Aspects of Justice

This paper shows ways to develop, integrate, and transform Kant’s and Arendt’s theories on political evil into a unified Karendtian theory. Given the deep influence Kant had on Arendt’s thinking, the deep philosophical compatibility between their projects is not surprising. But the results of drawing on the resources left by both is exciting and groundbreaking with regard to both political evil in general and the challenges of modernity and totalitarianism in particular.

Retributive theories of punishment hold that moral desert is a necessary and sufficient condition for punishment. This principle has been justified in light of rectifying a 'balance of justice' upset by wrongdoing. Many opposed to retributivism, such as Nussbaum, have argued such a ‘balance’ is nothing more than ‘magical’ thinking and retributivism is, in fact, positively harmful. On the contrary, I will argue that there is a compelling way to make sense of that intuition. The Chinese Neo-Confucian tradition and medieval (...) Latin theologian Thomas Aquinas hold that moral wrongs upset a normative order of relationships and, in this respect, disrupt the order that ought to exist in the human community. Despite criticisms that retributivism about punishment requires outlandish metaphysical assumptions, I therefore propose the theory remains plausible without any such appeal. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of intersectional feminist theory by critically examining the notion of identity implicitly assumed in major critiques of intersectionality. Critics take intersectionality to fragment women along the lines of identity categories such as race, class, and sexuality. Underlying this interpretation, I argue, is the metaphysical assumption that identity is a fixed entity. This is a misunderstanding of identity that neglects how identity is actually lived. By exploring how Asian American women experience their “Asian” identity in their (...) everyday lives (e.g., the “Asian-as-patriarchal vs. White-as-gender-progressive” stereotype, growing anti-Asian racism amid COVID-19, and Asian-Black feminist solidarities), I demonstrate that Asian identity is not fixed but changing according to how it is related to power. I identify and discuss three characteristic types of the identity-power relationship: manifestation of power-as-oppression through the construction of identity, reproduction of power-as- oppression, and creation of new forms of power, namely resistance and solidarity, through the reconstruction of identity. The lives of multiply-oppressed women (e.g., Asian women) can be understood as the locus at which the identity-power relationship is worked out, that is, the power dynamics of oppression are manifested, reproduced, and resisted through the (re)construction of identity. Building on this analysis and engaging discussions on non-ideal theory in social/political philosophy, I argue that intersectional feminist theory can be best explained as a non-ideal theory in a strong sense: a theory that, by focusing on the lives of the multiply oppressed, presents the intersecting dynamics of oppression as central and theory-guiding. (shrink)

Why is it that we respond to one form of human suffering rather than another? If we are all human beings, and thus are all capable of imagining—if only imperfectly—the pain and suffering caused by wars, famines, bombings, floods, accidents and other instances of human misery, then why should it matter if it happens to people who look like us or talk like us? Or who happen to live here rather than somewhere else? Immanuel Kant, in his amazingly prescient 1796 (...) essay on ‘Perpetual Peace’, suggested that the moral possibilities of what we today call globalisation would only be realised when ‘the violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere’ (Kant 1991, pp. 107–8). How close to this ideal are we today? (shrink)

Trata-se de elaborar um conceito de opressão mediante engajamento crítico com a filosofia de Paulo Freire e explorar quatro aspectos da opressão: 1) hierarquização social; 2) injustiça epistêmica; 3) injustiça estética; 4) sujeição a um poder arbitrário.

A collection of 17 essays on Kantian moral theory and practical ethics, including papers on autonomy, human dignity, utopian thinking, O'Neill and Rawls on constructivism, tragic choices, philanthropy, conscientious object, suicide, respect, self-respect, and an ideal attitude of appreciation beyond art, nature, and gratitude. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abbreviations for Kant’s Works INTRODUCTION PART II: KANT AND KANTIAN PERSPECTIVES (1) The Groundwork (2) Kant on Imperfect Duties to Oneself (3) Kantian Autonomy and Contemporary Ideas of Autonomy (4) Rüdiger Bittner on Autonomy (...) (5) Kantian Perspectives on the Rational Basis of Human Dignity (6) In Defense of Human Dignity (7) The Kingdom of Ends as an Ideal and Constraint on Legislation (8) Kantian Ethics and Utopian Thinking (9) Varieties of Constructivism PART II: PRACTICAL ETHICS (10) Human Dignity and Tragic Choices (11) Duties and Choices in Philanthropic Giving: A Kantian Perspective (12) Killing Ourselves (13) Conscientious Conviction and Conscience (14) Stability, A Sense of Justice, and Self-Respect (15) Two Conceptions of Virtue (16) Beyond Respect and Beneficence: An Ideal of Appreciation (17) Ideals of Appreciation and Expressions of Respect REFERENCES INDEX . (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the basis for the moral obligation to remember. As the moral relation to the past is primarily a matter of shared identity, the kind of obligation in question splits into two related issues, namely, that of political, state-oriented and state-organized memory on which the political identity rests and that of memory labour grounded in social identities based in shared, time-extended projects. Drawing upon tensions between these two, I discuss time control and the (...) accumulation of identity as central to memory labour and, referring to John Zerzan’s critique of symbolical roots of power, pinpoint the moral basis of such an accumulation. On the basis of this, I argue for nesting the duty to remember in acknowledging the agent’s recognition of the relatedness and dependency of their agency and possibilities of flourishing which can be obtained thanks to adjusting the field of the virtue of practical wisdom so that it includes members of the time-extended community. (shrink)

It is widely believed that just societies would be characterized by some combination of democratic political institutions and market-based economic institutions. Underlying the commitment to the combination of democracy and markets is the view that certain normatively significant outcomes in a society ought to be determined by democratic processes, while others ought to be determined by market processes. On this view, we have reason to object when market processes are employed in ways that circumvent democratic processes and affect outcomes that (...) ought to be determined democratically. In this paper, I argue that Waheed Hussain’s recent account of the conditions that must be met in order for the use of market power in pursuit of social change to avoid conflict with democratic values is objectionably narrow, and offer an alternative account that avoids the problems that undermine his account without abandoning the requirement that democratic values be properly respected. The central feature of my account that makes this possible is a broader conception of democratic processes that includes public deliberation and debate aimed at shaping informal social norms and practices. (shrink)

In more and more contexts, human decision-making is replaced by algorithmic decision-making. While promising to deliver efficient and objective decisions, algorithmic decision systems have specific weaknesses, some of which are particularly dangerous if data are collected and processed by profit-oriented companies. In this paper, I focus on two problems that are at the root of the logic of algorithmic decision-making: (1) (in)tolerance for ambiguity, and (2) instantiations of Campbell’s law, i. e. of indicators that are used for “social decision-making” being (...) subject to “corruption pressures” and tending to “distort and corrupt” the underlying social processes. As a result, algorithmic decision-making can risk missing the point of the social practice in question. These problems are intertwined with problems of structural injustice; hence, if algorithms are to deliver on their promises of efficiency and objectivity, accountability and critical scrutiny are needed. (shrink)

Does the Australian state exercise legitimate power over the indigenous peoples within its borders? To say that the state’s political decisions are legitimate is to say that it has the right to impose those decisions on indigenous peoples and that they have a (at least a prima facie) duty to obey. In this paper, I consider the general normative frameworks within which these questions are often grasped in contemporary political theory. Two dominant modes of dealing with political legitimacy are through (...) the politics of ‘recognition’ and ‘justification’. I argue that in order to address the fundamental challenges posed by indigenous peoples to liberal settler states today we need to pluralise our conceptions of political legitimacy. (shrink)

The debate over the constitutional recognition of Indigenous peoples is a deeply political one. That might appear to be a controversial claim. After all, there has been much talk about minimising the scope for disagreement between ‘constitutional conservatives’ and supporters of more expansive constitutional recognition. And there is concern to ensure that any potential referendum enjoys the maximum conditions and opportunity for success. However, my argument shall be that any form of constitutional recognition of Australia’s First Peoples needs to be (...) seen as part of an ongoing transformation in the relations between Indigenous peoples and the Australian state. (shrink)

Many economists and social theorists hypothesize that most societies could soon face a ‘post-work’ future, one in which employment and productive labor have a dramatically reduced place in human affairs. Given the centrality of employment to individual identity and its pivotal role as the primary provider of economic and other goods, transitioning to a ‘post-work’ future could prove traumatic and disorienting to many. Policymakers are thus likely to face the difficult choice of the extent to which they ought to satisfy (...) individual citizens’ desires to work in a socioeconomic environment in which work is in permanent decline. Here I argue that policymakers confronting a post-work economy should discount, or at least consider problematic, the desire to work because it is very likely that this desire is an adaptive preference. An adaptive preference is a preference for some state of affairs within a limited set of options formed under unjust conditions. The widespread desire for work has been formed under unjust labor conditions to which individuals are compelled to submit in order to meet material and ethical needs. Furthermore, the prevalence of the ‘work dogma’ in contemporary societies precludes nearly all individuals from seeing alternatives to work as live options. (shrink)

Theorists have argued that under certain background conditions the commercial, for-profit corporation might bear responsibility to act to advance justice. However, other agents too may be responsible to take remedial action, especially when the state defaults. This raises the question of the sequence in which the agents should act. I develop a framework that offers guidance in determining when the corporation ought to intervene to advance justice. The existing literature typically identifies responsibility-bearers solely by their capacity to remedy an unjust (...) situation which I believe to be too simplistic. I introduce two additional grounds for identifying responsibility-bearers, a role-based account and participation-based account and show that this pluralist approach delivers a better account of who bears responsibility to act and when to discharge this responsibility. (shrink)

Many contemporary forms of oppression are not primarily the result of formally organized collective action nor are they an unintended outcome of a combination of individual actions. This raises the question of collective responsibility. I argue that we can only determine who is responsible for oppression if we understand oppression as a matter of social practices that create obstacles for social change. This social practice view of oppression enables two insights: First, that there is an unproblematic sense in which groups (...) can bear irreducible collective responsibility for oppression. Second, that there are derived forms of individual responsibility for members of dominant groups. (shrink)

How may a society, in a morally defensible way, confront a past of injustice and suffering, and seek to break the spell of violence and disregard for human life? I begin by demonstrating the relevance of this question to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and I draw attention to André du Toit’s longstanding interest in ways in which truth commissions may function to consolidate political change. In the second section of the article, I argue that truth commissions should (...) be regarded as a defensible moral compromise between the values of justice and social unity, and I criticize claims that truth commissions promote transitional justice, when that is understood as a distinctive conception of justice that emerges in circumstances of regime transition. In the third section, I criticize the claim that truth commissions are not a moral compromise at all but embody a superior, restorative conception of justice. I conclude by showing why retribution is required by criminal justice, and why truth commissions must be seen, not as an end in them selves, but as institutions whose function is to emphasize the importance of the rule of law, normal criminal justice, and legal recognition. (shrink)

Current and recent philosophy of history contemplates a deep change in fundamental notions of the presence of the past. This is called breaking up time. The chief value for this change is enhancing the moral reach of historical research and writing. However, the materialist view of reality that most historians hold cannot support this approach. The origin of the notion in the thought of Walter Benjamin is suggested. I propose a neo-idealist approach called perennialism, centered on recurrent moral dilemmas and (...) choices. This suggests a view of the relations of moral thought and ontology placed in the diachronic context that historians study. (shrink)

The tendency to reciprocate – to return good for good and evil for evil – is a potent force in human life, and the concept of reciprocity is closely connected to fundamental notions of ‘justice’, ‘obligation’ or ‘duty’, ‘gratitude’ and ‘equality’. In _Reciprocity_, first published in 1986,_ _Lawrence Becker presents a sustained argument about reciprocity, beginning with the strategy for developing a moral theory of the virtues. He considers the concept of reciprocity in detail, contending that it is a basic (...) virtue that provides the basis for parental authority, obligations to future generations, and obedience to law. Throughout the first two parts of the book, Becker intersperses short pieces of his own narrative fiction to enrich reflection on the philosophical arguments. The final part is devoted to extensive bibliographical essays, ranging over anthropology, psychology, political theory and law, as well as the relevant ethics and political philosophy. (shrink)

The emergence of global bioethics is connected to a rise of interest in ethics in general (both in academia and in the public sphere), combined with an increasing awareness of the interrelatedness of peoples and their ethical dilemmas, and the recognition that global problems need global solutions. In short, global bioethics has two distinguishing features: first, its global scope, both geographically and conceptually; and second, its focus on justice (communal and individual).

In his multi-faceted attack on Rawls’s account of justice, G.A. Cohen has argued that the notion of basic structure is necessarily insensitive to the importance of informal social norms to social justice. The paper argues that the most plausible account of the basic structure is not blind to informal social norms in any meaningful sense. Whereas informal, non-legally coercive institutions are not part of the basic structure as such, their careful consideration is necessary for the assessment of whether the basic (...) structure itself is indeed just. This claim is based on an account of what it means for normative principle to apply to institutions, which I expound in detail throughout the paper. Principles apply to institutions, I argue, not in that they restrain their conduct, but in that they indicate which social conditions they should bring about. (shrink)

Many pressing problems are of the following kind: some collection of actions of multiple people will produce some morally significant outcome (good or bad), but each individual action in the collection seems to make no difference to the outcome. These problems pose theoretical problems (especially for act-consequentialism), and practical problems for agents trying to figure out what they ought to do. Much recent literature on such problems has focused on whether it is possible for each action in such a collection (...) to make such a tiny impact on the world that it makes no expected difference to the outcomes with which we’re concerned. I argue that even if this is impossible, there are cases in which each action makes no difference, not because it has such a tiny effect on the world, but because if it were not performed, a similar action would be. This recognition allows us to connect these problems with discussions of structural injustice. (shrink)

Aristotle’s account of the virtue of justice has been regarded as one of the least successful aspects of his ethics. Among the most serious criticisms lodged against his views are (i) that he fails to identify the proper subject matter of justice (LeBar 2020), (ii) that he wrongly identifies the characteristic motives relevant for justice and injustice (Williams 1980), and (iii) that his account is parochial, i.e., that it fails to correctly recognize or characterize our obligations of justice to those (...) outside our community (Annas 1995; Curzer 2012, ch. 13). Indeed, Mark LeBar has recently argued that, although Aristotle’s eudaimonist framework remains the most promising metaethical strategy to ground justice as a virtue of individual human beings, the normative content of his theory is so flawed that neo-Aristotelians ought to adopt a Kantian theory of justice that centers on according respect to persons (LeBar 2020). My aim in this paper is to defend Aristotle’s views from these criticisms in order to show that it holds promise as an account of justice as a virtue. Notably, neo-Aristotelians have generally neglected the topic of justice, despite its centrality to Aristotle’s ethics and to our own social lives. I argue that they ought to take Aristotle’s account seriously as a starting point for their own theorizing, while recognizing that it needs modification on some points. (shrink)

According to relational egalitarians, the fundamental value that grounds requirements of justice is egalitarian social relationships. Hierarchical authority relations appear to be a threat to relational equality. Such relations, however, are pervasive in our working lives. Contemporary workplaces, then, seem to be potential sites of substantial injustice for relational egalitarians. This presents us with a challenge: the view that justice requires that individuals relate as equals appears difficult to reconcile with the view that it is permissible for firms to be (...) organized with hierarchical authority structures, and yet both claims seem independently plausible. This chapter argues that these claims can be reconciled, but only if we reject the widely accepted Rawlsian “institutionalist” view that principles of justice apply to the institutions of the basic structure of society, but do not apply directly to the conduct of agents within those institutions. (shrink)

A component of Laura Valentini’s paradox of ideal theory is that an ideal theory fails to be action guiding. But why? I present a strange but traditional reason that Valentini does not list.

This paper offers a solution to Laura Valentini’s paradox of ideal theory. A reason for idealizing assumptions is because otherwise the theory would be too complicated to be action guiding.

This paper offers a cheap solution to Laura Valentini’s paradox of ideal theory. An ideal theory cannot be sound by definition, since in the relevant sense of “ideal theory” it involves false propositions.

Ce texte offre un aperçu des articles composant ce numéro spécial et présente brièvement les principaux arguments avancés dansA Conceptual Investigation of Justice, dont une des thèses centrales veut qu’un important désaccord à la fois sémantique et philosophique sur la définition du terme «justice» soit au cœur de plusieurs questions en philosophie politique contemporaine. Cette présentation nous amène par ailleurs à décrire les caractéristiques d’un débat sémantique dont la portée dépasse la stricte sphère linguistique.

Cet article détaille et défend les arguments avancés dans l’ouvrageA Conceptual Investigation of Justiceen réponse aux critiques. Cette mise au point développe certaines des idées contenues dans le livre, mais elle présente également des perspectives inédites, étayant l’argumentaire de sa thèse principale.

This handbook is currently in development, with individual articles publishing online in advance of print publication. At this time, we cannot add information about unpublished articles in this handbook, however the table of contents will continue to grow as additional articles pass through the review process and are added to the site. Please note that the online publication date for this handbook is the date that the first article in the title was published online. For more information, please read the (...) site FAQs. (shrink)

An account of two sources of the "minimal global ethic," one interpretive and the other creative. Humour, more specifically slapstick, is the interpretive source, while "revelation" as present in both Rabbinic Judaism and Modernism is the creative source. The question of the ethic and conflict is then briefly discussed. This version, posted 22 January 2023, is a revised form of the chapter from the book published in 2009.

An objection to John Rawls’s original position is that it faces a problem of inconsistent features: the individuals in this hypothetical situation are not supposed to know where they are in history, but they have knowledge of general social science, from which they can infer at which point in time they are. In this paper, I consider two solutions. One of these solutions depends on extending a solution to another well-known objection: that readers cannot imagine lacking the knowledge that these (...) individuals lack. (shrink)

Hume's concept of justice as an artificial virtue is still controversial. In contrast to the more traditional research debate, the text defends a new reading of Hume's peculiar conception of justice, which understands his argument for justice as a special form of an internalism of practical reasons. It shows that his motivational justification for the virtue of justice proves to be consistent within his affect theory and yet systematically vulnerable.

In On Trade Justice, Risse and Wollner defend an account of trade justice on which the central requirement, applying to both states and firms, is a requirement of non-exploitation. On their view, trade exploitation consists in ‘power-induced failure of reciprocity’, which generates an unfair distribution of the benefits and burdens associated with trade relationships. In this paper, I argue that while there are many appealing features of Risse and Wollner’s account, their discussion does not articulate and develop the unified picture (...) of states’ and firms’ obligations that they aim to provide as clearly as it might have. In particular, it is, I claim, unclear exactly how they understand the relationship between the fairness-based requirements that apply to states and those that apply to firms. I argue that there are two types of accounts that they might accept: a transactional account and a structural account. I offer reasons to think that there are reasons to prefer a structural account. In addition, I note some of the key implications of accepting such an account, and suggest that if Risse and Wollner accept these implications and revise other aspects of their view accordingly, the result is a plausible and unified account of what trade justice requires. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has caused significant economic hardships for millions of people around the world. Meanwhile, many of the world’s richest people have seen their wealth increase substantially during the pandemic, despite the significant economic disruptions that it has caused on the whole. It is uncontroversial that these effects, which have exacerbated already unacceptable levels of poverty and inequality, call for robust policy responses from governments. In this paper, I argue that the disparate economic effects of the pandemic also generate (...) direct obligations of justice for those who have benefitted from pandemic windfalls. Specifically, I argue that even if we accept that those who benefit from distributive injustice in the ordinary, predictable course of life within unjust institutions do not have direct obligations to redirect their unjust benefits to those who are unjustly disadvantaged, there are powerful reasons to hold that benefitting from pandemic windfalls does ground such an obligation. (shrink)

Are institutional principles of justice subject to a minimal realism constraint to the effect that, in order to be valid, they must not make wildly unrealistic demands? Most of us say “yes.” David Estlund says, “no.” However, while Estlund holds that 1) institutional principles of justice are not subject to a minimal realism constraint, he accepts that 2) institutional principles of justice are subject to an *attainability constraint* to the effect that, in order to be valid, they must not make (...) demands we are unable to meet; and 3) what he calls “institutional proposals” are subject to a minimal realism constraint. I argue that these three theses do not represent a plausible combination, at least given Estlund’s account of the principle/proposal distinction. Given this account, Estlund is either wrong to reject a minimal realism constraint on institutional principles of justice, or wrong to accept an attainability constraint on institutional principles of justice and/or a minimal realism constraint on institutional proposals. Either way, this has significant implications for the plausibility of his overall case against the minimal realism constraint on institutional principles of justice. (shrink)

In this article, I aim to clarify some key issues in the ongoing debate about the relationship between Rawlsian political philosophy and business ethics. First, I discuss precisely what we ought to be asking when we consider whether corporations are part of the “basic structure of society.” I suggest that the relevant questions have been mischaracterized in much of the existing debate, and that some key distinctions have been overlooked. I then argue that although Rawlsian theory’s potential implications for business (...) ethics are more extensive than some have suggested, the nature of the concern that we ought to have about the effects of corporate behavior on individuals’ economic and social conditions should lead us to reject the view that corporations are bound by principles of justice only if, and insofar as, they are part of the basic structure. (shrink)

Extremism about Demands is the view that morality is significantly more demanding than prevailing common-sense morality acknowledges. This view is not widely held, despite the powerful advocacy on its behalf by philosophers such as Peter Singer, Shelly Kagan, Peter Unger, and G.A. Cohen. Most philosophers have remained attracted to some version of Moderation about Demands, which holds that the behavior of typical well-off people is permissible, including the ways that such people tend to employ their economic and other resources. It (...) is difficult to resist the conclusion that proponents of Extremism have not taken sufficiently seriously the central convictions that motivate the Moderate view. -/- This dissertation offers an improved defense of Extremism about Demands. At its center is an argument that appeals dialectically to requirements of justice that Moderates themselves already implicitly accept. Specifically, I claim that any plausible set of Moderate moral principles will, when applied to a world like ours, yield demands on typical well-off people that far exceed the demands of common-sense morality. -/- My argument has two cruxes. The first is the idea that our concern for justice is at least partially grounded in a concern for individuals’ interests, broadly construed. The other is a principle that I call Injustice entails Obligations, which says that we are collectively subject to requirements of justice that, if fully complied with, would ensure the transition from current injustice to a just state of affairs. Any view that is compatible with both the interest-based view of (part of) our concern for justice and Injustice entails Obligations will, I argue, require sacrifices from typical well-off people that substantially exceed what prevailing common-sense morality requires of them. -/- Moderates typically emphasize the idea that each person has an important interest in pursuing the projects, plans, relationships, and commitments that are most important to her. But they also believe that acceptable Moderate principles will properly balance this idea with the idea that from a properly impartial perspective everyone, and everyone's interests, are equally morally important. Because Moderates accept the latter idea, they are already committed to thinking that in a just world, everyone would have a sufficient minimum share of society’s resources. I argue that even if we limit our focus to distributive justice in a single society such as the United States, and even if we assume that distributive justice requires only a sufficient minimum, the extent to which the status quo must be transformed in order for justice to be achieved is still too great to be compatible with Moderate demands on typical well-off people. -/- There are a number of ways to try to argue that Moderate principles and Injustice entails Obligations are compatible with Moderation about Demands. For instance, it might be argued that all or nearly all of the demands to sacrifice in order to promote justice can be assigned to the super-rich, rather than to typical well-off people. Or it might be argued that the sacrifices of a single well-off person cannot be required because they amount to a mere “drop in the bucket” relative to what needs to be done in order to fully achieve justice. I show that such arguments fail. -/- The argument that I consider in greatest detail derives from John Rawls’s view that the principles of justice apply to the institutions of the “basic structure of society,” and do not apply directly to the conduct of individuals. If this “Institutionalism” is right, then it cannot be the case that individuals are obligated to promote justice directly in the way that I suggest they are. Furthermore, it might seem that a view that assigns all of the burdens of promoting justice to the basic structure satisfies the imperative to transition from injustice to justice, since if the relevant institutions were to begin doing everything that the Rawlsian view says they ought to be doing, the requirements of justice would be met. I argue, however, that there is no understanding of Institutionalism on which it is itself consistent with the following desiderata: Moderate principles, and the associated interest-based view of (part of) the ground of our concern for justice; Injustice entails Obligations; and Moderate demands. So, Institutionalism cannot make Moderate principles and Injustice entails Obligations compatible with Moderate demands. -/- Moderate principles and Injustice entails Obligations, then, remain incompatible with Moderation about Demands. Since there are compelling reasons to accept both Moderate principles and In justice entails Obligations, I conclude that we must reject Moderation about Demands. The obligations that justice places on typical well-off people are substantially more extensive than is acknowledged by prevailing common-sense morality. (shrink)

My dissertation defends W.E.B. Du Bois’s philosophy of modern freedom, which he grounds in the historical reconstruction of the American civic community on the moral basis of free and equal citizenship. Rather than ascribe to him an elitist politics of racial ‘uplift’ and assimilation to Anglo- American folkways, I instead argue that he defends black moral and political autonomy for securing state power and civic equality. Additionally, he challenges both historical and the contemporary political philosophers, including John Rawls, Axel Honneth, (...) and Philip Pettit, to articulate the racial dimension of the development of a social order that actualizes the moral meaning of free and equal citizenship. In establishing his novel philosophy of freedom, I adduce three critical components: (1) Contra standard interpretations of Du Bois that claim he espouses a controversial racialist doctrine, I argue that his racialism is best understood as conceptualizing the ethical salience of racial difference in the context of a democratic plurality. In the light of dominant accounts of plurality that do not foreground race, pace Margaret Gilbert and John Rawls, Du Bois deemphasizes individuals’ free choice in social group formation. In accepting the importance of free choice, he stresses collective historical experience as furnishing the normative salience of racial identity, which prefigures individuals’ free choice. A racialist model of racial difference in a democratic plurality exacts the civic obligation to confront the historical legacy of slavery and Jim Crow. (2) In advancing the moral value of citizenship, Du Bois affirms the moral obligation of the modern American state to represent black interests from Reconstruction onwards. Drawing on G.W.F. Hegel’s normative theory of the modern state, I justify Du Bois’s analysis of postbellum federal policies concerning black freedmen and refugees of the Civil War. Du Bois observes that the Freedmen’s Bureau – established with the passage of the 1865 Radical Reconstruction Amendments – democratically facilitated a ‘social revolution’ by promoting the integration of black freedmen on the moral basis of free and equal citizenship under the aegis of the federal government. Implicit in his analysis is a normative commitment to representational government that in attending to the needs of the postbellum black community incorporates black political will in the public adjudication of the common good – a historically unprecedented phenomenon. (3) With the rise of Jim Crow, when the U.S. federal government skirted its moral obligation to defend black interests, Du Bois argues that the black church and college assumed a civic function. Habits of citizenship flourished there, affirming the moral agency of African Americans as American citizens. Inasmuch as these institutions groomed disenfranchised black citizens for the assumption of political power, I articulate the challenge they present to John Rawls, Axel Honneth, and Philip Pettit to chart the civic dimension of ‘private’ social institutions. Because they neglect to theorize the historical experience of racial subordination, their views of freedom omit a formulation of social cooperation guided by the notion of the civic within the institutional context of civil society. Specifically, their accounts of the interrelation between citizens, social institutions, and the modern state fail to capture the civic function of the black church and college during Jim Crow. Thus, Du Bois’s dynamic, institution-based account of freedom highlights the racial dimension in the historical contestation of the legitimate scope and ends of the American civic community. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I draw on W.E.B. Du Bois’s political thought to challenge de Shalit’s characterization of the role of the philosopher and the public in political theory. I press three issues to clarify what it would take for a political philosopher to take into consideration what the public thinks: the relation of the method of public reflective equilibrium to history and the empirical sciences; the moral education that results from the public’s participation in philosophical discussions; and how political philosophers should handle (...) the public’s recalcitrant ignorance and hostility in their theories. (shrink)

This article develops a liberal theory of cultural rights that must be guaranteed by just legal and political institutions. People form their own individual conceptions of the good in the cultural space constructed by the political societies they inhabit. This article argues that only rarely do individuals develop views of what is valuable that diverge more than slightly from the conceptions of the good widely circulating in their societies. In order for everyone to have an equal opportunity to autonomously form (...) their own independent conception of the good, rather than merely following others, culture must be democratically controlled. Equal respect for members of a liberal democracy requires that all citizens have roughly equal opportunities to do things like make movies, publish novels, and exhibit paintings. This article contends that the contemporary American legal order fails to guarantee that all cititizens have roughly equal opportunities to shape and influence their shared culture. Guaranteeing the liberty to do so would require reforms to many areas of law, including applying anti-discrimination law more broadly to the conduct of cultural organizations, expanding fair use protections in copyright law, limiting the ability of businesses to arbitrarily refuse service to customers, and restricting private control of capital in order to democratize the means of cultural production. (shrink)

امریکا و جهان در روند فروپاشی از رشد جمعیت بیش از حد هستند, بیشتر از آن برای قرن گذشته, و در حال حاضر همه از آن, با توجه به مردم جهان 3. مصرف منابع و علاوه بر این از 3 میلیارد بیشتر ca. ۲۱۰۰ تمدن صنعتی را سقوط خواهد کرد و در مورد گرسنگی ، بیماری ، خشونت و جنگ در مقیاس سرسام آور را به ارمغان بیاورد. زمین از دست می دهد حداقل 1 درصد از خاک خود را در (...) هر سال ، به طوری که آن را نزدیک ۲۱۰۰ ، بیشتر از مواد غذایی خود را در حال رشد ظرفیت از بین رفته است. میلیاردها خواهد مرد و جنگ هسته ای است اما برخی دیگر. در امریکا ، این است که شدیدا با مهاجرت گسترده و تولید مثل مهاجر شتاب ، همراه با سوء استفاده ممکن است توسط دموکراسی ساخته شده است. طبیعت فاسد بشر به خوبی به رویای دموکراسی و تنوع در یک کابوس جرم و فقر تبدیل می شود. چین ادامه خواهد داد به پایمال امریکا و جهان ، تا زمانی که آن را حفظ دیکتاتوری که محدودیت خودخواهی. علت اصلی سقوط ، ناتوانی روانشناسی ذاتی ما برای انطباق با دنیای مدرن است که مردم را برای درمان افراد نامربوط به عنوان اینکه منافع مشترک دارند ، هدایت می کند. ایده حقوق بشر یک فانتزی شیطانی است که توسط چپی ها به منظور جلب توجه از تخریب بی رحم زمین توسط یک بسته مادری 3rd ترویج شده است. این, به علاوه جهل از زیست شناسی اساسی و روانشناسی, منجر به هذیان مهندسی اجتماعی از حدی تحصیل کرده که کنترل جوامع دموکراتیک. تعداد کمی از درک که اگر شما کمک یک نفر به شما آسیب شخص دیگری--هیچ ناهار رایگان وجود دارد و هر آیتم تنها هر کسی مصرف از بین میبرد زمین فراتر از تعمیر. در نتیجه ، سیاست های اجتماعی در همه جا ناپایدار هستند و یک به یک تمام جوامع بدون کنترل دقیق در خودخواهی به هرج و مرج یا دیکتاتوری سقوط می کنند. حقایق اساسی ترین ، تقریبا هرگز ذکر شد ، این است که منابع کافی در آمریکا و یا جهان وجود ندارد به بلند کردن درصد قابل توجهی از فقیر از فقر و نگه داشتن آنها وجود دارد. تلاش برای انجام این کار غیر امریکا و از بین بردن جهان است. ظرفیت زمین برای تولید مواد غذایی روزانه کاهش می یابد ، همانطور که کیفیت ژنتیکی ما است. و در حال حاضر ، مثل همیشه ، تا بحال بزرگترین دشمن فقیر فقیر دیگر و نه غنی است. بدون تغییرات چشمگیر و فوری ، هیچ امیدی برای جلوگیری از سقوط آمریکا یا هر کشوری که به دنبال یک سیستم دموکراتیک است ، وجود ندارد. (shrink)

अमेरिका और दुनिया अत्यधिक जनसंख्या वृद्धि से पतन की प्रक्रिया में हैं, पिछली सदी के लिए यह सबसे अधिक है, और अब यह सब, 3 दुनिया के लोगों के कारण. संसाधनों की खपत और 3 अरब से अधिक ca. 2100 के अलावा औद्योगिक सभ्यता पतन और भुखमरी, रोग, हिंसा और एक चौंका देने वाले पैमाने पर युद्ध के बारे में लाना होगा. पृथ्वी हर साल अपने topsoil के कम से कम 1% खो देता है, तो के रूप में यह 2100 (...) के पास, अपने भोजन की बढ़ती क्षमता के सबसे चला जाएगा. अरबों मर जाएगा और परमाणु युद्ध सब कुछ है, लेकिन कुछ है। अमेरिका में, यह बेहद बड़े पैमाने पर आव्रजन और आप्रवासी प्रजनन द्वारा त्वरित किया जा रहा है, लोकतंत्र द्वारा संभव बनाया दुर्व्यवहार के साथ संयुक्त. भ्रष्ट मानव प्रकृति inexorably अपराध और गरीबी का एक दुःस्वप्न में लोकतंत्र और विविधता के सपने बदल जाता है. चीन अमेरिका और दुनिया को पराजित करना जारी रखेगा, जब तक कि वह स्वार्थ को सीमित करने वाली तानाशाही को बनाए रखता है। पतन का मूल कारण हमारे सहज मनोविज्ञान की अक्षमता को आधुनिक दुनिया के अनुकूल है, जो लोगों को असंबंधित व्यक्तियों के इलाज के लिए की ओर जाता है जैसे कि वे आम हितों था. मानव अधिकारों का विचार एक बुरी कल्पना वामपंथियों द्वारा प्रोत्साहित करने के लिए अनियंत्रित 3 दुनिया मातृत्व द्वारा पृथ्वी की बेरहम विनाश से दूर ध्यान आकर्षित है. यह, बुनियादी जीव विज्ञान और मनोविज्ञान की अज्ञानता के अलावा, आंशिक रूप से शिक्षित जो लोकतांत्रिक समाज को नियंत्रित करने के सामाजिक इंजीनियरिंग भ्रम की ओर जाता है. बहुत कम लोग समझते हैं कि अगर आप किसी और को नुकसान पहुँचाने में आपकी मदद करते हैं, तो मुफ्त दोपहर का भोजन नहीं होता और हर एक वस्तु का उपभोग करने से धरती की मरम्मत से परे नष्ट हो जाती है। नतीजतन, हर जगह सामाजिक नीतियां unsustainable हैं और स्वार्थ पर कड़े नियंत्रण के बिना एक के बाद एक सभी समाज अराजकता या तानाशाही में गिर जाएगी. सबसे बुनियादी तथ्यों, लगभग कभी नहीं उल्लेख किया है, कि अमेरिका या दुनिया में पर्याप्त संसाधनों के लिए गरीबी से बाहर गरीबों का एक महत्वपूर्ण प्रतिशत उठा और उन्हें वहाँ रखने के लिए नहीं कर रहे हैं. ऐसा करने का प्रयास अमेरिका को दिवालिया कर रहा है और दुनिया को नष्ट कर रहा है। भोजन का उत्पादन करने के लिए पृथ्वी की क्षमता दैनिक कम हो जाती है, के रूप में हमारी आनुवंशिक गुणवत्ता करता है. और अब, हमेशा की तरह, अब तक गरीबों का सबसे बड़ा दुश्मन अन्य गरीब है और अमीर नहीं है. नाटकीय और तत्काल परिवर्तन के बिना, वहाँ अमेरिका, या किसी भी देश है कि एक लोकतांत्रिक प्रणाली के बाद के पतन को रोकने के लिए कोई उम्मीद नहीं है. (shrink)

إن أمريكا والعالم في طور الانهيار من النمو السكاني المفرط، ومعظمها في القرن الماضي، والآن كل ذلك، بسبب شعوب العالم الثالث. إن استهلاك الموارد وإضافة 3 بلايين أخرى من عام 2100 سينهار الحضارة الصناعية ويجلب المجاعة والمرض والعنف والحرب على نطاق مذهل. الأرض تفقد ما لا يقل عن 1٪ من التربة السطحية كل عام، لذلك مع اقترابها من عام 2100، فإن معظم قدرتها على زراعة الأغذية سوف تختفي. المليارات سوف تموت والحرب النووية كلها مؤكدة وفي أمريكا، يتسارع هذا بشكل كبير (...) من خلال الهجرة الجماعية واستنساخ المهاجرين، إلى جانب الانتهاكات التي أتاحتها الديمقراطية. إن الطبيعة البشرية الفاسدة تحول بلا هوادة حلم الديمقراطية والتنوع إلى كابوس الجريمة والفقر. وستواصل الصين التغلب على أمريكا والعالم، ما دامت تحافظ على الدكتاتورية التي تحد من الأنانية. السبب الجذري للانهيار هو عدم قدرة علم النفس الفطري لدينا على التكيف مع العالم الحديث، مما يؤدي الناس إلى معاملة الأشخاص غير ذوي الصلة كما لو كان لديهم مصالح مشتركة. إن فكرة حقوق الإنسان هي خيال شرير يروج له اليساريون للفت الانتباه بعيدا ً عن الدمار الذي لا يرحم للأرض من خلال الأمومة العالمية الثالثة غير المقيدة. وهذا، بالإضافة إلى الجهل بالبيولوجيا الأساسية وعلم النفس، يؤدي إلى أوهام الهندسة الاجتماعية للمتعلمين جزئيا الذين يسيطرون على المجتمعات الديمقراطية. قليلون يفهمون أنه إذا ساعدت شخصاً واحداً، فإنك تؤذي شخصاً آخر - لا يوجد غداء مجاني وكل عنصر يستهلكه أي شخص يدمر الأرض التي لا يمكن إصلاحها. وبالتالي، فإن السياسات الاجتماعية في كل مكان غير مستدامة، وكل مجتمع على حدة كل المجتمعات التي لا تخضع لضوابط صارمة على الأنانية سينهار إلى فوضى أو دكتاتورية. والحقائق الأساسية، التي لم تذكر قط تقريبا، هي أنه لا توجد موارد كافية في أمريكا أو العالم لانتشال نسبة كبيرة من الفقراء من الفقر وإبقائهم هناك. إن محاولة القيام بذلك هي إفلاس أمريكا وتدمير العالم. وتنخفض قدرة الأرض على إنتاج الأغذية يوميا، كما تنخفض نوعيتنا الوراثية. والآن، كما هو الحال دائما، فإن أكبر عدو للفقراء هو الفقراء الآخرين وليس الأغنياء. وبدون تغييرات جذرية وفورية، لا يوجد أمل في منع انهيار أمريكا، أو أي بلد يتبع نظاما ديمقراطيا. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that much theorizing about the value of equality, and about justice more generally, has focused unduly on distributive issues and neglected the importance of egalitarian social relationships. As a result, relational egalitarian views, according to which the value of egalitarian social relations provides the grounds of the commitment that we ought to have to equality, have gained prominence as alternatives to more fundamentally distributive accounts of the basis of egalitarianism, and of (...) justice-based entitlements. In this paper, I will suggest that reflecting on the kind of explanation of a certain class of our justice-based entitlements that relational egalitarian considerations can offer raises doubts about the project, endorsed by at least some relational egalitarians, of attempting to ground all entitlements of justice in the value of egalitarian social relationships. I will use the entitlement to healthcare provision as my central example. The central claim that I will defend is that even if relational egalitarian accounts can avoid implausible implications regarding the extension of justice-based entitlements to health care, it is more difficult to see how they can avoid what seem to me to be implausible explanations of why individuals have the justice-based entitlements that they do. To the extent that I am correct that relational egalitarian views are committed to offering implausible explanations of the grounds of justice-based entitlements to healthcare, this seems to me to provide at least some support for a more fundamentally distributive approach to thinking about justice in healthcare provision. (shrink)

We argue that violent political protest is justified in a generally just society when violence is required to send a message about the nature of the injustice at issue, and when it is not ruled out by moral or pragmatic considerations. Focusing on protest as a mode of public address, we argue that its communicative function can sometimes justify or require the use of violence. The injustice at the heart of the Baltimore protests—police brutality against black Americans —is a paradigmatic (...) case of this sort, because of the relationship of the police to the injustice and the protests against it. (shrink)

Amartya Sen argues that Rawls’s theory is not only unnecessary in the pursuit of justice, but it may even be an impediment to justice in so far as it has discouraged more useful work. Against what he considers the dominance of transcendental theory, Sen calls for a more realistic and practical ‘comparative’ theory of justice. Sen’s negative point has been widely discussed, but here I develop a reconstruction of Sen’s positive theory (a combination of Adam Smith’s Impartial Spectator, Social Choice (...) Theory, and the Capabilities Approach) in order to evaluate it on its own terms. I find that the theory is technocratic, despite Sen’s insistence to the contrary. (shrink)

It is natural and relatively common to suppose that feasibility is a constraint on what we ought to do all-things-considered but not a constraint on what we ought to do as a matter of justice. I show that the combination of these claims entails an implausible picture of the relation between feasibility and desirability given an attractive understanding of the relation between what we ought to do as a matter of justice and what we ought to do all-things-considered.