RESUMO O presente artigo pretende restituir o exame ontofenomenológico da ipseidade e da temporalidade em “L’être et le néant” a partir de dois momentos, quais sejam: fenomenologia das três dimensões temporais e ontologia da temporalidade. Este duplo exame não poderá ser pensado sem uma definição prévia do para-si como ipse temporal que falta de... para..., isto é, como ser que, enquanto nada de ser, é uma falta de ser que busca, em vão, preenchê-la. A impossibilidade deste preenchimento, como buscaremos evidenciar, (...) é ontologicamente necessária para que a temporalização do serpara-si não se deixe infestar com a inércia típica do ser-em-si. ABSTRACT The present article intends to restore, from the Sartrean work L'être et le néant, the ontophenomenological examination of ipseity and temporality, understanding this examination in two moments: phenomenology of the three temporal dimensions and ontology of temporality. This double exam could not be thought without a previous definition of for-itself’s as temporal ipseas lack of from… to…, that is, as a for-itself which, while nothingness of being, is a lack of being that constantly seeks to fill it. The impossibility of this fill-up, as we shall see, is ontologically necessary so that the temporality of the being-for-itself does not let itself infest with the typical inertia of the being-in-itself. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende restituir a leitura que Heidegger e Sartre realizam da filosofia de Descartes, desvelando, a partir disso, as diferentes posições interpretativas que ambos os filósofos tomam em relação ao pensamento cartesiano. Observar-se-á que o tratamento dado por Heidegger à metafísica cartesiana explicita um anti-humanismo contrário ao humanismo sartreano. A partir dessa diferença, seremos capazes de assinalar um distanciamento teórico entre Heidegger e Sartre, distanciamento que poderá revelar, por conseguinte, a maneira peculiar pela qual Sartre opera com os conceitos (...) hedeggerianos em L’être et le néant. Palavras-chave: humanismo; anti-humanismo; fenomenologia; liberdade; metafísica.: This article aims to replace the Hedeigger’s and Sartre’s read from Descarte’s philosophy unveiling, from that, the different interpretive positions that both philosophers take in relation to the Cartesian thought. We will observe that the treatment given by Heidegger to the Cartesian metaphysics reveals an anti-humanism contrary from Sartre’s humanism. From this difference, we will be able to point out a theoretical detachment between Heidegger and Sartre, detachment that may reveal, meanwhile, the peculiar way by which Sartre deals with the Heidegger’s concepts in L’être et le néant. Keywords: humanism; anti-humanism; phenomenology; freedom; metaphysics. (shrink)

Neste artigo pretendemos analisar a maneia pela qual o filósofo francês Jean-Paul Sartre modaliza, a partir da psicanálise existencial elaborada em L’être et le néant, sua biografia existencial sobre o poeta Charles Baudelaire. Em Baudelaire, seremos capazes de localizar os prolegômenos a toda biografia existencial sartreana futura, isto é, o modus operandi de investigação/escrita biográfica de Sartre.

O presente artigo perscruta o modo dialético pelo qual Sartre, desde os anos 1960, aclimata a vida psíquica e o vivido. Para esta lida, realizaremos uma incursão investigativa sustentada por um conjunto de escritos sartreanos deste período, dando especial enfoque sobretudo ao ensaio Questões de método (1957) e à conferência que nosso autor profere em 1961, e cujo título, Marxismo e subjetividade, é revelador da sua tentativa de conciliar o existencialismo e o materialismo histórico à luz de uma dialética existencial. (...) Na sequência, mostramos como a dialetização da vida psíquica, que pressupõe uma antinomia dialética (presença a si e ausência de si), enseja, por parte do filósofo, uma crítica pontual à psicanálise freudiana. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo pretende investigar a maneira pela qual o filósofo francês Jean-Paul Sartre enquadra, em sua psicologia fenomenológica da imaginação, a problemática acerca do irreal normal e do irreal patológico. Estruturando psicofenomenologicamente a atividade da consciência imaginante, será possível ver que a imagem difere radicalmente da percepção, mas ambas permanecem, contudo, consciência intencional. Nessa toada, cabe a indagação: se toda consciência imaginante é consciência intencional, como enquadrar as experiências alucinatórias?: The aim of the present article is to investigate how (...) the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre understood, in his phenomenological psychology of the imagination, the problematic of the "normal unreal" and the "pathological unreal". By psycho-phenomenologically structuring the activity of the imaginative consciousness, we can see that the image differs radically from perception, but both remain intentional consciousness. In this context, it is necessary to ask the following question: if all imaginative consciousness is intentional consciousness, how can we frame hallucinatory experiences? (shrink)

Pretendemos analisar neste artigo o fundamento ontofenomenológico do conhecimento em L’être et le néant. Como veremos, o conhecimento será concebido a partir de uma negação de tipo interna definida como relação ontológica fundamental entre ser-para-si e ser-em-si. Todavia, caso almejemos compreender o estatuto profundo de uma tal relação, teremos que escrutinar as definições sartreanas de ser do fenômeno e fenômeno de ser, ser transfenomenal, ser-em-si, ser-para-si e estrutura reflexo-refletidora do cogito. Recuperando tais definições, mostraremos que a identidade do ser do (...) para-si e do conhecimento, antes de sinalizar que o conhecimento seja a medida do ser, desponta de um registro ontofenomenológico no qual o para-si, enquanto nada de ser, anuncia a si mesmo a partir do em-si. (shrink)

Este artigo visa analisar a categoria do mágico em duas obras fenomenológicas do filósofo francês Jean-Paul Sartre, quais sejam: La transcendance de l’Ego e Esquisse d’une théorie des émotions. Em ambos os textos, o expediente do mágico é recorrente e assinala, por sua vez, uma certa experiência da consciência que poderíamos nomear como anti-fenomenológica. Ademais, este registro do mágico constitui para Sartre um modo, digamos, privilegiado no que tange à análise da ininteligibilidade da relação da consciência com o mundo, com (...) os outros e consigo mesma. (shrink)

O presente artigo objetiva uma análise crítica da aproximação de Sartre com o marxismo. Para tanto, são analisados alguns conceitos fundamentais de Questions de Méthode (1957). Como buscaremos evidencia aqui, o filósofo, apesar de incorporar o social em suas análises, parece insistir em um subjetivismo que traz consequências paradoxais para esta sua nova fase filosófica.

Este artigo pretende elucidar alguns aspectos da biografia existencial de Sartre sobre o poeta e romancista Jean Genet. Elucidando a estrutura da obra, veremos que a presente biografia faz emergir o sentido e o peso do social nas análises sartreanas acerca da liberdade.

O artigo em tela busca apresentar o embate entre, de um lado, a antropologia filosófica de Sartre e, de outro, a antropologia estrutural de Lévi-Strauss. Para esta lida, trazemos à baila o díptico Sartreano Questions de Méthode (1957) e Critique de la Raison dialectique (1960) e a obra levistraussiana La pensée sauvage (1962). Através deste confronto, objetivamos especificar a referida antropologia de Sartre e o modo ela, em pleno “vórtice estrutural”, responde à questão da estrutura.

Previously, the author tried to show that some arguments in one of the two versions of Nicholas of Autrecourt’s Quaestio de intensione visionis are taken almost verbatim from the anonymous Tractatus de sex inconvenientibus. This paper concentrates on the arguments themselves in order to consider two main issues: the ‘translatability’ of limit decision problems, manifest in Autrecourt’s juxtaposition of questions de maximo et minimo, de primo et ultimo instanti, and the intension and remission of forms; the importance of Parisian discussions (...) of limit decision problems prior to the adoption of the new analytical languages developed at Oxford. Thus, the paper is divided in two sections, the first concerning some arguments of Autrecourt’s question, the second focusing on the link between one of Autrecourt’s arguments and the medieval tradition of commentaries on Aristotle’s De caelo, in which it is possible to find some antecedents of the analytical approach that later Parisian scholars would apply to these problems. (shrink)

Nos deteremos aqui sobre a crítica de Matthew Kramer em relação à interpretação de Quentin Skinner sobre o conceito de “liberdade” em Hobbes contida em seu artigo “On the Unavoidability of Actions: Quentin Skinner, Thomas Hobbes, and the Modern Doctrine of Negative Liberty” (2001). Nele, Kramer trata do então crescente interesse do projeto intelectual de Skinner pelo pensamento hobbesiano, algo já evidenciado desde a publicação de seu livro Liberdade Antes do Liberalismo (1998). Kramer toma como referência central de sua resposta (...) o artigo de Skinner intitulado “Thomas Hobbes on the Proper Signification of Liberty”, criticando a sua posição e contrastando com algumas de suas próprias ideias sobre “liberdade” e “não-liberdade”. Através dessas considerações, Kramer reavalia a noção da liberdade em Hobbes, tomando-a como o protótipo liberal da liberdade negativa por excelência, demonstrando assim os supostos equívocos contidos na interpretação de Skinner sobre ela. Buscamos defender aqui, contudo, que a proposta interpretativa de Kramer carece da devida fundamentação metodológica que correlaciona o neorrepublicanismo de Skinner no campo da filosofia política com certos princípios oriundos de sua historiografia que não são devidamente considerados pelo primeiro. A sua crítica estaria, assim, comprometida por uma abordagem desconectada do pensamento e das intenções de Hobbes enquanto um agente político inserido em um determinado contexto linguístico e social, quadro que seria posteriormente resgatado de maneira primorosa por Skinner em seu estudo Hobbes and Republican Liberty (2008). (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is commonly characterized as the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. Little has been said, however, on how best to construe these representational devices—in other words, on what conceptual engineering should be all about. This paper tackles this problem with a basic strategy: First, by presenting a taxonomy of the different possible subject matters for conceptual engineering; then, by comparatively assessing them and selecting the most conducive one with a view to making conceptual engineering an actionable (...) method, that is, a method that can be applied effectively and consistently to specific case studies. The outcome is that conceptual engineering should be all about concepts on pain of pragmatic inconsistencies otherwise. (shrink)

This textbook presents the basics of philosophy that are necessary for the student and researcher in science in order to better understand scientific work. The approach is not historical but formative: tools for semantical analysis, ontology of science, epistemology, and scientific ethics are presented in a formal and direct way. The book has two parts: one with the general theory and a second part with application to some problems such as the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the nature of mathematics, and (...) the ontology of spacetime. The book addresses questions such as "What is meaning?", "What is truth?", "What are truth criteria in science?", "What is a theory?", "What is a model?" "What is a datum?", "What is information?", "What does it mean to understand something?", "What is space?", "What is time?", "How are these concepts articulated in science?" "What are values?" "What are the limits of science?", and many more. The philosophical views presented are "scientific" in the sense that they are informed by current science, they are relevant for scientific research, and the method adopted uses the hypothetical-deductive approach that is characteristic of science. The results and conclusions, as any scientific conclusion, are open to revision in the light of future advances. Hence, this philosophical approach opposes to dogmatic philosophy. Supported by end-of-chapter summaries and a list of special symbols used, the material will be of interest for students and researchers in both science and philosophy. The second part will appeal to physicists and mathematicians. (shrink)

In recent years, Cesar Chavez’s life and legacy have been subjected to increased scrutiny. The ensuing reevaluations of Chavez, wittingly or not, are matters of ethical, as well as historical and biographical, concern. This article has two aims. First, it reconstructs Chavez’s account of exemplarity and uses it to assess his legacy. Second, it provides an account of exemplarity situated within social practices. As I argue, exemplarity operates through social practices, rather than mystically as posited by a contagion model. The (...) end result is an ethically nuanced reassessment of Chavez and an account of exemplarity that includes its social dimension. (shrink)

This paper discusses the logical space of alternative conceptual engineering projects, with a specific focus on (1) the processes, (2) the targets and goals, and (3) the methods of such projects. We present an overview of how these three aspects interact in the contemporary literature and discuss those alternative projects that have yet to be explored based on our suggested typology. We show how choices about each element in a conceptual engineering project constrain the possibilities for the others, thereby giving (...) rise to distinct groupings of possible projects under the banner of conceptual engineering. We conclude with a critical reflection on the potential ethical issues that arise as a result of effectively putting conceptual engineering into practice. (shrink)

There are communities in which disadvantaged groups experience severe inequality. For instance, poor and indigent families face many difficulties accessing their social rights. Their condition is largely the consequence of the wrong choices of those in power, either historical or more recent choices. The lack of opportunities of these deprived citizens is due to state omissions. In such communities, it is not unusual for homeless members of these particular groups to occupy abandoned lands and build their shelters there. However, almost (...) everywhere, these actions constitute a crime. The typical response to this situation is prosecution and punishment. In this paper, I will defend the occupation of public places as a consequence of the failure of governments to solve the problem of housing, and I will argue that we must distinguish a social claim from a crime and avoid the use of criminal law in these “occupation cases”. I will also argue that our right—as a community—to blame and punish these “squatters” is eroded by the fact that we perpetrated their situation of injustice. (shrink)

Akama et al. [1] systematically studied an arithmetical hierarchy of the law of excluded middle and related principles in the context of first-order arithmetic. In that paper, they first provide a prenex normal form theorem as a justification of their semi-classical principles restricted to prenex formulas. However, there are some errors in their proof. In this paper, we provide a simple counterexample of their prenex normal form theorem [1, Theorem 2.7], then modify it in an appropriate way which still serves (...) to largely justify the arithmetical hierarchy. In addition, we characterize a variety of prenex normal form theorems by logical principles in the arithmetical hierarchy. The characterization results reveal that our prenex normal form theorems are optimal. For the characterization results, we establish a new conservation theorem on semi-classical arithmetic. The theorem generalizes a well-known fact that classical arithmetic is $\Pi _2$ -conservative over intuitionistic arithmetic. (shrink)

I present a discussion of some issues in the ontology of spacetime. After a characterisation of the controversies among relationists, substantivalists, eternalists, and presentists, I offer a new argument for rejecting presentism, the doctrine that only present objects exist. Then, I outline and defend a form of spacetime realism that I call event substantivalism. I propose an ontological theory for the emergence of spacetime from more basic entities. Finally, I argue that a relational theory of pre-geometric entities can give rise (...) to substantival spacetime in such a way that relationism and substantivalism are not necessarily opposed positions, but rather complementary. In an appendix I give axiomatic formulations of my ontological views. (shrink)

The aim of this research is to ascertain whether a firm’s environmental motivations may help to predict how complete or incomplete its environmental management will be, understanding incomplete management to be that which neglects one or more of the three keys aspects of such management, namely, monitoring, action and results. We specifically posit that while motivations based on the search for legitimation lead to more incomplete styles of environmental management, competitive motivations entail a more complete management. The analyses conducted with (...) a sample of 1,902 plants provide empirical evidence in favour of such reasoning. The contribution this research makes, therefore, is not restricted solely to showing the effect motivations have on the environmental performance of organisations, as it also introduces a new dimension of environmental management—the degree of completeness, which needs to be considered when understanding and evaluating this effect. (shrink)

I present a formal ontological theory where the basic building blocks of the world can be either things or events. In any case, the result is a Parmenidean worldview where change is not a global property. What we understand by change manifests as asymmetries in the pattern of the world-lines that constitute 4-dimensional existents. I maintain that such a view is in accord with current scientific knowledge.

The present article is the third part of a trilogy of papers, devoted to analysing the influence of semantic Platonism on contemporary philosophy of language. In Part I (Picazo 2021), the discussion was set out by examining a number of typical traces of Platonism in semantic theory since Frege. In Part II (Picazo 2021a), additional illustrations of such traces were provided, taken from a collection of recent commissioned essays on the philosophy of language (Schantz 2012). The present part is devoted (...) to providing yet additional illustrations of such traces, taken from a collection of classic essays on the subject: the book Modern Philosophy of Language, edited by Maria Baghramian in 1998. We shall, thus, describe a number of examples in which the influence of semantic Platonism on these essays can be felt. Prominent among these examples are the confusion between sentences and propositions (and related confusions), the avoidant attitude with respect to basic aspects of linguistic meaning, the overuse of analytic methodology for semantic research, the adoption of a background Platonic metaphysics of meanings and the overreaction against semantic Platonism and germane views, witnessing an inverse influence (‘by opposition’) from these views. (shrink)

The idea of a moving present or ‘now’ seems to form part of our most basic beliefs about reality. Such a present, however, is not reflected in any of our theories of the physical world. I show in this article that presentism, the doctrine that only what is present exists, is in conflict with modern relativistic cosmology and recent advances in neurosciences. I argue for a tenseless view of time, where what we call ‘the present’ is just an emergent secondary (...) quality arising from the interaction of perceiving self-conscious individuals with their environment. I maintain that there is no flow of time, but just an ordered system of events. (shrink)

Popper’s original definition of truthlikeness relied on a central insight: that truthlikeness combines truth and information, in the sense that a proposition is closer to the truth the more true consequences and the less false consequences it entails. As intuitively compelling as this definition may be, it is untenable, as proved long ago; still, one can arguably rely on Popper’s intuition to provide an adequate account of truthlikeness. To this aim, we mobilize some classical work on partial entailment in defining (...) a new measure of truthlikeness which satisfies a number of desiderata. The resulting account has some interesting and surprising connections with other accounts on the market, thus shedding new light on current attempts of systematizing different approaches to verisimilitude. (shrink)

En este artículo analizo la idea de que se puede hacer filosofía a través de la poesía y trato de darle sentido a la expresión “poesía filosófica”. Sostengo que hay básicamente dos modos de entender esta expresión: 1) como ejemplificación, es decir, la poesía puede servir como ejemplo filosófico de distintas maneras; y 2) como articulación de una teoría filosófica. Aquí analizo la idea de que se puede obtener un tipo de conocimiento sui generis a través de la poesía, así (...) como la de que la poesía puede justificar supuestas verdades filosóficas. Rechazo estas dos ideas y, con ellas, la tesis de que se puede articular una teoría filosófica a través de la poesía. Sin embargo, acepto que no hay nada intrínseco a la poesía que le impida hacerlo, aunque, en general, esto no sucede. (shrink)

Previous studies have found that serum lipid levels independently associate with mental health problems in adulthood. However, little is known about the association between serum lipid levels and positive aspects of mental health such as resilience and self-esteem, which develop in adolescence. The aim of this study is to examine the association between serum lipid levels and resilience and self-esteem in Japanese adolescents. Data were pooled data from the Adachi Child Health Impact of Living Difficulty study in 2016 and 2018, (...) a school-based, cross-sectional study in Adachi City, Tokyo, Japan. Resilience of the child was assessed by caregivers, and self-esteem was self-identified via questionnaires. Serum lipid levels [total cholesterol, low-density lipoproteins, and high-density lipoproteins ] were assessed in school health checkup, in addition to height and weight measurements. Multiple linear regression was applied to investigate the association between standardized serum lipid levels and resilience and self-esteem. LDL showed inverse association with resilience [β = −1.26, 95% confidence interval = −2.39 to −0.14] after adjusting for child’s BMI, month of birth, sex, absence of parent, household income, caregiver’s mental health, and lifestyle. We also found an inverse association of total cholesterol and higher LDL cholesterol with self-esteem. HDL cholesterol was not associated with resilience and self-esteem. Among Japanese adolescent, total and LDL cholesterol may be biomarkers of resilience and self-esteem. (shrink)

A supertask consists in the performance of an infinite number of actions in a finite time. I show that any attempt to carry out a supertask will produce a divergence of the curvature of spacetime, resulting in the formation of a black hole. I maintain that supertaks, contrarily to a popular view among philosophers, are physically impossible. Supertasks, literally, collapse under their own weight.

We provide a fine‐grained analysis on the relation between König's lemma, weak König's lemma, and the decidable fan theorem in the context of constructive reverse mathematics. In particular, we show that double negated variants of König's lemma and weak König's lemma are equivalent to double negated variants of the general decidable fan theorem and the binary decidable fan theorem, respectively, over a nearly intuitionistic system containing a weak countable choice only. This implies that the general decidable fan theorem is not (...) equivalent to the binary decidable fan theorem in the absence of a strong countable choice. In addition, we introduce a principle which fills the gap between König's lemma and weak König's lemma, and show that König's lemma is equivalent to weak König's lemma plus this principle. We also solve several problems arising from the investigation. (shrink)

La teología católica de la pena, que durante siglos se mantuvo prácticamente inalterada, ha experimentado en los últimos 20 años una profunda transformación, impulsada por la idea conciliar de la dignidad de la persona humana, una más cabal comprensión del concepto bíblico de justicia divina y una conciencia más aguda de las deficiencias e injusticias del sistema penal, en particular, de la pena carcelaria. El presente artículo, a través del estudio de diversos documentos magisteriales relevantes para este tema, ilustra la (...) nueva perspectiva de la justicia reconciliadora, que busca dar a la sanción retributiva un sentido auténticamente medicinal, convirtiéndola en un recorrido potencialmente dotado de sentido para el delincuente, conducente a su rehabilitación y su reinserción en la comunidad. The Catholic Theology of punishment, which for centuries had remained unaltered, has undergone during the last 20 years a deep transformation, due to the conciliar idea of the dignity of the human person, a better understanding of the biblical concept of divine justice, and a new awareness of the deficiencies of the criminal justice system, especially as regards prison. This article, through the analysis of different magisterial documents, illustrates the new perspective of reconciliative justice, which seeks to give retributive sanctions an authentic medicinal orientation, as a potentially meaningful process for their subjects, in order to enable their rehabilitation and reintegration in the community. (shrink)