Originally published in 1966 and now recognized as a classic, Norman O. Brown's meditation on the condition of humanity and its long fall from the grace of a natural, instinctual innocence is available once more for a new generation of readers. Love's Body is a continuation of the explorations begun in Brown's famous Life Against Death . Rounding out the trilogy is Brown's brilliant Apocalypse and/or Metamorphosis.

Here is the final volume of Norman O. Brown's trilogy on civilization and its discontents, on humanity's long struggle to master its instincts and the perils that attend that denial of human nature. Following on his famous books _Life Against Death_ and _Love's Body_, this collection of eleven essays brings Brown's thinking up to 1990 and the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. Brown writes that "the prophetic tradition is an attempt to give direction to the (...) social structure precipitated by the urban revolution; to resolve its inherent contradictions; to put an end to its injustice, inequality, anomie, the state of war... that has been its history from start to finish." Affiliating himself with prophets from Muhammad to Blake and Emerson, Brown offers further meditations on what's wrong with Western civilization and what we might do about it. Thus the duality in his title: crisis and the hope for change. In pieces both poetic and philosophical, Brown's attention ranges over Greek mythology, Islam, Spinoza, and _Finnegan's Wake_. The collection includes an autobiographical essay musing on Brown's own intellectual development. The final piece, "Dionysus in 1990," draws on Freud and the work of Georges Bataille to link the recent changes in the world's economies with mankind's primordial drive to accumulation, waste, and death. (shrink)

Originally published in 1966 and now recognized as a classic, Norman O. Brown's meditation on the condition of humanity and its long fall from the grace of a natural, instinctual innocence is available once more for a new generation of readers. _Love's Body_ is a continuation of the explorations begun in Brown's famous _Life Against Death_. Rounding out the trilogy is Brown's brilliant _Apocalypse and/or Metamorphosis_.

Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.

This book argues that according to Metaphysics Zeta, substantial forms constitute substantial being in the sensible world, and individual composites make up the basic constituents that possess this kind of being. The study explains why Aristotle provides a reexamination of substance after the Categories, Physics, and De Anima, and highlights the contribution Z is meant to make to the science of being. Norman O. Dahl argues that Z.1-11 leaves both substantial forms and individual composites as candidates for basic constituents, (...) with Z.12 being something that can be set aside. He explains that although the main focus of Z.13-16 is to argue against a Platonic view that takes universals to be basic constituents, some of its arguments commit Aristotle to individual composites as basic constituents, with Z.17’s taking substantial form to constitute substantial being is compatible with that commitment.. (shrink)

A review of the strategic management, policy, information management, and the marketing literature reveals that many large and medium sized companies now collect and use business intelligence. The number of firms engaging in these activities is increasing rapidly.While the whys and hows of this practice have been discussed in the academic and professional literature, the ethics of intelligence gathering have not been adequately discussed in a public forum. This paper is intended to generate discussion by advancing criteria which could be (...) used as the basis for judging actions of those involved in business intelligence and for creating reasonable policies in this sensitive area of practice. (shrink)

Virtually everyone will agree that according to Aristotle, for a particular substance to be is at least for it to be a thing of a certain kind. Every particular substance falls under a substance kind, where the essence of that particular substance at least includes the essence of its substance kind. For example, for a particular man to be is at least for him to be characterized by those predicates that make something a man. More generally, if A is said (...) of a particular A kath’ hauto, then the essence of that particular A will at least include the essence of the kind A. Let us call the first of these essences the essence of a particular A, and the second the essence of the kind A. The question now is whether Aristotle would maintain that the essence of a particular A includes the essence of the kind A for every kind A. In particular, would he maintain this when A is said of a particular subject kata sumbebêkos? For example, would he say that what it is for a particular pale man to be includes what it is to fall under the kind pale man? (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Aristotle on Action Aristotle on Practical Reason Aristotle on Weakness of the Will Notes Bibliography.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Substance Being the Same As Its Essence in Metaphysics Z 6: The Pale Man ArgumentNorman O. Dahlin general Aristotle’s account of substance in the Categories is clear. Primary substances, the basic constitutents of the world, are independently existing individuals, paradigm examples of which are particular living organisms. However, the later use to which Aristotle puts matter and form provides him with two new candidates for primary substance.1 A (...) reconsideration of substance is in order, and Aristotle begins it in Metaphysics Z. The status of matter soon becomes clear. It can’t be substance because it isn’t a “this” and separate (Z 3, 1029a26–28). The status of form, however, is another story. Aristotle argues in Z 6 that substances are the same as their essences. While the evidence isn’t unequivocal, Z 4, 10, 11, and 15 take essence to be form, where form is universal. Z 13, however, argues that no universal is substance. Aristotle thus appears caught in an inconsistency. Substance is universal form because it is the same as universal form; however, no universal is substance. This and other problems have led to as wide a variety of interpretations of Metaphysics Z as one will find of any philosophical text. Virtually all of them end up attributing to Aristotle one of [End Page 1] three views about substance—substances are universal forms, particular forms, or composites of matter and form.2This paper takes a first step in a project that promises to remove the above inconsistency while allowing but not requiring Aristotle to take concrete particular substances (composite substances involving both matter and form) to be substances. The project looks at the first of the three claims that lead to the above apparent inconsistency and asks whether the sameness relation in it should be understood as identity or a weaker relation that could hold between concrete particular substances and their universal essences. It is the latter possibility that promises to avoid the above contradiction. If concrete particular substances can be the same as their universal essences, then the essences of substances can be universals without necessarily turning substances into universals. Nevertheless, granting this possibility wouldn’t require Aristotle to take concrete particular substances to be substances. Forms of concrete particular substances will also be the same as their essences in this weaker sameness relation, and considerations other than those at work in Z 6 could still lead Aristotle to rule out concrete individuals as substances.1Although Aristotle has standardly been interpreted as arguing in Z 6 that substances are identical with their essences,3 two considerations allow the question of this paper to be raised. [End Page 2]The first is the variety of uses to which Aristotle puts such notions as the same (tauto) or one (hen). Aristotle’s concern in Z 6 is with whether certain things are or are not the same (tauto), one (hen), or one and the same (hen kai auto and to auto kai hen) as their essences.4 He argues that kata sumbebēkos legomena (things said to be what they are with respect to an accident) are not the same as their essences, but that kath’ hauta legomena (things said to be what they are with respect to themselves), a class of things that includes substances,5 are the same as their essences. However, when Aristotle says that one thing and another are the same or one, there is more than one kind of claim he can be making. Some of them apply to things that are identical; others do not.For example, things can be the same in number, species, and genus. A doublet and a cloak are the same in number, a man and another man are the same in species, and a man and a horse are the same in genus.6 Although a doublet and a cloak are identical, a man and another man, and a man and a horse, are not.Things can also be accidentally the same, or the same in definition, substance, or essence,7 where these two ways of being the same cut across the previous ways of being the same. For example... (shrink)

This is the first book length study of Norman O. Brown's large scale works from /Heremes the Thief/ to /Closing Time/. Delving into the complex writing, David Greenham explains Brown to a larger audience while also exploring the relationship between Brown's writings and those of his better-known contemporary, Herbert Marcuse.

Review of On a COlllplex Theory of a Simple God: An Investigation in Aquinas' Philosophical Theology, by Christopher M. Hughes.

This study explores nurses' experiences of workplace conflict with patients and their family members, how it differs by ethnic/racial identity, and highlights the coping strategies engaged to lessen these conflicts. Using a qualitative research design, this study draws on phenomenology and in‐depth interviews of 66 registered nurses and registered practical nurses from multiple sites in two Canadian cities to explore the experiences of nurses with multiple marginalized identities in relation to nurse–patient and nurse–patient's family member conflicts in direct care practice. (...) The results show that horizontal conflicts, especially, ones involving nurses, patients, and their family members are quite pervasive in the nursing profession. Direct care nurses, especially, ethnic minorities relative to majority groups experience excessive physical assaults, verbal aggressive behaviors, racial stereotyping and discrimination, and sexual harassment from patients and patients' family members. Institutional support through policies and practices designed to de‐escalate aggressive behavior from patients and their family members were identified as important support systems. We conclude that policies aimed at creating a safe and strong health‐care system call for holding patients and th'eir family members legally responsible for uncivil and aggressive behavior against caregivers. (shrink)

Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, xxiii + 412 pp.

This paper presents the behavioral interview model that we developed to formalize our hiring practices when we, most recently, needed to hire a new clinical ethicist to join our staff at the Center for Ethics at Washington Hospital Center.