1. Yŏnŭn kŭl -- 2. '3' wŏlli ŭi ŭimi wa kŭn'gŏ -- 3. Tong, sŏyang mit chayŏn ŭi '3' wŏlli mosŭptŭl -- 4. Hanminjok ŭi '3' wŏlli mosŭptŭl -- 5. '3' wŏlli ŭi ch'angjojŏk hwakchang mit hwaryong -- 6. Naganŭn kŭl.

There are a number of recent attempts to introduce Confucian values to the ethical analysis of technology. These works, however, have not attended sufficiently to one central aspect of Confucianism, namely Ritual (‘Li’). Li is central to Confucian ethics, and it has been suggested that the emphasis on Li in Confucian ethics is what distinguishes it from other ethical traditions. Any discussion of Confucian ethics for technology, therefore, remains incomplete without accounting for Li. This chapter aims to elaborate on the (...) concept of Confucian Li and discuss its relevance to ethics of technology. Particularly, by referring to Li’s communicative, formative, and aesthetic function, I formulate an approach to ethics of technology with an emphasis on community, performance, and the aesthetic and demonstrate how this approach proceeds with the ethical analysis of technology. In doing so, I attempt to answer the question: why Confucianism matters in ethics of technology. (shrink)

Algorithms can now identify patterns and correlations in the (big) datasets, and predict outcomes based on those identified patterns and correlations with the use of machine learning techniques and big data, decisions can then be made by algorithms themselves in accordance with the predicted outcomes. Yet, algorithms can inherit questionable values from the datasets and acquire biases in the course of (machine) learning, and automated algorithmic decision-making makes it more difficult for people to see algorithms as biased. While researchers have (...) taken the problem of algorithmic bias seriously, but the current discussion on algorithmic fairness tends to conceptualize ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness primarily as a technical issue and attempts to implement pre-existing ideas of ‘fairness’ into algorithms. In this paper, I show that such a view of algorithmic fairness as technical issue is unsatisfactory for the type of problem algorithmic fairness presents. Since decisions on fairness measure and the related techniques for algorithms essentially involve choices between competing values, ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness should be conceptualized first and foremost as a political issue, and it should be (re)solved by democratic communication. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to explicitly reconceptualize algorithmic fairness as a political question and suggest the current discussion of algorithmic fairness can be strengthened by adopting the accountability for reasonableness framework. (shrink)

Torat Ḥovot ha-levavot / ḥibro Baḥye ben Yosef ibn Paḳudah -- Lev Yiśraʼel / [me-et Aharon Yiśraʼel Ḳahan] -- Nefesh Avigdor / liḳuṭ mi-shiʻure Avigdor Miller.

2. Saebyŏngnyŏk chʻodang esŏ on pʻyŏnji.

Che 1-kwŏn. Kodae-kŭndae sasang -- che 2-kwŏn. Hyŏndae sasang.

001. 王陽明의 철학사상 002. 현대의 시대적 상황 003. 양명학의 형성 배경 004. 기존 학설과 양명학 005. 왕양명의 심즉이론 006. 왕양명의 지행합일체 007. 왕양명의 치량지론 008. 왕양명의 이상사회 사상 009. 왕양명의 군사사상 010. 왕양명의 영향과 전개 011. 동, 서의 양명학 012. 한국의 양명학 013. 양명학의 조선 전래 014. 양명학에 대한 비판 015. 전래 초기의 양명학 수용 016. 조선조 양명학의 태두 정제두 017. 하곡 이후의 양명학 018. 겸곡 박은식의 양명학 019. 애당 정인보의 양명학.

Culture is a concept that is claimed these days as the last authority for appeal in most discussions on human affairs and as the ultimate cause of important differences among people: “[C]ulture is the sole source of the validity of a moral right or rule”1 Only culture seems to be conclusive for almost all of what men are and what they do. Culture is what we collectively create but, at the same time, what we are determined by; we are our (...) own masters and at the same time slaves of our own creations. The culture that is so decisive today, however, is not a universal culture common to everyone but the concrete culture of each society2 here and now. Thus the culture that is concretely relevant to us today is plural. Pluralism in the present understanding may not necessarily trouble Christians, but the relativism that accompanies it does. More alarming, however, is cultural determinism that seriously discourages Christian efforts for evangelism and, especially, foreign mission. (shrink)

The rapid growth of Korean churches and the conflict-ridden Korean society may serve to illustrate how evangelists should face critical socio-political issues. The Korean experience seems to indicate that evangelists are most effective when they concentrate their entire efforts on preaching “Jesus Christ and Him Crucified” alone. Believers in general, however, should be keenly interested in such issues as human rights and social justice, not only for their own sake but also for the sake of effective future evangelism. The Church's (...) involvement in these issues gives a favourable impression of Christianity, which in turn facilitates evangelism. (shrink)

A closer look at the theories and questions in philosophy of technology and ethics of technology shows the absence and marginality of non-Western philosophical traditions in the discussions. Although, increasingly, some philosophers have sought to introduce non-Western philosophical traditions into the debates, there are few systematic attempts to construct and articulate general accounts of ethics and technology based on other philosophical traditions. This situation is understandable, for the questions of modern sciences and technologies appear to be originated from the West; (...) at the same time, the situation is undesirable. The overall aim of this paper, therefore, is to introduce an alternative account of ethics of technology based on the Confucian tradition. In doing so, it is hoped that the current paper can initiate a relatively uncharted field in philosophy of technology and ethics of technology. (shrink)