o presente artigo analisa a singularidade epistemológica que implica a utilização, tanto por parte do âmbito médico-psiquiátrico-, quanto, - e especialmente-, da psicanálise, dos nomes próprios de Sade e de Sacher-Masoch, autores oriundos da literatura não da medicina, nas suas tabelas sintomatológicas. Os nomes de Sade e Masoch identificam determinadas condições psíquicas bem conhecidas, assim como ajudam a organizar uma taxonomia do campo das perversões: o sadismo e o masoquismo. O texto aborda dois tópicos conceituais que se derivam desta escolha (...) epistemológica: o primeiro visa determinar quais condições e caraterísticas muito específicas estas sintomatologias devem possuir para que não poderem ser nomeadas, como habitualmente, com os nomes dos médicos que reconhecem e isolam o conjunto sintomático. O segundo tópico analisa certo uso não literário que a psicanálise propõe destes sintomas nomeados por literatos, em particular a afirmação da necessária constituição de um complexo sadomasoquista. Neste sentido, o artigo verifica que, se levadas em consideração as literaturas de Sade e de Masoch, - no que elas expõem sobre tipos psíquicos e sobre produção desejante-, este complexo, esta reunião, não seria possível. A psicanálise reuniria o que a literatura, com tanto cuidado diferenciou. Para levar adiante esta reflexão, o texto acompanha a leitura que Gilles Deleuze propões da obra de Sacher Masoch, no seu texto, Apresentação de Sacher-Masoch: o frio e o cruel. (shrink)

The notion that our society, its education system and its intellectual life, is characterised by a split between two cultures – the arts or humanities on one hand, and the sciences on the other – has a long history. But it was C. P. Snow's Rede lecture of 1959 that brought it to prominence and began a public debate that is still raging in the media today. This 50th anniversary printing of The Two Cultures and its successor piece, A Second (...) Look features an introduction by Stefan Collini, charting the history and context of the debate, its implications and its afterlife. The importance of science and technology in policy run largely by non-scientists, the future for education and research, and the problem of fragmentation threatening hopes for a common culture are just some of the subjects discussed. (shrink)

The notion that our society, its education system and its intellectual life, is characterised by a split between two cultures – the arts or humanities on one hand and the sciences on the other – has a long history. But it was C. P. Snow's Rede lecture of 1959 that brought it to prominence and began a public debate that is still raging in the media today. This fiftieth anniversary printing of The Two Cultures and its successor piece, A Second (...) Look features an introduction by Stefan Collini, charting the history and context of the debate, its implications and its afterlife. The importance of science and technology in policy run largely by non-scientists, the future for education and research, and the problem of fragmentation threatening hopes for a common culture are just some of the subjects discussed. (shrink)

Offering an original perspective on the central project of Descartes' Meditations, this book argues that Descartes' free will theodicy is crucial to his refutation of skepticism. A common thread runs through Descartes' radical First Meditation doubts, his Fourth Meditation discussion of error, and his pious reconciliation of providence and freedom: each involves a clash of perspectives-thinking of God seems to force conclusions diametrically opposed to those we reach when thinking only of ourselves. Descartes fears that a skeptic could exploit this (...) clash of perspectives to argue that Reason is not trustworthy because self-contradictory. To refute the skeptic and vindicate the consistency of Reason, it is not enough for Descartes to demonstrate that our Creator is perfect; he must also show that our errors cannot prove God's imperfection. To do this, Descartes invokes the idea that we err freely. However, prospects initially seem dim for this free will theodicy, because Descartes appears to lack any consistent or coherent understanding of human freedom. In an extremely in-depth analysis spanning four chapters, Ragland argues that despite initial appearances, Descartes consistently offered a coherent understanding of human freedom: for Descartes, freedom is most fundamentally the ability to do the right thing. Since we often do wrong, actual humans must therefore be able to do otherwise-our actions cannot be causally determined by God or our psychology. But freedom is in principle compatible with determinism: while leaving us free, God could have determined us to always do the good. Though this conception of freedom is both consistent and suitable to Descartes' purposes, when he attempts to reconcile it with divine providence, Descartes's strategy fails, running afoul of his infamous doctrine that God created the eternal truths. (shrink)

Dan Baras has recently argued for the claim that Theistic Mathematical Platonism fares no better than Mathematical Platonism with respect to explaining why our mathematical beliefs are correlated with mind-independent mathematical truths. In this paper I argue that, insofar as TMP provides a proximate or local explanation for this truth-tracking correlation whereas MP fails to offer any corresponding explanation, Baras’s claim that TMP fares no better than MP with respect to explaining this correlation is false.

In this interview, C. P. Goodman invites British Polanyi scholar Richard T. Allen to reflect on his interest in Polanyi’s philosophical ideas and share what he believes is valuable in his thought.