This article focuses on two questions about the doctrine of the resurrection, questions that will occur to most philosophers and theologians interested in identity in general, and in personal identity in particular. The first question is: how? How could a body that at the end of this life was frail and feeble be the very same body as a resurrection body, a body which will not be frail or feeble, but will instead be glorified? (...) Moreover, how could a body that has passed out of existence – perhaps as a result of decay or cremation – come back into existence on the Day of Resurrection? The second question is: why? Why would anyone want a resurrection of the body? And even if the resurrection delivers something that we want – maybe one's current body has some sentimental value and so having it back would be nice – we might still wonder why any religion would give the doctrine a central place, as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all do. (shrink)

At the end of his life, Rahner pointed to the need for a fully systematic theology that brings out the inner relationship between Jesus Christ and the universe put before us by the natural sciences. In this article, it is argued that Rahner had long been pursuing this theological agenda. His various contributions on this topic arebrought together and discussed within a framework of six systematic elements that are found in his work: self-bestowal as the meaning and purpose of creation; (...) self-transcendence as the way of divine action; resurrection as the beginning of the transformation of the universe; God as Absolute Future; human action as finally significant; hope as trust in God in the midst of perplexity. This synopsis leads to some critical reflections on Rahner’s achievement. The paper was presented at the 2005 meeting of the Karl Rahner Society. (shrink)

This is the first book length study of Norman O. Brown's large scale works from /Heremes the Thief/ to /Closing Time/. Delving into the complex writing, David Greenham explains Brown to a larger audience while also exploring the relationship between Brown's writings and those of his better-known contemporary, Herbert Marcuse.

At the end of his life, Rahner pointed to the need for a fully systematic theology that brings out the inner relationship between Jesus Christ and the universe put before us by the natural sciences. In this article, it is argued that Rahner had long been pursuing this theological agenda. His various contributions on this topic arebrought together and discussed within a framework of six systematic elements that are found in his work: self-bestowal as the meaning and purpose of creation; (...) self-transcendence as the way of divine action; resurrection as the beginning of the transformation of the universe; God as Absolute Future; human action as finally significant; hope as trust in God in the midst of perplexity. This synopsis leads to some critical reflections on Rahner’s achievement. The paper was presented at the 2005 meeting of the Karl Rahner Society. (shrink)

The issue of the resurrection of the body has given rise to a plethora of interpretations. There is a natural need to clarify such issues, since there cannot be a separation between faith in Christ and the resurrection of the body. The two go hand in hand, because one cannot go without the other. In the context of debates spawned by the need to understand, Thomas Burnet seems like a study theologian and a clean hearted man, (...) who wrote for the neighbour, and who managed to offer a detailed map of the resurrection the body. The essay will point to the main aspects of the Burnet’s theology on the resurrection of the body, in a rather descriptive manner. It will also refer to other writers, who tackled the same issues, as a means to show the depth of Burnet’s perspective. (shrink)

In his recent book, Survival and Disembodied Existence Terence Penelhum presents a convincing case against the belief in disembodied personal survival. His formidable attack constitutes, I think, one of the strongest cases that has yet been made out against such a belief. I am in substantial agreement with his position.

Although not a great deal has been said about heaven in the Christian tradition, it is part of the traditional notion of heaven that the blessed are in a condition of perfect happiness. In this life we can be happy to a certain degree, but mixed with earthly happiness is disappointment, frustration, and even sorrow. In heaven, by contrast, there is no sadness, nothing is lacking, happiness is complete. The usual way of explaining this perfect happiness is in terms of (...) the ‘beatific vision’ – the face to face relationship of knowing and loving God which the blessed enjoy. On earth we experience only finite objects; nothing that we come to know ever completely satisfies our desire to know, and nothing that we love ever completely satisfies our will. But in the beatific vision we shall be in a direct relationship with the infinite God, who in his boundless perfection will completely ‘fill up’ our capacities to know and love. As the completely adequate object of these capacities, God will make us perfectly happy. As Aquinas puts it, ‘…But if God alone were seen, who is the fount and source of all being and of all truth, he would so fill the natural desire for knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely happy.’. (shrink)

In confessing the bold words, “I believe in the resurrection of the body,” we Christians affirm that the corruptibilities that everywhere loom so large will not have the last word. To the contrary, resurrection—both Christ's and ours—is the hope by which we live and the light by which we see.

This chapter argues that there is no reason that there won’t be physical disabilities in the life of heaven. To argue for this conclusion, the chapter considers what bodies will be good for in the life of heaven. On the one hand, if the life of heaven is physically dynamic, that is, where our bodies change and we can do things with them, like play rugby and climb mountains, physical disabilities can be part of the limitations that allow the physical (...) things we do to be difficult, which, in turn, allows us to achieve physical things. Since the possibility of achievement is important for a life supremely worth living, as the life of heaven is, God has no reason to eliminate, unilaterally, that is, without the person’s consent, physical disabilities in the life of heaven. On the other hand, if the life of heaven is physically static, where our bodies don’t change and we can’t do things with them, physical disabilities are neither a help nor a harm to such a life, and so God has no reason to eliminate unilaterally physical disabilities in the life of heaven. This then leads to the conclusion that God gives a person the option to retain or have eliminated their physical disability in the life of heaven. (shrink)

Vere Chappell has pointed out that it is not clear whether Locke has a well-developed ontology or even whether he is entitled to have one.2 Nevertheless, it is clear that Locke believes that there are organisms, and it is clear that he thinks that there are substances. But does he believe that organisms are substances? There are certainly parts of the Essay in which Locke seems unequivocally to state that organisms are substances. For instance, in 2.23.3 Locke uses men and (...) horses as examples of substances. In Locke’s most explicit the account of abstraction, given in 3.3.7-9, organism [vivens] is treated as a sub-species of body and body as a sub-species of substance; so, by transitivity, organism is a kind of substance. Finally, in his discussion of essences in 3.6, Locke uses all of the following organisms as examples of substances: horses, mules, men, sheep, goats, plants, drills, changelings, asses, bulls, cats, and rats. This textual evidence would seem to settle the matter about the ontological status of organisms. However, there are other parts of the Essay in which the ontological status of organisms is less clear, to say the least. In fact, there are texts in which Locke seems to state (or at least to be committed to the.. (shrink)

The future state of the redeemed human being in heaven is difficult, if not impossible, to pin down in this life. Nevertheless, Augustine and Anselm speculate on the heavenly life of the human being, proceeding from certain theological premises gathered from Scripture, and their arguments often both mirror and complement one another. Because Anselm and Augustine hold the premise that human beings in heaven are “equal to the angels” (Luke 20:36), our understanding of the heavenly condition of the human can (...) be illuminated by angelology, and vice-versa; each reveals the nature of the other. The paper examines aspects of the positions of Augustine and Anselm on the original state of the angels, their fall, and their confirmation, and then explores the condition of prelapsarian Adam and the transformation of the elect in order to illuminate how these figures conceive the afterlife. The angelologies (and demonologies) of Augustine and Anselm help one to understand the heavenly goal of human life, how the redeemed state of human beings differs from their original condition in Eden, and why there is no redemption for the fallen angels. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to Joshua Mugg and James T. Turner, Jr's claim that the doctrine of the resurrection requires the numerical sameness of ante- and post-mortem bodies. I argue that they have not shown that Scripture teaches this view and, therefore, that animalism, as opposed to substance dualism, does not offer a superior explanation for the necessity of the resurrection.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, (...) and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This article takes a fresh look at the place of transcendence in feminist theology. The author argues that it is this concept that allows us to imagine the impossible and therefore has a central part to play. The article engages with process thought and so argues that God, which is part of the process is nevertheless more than the sum of the parts. Deity, it is argued, is the web in which all things take place.

Human tissue samples are essential to biomedical research, but recent controversies reveal disagreement over how to relate these fragments to donors. Deidentification has become impossible, a property model contravenes legal and religious traditions, and there is conflict over procedures for informed consent. While Michael Banner draws on Augustine and ethnographies to emphasize the role of fragments of the body in mourning, ethnographies actually suggest that many people believe that tissues and organs retain an ongoing connection to their donors. The (...) Christian practice of the veneration of relics and the doctrine of the resurrection of the body support the idea of an ongoing tie between the person and the dead body, a connection affirmed by theologians such as Gregory of Nyssa even when it is unnecessary for their anthropology. This relationship of the donor to tissue supports the ongoing participation of the donor or her family in decisions on research. (shrink)

The concept of the resurrection of the body (or of the dead) is most easily explained by laying out the ways in which it differs from the most important competing picture of the survival of death, the Platonic picture. It can be plausibly argued that the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead presupposes some form of dualism. The resurrection life, as the post‐resurrection stories of Jesus show, is a physical life, the life of an (...) organism. A belief in a general resurrection of the dead is one of many Judeo‐Christian elements that have been incorporated into Islam. Some who accept the doctrine of resurrection deny the existence of a separable, immaterial soul. Those human beings who refuse salvation will, after the general resurrection, be thrust into a condition that the New Testament describes by a mixture of three images: exclusion, pain, and refuse. (shrink)

Christian tradition has largely held three affirmations on the resurrection of the physical body. Firstly, that bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife. Secondly, there is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise. Finally, there is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings. The same tradition also largely adheres to a robust doctrine of The Intermediate State, a paradisiacal disembodied state of existence following the biological death of a human being. This book argues that these (...) positions are in fact internally inconsistent, and so a new metaphysics for life after death is required. (shrink)

The ArgumentWhile postmodernism has had very little influence in biology, it can provide a framework for discussing the context in which biology is done. Here, four biological views of the body/self are contrasted: the neural, immunological, genetic, and Phenotypic bodies. Each physical view of the body extrapolates into a different model of the body politic, and each posits a different relationship between bodies of knowledge. The neural view of the body models a body politic wherein (...) society is defined by its culture and laws. The genetic view privileges views of polities based on ethnicity and race. The immune body extrapolates into polities that can defend themselves against other such polities. The phenotypic view of the body politic stands in opposition to these three major perspectives and integrates them without given any predominance. The view of science as a “neural” body of knowledge contends that science is aperspectival and objective. The perspective of the “immune” body is that science exists to defend the interests of its creators. The genetic view of science is that science is the basis of all culture. The extrapolation of the phenotypic body to science insists upon the utilitarian rationale for scientific enterprises. In all instances, the genetic view of the body/body politic/body of science is presently in ascendance. (shrink)

Based on themes in Aquinas, this paper adds to the defense of the doctrine of an eternal hell, focusing on the state of those in hell after the resurrection. I first summarize the Thomistic doctrine of the human person as a body-soul unity, showing why existence as a separated soul is truncated and unnatural. Next, I discuss the soul-body reunion at the resurrection, which restores an essential aspect of human nature, even for the damned. This reveals (...) the love of God since He gives the damned the best human existence they can possibly have given their disordered wills. Finally, I defend this position against three important objections. (shrink)

The objective of this work is to investigate the philosophical anthropology that underpins the anthropology of the Early Christians. It is curious to know why Christian anthropology is intellectually and practically inclined towards the philosophical anthropology of the Platonic tradition rather than the theological-philosophical tradition of the biblical Hebrew people in the Old Testament. Today the emphasis on Christian anthropology is that the human person is an integration of body and soul. Contrary to this position, the writer maintains that (...) the Christian anthropology, especially during the period of the early Christians (here understood as the period within the first five centuries C.E.), fundamentally conceives the human person as a composite of soul and body, which is a conscious employment of Platonic anthropology. This article observes that, as regards the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, there is a dichotomy between theological coherency and the actual Christian practice on the Christian conception of the human person. Hence, this work argues that the Platonic influence on the philosophical anthropology of the Early Christian was a deliberate act to give a more rational foundation to the theological problematic on the resurrection of the dead and on the resurrected body. It explains why Aquinas’s theological cum philosophical thinking, though overwhelmingly an Aristotelian ground, could not “Aristotelize” his philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

Arguments analogous to those found in the late medieval theory of the king’s two bodies, popularized by Ernst Kantorowicz, were resurrected in early nineteenth-century constitutional theories of the moderating powers of monarchy. Post-revolutionary French liberal thought, echoed by its Portuguese counterpart, rediscovered the virtues of the institution of royalty, notably the immaterial and immortal body of the king. This rediscovery was prompted by the uncertainties of different national political contexts which made many contemporaries believe it desirable to integrate restored (...) monarchies within modern constitutional models for state stability. This first occurred with the Bourbons’ return to post-Napoleonic France and the restoration of the monarchy in 1814, and then with the Braganza royal family’s return to Portugal in 1821 after thirteen years of rule from Brazil. Using arguments similar to those previously made in late medieval European political and legal thought, French and Portuguese liberals developed a theory of the king’s two powers, according to which the monarch at once exercised a moderating power, defined by the abstract institutional nature of the king’s person, and an executive power, embodied within his physical person. This conceptualization of royal duality was intended to make it possible to delegate executive power to ministers, leaving the king only the attributes of a largely symbolic power. Liberals thereby hoped to confine the monarch to his purely institutional body in a de-politicized constitutional role. (shrink)

The objective of this work is to investigate the philosophical anthropology that underpins the anthropology of the Early Christians. It is curious to know why Christian anthropology is intellectually and practically inclined towards the philosophical anthropology of the Platonic tradition rather than the theological-philosophical tradition of the biblical Hebrew people in the Old Testament. Today the emphasis on Christian anthropology is that the human person is an integration of body and soul. Contrary to this position, the writer maintains that (...) the Christian anthropology, especially during the period of the early Christians, fundamentally conceives the human person as a composite of soul and body, which is a conscious employment of Platonic anthropology. This article observes that, as regards the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, there is a dichotomy between theological coherency and the actual Christian practice on the Christian conception of the human person. Hence, this work argues that the Platonic influence on the philosophical anthropology of the Early Christian was a deliberate act to give a more rational foundation to the theological problematic on the resurrection of the dead and on the resurrected body. It explains why Aquinas’s theological cum philosophical thinking, though overwhelmingly an Aristotelian ground, could not “Aristotelize” his philosophical anthropology. (shrink)