Abstract

Virtually everyone will agree that according to Aristotle, for a particular substance to be is at least for it to be a thing of a certain kind. Every particular substance falls under a substance kind, where the essence of that particular substance at least includes the essence of its substance kind. For example, for a particular man to be is at least for him to be characterized by those predicates that make something a man. More generally, if A is said of a particular A kath’ hauto, then the essence of that particular A will at least include the essence of the kind A. Let us call the first of these essences the essence of a particular A, and the second the essence of the kind A. The question now is whether Aristotle would maintain that the essence of a particular A includes the essence of the kind A for every kind A. In particular, would he maintain this when A is said of a particular subject kata sumbebêkos? For example, would he say that what it is for a particular pale man to be includes what it is to fall under the kind pale man?