Green and Shapiro's critique of rational choice theory underestimates the value of unification and the necessity of universalism in science. The central place of intentionality in social life makes both unification and universalism feasible norms in social science. However, ?universalism? in social science may be partial, in that the independence hypothesis?that the causal mechanism governing action is context independent?may hold only locally in certain classes of choice domains.

In Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Philip Pettit seeks to revive republicanism not only as a critical perspective on contemporary political life but as a guiding principle for the design of modern political institutions. His conception of republicanism sees it as aimed at securing a kind of liberty: freedom from domination, which he defines as dependence on the arbitrary will of another. Pettit contrasts his conception of liberty with the notion, traced to Hobbes, Bentham and “enlightenment” thinkers, of (...) freedom as noninterference, a conception of freedom that put things off on the wrong track. (shrink)

In the Common Mind, Pettit argues that rational choice theory cannot provide genuine causal accounts of action. A genuine causal explanation of intentional action must track how people actually deliberate to arrive at action. And, deliberation is necessarily enculturated or situated “. . . we take human agents to reason their way to action, using the concepts that are available to them in the currency of their culture” (p. 220). When deciding how to act, “. . . people find their (...) way to action in response to properties that they register in the options before them, properties that are valued in common with others and that can be invoked to provide at least some justification of their choices” (p. 272). That people seek to make justified decisions implies that, at times, their own goals or objectives will be modified in deliberation. Something that rational choice theory cannot allow. (shrink)

In Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Philip Pettit seeks to revive republicanism not only as a critical perspective on contemporary political life but as a guiding principle for the design of modern political institutions. His conception of republicanism sees it as aimed at securing a kind of liberty: freedom from domination, which he defines as dependence on the arbitrary will of another. Pettit contrasts his conception of liberty with the notion, traced to Hobbes, Bentham and “enlightenment” thinkers, of (...) freedom as noninterference, a conception of freedom that put things off on the wrong track. (shrink)

Republicans have traditionally opposed democracy, arguing that rule by a majority is a form of despotic or lawless rule, and liberalism due to its emphasis on private goods over public projects and shared or public interests. Today, however, republicanism is associated with certain kinds of ‘democratic’ institutions and deliberative practices, whereas democracy is considered a means of assuring significant liberal protections for individual freedom. This chapter examines the link between republicanism and the nature of law. It describes at least two (...) separate complexes of constitutional prescriptions that can be found in republican thought: the classical complex that can be seen in various forms in Rome and Athens. It argues that modern republicans endorse institutions that are different from those advocated by their classical forbearers because they have a different understanding of society and social conflict, and traces this difference to ‘social ontology’. The chapter also contends that a republican notion of the common good depends at least in part on what is believed to be the greatest danger or threat to the republic. (shrink)