This chapter will develop standards for assessing individual moral responsibility for collective action. In some cases, these standards expand a person’s responsibility beyond what she or he would be responsible for if performing the same physical behavior outside of a group setting. I will argue that structural differences between two ideal types of groups— organizations and goal- oriented collectives— largely determine the baseline moral responsibility of group members for the group’s collective action. (Group members can be more (...) or less responsible for collective action beyond that baseline due to personal qualities like knowledge of the intended collective outcome.) The same individual physical behavior can make the member of a goal-oriented collective responsible for the entire collective action to an equal degree with her fellow group members, whereas the typical organization member is only responsible for his contributory action. (shrink)

Numa sociedade democrática, as regras sociais são impostas a cada um por todos. Como “recebedores” de tais regras, tendemos a pensar que elas deviam ser designadas para engendrar a melhor distribuição possível de bens e males ou qualidade de vida. Enquanto autores das regras, tendemos a pensar que os malefícios por nós impostos através de tais regras têm maior peso moral que os danos que nós meramente deixamos de evitar ou mitigar. Embora as atuais teorias sejam dominadas pela primeira perspectiva, (...) uma concepção adequada da justiça exige um balanceamento de ambas tendências. O tema da equidade na saúde é bem apropriado para mostrar como concepções da justiça puramente dirigidas aos recebedores estão fadadas ao fracasso e como esboçar uma alternativa mais promissora. (shrink)

Can we hold citizens causally responsible for the outcomes of their voting decisions? They could stand in the causal relationship required for such responsibility either collectively or individually. Recent accounts ascribing responsibility to citizens have primarily taken the collective route because of a major obstacle to using an individualistic approach, namely, the problem of overdetermination: the actions of each citizen do not make an individual difference to, and therefore cannot be a cause of, the overall political outcome. (...) I suggest, drawing on Parfit (1984) and Wright (1985), that we should allow for the idea that individuals can be causally responsible in virtue of making a difference to an outcome not only as an individual, but also as part of a set of agents. I conclude that we therefore can overcome the problem of overdetermination for the individualistic approach and that it merits further investigation. (shrink)

It is often assumed that, except perhaps in a few rare cases, people with addiction can be aptly held responsible for having acquired the condition. In this chapter, I consider the argument that supports this view and draw attention to a number of challenges that can be raised against it. Assuming that early decisions to use drugs were made in possession of normal-range psychological capacities, I consider the key question of whether drug users who later became addicted should have known (...) that addiction was a likely outcome of their decisions to use drugs in a way that makes them blameworthy for their lack of foresight. I focus on three different points of contention surrounding this claim: how likely the outcome to be predicted was, how tolerable risk should be weighed against the expected value of decisions to use, and how reliable the relevant predictive abilities of the average person are. Once we consider in some detail what would have to be true in order for someone to be aptly held responsible for becoming addicted, the prospects for making a convincing case to that effect look, I argue, somewhat more uncertain than they might at first appear. (shrink)

As more and more decisions that have a significant ethical dimension are being outsourced to AI systems, it is important to have a definition of moral responsibility that can be applied to AI systems. Moral responsibility for an outcome of an agent who performs some action is commonly taken to involve both a causal condition and an epistemic condition: the action should cause the outcome, and the agent should have been aware -- in some form or other -- (...) of the possible moral consequences of their action. This paper presents a formal definition of both conditions within the framework of causal models. I compare my approach to the existing approaches of Braham and van Hees (BvH) and of Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner (HK). I then generalize my definition into a degree of responsibility. (shrink)

This article explains how we ordinary subjects of a state who are neither political leaders nor functionaries are responsible for outcomes that are properly attributed to that state and that took place during our adult lifetime. Its focus is on the connection we forge to those outcomes via our obedience alone. If our responsibility as subjects is justified, it would apply under all regime types including oppressive and authoritarian ones. The argument is that this responsibility can (...) only be justified within a minimal account of agency and a bare-bones account of responsibility. Thus, while we incur a burden of responsibility for the state via our obedience alone, that burden does not suffice to either blame us or extract remedies from us for state injustices. For us obedient subjects, however, it is important that we be cognizant of this burden as it marks the most minimal agency we exercise in the state. (shrink)

Climate change can be construed as a question of collective responsibility from two different viewpoints: climate change being inherently a collective problem, or collective entities bearing responsibility for climate change. When discussing collective responsibility for climate change, “collective” can thus refer to the problem of climate change itself, or to the entity causing the harm and/or bearing responsibility for it. The first viewpoint focuses on how climate change is a harm that has been caused collectively. Collective (...) action problem refers to an aggregation of individual actions which together produce an outcome that is not intended at the level of an individual action. It cannot be solved by any one agent acting unilaterally. Instead, climate change action must be enacted and supported by numerous agents. The second way to conceptualize climate change as a question of collective responsibility focuses on the collective entities that bear responsibility for climate change. As a global problem, climate change is linked to the realm of international politics, where states, governments, and intergovernmental organizations are the main collective entities. Other important agential collectives in terms of climate responsibility are corporations, including carbon majors who have produced the bulk of emissions. Climate change has also been theorized as a structural injustice, which combines elements from both the viewpoints on what is collective about responsibility for climate change. (shrink)

Governments, physicians, media and academics have all called for individuals to bear responsibility for their own health. In this article, I argue that requiring those with adverse health outcomes to bear responsibility for these outcomes is a bad basis for policy. The available evidence strongly suggests that the capacities for responsible choice, and the circumstances in which these capacities are exercised, are distributed alongside the kinds of goods we usually talk about in discussing distributive justice, and (...) this distribution significantly explains why people make bad health choices. These facts suggest that we cannot justifiably hold them responsible for these choices. We do better to hold responsible those who determine the ways in which capacities and circumstances are distributed: they are indirectly responsible for these adverse health outcomes and possess the capacities and resources to take responsibility for these facts. (shrink)

A values-centered leadership model comprised of leader stakeholder and economic values, follower values congruence, and responsible leadership outcomes was tested using data from 122 organizational leaders and 458 of their direct reports. Alleviating same-source bias concerns in leadership survey research, follower ratings of leadership style and follower ratings of values congruence and responsible leadership outcomes were collected from separate sources via the split-sample methodology. Results of structural equation modeling analyses demonstrated that leader stakeholder values predicted transformational leadership, whereas (...) leader economic values were associated with transactional leadership. Follower values congruence was strongly associated with transformational leadership, unrelated to transactional leadership, and partially mediated the relationships between transformational leadership and both follower organizational citizenship behaviors and follower beliefs in the stakeholder view of corporate social responsibility. Implications for responsible leadership and transformational leadership theory, practice, and future research are discussed. (shrink)

I argue that an agent can be morally responsible and fully (but not necessarily solely) blameworthy for another agent’s free intentional action, simply by intentionally creating the conditions for the action in a way that causes it. This means, I argue, that she can be morally responsible for the other’s action in the relevantly same way that she is responsible for her own non-basic actions. Furthermore, it means that socially mediated moral responsibility for intentional action does not require an (...) agent to authorize another to act on her behalf, nor does it require her to threaten, coerce, or deceive the other. (shrink)

Many contemporary forms of oppression are not primarily the result of formally organized collective action nor are they an unintended outcome of a combination of individual actions. This raises the question of collective responsibility. I argue that we can only determine who is responsible for oppression if we understand oppression as a matter of social practices that create obstacles for social change. This social practice view of oppression enables two insights: First, that there is an unproblematic sense in which (...) groups can bear irreducible collective responsibility for oppression. Second, that there are derived forms of individual responsibility for members of dominant groups. (shrink)

In a democratic society, the social rules are imposed by all upon each. As “recipients” of the rules, we tend to think that they should be designed to engender the best attainable distribution of goods and ills or quality of life. We are inclined to assess social institutions by how they affect their participants. But there is another, oft-neglected perspective which the topic of health equity raises with special clarity: As imposers of the rules, we are inclined to think that (...) harms we inflict through the rules have greater moral weight than like harms we merely fail to prevent or to mitigate. What matters morally is not merely how we affect people, but how we treat them through the rules we impose. While current (consequentialist and Rawlsian) theorizing is dominated by the first perspective and thus supports purely recipient-oriented moral conceptions, an adequate approach to social justice requires a balancing of both. Such balancing results in a relational conception of justice, which distinguishes various ways in which an institutional scheme may causally affect the quality of life of its participants.This essay argues that the strength of our moral reason to prevent or mitigate particular medical conditions depends not only on what one might call distributional factors, such as how badly off the people affected by these conditions are in absolute and relative terms, how costly prevention or treatment would be, and how much patients would benefit from given treatment. Rather, it depends also on relational factors, that is, on how we are related to the medical conditions they suffer. It then discusses some implications of this view for understanding responsibilities for international health outcomes. (shrink)

Some writers, such as John Fischer and Michael McKenna, have recently claimed that an agent can be morally responsible for a wrong action and yet not be blameworthy for that action. A careful examination of the claim, however, suggests two readings. On one reading, there are further conditions on blameworthiness beyond freely and wittingly doing wrong. On another innocuous reading, there are no such further conditions. Despite Fischer and McKenna’s attempts to offer further conditions on blameworthiness in addition to (...) class='Hi'>responsibility for wrongdoing, I argue that only the innocuous reading is plausible. Once we distinguish between blame being deserved and blame being all-things-considered appropriate, we need not appeal to further conditions on blameworthiness. This discussion has important upshots regarding how compatibilists respond to certain manipulation arguments and how proponents of derived responsibility respond to criticism that agents are responsible even for outcomes that are not reasonably foreseeable. (shrink)

While it is well recognized that many everyday consumer behaviors, such as purchases of sweatshop goods, come at a cost to the global poor, it has proven difficult to argue that even knowing, repeat contributors are somehow morally complicit in those outcomes. Some recent approaches contend that marginal contributions to distant harms are consequences that consumers straightforwardly should have born in mind, which would make consumers seem reckless or negligent. Critics reasonably reply that the bad luck that my innocent (...) purchase contributes distantly to harm provides insufficient grounds for moral blame; moreover, such distant and seemingly inevitable collective effects are not by themselves obvious reasons for agents to refrain from acting. Granting these criticisms, I argue that the harm that agents do through knowing contributions to distant collective harm actually builds on the morally sparse agential phenomenology of everyday purchases and decisions: contributors who knowingly disregard distant harms, rather than being reckless or negligent about consequences they should have foreseen, very directly perpetuate the moral invisibility and the lack of recognition from which the global poor generally suffer. This provides agents with clearer moral reasons to refrain from knowing participation in unstructured collective harms, and clearer reason to bear them in mind in acting. (shrink)

Health policy sometimes hinges on claims about the responsibility borne by people or corporations for health outcomes. We don't want these claims to be arbitrary, so we construe them as discoveries of plain fact. But we're mistaken. They are interwoven with our values and social institutions. Recognizing that they are allows us to debate them more honestly and thoroughly.

ABSTRACT Patient self‐management (SM) of chronic disease is an evolving movement, with some forms documented as yielding important outcomes. Potential benefits from proper preparation and maintenance of patient SM skills include quality care tailored to the patient's preferences and life goals, and increase in skills in problem solving, confidence and success, generalizable to other parts of the patient's life. Four central ethical issues can be identified: 1) insufficient patient/family access to preparation that will optimize their competence to SM without (...) harm to themselves, 2) lack of acknowledgement that an ethos of patient empowerment can mask transfer of responsibility beyond patient/family competency to handle that responsibility, 3) prevailing assumptions that preparation for SM cannot result in harm and that its main purpose is to deliver physician instructions, and 4) lack of standards for patient selection, which has the potential to exclude individuals who could benefit from learning to SM. Technology assessment offers one framework through which to examine available data about efficacy of patient SM and to answer the central question of what conditions must be put in place to optimize the benefits of SM while assuring that potential harms are controlled. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to explore the idea of human moral responsibility for (the outcomes) of natural disasters. First, I discuss the claim that there is often a human causal contribution to negative outcomes of even such paradigmatic natural disasters as earthquakes, typhoons, and volcano eruptions. Second, I attempt to move away from discussions attributing human causal responsibility to discussions attributing human moral responsibility for such outcomes (and to the obstacles to such (...) attributions). I suggest that in most (perhaps even all) cases of moral responsibility for the outcomes of natural disasters moral responsibility is grounded in culpable negligence, including culpable failure to prevent the side-effects of our actions or omissions. (shrink)

This book offers a scientific whistleblower’s perspective on current implementation of federal research misconduct regulations. It provides a narrative of general interest that relates current cases of research ethics to philosophical, historical and sociological accounts of fraud in scientific research. The evidence presented suggests that the problems of falsification and fabrication remain as great as ever, but hidden because the current system puts universities in charge of investigations and permits them to use confidentiality regulations to hide the outcomes of (...) investigations. The book documents the significant conflict of interest that arises because federal regulation gives universities the responsibility to conduct investigations of their own faculty with severely limited oversight. The book is intended for young research scientists or anyone who wishes to understand the challenges faced by scientists in the workplace today. The central thread in the book is an exclusive account of an experienced research scientist who was the first to expose the facts that led to the longest running research misconduct investigation in the history of the National Science Foundation. (shrink)

In this article, we focus on the attribution of moral responsibility for the actions of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). To do so, we suggest that the responsibility gap can be closed if human agents can take meaningful moral responsibility for the actions of AWS. This is a moral responsibility attributed to individuals in a justified and fair way and which is accepted by individuals as an assessment of their own moral character. We argue that, given the (...) unpredictability of AWS, meaningful moral responsibly can only be discharged by human agents who are willing to take a moral gambit: they decide to design/develop/deploy AWS despite the uncertainty about the effects an AWS may produce, hoping that unintended and unwanted or unforeseen outcomes may never occurs, but also accepting to be held responsible if such outcomes will occur. We argue that, while a moral gambit is permissible for the use of non-lethal AWS, this is not the case for the actions of lethal autonomous weapon systems. (shrink)

There has recently been increasing interest in the possibility and ethics of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), which would combine sophisticated AI with machinery capable of deadly force. One objection to LAWS is that their use will create a troubling responsibility gap, where no human agent can properly be held accountable for the outcomes that they create. While some authors have attempted to show that individual agents can, in fact, be responsible for the behaviour of LAWS in various (...) circumstances, this will not be possible in all cases. This article argues, however, that by assigning responsibilities to group agents operating within the military‐industrial complex, as well as the military‐industrial complex as a whole, we may be able to close the responsibility gap, or at least reduce its costs. Insofar as the potential for responsibility gaps poses an ethical barrier to the development and deployment of LAWS, this argument, if sound, may show their use to be morally permissible in a greater range of cases. (shrink)

Abstract“Gamification” refers to adding game-like elements to non-game activities so as to encourage participation. Gamification is used in various contexts: apps on phones motivating people to exercise, employers trying to encourage their employees to work harder, social media companies trying to stimulate user engagement, and so on and so forth. Here, I focus on gamification with this property: the game-designer (a company or other organization) creates a “game” in order to encourage the players (the users) to bring about certain (...) class='Hi'>outcomes as a side effect of playing the game. The side effect might be good for the user (e.g., improving her health) and/or good for the company or organization behind the game (e.g., advertising their products, increasing their profits, etc.). The “players” of the game may or may not be aware of creating these side effects; and they may or may not approve of/endorse the creation of those side effects. The organizations behind the games, in contrast, are typically directly aiming to create games that have the side effects in question. These aspects of gamification are puzzling and interesting from the point of view of philosophical analyses of agency and responsibility for outcomes. In this paper, I relate these just-mentioned aspects of gamification to some philosophical discussions of responsibility gaps, the ethics of side effects (including the Knobe effect and the doctrine of double effect), and ideas about the relations among different parties’ agency. (shrink)

This chapter examines the case for health care policies aimed at holding obese individuals responsible for their weight and for obesity-related health issues. In particular, it considers the merits of two arguments for policies that would seek to make obese individuals bear some of the higher health care costs associated with being that way. On the fairness argument, it is claimed that such policies would serve the interests of fairness by holding obese individuals to account for irresponsible lifestyle choices that (...) are linked to their higher weight and its associated health risks. On the public health promotion argument, it is claimed that adopting such policies could produce impressive public health benefits: encouraging people to make healthier lifestyle choices, reducing obesity rates, and reducing obesity-related health care spending. Both arguments face serious objections. Contrary to the fairness argument, policies aimed at holding obese individuals responsible for their weight or for related health problems would neither treat people as they deserve to be treated nor make the distribution of health care resources fairer. And contrary to the public health promotion argument, those policies would not produce better health outcomes for society at large. Indeed, they would tend to do just the opposite. Reflection on the shortcomings of those arguments reveals that their conclusion is false: society should not adopt policies aimed at holding obese individuals responsible for their weight or for obesity-related health problems. (shrink)

Recent discussions of civil disobedience show the world of scholarship and public affairs in disarray. Not only is there considerable disagreement over how civil disobedience is to be justified, there is hardly less disagreement over what civil disobedience is. Can it be violent, or must it be nonviolent, in intention and in outcome? Can civil disorder be a special case of mass civil disobedience? Must civil disobedience proceed within the framework of the existing politico-legal system or may it be revolutionary (...) in intention? Could it be anarchistic? Should the authorities endeavor to prosecute and punish the civil disobedient as though he were a common criminal? Is disobedience which results in no punishment of the disobedient not civil disobedience after all? Because of disagreements over the answers to these questions, the description of an act as an act of civil disobedience is likely to be ambiguous and controversial not only for the general public and the government but even in some cases for the protesters themselves. Confusion rooted in honest misunderstanding is compounded by bad faith, by basic disagreements over the ideal and the actual relations between the individual and the state, and by obscurity in the facts surrounding the intentions of the protesters and the consequences of their acts. (shrink)

Wealth and income are highly predictive of health and longevity. Egalitarians who maintain that this “socioeconomic-status gradient” in health is unjust are challenged by the fact that a significant component of it is owed to the higher prevalence of certain kinds of voluntary risk-taking among members of lower socioeconomic groups. Some egalitarians have argued that these apparently free personal choices are not genuinely free, and that those who make them should not be held morally responsible for the resulting harms to (...) their health. I argue to the contrary that such choices usually are fully free, and that those who make them are responsible for their consequences. This does not imply, however, that society cannot also be responsible for those consequences. It is responsible for them if they are statistically foreseeable and avoidable outcomes of unjust public institutions and policies. I show that many of the harms to health that contribute to the voluntary behavioral component of the SES health gradient satisfy that description. Society can therefore be morally responsible for those harms, even though the individuals who suffer them are also fully responsible for them. (shrink)

The suggestion that philosophers are responsible for global warming seems, on the face of it, absurd. However, that we might cause global warming has been known for over a century. If we had had in existence a more rigorous kind of academic inquiry devoted to promoting human welfare, giving priority to problems of living, humanity might have become aware of the dangers of global warming long ago, and might have taken steps to meet these dangers decades ago. That we do (...) not have academic inquiry of this type, giving priority to problems of living and able to warn humanity of the impending disaster of global warming, is the result of a philosophical mistake – a mistake about what constitutes rigorous intellectual inquiry. This is a mistake of philosophers. Thus philosophers, in failing to grasp the profound intellectual and humanitarian failings of academia as it is at present organized (the outcome of implementing a seriously defective philosophy of inquiry) can perhaps be said to be responsible for global warming. (shrink)

This article defends three interconnected premises that together demand for a new way of dealing with moral responsibility in developing and using technological artifacts. The first premise is that humans increasingly make use of dissociated technological delegation. Second, because technologies do not simply fulfill our actions, but rather mediate them, the initial aims alter and outcomes are often different from those intended. Third, since the outcomes are often unforeseen and unintended, we can no longer simply apply the (...) traditional (modernist) models for discussing moral responsibility. We need to reinterpret moral responsibility. A schematic layout of a model on Social Role-Responsibility that incorporates these three premises is presented to allow discussion of a new way of interpreting moral responsibility. (shrink)

According to some scholars, while sets of greenhouse gases emissions generate harms deriving from climate change, which can be mitigated through collective actions, individual emissions and mitigation activities seem to be causally insufficient to cause harms. If so, single individuals are neither responsible for climate harms, nor they have mitigation duties. If this view were true, there would be collective responsibility for climate harms without individual responsibility and collective mitigation duties without individual duties: this is puzzling. This paper (...) explores a way to solve this puzzle. First, it will be argued that individual emissions, though not proper and full-fledged causes, causally contribute to raise the probability of climate harms. As a consequence, individuals are in fact responsible for their expected contributions to climate harms – this is contributive responsibility for likely outcomes. Second, it will be argued that people have responsibility also for the possible impacts of their individual emissions on climate harms. People can plausibly be regarded as individually responsible for the possible outcomes of their actions in close possible alternative worlds – this is robust responsibility. Non-causal individual responsibility for climate harms is plausible, and the puzzle may be solved. (shrink)

The responsible research and innovation framework seeks to bring science closer to society, with scientific research conducted not just for the benefit of society, but with role players in society engaging with scientists on research and innovation at every stage. A central focus of the RRI framework is the approach taken to embed these concepts in the higher education training of science students. In this study the direct engagement between science students and the public is explored as an opportunity for (...) achieving RRI learning outcomes. The study also explores the potential benefits that such direct engagement with the public holds for postgraduate biotechnology students. The case study described here suggests that even brief interactions with the public through science engagement activities such as “Speed-Date-a-Scientist” can contribute towards affirmation of choice of career, students’ motivation as researchers and shaping of their identity as scientists, important processes in their own learning to become scientists. Students also indicated a greater sense of motivation to do research that benefits the public, resonating with RRI learning outcomes. (shrink)

Previous studies have examined the outcome evaluation related to the self and other, and recent research has explored the outcome evaluation of the self and other with pro-social implications. However, the evaluation processing of outcomes in the group in need remains unclear. This study has examined the neural mechanisms of evaluative processing by gambling for the self and charity, respectively. At the behavioral level, when participants make decisions for themselves, they made riskier decisions following the gain than loss in (...) small outcomes and engage in more risky behaviors following the loss than gain in large outcomes. However, magnitude and valence did not affect the next risky behavior when participants made decisions for the charity. At the neurophysiological level, the results found that the FRN was larger for the charity outcome than for the self-outcome. For FRN, the valence difference of small outcomes was smaller than that of large outcomes. The P3 response was larger for the self-outcome than for the charity outcome. Meanwhile, compared with the small outcome, the self-charity discrepancies have a significant difference in large outcomes. In addition, the FRN amplitude for self in large outcomes was negatively correlated with the upcoming risky choices, regardless of outcome valence. The behavioral results suggest that people are more likely to optimize strategies for themselves than for the charity. The ERP findings indicated that people focus more on charity outcome than self-outcome in the early stage. In the middle and late stages, people turn attention to their outcomes, and the difference between self’s and charity’s outcome varies with the magnitude. Specifically, it is only in large outcomes that people engage more emotional attention or motivation in their outcomes, but self and charity outcomes had a similar emotional engagement in small outcomes. (shrink)

Based on the balance theory, we hypothesized that emotions induced by other person’s outcomes function as responses restoring balance within cognitive units consisting of the perceiver, other persons and their outcomes. As a consequence, emotional reactions towards others’ outcomes depend on the perceiver’s attitudes in such a way that outcomes of a well-liked person rise congruous responses, while outcomes of a disliked other lead to incongruous responses. Our participants recalled a situation from their past in (...) which somebody they liked or disliked had succeed or failed. Additionally, we manipulated whether the outcome referred to a domain where participants’ self-interest was involved or not. We analyzed the participants’ average emotional state as well as specific emotions induced by the recalled events. Consistently with expectations we found that balancing principles played a major role in shaping emotional responses to successes and failures of person who were well-liked or disliked. (shrink)

One of the stated aims of the “2008 Policy Plan on Asylum” by the European Commission is increased ‘responsibility sharing’ between Member States with respect to asylum seekers. Luc Bovens and Günperi Sisman assess the extent to which UNHCR outcome data reflect these aims between 2006 and 2011 – from the end of the first phase of the Common European Asylum System until the latest available data. They find that Greece, Portugal and Spain take on very low responsibility (...) for asylum seekers per capita and per unit of GDP. Eastern European states do poorly per capita, but do much better per unit of GDP. There is also an overall trend towards greater responsibility sharing for acceptances and stocks per unit of GDP. (shrink)

In a competitive, globalised world, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is proposed as a strategy to invigorate the competitiveness of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The primary objective of this paper is to identify CSR factors that influence the competitiveness of SMEs and to develop a hypothesised model that can be tested on SMEs. Although SMEs in Uganda are increasingly becoming the backbone of the economy, their rate of survival and competitiveness are a cause for concern. The outcomes of (...) CSR activities can help to improve the survival rate of SMEs, and may offer great opportunities for business competitiveness, locally and globally. (shrink)

Technological innovations, despite their several benefits, may have drawbacks, thus, they need a control mechanism or directional channel. Responsible innovation (RI) has gained popularity in technology-intensive countries as a way to regulate otherwise uncontrollable and radical technological innovations. However, existing RI research lacks a clear theoretical foundation and has not adequately addressed the commercial and performance aspects of innovative products and firms. The current research proposes an empirically testable model for RI by conducting a structured literature review, focusing on the (...) commercial aspect of innovative products and firms’ sustainability performance in the financial, social, and environmental dimensions. The study suggests a link between RI and the resource-based theory of the firm and proposes that RI can be seen as a distinctive competency developed through the firm’s resources and capabilities. The model would help enterprises achieve ethical and social acceptability and improve sustainability performance. Metadata examination of 98 articles yielded insights. The findings and future research directions of this study provide new insights for business strategy and policy. (shrink)

This article provides a new mechanism in understanding how partner heterogeneity moderates an alliance's ability to advance corporate social responsibility goals. I identified the antecedents for firms to select a more diverse set of partners and explored whether more diverse alliances (especially cross-sector alliances) may facilitate partners to achieve more proactive environmental outcomes. I employ 146 environmental alliances formed in the U.S. between 1990 and 2009 to test the assertions. Results suggest that firms with innovative orientation and alliance (...) experiences tend to choose a more diverse set of partners (especially cross-sector partners); and such partner heterogeneity in turn moderates an alliance's environmental outcomes—compared to inter-firm alliances, cross-sector alliances are more likely to facilitate partners to pursue more proactive environmental strategies. (shrink)

There is a longstanding debate about genetics research into intelligence. Some scholars question the value of focusing on genetic contributions to intelligence in a society where social and environmental determinants powerfully influence cognitive ability and educational outcomes. Others warn that censoring certain research questions, such as inquiries about genetic differences in intellectual potential, compromises academic freedom. Still others view interest in this subject as a corollary to a long and troublesome history of eugenics research. The dawn of a new (...) era in genome sequencing as a commodity will sustain scientific interest in the genetics of intelligence for the foreseeable future, but deep‐rooted challenges threaten the scientific merit of the research. The use of imprecise definitions of study populations, the difficult nature of studying the environment, and the potential of researcher bias are inextricably linked with concerns about the trustworthiness and utility of research in this area. Leadership by the genetics community is essential to ensure the value and trustworthiness of these studies. (shrink)

This essay critically engages proposals by Thomas Pogge and Leif Wenar meant to combat ‘the resource curse.’ Pogge and Wenar call for boycotts against stealing oppressors, sharing the expectation that the boycotts will significantly contribute to economic and political reform in the target countries. In contrast, I argue that liberal democracies should indeed stop trading with dictators and civil warriors, but for inward rather than outward looking reasons. We, the citizens of liberal democracies through our elected governments, ought to boycott (...) severely oppressive regimes for the sake of our own moral integrity*simply in order to stop being complicit in what is effectively massive scale armed robbery. This inward looking thesis is distinctive in three ways. First, it contrasts with the dominant assumption that global reform must be grounded in the achievement of better political and economic outcomes for others. Second, the inward look manages to avoid the profound empirical uncertainty associated with any attempt to predict the direct effects of global rule changes on domestic institutions. Third, by isolating each democracy’s responsibility for each case of illicit trade, the inward looking strategy deals more adequately than the outward view with collective action problems, and therefore has a greater chance of grounding actual reforms, with whatever prospects for better outcomes they may entail.Keywords: resource curse; boycotts; democratic trade; Thomas Pogge; Leif Wenar. (shrink)

This essay critically engages proposals by Thomas Pogge and Leif Wenar meant to combat ‘the resource curse.’ Pogge and Wenar call for boycotts against stealing oppressors, sharing the expectation that the boycotts will significantly contribute to economic and political reform in the target countries. In contrast, I argue that liberal democracies should indeed stop trading with dictators and civil warriors, but for inward rather than outward looking reasons. We, the citizens of liberal democracies through our elected governments, ought to boycott (...) severely oppressive regimes for the sake of our own moral integrity*simply in order to stop being complicit in what is effectively massive scale armed robbery. This inward looking thesis is distinctive in three ways. First, it contrasts with the dominant assumption that global reform must be grounded in the achievement of better political and economic outcomes for others. Second, the inward look manages to avoid the profound empirical uncertainty associated with any attempt to predict the direct effects of global rule changes on domestic institutions. Third, by isolating each democracy’s responsibility for each case of illicit trade, the inward looking strategy deals more adequately than the outward view with collective action problems, and therefore has a greater chance of grounding actual reforms, with whatever prospects for better outcomes they may entail.Keywords: resource curse; boycotts; democratic trade; Thomas Pogge; Leif Wenar. (shrink)

This article considers two prominent, competing approaches to defining the scope of business responsibility for human rights. The first approach advocates extension of business responsibility beyond the boundaries of the enterprise to encompass broader ‘spheres of influence’. The second approach advocates a business ‘responsibility to respect’ human rights. Building on a critical evaluation of these competing accounts of business responsibility, this article outlines a modified account, referred to as a framework of ‘spheres of responsibility’. On (...) such an account, business responsibility for human rights outcomes is conceptualised not only in relation to direct ‘harms’ imposed by business, but also in relation to corporate influence over broader relationships and institutions that shape and constrain the substantive realisation of human rights. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the conditions under which an agent can be justifiably held responsible or liable for the harmful consequences of his or her actions. Kant has famously argued that as long as the agent fulfills his or her moral duty, he or she cannot be blamed for any potential harm that might result from his or her action, no matter how foreseeable these may (have) be(en). I call this the Duty-Absolves-Thesis or DA. I begin by stating the thesis (...) in a more precise form and then go on to assess, one by one, several possible justifications for it: that (i) it wasn’t the view Kant himself actually held or was committed to; (ii) there is nothing strange about the DA, either theoretically or intuitively; (iii) the DA is more plausible as an account of legal (either criminal or tort) liability; (iv) the DA becomes perfectly plausible when conceived as a thesis about what insulates the agent from either remedial moral responsibility or the demands of compensatory justice; (v) the rationale for the DA is to protect our moral assessment of agents and their actions from the threat of moral luck. I show, with the help of the infamous Inquiring Murderer example, all these (and some other) justificatory attempts unsuccessful. I conclude that besides being counter-intuitive, the DA-thesis also lacks firm theoretical grounding and should therefore be rejected as (part of) an account of outcome moral responsibility. (shrink)

: Background: In responsible research and innovation (RRI), innovation is seen as a way in which humankind finds solutions for societal issues. However, studies on commercial innovation show that firms respond in a different manner and at a different speed to the same societal issue. This study investigates what role organizational motives play in the product innovation processes of firms when aiming for socially responsible outcomes. Methods: This multiple-case study investigates the motives of food firms for healthier product innovation (...) by interviewing firms about the organizational motives behind product reformulation and innovation. Results: This study highlights the importance of having both instrumental and moral motives in the innovation process when aiming for socially responsible outcomes, and how both these motives interact and contribute to responsible innovation in industry. Furthermore, the study results question the nature of relational motives as a separate category from the other two categories of motives, as suggested by corporate social responsibility (CSR) scholars. Conclusions: If commercial innovation needs to contribute to solutions for societal issues, the importance of moral motives has to be stressed without annihilating the instrumental objectives of firms. Both motives contribute to the success factors of responsible product innovation in industry. (shrink)

Half of the 33.2 million people living with HIV today are women. Yet, responses to the epidemic are not adequately meeting the needs of women. This article critically evaluates how prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) programs, the principal framework under which women's health is currently addressed in the global response to AIDS, have tended to focus on the prevention of HIV transmission from HIV-positive women to their infants. This paper concludes that more than ten years after their inception, PMTCT programs (...) still do not successfully ensure the adequate treatment, care and support of HIV-infected women. Of particular concern is the continued widespread use of single-dose nevirapine despite World Health Organization recommendations to employ more effective combination therapies that do not potentially jeopardize women's future treatment outcomes. In response, the article calls for a more comprehensive approach that places women's health needs at the centre of AIDS responses. This is critical in settings where the pandemic is generalized and there is a push to greatly expand PMTCT programs, as a more effective and equitable way of meeting the needs of women in the context of HIV. Without such a comprehensive approach, women will continue to be impacted disproportionately by the pandemic, and current strategies for prevention, including PMTCT, and treatment will not be as effective and responsive as they need to be. (shrink)

This article considers two prominent, competing approaches to defining the scope of business responsibility for human rights. The first approach advocates extension of business responsibility beyond the boundaries of the enterprise to encompass broader ' spheres of influence'. The second approach advocates a business ' responsibility to respect* human rights (but not a ' positive* duty to protect, promote or fulfil rights).Building on a critical evaluation of these competing accounts of business responsibility, this article outlines a (...) modified account, referred to as a framework of ' spheres of responsibility*. On such an account, business responsibility for human rights outcomes is conceptualised not only in relation to direct ' harms' imposed by business, but also in relation to corporate influence over broader relationships and institutions that shape and constrain the substantive realisation of human rights. (shrink)

:The distinction between brute luck and option luck is fundamental for luck egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians write as if it could be used to specify which outcomes people should be held responsible for. In this paper, I argue that the distinction can’t be used this way. In fact, luck egalitarians tend to rely instead on rough intuitive judgements about individual responsibility. This makes their view vulnerable to what’s known as the neutrality objection. I show that attempts to avoid (...) this objection are unsuccessful. I conclude that until it provides a better account of attributing responsibility, luck egalitarianism remains incomplete. (shrink)

The discovery and development of new therapeutics has always been central to improving health worldwide. However, there is ongoing concern regarding the current state of medical innovation. Output from the pharmaceutical industry has been criticized for not being “transformative,” that is, offering substantial improvements in patient outcomes over existing therapeutics. While the cost of drug development continues to rise, breakthrough therapies remain elusive and one half of Phase 3 studies fail. Venture capital, a traditional source of funding for new (...) breakthrough biomedical innovations, has decreased investment by 30% in the biotechnology and medical device sectors from 2007 to 2013. Stakeholders question whether the new drugs approved each year by the FDA —many criticized as marginal improvements over existing therapies — justify the enormous investment. (shrink)

The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action calls for development of ‘a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties’ (emphasis added). By definition, parties to the climate convention are sovereign states. This reiteration of the role of states reveals an attachment to statist responses to climate change that has so far failed to reduce global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Indeed, GHG pollution is increasing. The main reason for this increase is (...) growth in emissions from many developing countries, which collectively now produce over half of global emissions. Under current climate agreements, these countries are not obligated to limit these emissions. To require them to do so would arguably defy the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) among states that forms the basis of the climate regime. (shrink)