In §50 of Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein wrote the sentence, “There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris.” Although some interpreters have claimed that Wittgenstein’s statement is mistaken, while others have proposed various explanations showing that this must be correct, none have questioned the fact that he intended to assert that it is impossible to describe the (...) standard meter as being a meter long. Given that Wittgenstein introduces this sentence as analogous to the claim that “existence cannot be attributed to an element,” and that the preceding passages discuss a language-game the simples of which can be described by their own names, there is good reason to think that Wittgenstein did not intend to assert this infamous sentence. (shrink)

In §50 of Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein wrote the sentence, “There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris.” Although some interpreters have claimed that Wittgenstein's statement is mistaken, while others have proposed various explanations showing that this must be correct, none have questioned the fact that he intended to assert that it is impossible to describe the (...) standard meter as being a meter long. Given that Wittgenstein introduces this sentence as analogous to the claim that “existence cannot be attributed to an element,” and that the preceding passages discuss a language‐game the simples of which can be described by their own names, there is good reason to think that Wittgenstein did not intend to assert this infamous sentence. (shrink)

This volume draws connections between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the work of Saul Kripke, especially his Naming and Necessity. Saul Kripke is regarded as one of the foremost representatives of contemporary analytic philosophy. His most important contributions include the strict distinction between metaphysical and epistemological questions, the introduction of the notions of contingent a priori truth and necessary a posteriori truth and original accounts of names, descriptions, identity, necessity and realism. The chapters in this book elucidate the relevant connections between Kripke's (...) work and Wittgenstein, specifically concerning the standard meter, contingent apriori and rule-following. The contributions shed light on how Kripke's philosophical outlook was influenced by Wittgenstein, and how mainstream analytic philosophy and Wittgensteinian philosophy can fruitfully engage with one another. Kripke and Wittgenstein will be of interest to philosophers working on Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

This article critically examines Saul Kripke's (1972) argument for the separability of necessary truths from truths known a priori, focusing on his criticism of the standard meter case presented by Wittgenstein (1968). It attempts to show that Kripke's argument is unworkable on any of several readings. Wittgenstein's own broadly conventionalist account of necessary truth is then considered in the light of the standard meter example.

I certainly find it easier to recognize the deep continuities within Wittgenstein's thought, than the real nature of the contrasts: one only comes to recognize these for what they are after prolonged engagement with the two works.Heather Gert has offered a reading of Investigations §§ 46-50. Her attention devolves primarily on the notorious standard meter paragraph of § 50. Important to her reading is her conviction about what it is from the Tractatus that is being criticized and about (...) how it is being criticized.I believe Gert's reading of the passage is mistaken. Gert fails to get fully into focus what is happening in the distance, in the Tractatus, and she fails to get into focus what is happening nearby, in .. (shrink)

The separation of men’s and women’s competitions in the sporting world has been suggested as a necessary protection for female athletes against the superior athletic performances of male athletes. The comparison of the most elite performers in these two categories maintains the historical pattern of viewing male sport and the male athlete as the standard, and female sport and the female athlete as the inferior ‘other’. This paper argues for a transformative utilization of the separation of men’s and women’s (...) sports by female athletes and sporting organizations. Female sporting organizations may creatively change the rules and practices of the malestandard, so as to challenge the historical patterning of sport. This paper will use the image of the cyborg, and the motivation behind cyborg politics, to call for creativity in dealing with the ban on drugs in sport. (shrink)

For those who are eagerly awaiting the return of Christ in glory, the admonition articulated in Matthew 24:42 has always been of paramount importance. Not only are we counseled to remain ever vigilant, but the intellectual boundaries within which we may abide in our expectation are also carefully delineated, for it is here that Christ most firmly establishes his mandate that we profess a radical agnosticism regarding the time-tables of sacred history. Nonetheless, since the days of the Church Fathers there (...) have been some who, for a variety of reasons, have sought to arrive at a more certain — or at least more refined — understanding of the timing of the Parousia, most often through a combination of exegesis and numerology. To a certain degree, Christian of Stavelot's comments on Matthew 24:42 must be considered among these attempts. (shrink)

Tasked with the challenge to build better and better computers, quantum computing and classical computing face the same conundrum: the success of classical computing systems. Small quantum computing systems have been demonstrated, and intermediate-scale systems are on the horizon, capable of calculating numeric results or simulating physical systems far beyond what humans can do by hand. However, to be commercially viable, they must surpass what our wildly successful, highly advanced classical computers can already do. At the same time, those classical (...) computers continue to advance, but those advances are now constrained by thermodynamics, and will soon be limited by the discrete nature of atomic matter and ultimately quantum effects. Technological advances benefit both quantum and classical machinery, altering the competitive landscape. Can we build quantum computing systems that out-compute classical systems capable of some \(10^{30}\) logic gates per month? This article will discuss the interplay in these competing and cooperating technological trends. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall discuss the issue whether the standard meter in Paris is in fact one meter long. Whether one could meaningfully assert this proposition depends on how the unit of length a meter is defined. I would like to suggest three conceivable definitions. One meter long is everything that has the same length as an arbitrary chosen rod S now has. According to the second definition one meter long is everything that (...) coincides in the endpoints with the rod S when placed alongside. The third definition states that one meter long is-in a literal sense-the rod S solely. Other objects are one meter long-although in a derived sense-if they coincide in the endpoints with S when placed alongside. The first definition is in essence the standpoint of Kripke, the second one can be attributed to Wittgenstein, the last definition is the proposal I would like to advocate here. In particular, I hold that the third definition can be attributed to Wittgenstein as well. A language-game of measuring presupposes a preparatory game of fixing a unit of measure. The meaning of the expression "standard meter" must thus be derived from this preparatory game. Therefore with all other objects, one can say only in a derived sense that they are one meter long or not. (shrink)