Der Begriff der Freiheit zeigt keinen gesicherten Tatbestand an. Vielmehr bildet er den Titel einer Problemlage. Für sie fand Hegel drastische Worte: "Über keine Idee weiß man es so allgemein, daß sie unbestimmt, vieldeutig und der größten Mißverständnisse fähig und ihnen deswegen wirklich unterworfen ist als über die Idee der Freiheit, und keine ist mit so wenigem Bewußtsein geläufig". Auch heute macht sich die Unbestimmtheit, Vieldeutigkeit und mögliche Missverständlichkeit der Freiheitsidee in der Mannigfaltigkeit der mit ihr verbundenen Probleme geltend.

Over the last two decades, Axel Honneth has written extensively on the notion of social pathology, presenting it as a distinctive critical resource of Frankfurt School Critical Theory, in which tradition he places himself, and as an alternative to the mainstream liberal approaches in political philosophy. In this paper, I review the developments of Honneth's writing on this notion and offer an immanent critique, with a particular focus on his recent major work "Freedom's Right". Tracing the use of, (...) and problems internal to, Honneth's concept of social pathology serves to demonstrate his increasing reformism. It also serves to catalogue some of the dead ends that Critical Theory should avoid in taking up the idea of social pathology. The implication is not that this idea should be dropped. Rather, the paper is undertaking the necessary step of clearing the ground for further progress to take place on the question of what role the idea of social pathology can and should play in Critical Theory. The paper is critical in nature (and relentlessly so), but ultimately serves a constructive purpose. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider succinctly the main Marxist objections to Honneth’s model of critical social theory, and Honneth’s key objections to Marx-inspired models. I then seek to outline a rapprochement between the two positions, by showing how Honneth’s normative concept of recognition is not antithetical to functionalist arguments, but in fact contains a social-theoretical dimension, the idea that social reproduction and social evolution revolve around struggles around the interpretation of core societal norms. By highlighting the social (...) theoretical side of recognition, one can outline a model of critical social theory that in fact corresponds to the descriptive and normative features outlined by Marx himself. However, the price of this rapprochement for Honnethian critical theory is a greater emphasis on the division of labour as the central mechanism of social reproduction. (shrink)

This paper explores the ambivalent effects of recognition through a critical examination of Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition. I argue that his underlying perfectionist account and his focus on the psychic effects of recognition lead him to overlook important connections between recognition and power. These claims are substantiated through Butler’s theory of gender performativity and recognition; and issues connected to the socio-institutional recognition of transgender identities. I conclude by suggesting that certain problems with Butler’s own position can corrected by (...) drawing more from the Foucauldian aspects of her work. I argue that this is the most promising way to conceptualise recognition and its complex, ambivalent effects. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this article I examine Axel Honneth’s positive theory of recognition. While commentators agree that Honneth’s theory qualifies as a positive theory of recognition, I believe that the deeper reason for why this is an apt characterisation is not yet fully understood. I argue that, instead of considering only what it is to recognise another person and what it means for a person to be recognised, we need to focus our attention on how Honneth pictures the practice (...) of recognition as a whole, which according to him works to make societies into places of greater freedom. This conception of recognition as a freedom-enhancing practice is supposed to provide a solution to a key problem of Frankfurt School critical theory, namely of how to determine the emancipatory practice in which critical theory is rooted, which becomes apparent as soon as one turns to the context in which Honneth originally develops his theory of recognition. At the end of the article, I offer a few reasons for doubting the overly positive picture of the practice of recognition that Honneth provides us with. (shrink)

With his insightful and wide-ranging theory of recognition, Axel Honneth has decisively reshaped the Frankfurt School tradition of critical social theory. Combining insights from philosophy, sociology, psychology, history, political economy, and cultural critique, Honneth’s work proposes nothing less than an account of the moral infrastructure of human sociality and its relation to the perils and promise of contemporary social life. This book provides an accessible overview of Honneth’s main contributions across a variety of fields, assessing the strengths (...) and weaknesses of his thought. Christopher Zurn clearly explains Honneth’s multi-faceted theory of recognition and its relation to diverse topics: individual identity, morality, activist movements, progress, social pathologies, capitalism, justice, freedom, and critique. In so doing, he places Honneth’s theory in a broad intellectual context, encompassing classic social theorists such as Kant, Hegel, Marx, Freud, Dewey, Adorno and Habermas, as well as contemporary trends in social theory and political philosophy. Treating the full range of Honneth’s corpus, including his major new work on social freedom and democratic ethical life, this book is the most up-to-date guide available. _Axel Honneth_ will be invaluable to students and scholars working across the humanities and social sciences, as well as anyone seeking a clear guide to the work of one of the most influential theorists writing today. (shrink)

In der gegenwärtigen Debatte um Kritik und spezifischer um verschiedene Begründungsformen der kritischen Theorie spielt die kritische Theorie der Anerkennung, wie sie von Axel Honneth über die letzten 25 Jahre entwickelt worden ist, eine zentrale Rolle. Diese Theorie soll im vorliegenden Beitrag vorgestellt werden. Um den Aufbau und die Funktionsweise dieser Theorie richtig zu verstehen, ist es unabdingbar, sich zunächst zu vergegenwärtigen, wie sich Honneth in der Tradition der kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie positioniert, also innerhalb jenes Theorieprojekts, das seine Wurzeln (...) bei Hegel und Marx findet und durch Horkheimer in den 1930er Jahren Programm geworden ist. Nach der Lesart, die ich vertreten möchte, entwickelt Honneth seine Anerkennungstheorie vor dem Hintergrund eines wahrgenommenen Scheiterns der ersten und zweiten Generation der Frankfurter Schule an der methodischen Anforderung einer immanenten Kritik, die für das Projekt einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie definierend ist. Beides – die methodische Anforderung einer immanenten Kritik, wie sie Honneth begreift, und das Scheitern, das Honneth bei Horkheimer, Adorno und Habermas wahrnimmt – wird Gegenstand des ersten Teils (1) dieses Beitrags sein. „Anerkennung“ wird von Honneth als der Begriff eingeführt, mit dem das Kernproblem einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie gelöst werden soll. Mit dem Begriff der Anerkennung soll es nämlich, wie wir im zweiten Teil (2) eingehender nachvollziehen werden, möglich sein, Zugang zu konkreten Ansprüchen auf Befreiung zu finden, die von der Gesellschaft geschaffen und zugleich verletzt werden. In einer Diskussion ideologischer Anerkennung werde ich zuletzt (3) mögliche Grenzen der kritischen Theorie der Anerkennung Honneths aufzeigen, die sich unmittelbar aus dem Erbe der Frankfurter Schule, wie Honneth es begreift, ergeben. (shrink)

This book offers a critical assessment of Axel Honneth’s complex and growing opus in social and political philosophy. It examines this in the context of the history and future of the Frankfurt School and in its relation to contemporary analytic approaches to social and political philosophy as well as postmodernist critics.

This article argues that Axel Honneth’s ethics of recognition offers a robust model for a renewed critical theory of society, provided that it does not shy away from its political dimensions. First, the ethics of recognition needs to clarify its political moment at the conceptual level to remain conceptually sustainable. This requires a clarification of the notion of identity in relation to the three spheres of recognition, and a clarification of its exact place in a politics of recognition. We (...) suggest that a return to Hegel’s mature theory of subjectivity helps specify the relationship between the normative demand for autonomous identity and its realization in and through politics. (shrink)

This article argues that Axel Honneth’s ethics of recognition offers a robust model for a renewed critical theory of society, provided that it does not shy away from its political dimensions. First, the ethics of recognition needs to clarify its political moment at the conceptual level to remain conceptually sustainable. This requires a clarification of the notion of identity in relation to the three spheres of recognition, and a clarification of its exact place in a politics of recognition. We (...) suggest that a return to Hegel’s mature theory of subjectivity helps specify the relationship between the normative demand for autonomous identity and its realization in and through politics. (shrink)

Axel Honneth was born on 18 July 1949 in Essen, Germany, in the coal-mining part of North Rhine Westphalia, the son of Horst Honneth, a medical doctor, and Annemarie Honneth. His adolescence and early adulthood coincided with the eruption of radical movements around the world, notably in his native country. The legacies of his early involvement in politics can be traced throughout his work. His postgraduate research focused on social and political issues, and embraced the “critical theory” (...) tradition of the Frankfurt School. This is a strand in the Western philosophical landscape whose defining characteristic is precisely that it seeks to establish strong connections between philosophical analysis and the reality of the social and political worlds. In particular, the philosophers of the Frankfurt School seek to align their theoretical work with the progressive movements within the social that aim to challenge and transform oppressive social structures. The political bent of Honneth’s philosophical work can be witnessed in the positive references to Marx in his early articles, his criticisms of Habermas’ theoretical models, and his attempt recently to recalibrate a socialist project for the new century. (shrink)

Amid now extensive debates about cosmopolitanism in political theory, this article explores the implications of Axel Honneth’s recognition theory for issues in international justice, not least the dire situation of poverty in the world. In contrast with a purely resource-distributive approach, the essay turns particularly to Honneth’s recent revival of the Lukácsian concept of reification as a process of self-distancing from the elementary humanity of others. Specifically, Honneth re-formulates reification as a failure of an elementary or ‘antecedent’ (...) form of recognition. From the perspective of his theory, reification connotes the forgetfulness of others’ fundamental humanity. While Honneth takes such forgetfulness to become most readily apparent in dramatic violations such as the Holocaust, the article interprets his theory to explain, and eventually to challenge, the passive acceptance by many of dire material injustices. The article develops the implications of this challenge by interpreting from Honneth’s framework a duty to question international policies which tend to reify and objectify the least well off in the world, whilst remaining cognizant of the limits of de-reification to the more extensive, meaningful alleviation of poverty globally. (shrink)

I begin by briefly reconstructing Honneth’s concept of reification. His paradigm gives the reification of the non-human environment a marginal position in comparison to the reification of human beings, thereby detracting from its explanatory and critical potential. In order to avoid this outcome, I subsequently present a paradigm of subject identity formation in which not only affectively-based intersubjective interactions but also affectively-based interactions with the non-human environment are, in both a “genetic” and a “conceptual” sense, essential to establish an (...) objective and meaningful relationship with external reality. On the basis of this paradigm a closer connection can be identified between the reification of human beings and the reification of the non-human environment—a connection in which the reification of the latter may reinforce human reification (and vice versa). (shrink)

『자유의 권리』(2011) 이후 호네트는 “사회적 자유”를 사회비판의 “선도이념”(Leitidee)으로 제안한다(IS: 154). 그런데 이 개념은 호네트도 인정하다시피 오늘날의 우리에게는 “매우 특이하고 이상해 보일 수 있다”(RF: 94). 이 논문은 이러한 사회적 자유 개념을 가능한 한 명료하게 체계적으로 분석･해명하고, 이 개념의 타당성을 검토하는 것을 주된 목적으로 한다. 먼저 이 개념과 호네트가 구상하는 사회비판과의 관계를 밝힌다(1). 이어서 소극적 자유와 성찰적 자유에 대한 호네트의 이해를 살펴본다(2). 이제 이를 배경으로 해서 한편으로는 (일상의 예들도 활용하여) 호네트의 사회적 자유 개념을 가능한 한 우리들의 직관에 친숙하고 그럴 듯하게 제시하고, 다른 (...) 한편으로는 그러면서도 이 자유 개념의 특성을 분석적으로 명료하게 드러낸다(3). 마지막 절에서는 두 가지 점에서 호네트의 사회적 자유 개념의 난점을 검토한다. 하나는 연대 개념과의 관계이며, 다른 하나는 롤즈의 “합당한 다원주의의 사실” 논제를 받아들일 때 호네트의 사회적 자유 기획이 마주하게 되는 어려움이다(4). (shrink)

I provide a critique of Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition by calling into question the extent to which recognitive relations are immune to the effects of social and economic power and their ability to shape consciousness and moral cognition. I maintain that as a theory of socialization, Honneth’s theory is inadequate to deal with the strong structural-functional forces that hold administrative-capitalist societies together. This has the effect of constituting subjectivity in particular ways, and this problem of the constitution (...) of the personality and consciousness of individuals vitiates the descriptive and normative claims of the theory of recognition. I end by considering an alternative way to view recognition and its role in promoting a form of critical subjectivity. (shrink)

Ao longo das últimas duas décadas, a amplamente repercutida proposta teórica desenvolvida por Axel Honneth sugere um modelo de racionalidade que, contudo, permanece em larga medida ainda implícito. No presente artigo, proponho que a abordagem de Honneth sugere o que podemos entender como uma virada afetiva na teoria crítica. Para tanto, desdobro minha exposição em quatro passos. Primeiramente, apresento como a categoria do reconhecimento, a partir do sentido adotado por Honneth de uma “transcendência-imanência” da teoria social, mostra-se (...) como uma crítica aos padrões de racionalidade. Isto é, como este sentido constitui-se a partir dos limites de articulação comunicativas do sofrimento, em um particular entrecruzamento entre padrões de racionalidade e patologias sociais. Em um segundo passo, discuto como uma abordagem do vínculo entre afetos e teoria social é desdobrado em Luta por Reconhecimento, e, em seguida, como ela se distingue do sentido de conteúdos afetivos das práxis sociais em O Direito da liberdade. Se, em Luta por reconhecimento, uma concepção de afetos parece ser mais clara a partir do vínculo desenvolvido entre teoria social e teoria da subjetividade, procurarei mostrar que em O direito da liberdade esse conteúdo afetivo se apresenta de uma maneira mais plausível no âmbito de uma teoria das instituições, dissociada de fortes premissas antropológicas. Concluo mencionando de forma ainda programática como o potencial de crítica e conflito, presente nas intuições originais de Honneth, poderia se manter na análise do conteúdo afetivo da práxis social. Palavras-chave: Reconhecimento. Afetos. Instituições. Teoria crítica. Axel Honneth. (shrink)

O presente trabalho tem por objeto o retorno a Hegel proposto por Axel Honneth, em O direito da liberdade. Ante as concepções de liberdade negativa e reflexiva - segundo ele, “conceitos de liberdade individual que não levam adequadamente em conta a sua dependência em relação à mediação objetiva” -, Honneth se preocupa em oferecer uma compreensão alternativa, mais larga, de liberdade, que ele nomeia, atribuindo-a diretamente a Hegel, de liberdade social. Tal liberdade, ao contrário da liberdade meramente jurídica (...) ou moral, permitiria que se leve em conta o papel exercido pelas instituições e práticas normativas para a sua realização, reconhecendo-as como sua própria condição. Entretanto, apesar da valorização que é feita assim por Honneth às instituições, o autor é criticado por apresentar uma concepção das mesmas que seria demasiado unilateral. O mesmo ocorre com sua definição de “liberdade social”, a qual remeteria, segundo os críticos, a uma liberdade meramente individual, aquém da significação que lhe seria dada por Hegel. A análise da tese hegeliana acerca de uma eticidade imanente à esfera do mercado e às suas práticas, adotada também por Honneth, nos possibilitará avaliar não só os aspectos que os aproximam ou os separam, mas também a pertinência das críticas dirigidas a Honneth. The aim of the paper is to investigate the return to Hegel proposed by Axel Honneth in his work Freedom’s right. Honneth rejects an approach that conceives of freedom only as negative or reflexive. Hence, he seeks to provide an alternative concept, which he assigns to Hegel using the term “social freedom”. This concept of freedom, in opposite to the merely legal or moral one, should enable the recognition of the role played by the institutions as a condition in the process of its realization. However, despite the importance he gives to the institutions, Honneth is criticized for presenting an apparently too partial comprehension of them. The same happens to his definition of “social freedom”, which, according to the critics, would consist in a merely individualistic conception of freedom, falling short of Hegel’s understanding of this concept. An analysis of Hegel’s thesis about an ethicity that would be immanent to the market sphere, also adopted by Honneth, will allow us to evaluate not just the connecting points or the divergences existing between them, but also the relevance of the criticism directed at Honneth. (shrink)

_Axel Honneth: Critical Essays_ brings together critical interpretations of the work of Axel Honneth, from his earliest to his most recent writings, together with a comprehensive reply by Honneth that provides significant insights and clarifications into his project overall.

This paper explores the development of Honneth’s thought on work. It considers how his initial concerns with the embodied experience of labour and the absence of a contemporary and compelling class-specific lexicon with which to explore suffering at work have been surpassed and subordinated by his analysis of the social relations of recognition in civil society, which is distributed according to a contested and contestable achievement principle. I argue that despite the purchase of the criticisms offered by recent rejoinders, (...) they fail to engage with the strength of his analysis: that modern economics contains a normative order which works to justify the extant division of labour and income, even if its current formulation supports inequity, exclusion and exploitation. Feminist political economy is an ally in this analysis. The paper explores the points of intersection between these projects, but argues that incorporating feminist insights will require a fundamental revision to Honneth’s account of social rationalization in modernity. (shrink)

Is Honneth's theory sufficiently sensitive to practices of recognition that have historically emerged? This article answers in the negative by revisiting his ground-breaking study The Struggle for Recognition. The first two sections of this article reconstruct the connection he draws between the practices of recognition, the psychological damage experienced in its absence and the motivation for social conflict that results. In doing so, we discover the paradox of recognition: Honneth makes psychological and moral development depend on precisely the (...) `legally' instantiated system that is the source of disrespect in the first instance. Correspondingly, the paradox of recognition denies other alternative ways oppressed groups have achieved and sustained psychological and moral development. The third section offers the contrasting example of how black Americans used their religious imagination to overcome the effects of slavery. In doing so, they developed structures of mutuality to affirm self and community against misrecognition. (shrink)

I begin by briefly reconstructing Honneth’s concept of reification. His paradigm gives the reification of the non-human environment a marginal position in comparison to the reification of human beings, thereby detracting from its explanatory and critical potential. In order to avoid this outcome, I subsequently present a paradigm of subject identity formation in which not only affectively-based intersubjective interactions but also affectively-based interactions with the non-human environment are, in both a “genetic” and a “conceptual” sense, essential to establish an (...) objective and meaningful relationship with external reality. On the basis of this paradigm a closer connection can be identified between the reification of human beings and the reification of the non-human environment—a connection in which the reification of the latter may reinforce human reification. (shrink)

This book conducts a critical investigation into everyday intercultural recognition and misrecognition in the domain of paid work, utilising social philosopher Axel Honneth’s recognition theory as its theoretical foundation. In so doing, it also reveals the sophistication and productivity of Honneth's recognition model for multiculturalism scholarship. Honneth and Everyday Intercultural Recognition is concerned with the redress of intercultural related injustice and, more widely, the effective integration of ethically and culturally diverse societies. Bona Anna analyses the everyday experiences (...) of cross-cultural misrecognition in a distinctive ethno-cultural group, including social norms that have been marginalised in the contexts of employment. In this endeavour, she deploys key constructs from Honneth’s theory to argue for individual and social integration to be conceptualised as a process of inclusion through stables forms of recognition, rather than as a process of inclusion through forms of group representation and participation. This book will appeal to students and academics of multiculturalism interested in learning more about the usefulness of Honneth’s recognition theory in intercultural inquiry, including the ways in which it can circumvent some of the impasses of classical multiculturalism. (shrink)

Is Honneth's theory sufficiently sensitive to practices of recognition that have historically emerged? This article answers in the negative by revisiting his ground-breaking study The Struggle for Recognition. The first two sections of this article reconstruct the connection he draws between the practices of recognition, the psychological damage experienced in its absence and the motivation for social conflict that results. In doing so, we discover the paradox of recognition: Honneth makes psychological and moral development depend on precisely the (...) `legally' instantiated system that is the source of disrespect in the first instance. Correspondingly, the paradox of recognition denies other alternative ways oppressed groups have achieved and sustained psychological and moral development. The third section offers the contrasting example of how black Americans used their religious imagination to overcome the effects of slavery. In doing so, they developed structures of mutuality to affirm self and community against misrecognition. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente artículo explora los rendimientos de la teoría de la justicia de Axel Honneth para comprender las experiencias del sujeto en las sociedades contemporáneas. Para esto primeramente define la teoría de la justicia a través de las esferas del reconocimiento y posteriormente construye un modelo analítico posible considerando la justicia social a través de grados. Se proponen tres grados de justicia, que no son camisas de fuerza a lo social, sino puntos de partida para pensar la constitución (...) y las prácticas de los sujetos. Se concluye que las esferas del reconocimiento, pensadas a través de grados de justicia social permiten analizar las disímiles experiencias de los sujetos, pero comprendiendo las esferas y finalmente la justicia, a la luz de relaciones de poder y dominación que configuran ciertos contenidos morales de la justicia, pero no necesariamente contenidos que favorecen un mayor progreso moral en los órdenes sociales que prevalecen. El modelo analítico presentado permite considerar cómo se institucionalizan órdenes morales que definen formas de justicia que coactan la crítica, la lucha y el cambio.: This article explores the performances of Axel Honneth’s theory of justice to understand the subject’s experiences in contemporary societies. For this, it first defines the theory of justice through the spheres of recognition and then builds a possible analytical model considering social justice through degrees. Three degrees of justice are proposed, which are not social straitjackets, but starting points for thinking about the constitution and practices of the subjects. It is concluded that the spheres of recognition, thought through degrees of social justice, allow to analyze the different experiences of the subjects, but understanding the spheres and finally justice in the light of relations of power and domination that configure certain moral contents of the justice, but not necessarily content that will favor greater moral progress in the prevailing social orders. The analytical model allows us to consider how institutionalized moral orders, which define forms of justice that coerce criticism, struggle and change. (shrink)

Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition has recently been criticised on the grounds that it conceives of the relationship between recognition and power in terms of an opposition. According to Honneth’s critics, this is too simple because recognition and power are often intertwined. My aim in this article is twofold: On the one hand, I seek to understand why Honneth conceives of recognition and power as opposed. As I will argue, this is not the result of bad theorising; (...) rather, there are important methodological considerations that account for this conception – specifically, the idea that one can develop an immanent critique of power in line with the tradition of the Frankfurt School only by adopting the participant perspective. On the other hand, I agree with the gist of what Honneth’s critics say and want to make a systematic proposal as to why opposing recognition and power is too simple. This proposal will build on the argument developed in the first part and will consist in the claim that to treat recognition and power as opposed is to consider recognition relations exclusively from the participant perspective in contrast to the observer perspective. As a result, the potential entanglement of recognition with problematic social arrangements cannot come into view. (shrink)

Axel Honneth desenvolve o conceito de reconhecimento, encarado como uma necessidade fundamental do ser-humano, de forma a constituir-se no núcleo de uma teoria da justiça que procura especificar as condições intersubjetivas de autorrealização individual. Apresenta-se uma teoria da justiça assente na reconstrução das práticas e condições de reconhecimento já institucionalizadas, analisando as instituições sociais em um sentido amplo. Pretende-se aproximar a concepção normativa da justiça da análise sociológica das sociedades modernas, através da reconstrução normativa e ao colocar a ênfase (...) na liberdade social, baseada na dimensão intersubjetiva das instituições de reconhecimento. A liberdade social prevê o acesso às instituições de reconhecimento. Um dos objetivos é esboçar os problemas desse avanço interpretativo da teoria crítica do reconhecimento, pelo que iremos convocar a teoria da luta pelo reconhecimento de Honneth, incluir a sua reactualização mais recente do Direito de Hegel e explorar a sua proposta normativa para as condições de uma vida ética. (shrink)

The topic of recognition has come to occupy a central place in debates in social and political theory. Developed by George Herbert Mead and Charles Taylor, it has been given expression in the program for Critical Theory developed by Axel Honneth in his book The Struggle for Recognition. Honneth's research program offers an empirically insightful way of reflecting on emancipatory struggles for greater justice and a powerful theoretical tool for generating a conception of justice and the good that (...) enables the normative evaluation of such struggles. This 2007 volume offers a critical clarification and evaluation of this research program, particularly its relationship to the other major development in critical social and political theory; namely, the focus on power as formative of practical identities proposed by Michel Foucault and developed by theorists such as Judith Butler, James Tully, and Iris Marion Young. (shrink)

Depuis une vingtaine d'années, les réflexions d'Axel Honneth se sont imposées comme une référence majeure dans les domaines de la philosophie morale, sociale, et politique. L'enjeu que soulève la pensée critique de Honneth est alors d'examiner si, aujourd'hui, les institutions de la reconnaissance auxquelles nous participions - la famille, le marché du travail, l'État de droit, l'espace public - méritent véritablement le qualificatif de "démocratiques". Pages de début Introduction I. La reconnaissance et ses luttes II. Une conception de (...) la justice sociale III. Redistribution ou reconnaissance? IV. Les institutions de la reconnaissanceConclusion. Le droit de la reconnaissance Bibliographie Pages de fin. (shrink)

This paper attempts to sketch a critical model of political community by drawing upon recent contributions to the theory of ‘recognition’, particularly in the work of Axel Honneth. The paper proceeds by, first, delineating key features shared by a range of positions associated with ‘communitarianism’, along with the limitations and problems incurred by these commitments. The second part of the paper attempts to mobilise Honneth’s theoretical work to develop a conception of community that shares a number of the (...) basic premisesvis-á-vis political life associated with communitarianism, but which nevertheless accommodates the reservations expressed by communitarianism’s liberal and radical critics. (shrink)

En este artículo se señala el rastreo conceptual que hace Honneth para explicar la manera en que la negatividad social que surge, a partir del progreso histórico de la razón, da cuenta de la atomización social impuesta por el capitalismo como práctica patológica que genera la cosificación del ser humano. Esta realidad social, en cuanto problema vigente, conduce a la necesidad de reactivar los postulados de la teoría crítica para explicar cómo lo patológico de la razón descrito por Hegel, (...) se constituye, desde la concepción marxista de la historia, en un problema práctico en el que las condiciones materiales, orientadas hacia la lógica de la división del trabajo, ocasionan, según Lukács, que los individuos asuman la costumbre y el hábito de percibirse entre sí como cosas. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Most scholars' comprehension on labour are ambiguous because of the variety of philosophical contradictions embedded in their plausible theories being not explicitly stated but irrationally taken for granted. We, therefore, inquisitively direct sole attention to social spacetime in which, and by which, labour in totality takes place. And then consider the division of labour in natural spacetime as just the appearance of the alienation of labour in social spacetime by our Marxist renewal of the notion of labour - thus (...) manifesting its benefaction to an essential up-to-date explanation of human being, on which a labourer could struggle to survive as still a human being within social spacetime, to fight against the almighty empire of capitalism in the era of globalisation. RESUMO A compreensão da maioria dos estudiosos acerca do trabalho é ambígua em razão da variedade de contradições filosóficas embutidas no fato de suas teorias plausíveis não serem explicitamente declaradas, mas presumidas de modo irracional. Nós, assim, inquisitivamente, dirigimos nossa total atenção ao espaço-tempo social no qual, e através do qual, o trabalho ocorre, em sua totalidade. Em seguida, consideramos a divisão de trabalho em espaço-tempo natural como apenas uma aparência da alienação do trabalho em espaço-tempo social, segundo nossa renovação marxista da noção de trabalho - assim manifestando seu benefício em uma explicação atualizada do ser humano, segundo a qual um trabalhador deve lutar para sobreviver como um ser humano parado dentro do espaço-tempo social, lutar contra o todo-poderoso império do capitalismo na era da globalização. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to deal with some aspects of Axel Honneth’s reading of reification faced in his 2005 Verdinglichung. Eine Anerkennungstheoretische Studie. To this purpose, I critically analyse the interpretation of Marx by Lukács as it is expressed in Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat. Secondly, I claim that Lukács’ fetishism analysis is grounded in a significant misunderstanding of the core issue of Marx’s Critique of political economy. Furthermore, I suggest that Honneth’s reification concept (...) uncritically accepts, to some extent, the main theses on Marx as they are outlined in Lukács’ text. I conclude by arguing that the Marxian heritage advocated by Honneth is methodologically more deeply linked to Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness than to Marx’s Capital. (shrink)

[Axel Honneth and the return to the roots of critical theory: Recognition as „otherness of justice“; ].

In this paper I criticise Axel Honneth's reactualization of reification as a concept in critical theory in his 2005 Tanner Lectures and argue that he ultimately fails on his own terms. His account is based on two premises: (1) reification is to be taken literally rather than metaphorically, and (2) it is not conceived of as a moral injury but as a social pathology. Honneth concludes that reification is “forgetfulness of recognition”, more specifically, of antecedent recognition, an emphatic (...) and engaged relationship with oneself, others and the world, which precedes any more concrete relationship both genetically and categorially. I argue against this conception of reification on two grounds. (1) The two premises of Honneth's account cannot be squared with one another. It is not possible to literally take a person as a thing without this being a recognisable moral injury, and, therefore, I suggest that there are no cases of literal reification. (2) Honneth's account is essentially ahistorical, because it is based on an anthropological model of recognition that tacitly equates reification with autism. In conclusion, I suggest that any successful account of reification must (i) take reification metaphorically and (ii) offer a social-historical account of the origin(s) of reification. (shrink)

Axel Honneth est mondialement connu pour sa théorie de la reconnaissance. Mais il se trouve que dans son dernier livre (Der Geist der Freiheit ; L'esprit de la liberté), Honneth opère ce qui paraît être un tournant dans sa pensée, en mettant l'accent non plus tant sur la reconnaissance que sur la liberté, et en particulier sur la manière dont les institutions peuvent réellement augmenter la liberté des individus. Faut-il donc désormais parler d'un Honneth I (celui de (...) la reconnaissance), et d'un Honneth II (celui de la liberté)? (shrink)

Nel suo recente libro Das Recht der Freiheit, Axel Honneth propone un'interpretazione critica del neocapitalismo - risultato di una patologica evoluzione di un fenomeno, in sé, normale e persino positivo: la predominanza dei meccanismi di mercato nella sfera del lavoro e della produzione. Per Honneth, il mercato non solo č economicamente efficiente, ma permette anche l'emergere di forme di riconoscimento originali e insostituibili. Ciononostante, queste forme possono facilmente corrompersi se la relazione fra i partner dello scambio diventa troppo (...) squilibrata, come avviene nel neocapitalismo. L'articolo propone una valutazione critica di questa interpretazione storica. (shrink)

This article has two purposes. First, it aims to present a detailed analysis of the argument of “recognition” or even of the “fight for recognition”, which Hegel uses in his fragments from Jena treating of the system of philosophy, especially of the philosophy of spirit. It will be necessary to determine precedently by means of an exact interpretation the content of that expressions, in order to criticize and to compare, his original significance in Hegel with the theoretical application made by (...) Honneth. The special aim hereby is to correct and to explain the function of the “fight for recognition”, even in its sharpening significance as a “fight for life and death”, with relation to the genesis of the state of right. Second, the figure of “recognition” is related to Hegel’s Philosophy of right in the version of 1820. In this work, recognition participates in the theory of “institutions” which is analyzed by Honneth as well. Apart from the merits gained through the endeavour to introduce a classic philosophical theory into a conception of justice in society, we feel obliged to state an error in Honneth‘s interpretation in so far as he understands an institution as a simple social community of communication. For that reason, a conclusion based on a critical commentary can only include a negative recommendation, that means, not to follow those traces of interpretation but rather to defend and to consult the texts originally composed by Hegel. (shrink)