Michael T. Ferejohn presents a new analysis of Aristotle's theory of explanation and scientific knowledge, in the context of its Socratic roots. Ferejohn shows how Aristotle resolves the tension between his commitment to the formal-case model of explanation and his recognition of the role of efficient causes in explaining natural phenomena.

THE problem to be considered here is but a small corner of a much wider difficulty that has persistently impeded the attempt to develop a firm and full understanding of the theory of scientific explanation set out in Aristotle's Analytics. This broader difficulty is precipitated by the existence of two rather substantial groups of texts which seem to point in opposing exegetical directions.

This chapter contains sections titled: I II III IV Notes Bibliography.

This chapter contains section titled: I II III IV V VI VII.

BOOK REVI~WS 137 Gail Fine. On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv + 4oo. Cloth, $55.oo. To many readers it will no doubt seem odd at first that an author could spend over four hundred printed pages discussing a portion of a treatise comprising just a scant five pages of Greek text, even supposing that the work faithfully reports Aristotelian doctrine. However, in working through Fine's book , one comes to (...) see that it contains not only a thorough treatment of the first book of the Peri Ide0n, but also comprehensive interpretations of the metaphysical systems of Socrates, Plato , and Aristotle, and the parallels and differences among these systems. The book also contains clearheaded and instructive accounts of so-called "Third Man" arguments, and critical discussion of some influential interpretive hypotheses put forward in the writings of G. E. L. Owen. In the end, it is actually something of a marvel.. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Grades of Epistemological Involvement The Socratic Certification Program The General Account‐Requirement Definitional and Explanatory Accounts Chronic and Episodic Perspectives on Knowledge The Formal Aitia Metaphysics and Epistemology in the Republic The Simple and Subtle Aitiai in the Phaedo “Analytic” Formal Accounts in the Late Dialogues Note.

This is a book of prodigous proportions. It is intended as nothing less than a fully comprehensive treatment of every important discussion of its two principal topics in ancient Greek texts from the works of Homer until the closing of the philosophical schools in the sixth century A.D. Moreover, Hankinson’s sources are not limited just to philosophical writers; he also deftly extracts definite positive views on these subjects from the ancient medical literature as well as from the quasi-legal discourses of (...) the fifth century B. C. sophistical movement. But this is no pedestrian lock-step survey governed mechanically by chronological order. To the contrary, various subthemes are constantly interwoven throughout, as issues raised in earlier chapters reappear to be developed and augmented in later ones, which gives the progression of the book as a whole a rich and nuanced character. (shrink)

BOOK REVI~WS 137 Gail Fine. On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv + 4oo. Cloth, $55.oo. To many readers it will no doubt seem odd at first that an author could spend over four hundred printed pages discussing a portion of a treatise comprising just a scant five pages of Greek text, even supposing that the work faithfully reports Aristotelian doctrine. However, in working through Fine's book, one comes to see (...) that it contains not only a thorough treatment of the first book of the Peri Ide0n, but also comprehensive interpretations of the metaphysical systems of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and the parallels and differences among these systems. The book also contains clearheaded and instructive accounts of so-called "Third Man" arguments, and critical discussion of some influential interpretive hypotheses put forward in the writings of G. E. L. Owen. In the end, it is actually something of a marvel... (shrink)

The central aim of this short and pithy book is to challenge the widely held view that the concepts expressed by Aristotelian modal idioms are essentially temporal modalities, by which is meant that they can be defined wholly by means of non-modal and temporal idioms. More specifically, Waterlow contends that two notorious Aristotelian theses, if it is possible that p, then at some time it is the case that p, and if it is always the case that p, then it (...) is necessary that p, are not to be understood, even in restricted forms, as analytic outfall of the very nature of Aristotle's modalities. Rather, she argues, they are viewed by Aristotle himself as substantive principles whose truth he undertakes to establish in De Caelo 1.12 by means of an assortment of premises, some of which do flow from the nature of the modalities involved, but others of which pertain to the peculiar metaphysical setting in which the arguments occur. Now since, on Waterlow's account, this metaphysical setting centrally involves the notion of omnitemporality, and inasmuch as she also endeavors to explain how these same modalities operate in Aristotle's discussion of future contingents in De Interpretatione 9, her basic thesis is that for Aristotle, modal and temporal notions never merge, but occasionally mingle. (shrink)

Scholars of classical philosophy have long disputed whether Aristotle was a dialectical thinker. Most agree that Aristotle contrasts dialectical reasoning with demonstrative reasoning, where the former reasons from generally accepted opinions and the latter reasons from the true and primary. Starting with a grasp on truth, demonstration never relinquishes it. Starting with opinion, how could dialectical reasoning ever reach truth, much less the truth about first principles? Is dialectic then an exercise that reiterates the prejudices of one's times and at (...) best allows one to persuade others by appealing to these prejudices, or is it the royal road to first principles and philosophical wisdom? In From Puzzles to Principles? May Sim gathers experts to argue both these positions and offer a variety of interpretive possibilities. The contributors' thoughtful reflections on the nature and limits of dialectic should play a crucial role in Aristotelian scholarship. (shrink)

Modern readers who have wrestled with the difficulties of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics can sympathize with the twelfth-century lament of John of Salisbury that there are "as many obstacles to understanding this work as there are chapters in it--and you are lucky if there are not more obstacles than chapters". One recent reader who has met with some success in overcoming these difficulties is Michael Ferejohn, whose book attempts to set out systematically the elements of the Aristotelian theory of (...) scientific explanation. Rather than add to the eminent tradition of commentary on the text, Ferejohn provides a reconstruction of the theory and so a comprehensive interpretation of demonstrative knowledge. (shrink)

I review Michael T. Ferejohn's "Formal Causes: Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in Socratic and Aristotelian Thought".

Ferejohn’s clear and elegant book makes a strong case for a developmentalist reading of Aristotle’s views about the nature of philosophical understanding. It is a pleasurable read and engages with several issues central to Socratic and Aristotelian scholarship. Formal Causes will be an important resource for anyone thinking about Aristotle’s philosophical method and the relationships between his thought and that of his predecessors.Ferejohn’s general picture of Aristotle’s philosophical development is familiar, if also somewhat controversial. In the works comprising (...) the Organon, Aristotle’s thinking occurs largely within the confines he inherits from the Academy. He emphasizes the importance of formal causes in... (shrink)

Possibility offers a new analysis of the metaphysical concepts of possibility and necessity, one that does not rely on any sort of "possible worlds." The analysis proceeds from an account of the notion of a physical object and from the positing of properties and relations. It is motivated by considerations about how we actually speak of and think of objects. Michael Jubien discusses several closely related topics, including different purported varieties of possible worlds, the doctrine of "essentialism," natural kind (...) terms and alleged examples of necessity a posteriori. The book also offers a new theory of the functioning of proper names, both actual and fictional, and the discussion of natural kind terms and necessity a posteriori depends in part on this theory. (shrink)

The elephant in the room -- Crabs and octopuses -- The central intelligence of a frog -- The cerebral cortex and consciousness -- Social consciousness -- Yoda and Darth: how can we find -- Consciousness in the brain? -- The hard problem and other perspectives on consciousness -- Conscious machines -- Uploading minds -- How to build visual consciousness.

While philosophers hold that it is patently absurd to blame robots or hold them morally responsible [1], a series of recent empirical studies suggest that people do ascribe blame to AI systems and robots in certain contexts [2]. This is disconcerting: Blame might be shifted from the owners, users or designers of AI systems to the systems themselves, leading to the diminished accountability of the responsible human agents [3]. In this paper, we explore one of the potential underlying reasons for (...) robot blame, namely the folk's willingness to ascribe inculpating mental states or "mens rea" to robots. In a vignette-based experiment (N=513), we presented participants with a situation in which an agent knowingly runs the risk of bringing about substantial harm. We manipulated agent type (human v. group agent v. AI-driven robot) and outcome (neutral v. bad), and measured both moral judgment (wrongness of the action and blameworthiness of the agent) and mental states attributed to the agent (recklessness and the desire to inflict harm). We found that (i) judgments of wrongness and blame were relatively similar across agent types, possibly because (ii) attributions of mental states were, as suspected, similar across agent types. This raised the question - also explored in the experiment - whether people attribute knowledge and desire to robots in a merely metaphorical way (e.g., the robot "knew" rather than really knew). However, (iii), according to our data people were unwilling to downgrade to mens rea in a merely metaphorical sense when given the chance. Finally, (iv), we report a surprising and novel finding, which we call the inverse outcome effect on robot blame: People were less willing to blame artificial agents for bad outcomes than for neutral outcomes. This suggests that they are implicitly aware of the dangers of overattributing blame to robots when harm comes to pass, such as inappropriately letting the responsible human agent off the moral hook. (shrink)

When philosophers discuss the possibility of machines making scientific discoveries, they typically focus on discoveries in physics, biology, chemistry and mathematics. Observing the rapid increase of computer-use in science, however, it becomes natural to ask whether there are any scientific domains out of reach for machine discovery. For example, could machines also make discoveries in qualitative social science? Is there something about humans that makes us uniquely suited to studying humans? Is there something about machines that would bar them from (...) such activity? A close look at the methodology of interpretive social science reveals several abilities necessary to make a social scientific discovery, and one capacity necessary to possess any of them is imagination. For machines to make discoveries in social science, therefore, they must possess imagination algorithms. (shrink)