important themes. Clear communication and justification are paramount to obtain consent. Any CYP with capacity should be part of the consenting procedure, if possible. (shrink)

This 44-chapter volume tackles a quickly-evolving field of inquiry, mapping the existing discourse as part of a general attempt to place current developments in historical context; at the same time, breaking new ground in taking on novel subjects and pursuing fresh approaches. The term "A.I." is used to refer to a broad range of phenomena, from machine learning and data mining to artificial general intelligence. The recent advent of more sophisticated AI systems, which function with partial or full autonomy and (...) are capable of tasks which require learning and 'intelligence', presents difficult ethical questions, and has drawn concerns from many quarters about individual and societal welfare, democratic decision-making, moral agency, and the prevention of harm. This work ranges from explorations of normative constraints on specific applications of machine learning algorithms today-in everyday medical practice, for instance-to reflections on the (potential) status of AI as a form of consciousness with attendant rights and duties and, more generally still, on the conceptual terms and frameworks necessarily to understand tasks requiring intelligence, whether "human" or "A.I.". (shrink)

Dispositional essentialism is a non-Humean view about the essences of certain fundamental or natural properties that looms large in recent metaphysics , not least because it promises to explain neatly the natural modalities such as laws of nature, counterfactuals, causation and chance. In the current paper, however, several considerations are presented that indicate a serious tension between its essentialist core thesis and natural “metaphysical” interpretations of its central explanatory claims.

The argument from inductive risk is considered to be one of the strongest challenges for value-free science. A great part of its appeal lies in the idea that even an ideal epistemic agent—the “perfect scientist” or “scientist qua scientist”—cannot escape inductive risk. In this paper, I scrutinize this ambition by stipulating an idealized Bayesian decision setting. I argue that inductive risk does not show that the “perfect scientist” must, descriptively speaking, make non-epistemic value-judgements, at least not in a way that (...) undermines the value-free ideal. However, the argument is more successful in showing that there are cases where the “perfect scientist” should, normatively speaking, use non-epistemic values. I also show that this is possible without creating problems of illegitimate prescription and wishful thinking. Thus, while inductive risk does not refute value-freedom completely, it still represents a powerful critique of value-free science. (shrink)

I argue that Kant acknowledges two models of spontaneous self-determination that rational beings are capable of. The first model involves absolute unconditional necessity and excludes any form of contingency. The second model involves (albeit not as a matter of definition) a form of contingency which entails alternative possibilities for determining oneself. The first model would be exhibited by a divine being; the second model is exhibited by human beings. Human beings do, however, partake in the divine model up to an (...) extent, namely, as far as the legislative spontaneity of their law-giving faculties are concerned. I conclude by suggesting that for Kant, the mechanistic principle that we are exclusively determined by natural causes poses a twofold threat for human agency. In one respect (in relation to the second model), it threatens us with the obliteration of contingency, or with the universality of hypothetical necessity. But in another respect (in relation to the first model), it threatens us (and our putative "laws") with the obliteration of absolute necessity, or with the universality of contingency. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the (re-)conceptualisation of responsible innovation by proposing an evolutionary economic approach that focuses on the role of consumers in the innovation process. After a discussion of the philosophical foundations and ethical implications of this approach, which bears an explanatory potential that has not been adequately considered in previous discussions of responsible innovation, we present a first step towards capturing the important but often neglected role of consumers in innovation processes (including responsible innovation): We propose an agent-based (...) model that incorporates a multidimensional space of characteristics in which new products or services are represented by more than the mere aspect of price and quality. Instead, innovations are denoted by a large set of characteristics, including also negative or harmful ones. The model is used to illustrate that consumers’ heterogeneity and bounded rationality – even if considered in a simple manner – indeed play a crucial role in the creation and diffusion of responsible innovation which can and should be used for further work in this field and for possible extensions of the model. (shrink)

Musik ist anders. Durch Sprechen und Schreiben ist sie nicht zu ersetzen. Dennoch erzeugt sie den Wunsch nach Verständigung: über Musik selbst und über Zusammenhänge, die sie zu dem werden lassen, was sie ist. Auch wenn sie sich medial stets autonom verwirklicht, so ist Musik nicht isoliert. Die klingende Kunst reagiert - auf andere Musik, aber auch auf soziale oder ästhetische Bedingungen ihrer Zeit, wenngleich mit eigenen Mitteln. Der Band versammelt 35 Beiträge zur Musik von der Renaissance bis zum Bebop (...) und Techno, die aus musik- und literaturwissenschaftlichen, theologischen, philosophischen, philologischen und analytischen Perspektiven an diesen Gedanken anschliessen. (shrink)