James Sterba’s From Rationality to Equality is a bold effort to show that those who reject morality, coerced provision for basic needs, or a demanding egalitarian standard of justice violate precepts of rationality, resist the implications of their own deep convictions, or negligently ignore ecological dangers. Without opposing his moral conclusions, I present doubts about his arguments. The assessment of higher-ranking altruistic reasons that he calls “Morality as Compromise” is offered as distinctively non-question-begging, but only seems to have this status (...) on a construal that makes it a tautology. Contrary to his charge of inconsistency, right-wing libertarians can rely on a non-arbitrary criterion of coercive worsening in defending the entitlements they favor while rejecting the enforceable welfare right that he supports. The duty to make sacrifices for remote generations on which he bases his demand for substantial equality is in need of defense that he does not provide and does not clearly have the consequence he claims. These gaps point to the need to rely on a broader range of moral convictions, integrated in more complex ways. (shrink)

This paper exploits recent work on the normative and constitutive roles of knowledge in practical rationality, to put pressure on the idea that speakers could communicate without exploiting linguistic knowledge. I defend cognitivism about meaning, the view that speakers have rationally accessible (i.e., implicit rather than tacit) knowledge of semantic facts and principles, and that this knowledge is constitutive of their linguistic competence.

I develop and refine an argument for the total brain death criterion of death previously advanced by Germain Grisez and me: A human being is essentially a rational animal, and so must have a radical capacity for rational operations. For rational animals, conscious sensation is a pre-requisite for rational operation. But total brain death results in the loss of the radical capacity for conscious sensation, and so also for rational operations. Hence, total brain death (...) constitutes a substantial change—the ceasing to be of the human being. Objections are considered, including the objection that total brain death need not result in the loss of capacity for sensation, and that damage to the brain less than total brain death can result in loss of capacity for rational operations. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom and commonsense morality tend to take the integrity of persons for granted. But for people in systematically unjust societies, self-respect and human dignity may prove to be impossible dreams.Susan Babbitt explores the implications of this insight, arguing that in the face of systemic injustice, individual and social rationality may require the transformation rather than the realization of deep-seated aims, interests, and values. In particular, under such conditions, she argues, the cultivation and ongoing exercise of moral imagination is necessary (...) to discover and defend a more humane social vision. Impossible Dreams is one of those rare books that fruitfully combines discourses that were previously largely separate: feminist and antiracist political theory, analytic ethics and philosophy of mind, and a wide range of non-philosophical literature on the lives of oppressed peoples around the world. It is both an object lesson in reaching across academic barriers and a demonstration of how the best of feminist philosophy can be in conversation with the best of “mainstream” philosophy—as well as affect the lives of real people. (shrink)

We integrate dualistic conceptions of the real with Peirce's perspectives about reality and abduction, emphasizing the concept of reason underlying Peirce's thoughts. Peirce's abduction is related to the notions of retrogression and grounding in Hegel, later re-encountered in Hansonian-abduction. Abduction in turn is considered in relation to abstraction acquiring its fullest sense as a stage in the process of producing a theory. The process is iterative and self improving, it incorporates ``turbid thinking'' making it increasingly ``clear'' at successive iterations that (...) incorporate the lessons taught by failed predictions, i.e., refutations. The cycle of thoughts promoted by doubts comes to rest when belief is reached. We discuss how this coming to rest depends on a criterion for cessation of doubts. The observation is illustrated with two different criteria, one proposed by Mach that only demands analogy and the criteria of dualists such as Goethe and Whewell that inspire the present work. Hence, it is possible to produce, and socially accept, imperfect theories unless we demand the highest level of rationality, avoiding any leftover of the turbid thoughts that have been used in the early developments. This work rests upon the existence of some objective form of reason. Influenced by a constructivist, Piagetian, perspective of science, we propose and discuss a small number of conditions that we identify as characteristics of rational abduction: rules for the rational construction of theories. We show how a classical example of belief that satisfies today's most common definition of abduction does not match the standards of rational retroduction. We further show how the same rules indicate the partial detachment of Special Relativity from the observable world, a fact actually known to Einstein. We close arguing that there is an urgent need to develop a critical epistemology incorporating dualistic perspectives. (shrink)

Those in animal and environmental ethics wishing to extend moral considerability beyond the human community have at some point all had to counter the claim that it is reason that makes human distinct. Detailed arguments against the significance of reason have been rare due to the lack of any good empirical accounts of what reason actually is. Contemporary studies of the embodied mind are now able to fill this gap and show why reason is a poor choice for a (...) class='Hi'>criterion to distinguish us from non-human animals. I use studies of the embodied mind to show that rationality is integrally connected to our animal and animate nature and hence not a significant point of departure between human and non-human animals. (shrink)

Systemic discrimination produces individuals with a degraded self-concept who therefore may not care about autonomy or set ends compatible with human flourishing. Under systemic discrimination, the dominant conceptual and evaluative framework does not enable the oppressed to articulate their humanity or the rationality of aspiring to full human flourishing. And the injustice of that system may be fully visible only from a perspective outside of that system.

Plagiarism is increasingly evident in business and academia. Though links between demographic, personality, and situational factors have been found, previous research has not used actual plagiarism behavior as a criterion variable. Previous research on academic dishonesty has consistently used self-report measures to establish prevalence of dishonest behavior. In this study we use actual plagiarism behavior to establish its prevalence, as well as relationships between integrity-related personal selection and workplace deviance measures. This research covers new ground in two respects: (a) (...) That the academic dishonesty literature is subject to revision using criterion variables to avoid self bias and social desirability issues and (b) we establish the relationship between actual academic dishonesty and potential workplace deviance/white-collar crime. (shrink)

Kant famously made a distinction between actions from duty and actions in conformity with duty claiming that only the former are morally worthy. Kant’s argument in support of this thesis is taken to rest on the claim that only the motive of duty leads non-accidentally or reliably to moral actions. However, many critics of Kant have claimed that other motives such as sympathy and benevolence can also lead to moral actions reliably, and that Kant’s thesis is false. In addition, many (...) readers of Kant find the claim that we should deny moral worth to a dutiful action performed from friendly inclination highly counterintuitive. Moreover, Kantian commentators disagree about the status of actions in conformity with duty, some claim that these can be taken as equally morally worthy as those performed from duty, while others argue that they are not even permissible. -/- It has also been claimed that Kant’s theory of moral worth should be related to the theory of the Gesinnung developed in the Religion. Thus, some authors claim that, in order for an action to possess moral worth, the agent has to be unconditionally committed to morality, that is, the agent must possess a virtuous character or good fundamental maxim (i.e. a good Gesinnung). However, according to Kant’s radical evil thesis (that is, the thesis that man is evil by nature ), the default position for man is to possess an evil Gesinnung, i.e. a Gesinnung which is only conditionally committed to morality insofar as morality does not demand a great sacrifice of our own happiness. So, an unwelcome consequence of this line of interpretation is that in Kantian ethics morally worthy actions become very rare indeed. -/- The paper is divided in two parts. The first part aims to clarify why Kant thought that only actions from duty are morally worthy, replying to some common objections against Kant’s view. I argue that Kant’s non-accidental condition should not be understood in terms of reliability because such interpretation is incompatible with Kant’s theory of motivation and rational agency. I propose an alternative interpretation which supports Kant’ s claim that only the motive of duty leads nonaccidently to dutiful actions, and thus only actions from duty possess moral worth. I end by showing that although actions in conformity with duty are worthless from the moral point of view, they are not (in many cases) impermissible. The first part concludes that the criterion for the permissibility of actions is different to the criterion for the ascription of moral worth. Thus, rightness, which pertains to actions performed on maxims that can be willed as universal laws, and moral worth, which pertains to actions performed from a sense of duty, should be understood as two different levels of moral assessment. -/- The second part of the paper examines Kant’s conception of virtue with the aim of showing that although only agents with a virtuous character (good Gesinnung) will reliably act from duty, a person with an evil character (evil Gesinnung) could on frequent occasions act from duty. I argue that we should not deny moral worth to actions performed from duty even when the agent has an evil Gesinnung. Goodness of Gesinnung is not a necessary condition of the action of an agent possessing moral worth; reliability of motivation is necessary for the ascription of virtue but not for the ascription of moral worth. It follows that virtue, which refers to the agent’s character or fundamental maxim (i.e. the agent’s Gesinnung), and moral worth are also two different levels of moral assessment. The paper concludes that three levels of moral assessment can be distinguished in Kant’s ethical system: (i) rightness, (ii) moral worth and (iii) moral virtue. Moral virtue is the highest level of moral perfection for a human being. Striving towards virtue requires constant progress and effort and ultimately a ‘revolution of the heart.’ The important point is that even when we are still striving to achieve virtue (i.e. an unconditional commitment to morality), we can ascribe moral worth to actions performed by a genuine sense of duty. It turns out that, contrary to many influential interpretations, Kantian ethics is not merely concerned with the rightness or wrongness of particular actions nor is Kantian ethics primarily an ethic of virtue. Instead, Kant’s ethical system is complex and allows for different levels of moral assessment in which both an action-centred and agent-centred perspective can be integrated. (shrink)

Rational drug design is a method for developing new pharmaceuticals that typically involves the elucidation of fundamental physiological mechanisms. It thus combines the quest for a scientific understanding of natural phenomena with the design of useful technology and hence integrates epistemic and practical aims of research and development. Case studies of the rational design of the cardiovascular drugs propranolol, captopril and losartan provide insights into characteristics and conditions of this integration. Rational drug design became possible in (...) the 1950s when theoretical knowledge of drug-target interaction and experimental drug testing could interlock in cycles of mutual advancement. The integration does not, however, diminish the importance of basic research for pharmaceutical development. Rather, it can be shown that still in the 1990s, linear processes of innovation and the close combination of practical and epistemic work were interdependent. (shrink)

Plagiarism is increasingly evident in business and academia. Though links between demographic, personality, and situational factors have been found, previous research has not used actual plagiarism behavior as a criterion variable. Previous research on academic dishonesty has consistently used self-report measures to establish prevalence of dishonest behavior. In this study we use actual plagiarism behavior to establish its prevalence, as well as relationships between integrity-related personal selection and workplace deviance measures. This research covers new ground in two respects: (a) (...) That the academic dishonesty literature is subject to revision using criterion variables to avoid self bias and social desirability issues and (b) we establish the relationship between actual academic dishonesty and potential workplace deviance/white-collar crime. (shrink)

Plagiarism is increasingly evident in business and academia. Though links between demographic, personality, and situational factors have been found, previous research has not used actual plagiarism behavior as a criterion variable. Previous research on academic dishonesty has consistently used self-report measures to establish prevalence of dishonest behavior. In this study we use actual plagiarism behavior to establish its prevalence, as well as relationships between integrity-related personal selection and workplace deviance measures. This research covers new ground in two respects: (a) (...) That the academic dishonesty literature is subject to revision using criterion variables to avoid self bias and social desirability issues and (b) we establish the relationship between actual academic dishonesty and potential workplace deviance/white-collar crime. (shrink)

I investigate Thomas Aquinas's metaphysical account of human death, which is defined in terms of a rational soul separating from its material body. The question at hand concerns what criterion best determines when this separation occurs. Aquinas argues that a body has a rational soul only insofar as it is properly organised to support the soul's vegetative, sensitive, and rational capacities. According to the ‘higher‐brain’ concept of death, when a body can no longer provide the biological (...) foundation necessary for the operation of conscious rational thought and volition, a substantial change occurs in which the rational soul departs and the body left behind is a ‘humanoid animal’ or a mere ‘vegetable.’I argue that the separation of soul and body does not occur until the body ceases to function as a unified, integrated organism. A rational soul is not only the seat of a human being's rational capacities; it is also the principle of the body's sensitive and vegetative capacities. Since Aquinas defines a human being as a composite of soul and body, and not with merely the exercise of rational capacities, the determination of death requires incontrovertible evidence that the body has ceased all the operations that correspond to the soul's proper capacities. The evidence of this is the body's loss of its integrative organic unity and the criterion for determining when this loss occurs is the irreversible cessation of whole‐brain functioning. (shrink)

The notion of semantic correctness (meaningfulness, or sensefulness) of propositions is widespread in logico-philosophical and linguistic works, as well as in experimental cog­nitive science. Nevertheless, its content is not clear. Many discussions connected to its use serve as evidence for its obscurity. In this investigation, I articulate and solve some interrelated problems which should be analyzed to make this notion more intelligible. Firstly, I pose a question whether semantic correctness is a normative or a descriptive characteristic. In other words: does (...) it refer to a certain ideal of language usage ascribed to the abstract rational agent but not necessarily observed or even recognized by real agents (the normative option), or to some attitude of real language users towards linguistic ex­pressions (the descriptive option)? I show that the notion of semantic correctness emerged in theoretical contexts as normative due to its role within certain conceptions of scientific rationality. However, one can say that it also contains a descriptive aspect, but it is needed to state distinctively what this aspect is. Particularly, there is a question: can the compatibility of ontological categories in the worldview of a language user (call it onto­logical correctness) be taken as a criterion of semantic correctness for natural languages? I show that this is inadmissible: ontological categorial mistakes should not be seen as se­mantic deviations because in this case it would be impossible to delimit senseless sen­tences from contradictive and simply false sentences in natural languages. Finally, I pro­pose a novel view of the content of the meaningful/senseless dichotomy. It occupies a special place among semantic distinctions being related to structural laws of knowledge incrementation and discourse deployment. From this perspective, I outline an integral ap­proach to the conditions of meaningfulness/senselessness of propositions considering a number of factors. In particular, I analyze the conditions of senselessness for contradic­tions and tautologies. (shrink)

Purpose. This article is devoted to the case study of relevant linguacultural stereotypes of the particular organization’s managerial culture and based on corresponding results the inquiry of the discourses formation features associated with the lexico-semantic meanings dispersion of (Foucault). -/- Methods and Procedure of Research. Top managers of a large Ukrainian enterprise (67 respondents) were asked to arbitrarily describe the following concepts – “manager”, “subordinate”, “managerial style”. Each concept was differentiated according to the principle of the lexico-semantic opposition (“productive – (...) counterproductive”). The obtained set of texts was lemmatized and a frequency analysis of the lemmas was carried out as well. Collocations were also evaluated, in particular, repeated n-grams were identified. In the further analysis were used all detected n-grams and those lemmas, the observed frequencies of which statistically significantly exceeded the expected ones. -/- Results. Discourse formation features are determined by the paradigmatic relations of lexico-semantic units (words) and their semantic linear compatibility. The paradigmatic dispersion of a discourse is represented by the quality of connections between lemmas according to the criterion of the paradigm types to be found. Also informative is the assessment of the lemmas number (granularity of the discourse) and the spectrum diversity of paradigmatic relations in the discourse. These parameters reflect the properties of homogeneity/complexity of discourse meanings dispersion. The syntagmatic dissemination of discourse is manifested by the features of the words semantic linear interrelationship in each n-gram. This parameter reflects the quality of rationalizations (verbal-logical chains) associated with the corresponding discourses. The length of n-grams (the number of words) is also indicative – the higher n, the more differentiated the discourse is and vice versa. Matching the words semantics in n-grams with lemmas allows one to draw a conclusion regarding the internal consistency (integration) of the discourse. -/- Conclusions. Psycholinguistic tools can be effectively used in an organizational phenomena study. In particular, the frequency analysis of lemmas, their lexico-semantic evaluation, as well as the qualitative analysis of n-grams in the problem-targeted texts of respondents allows one to solve applied research issues related to the assessment of current linguacultural trends in an organization and understanding their possible causes. Managerial culture, as a linguacultural phenomenon, is represented by a set of stably reproduced discourses in the process of the organization’s functioning. At the same time, discourses are constituted by the dispersion of meanings (words), which is being realized in two linguistic dimensions – paradigmatic and syntagmatic ones. (shrink)

This paper considers ethical decision making by blending three streams of related research: cognitive moral development of the decision maker, rational choice theory and a subjective expected utility model. Ethical dilemmas can be defined as situations where moral certainty is compromised by rational cognition. In this paper, the authors assume that some people use a morality-first perspective and others a rationality-first perspective. Ethical scenarios were written and used to test hypotheses derived from this perspective. The instrument developed was (...) shown to be in need of further refinement. Results are discussed in terms of relationships between participant-characteristics variables overall and subscale responses to the ethical scenarios. (shrink)

Rational drug design is a method for developing new pharmaceuticals that typically involves the elucidation of fundamental physiological mechanisms. It thus combines the quest for a scientific understanding of natural phenomena with the design of useful technology and hence integrates epistemic and practical aims of research and development. Case studies of the rational design of the cardiovascular drugs propranolol, captopril and losartan provide insights into characteristics and conditions of this integration. Rational drug design became possible in (...) the 1950s when theoretical knowledge of drug-target interaction and experimental drug testing could interlock in cycles of mutual advancement. The integration does not, however, diminish the importance of basic research for pharmaceutical development. Rather, it can be shown that still in the 1990s, linear processes of innovation and the close combination of practical and epistemic work were interdependent. (shrink)

In this paper I shall be looking at the state of science before and after the 17th century especially with regard to the question of the nature of scientific knowledge, specifically scientific paradigms. I will argue that some of the major differences between modern science and pre-modern science are due to (i) methodological changes, (ii) the rise of paradigmatic monism in modern science as opposed to paradigmatic pluralism in pre-modern science, (iii) the integration of science with technology after the (...) 17th century. These changes, I maintain, also redefine the role of scientific knowledge in society and culture, and bring in its wake certain problems and challenges, which in turn elicit different types of responses. Pre-modern science, I argue, are admirably suited to play a cultural and religious role, partly because of a lack of a pragmatic criterion of knowledge, and the emphasis on rational coherence. This makes enchantment of nature through science, possible. However, with the further evolution of science, especially the introduction of the experimental method and the emphasis on empiricism in the 17th century, scientific knowledge now has to conform to different criteria of knowledge -pragmatic in partleading to 'paradigmatic monism' and the consequent loss of enchantment in our conception of nature. The rise of the new science beginning in the 17th century thus brings in its wake a new set of epistemological and cultural challenges which were met with in different ways. I will then comment on the different types of responses made against the rise of the new science. (shrink)

In this paper I shall be looking at the state of science before and after the 17th century especially with regard to the question of the nature of scientific knowledge, specifically scientific paradigms. I will argue that some of the major differences between modern science and pre-modern science are due to (i) methodological changes, (ii) the rise of paradigmatic monism in modern science as opposed to paradigmatic pluralism in pre-modern science, (iii) the integration of science with technology after the (...) 17th century. These changes, I maintain, also redefine the role of scientific knowledge in society and culture, and bring in its wake certain problems and challenges, which in turn elicit different types of responses. Pre-modern science, I argue, are admirably suited to play a cultural and religious role, partly because of a lack of a pragmatic criterion of knowledge, and the emphasis on rational coherence. This makes enchantment of nature through science, possible. However, with the further evolution of science, especially the introduction of the experimental method and the emphasis on empiricism in the 17th century, scientific knowledge now has to conform to different criteria of knowledge -pragmatic in partleading to 'paradigmatic monism' and the consequent loss of enchantment in our conception of nature. The rise of the new science beginning in the 17th century thus brings in its wake a new set of epistemological and cultural challenges which were met with in different ways. I will then comment on the different types of responses made against the rise of the new science. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.4 (2001) 705-720 [Access article in PDF] On the Notion of "Disinterestedness": Kant, Lyotard, and Schopenhauer Bart Vandenabeele The strange thing, on looking back, was the purity, the integrity, of her feeling for Sally. It was not like one's feeling for a man. It was completely disinterested, and besides, it had a quality which could only exist between women, between women just grown (...) up.--Virginia Woolf, Mrs. DallowayIf the genuine aesthetic experience exists empirically--and it does--then the definition of its specific quality is at the core of any aesthetic theory that is concerned with the particularity of aesthetic appreciation. Firstly, I shall attempt to provide an acceptable interpretation of this extremely intricate issue in Kant and, moreover, question the interpretation of two philosophers--Lyotard and Schopenhauer--who both struggled with the notion of "disinterestedness" and provided a highly original (but often misunderstood) interpretation of it in their own aesthetic theories. I shall argue that Lyotard took for granted something in Kant's aesthetics that Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory tries to resolve, that is, the wide gap between the agreeable and the charming on one side, and the beautiful on the other. Kant: Disinterestedness and Existence The first moment of Kant's Analytic of the Beautiful asserts that our liking in the beautiful cannot originatefrom any interest and that in the beautiful "we are not compelled to give our approval by any interest, whether of sense or of reason" (§ 5, 52). 1 But Kant also insists that the liking in the beautiful does not createany interest in the object either. [End Page 705]What may this mean? As Kant asserts in the beginning of section 5, it means that "a judgment of taste is merely contemplative, i.e., it is a judgment that is indifferent to the existence of the object [indifferent in Ansehung des Daseins eines Gegenstandes]: it [considers] the character of the object only by holding it up to our feeling of pleasure and displeasure [nur seine Beschaffenheit mit dem Gefühl der Lust und Unlust zusammenhält]" (§ 5, 51). The requirement that a pure judgment of taste be devoid of all interest forms the foundation of Kant's important distinction between aesthetic liking and the pleasure that may accompany moral judgment or action. 2 Kant's analysis of aesthetic response calls for another discrimination, too: the separation of aesthetic liking from mere sensory pleasure, which is the distinction that will occupy us here.Objects that arouse mere sensual pleasure, such as Belgian chocolates, are said to "gratify" (vergnügen) someone, and are then called "agreeable" (angenehm). An object "which one just likes" (was ihm bloß gefällt) is called beautiful. The incentive that corresponds to this object for thought is, respectively inclination (Neigung) or favor (Gunst). Favor, thus accorded the beautiful, is "the only free liking" (das einzige freie Wohlgefallen) (§ 5, 52). 3 Only pleasure in the beautiful is free of a connection with an interest. Both inclination and rational desire are connected with interest, and "all interest either presupposes a need [Bedürfniß] or gives rise to one; and, because interest is the basis that determines approval [als Bestimmungsgrund des Beifalls], it makes the judgment about the object unfree" (ibid.). As Paul Guyer rightly remarks, "in defining the 'quality' of aesthetic judgment Kant is not making a phenomenological distinction between different kinds of feelings of pleasure, but a distinction between the ways in which different instances of pleasure may be occasioned." 4 What Kant is suggesting is "that the presence or absence of a connection to interest may serve as a criterion for the reflective classification of given pleasures" (ibid).Section 3 aims to show that "a liking for the Agreeable is connected with Interest" (§ 3, 47). Pure favor, which is connected with the beautiful, "cannot be an inclination, or else the beautiful would be agreeable and there would be no aesthetic pleasure." 5 Kant, therefore, makes a crucial (but often overlooked) distinction between two senses of "sensation." 6 In the sense of the Critique of... (shrink)

Is reductionism simply a methodology that has allowed science to progress to its current state (methodological reductionism), or does this methodology indicate something more, that the material universe is determined in full by its smallest components (ontological or causal reductionism)? Such questions lie at the heart of much of the contemporary religion–science dialogue. In this essay I suggest that the position articulated by philosopher–theologian Bernard Lonergan is particularly suitable for dealing with these questions. For Lonergan, the criterion of the (...) real is simply its verified intelligibility and not its imaginability. Each of the various levels of reality, as studied in sciences such as physics, chemistry, biology, and sensitive and rational psychology, consists of an intelligible integration of what on the lower level would be simply random occurrences. The things studied by the various sciences (atoms, molecules, cellular organisms, animals, human persons, and so on) are intelligible unities, and no one level is somehow more real than any other. I argue that such a scheme, while seeming somewhat counterintuitive, is best able to deal with the multilayered reality of the contemporary physical and life sciences and provide an opening to the richness of the social sciences and the achievements of human culture. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article focuses on issues of gender identity and bodily integrity in the context of profound desires to modify the body. It contends that, while hormonal and surgical interventions in treating gender dysphoria must continue to be considered medically necessary for many people, we do not yet fully understand why it is justified as medically necessary for this condition and not for others with similar features. The article discusses the difference between the medical classification of “gender dysphoria” and “body (...) dysmorphic disorder” and the notion of mental distress in embodiment. It discusses the role that gender essentialism may have played in the medical sanction of hormonal interventions and gender reassignment surgeries. Finally, it proffers the alternative justificatory criterion, following Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, of “propriodescriptive authority” and explains why this justification, though highly subjective, provides better rational grounds for adjudicating which types of body modification can be considered medically necessary, grounds that can include, but also go well beyond, cases of gender dysphoria. (shrink)

The paper emphasizes the role of knowledge dimensions of an action which could be regarded as rational. Rational action usually results of specific decision — making process including selection, evaluation and acceptance of a preferred alternative. This process should integrate not only various types of knowledge but also the interdisciplinary or interdepartmental knowledge integration. The integration of knowledge may cover various forms, especially integration of knowledge relating to different domains, of different quality, of knowledge connected (...) with different goal-orientations. The paper stresses the role of the hitherto known and recognized alternatives. The integration procedures should also include the integration of various spheres and types of knowledge with accepted and justified systems of values. (shrink)

Aristotelian theory of virtue and of happiness assumes a moral psychology in which the parts of the soul, rational and non-rational, can communicate well with each other. But if Aristotle cannot give a robust account of what communicating well consists in, he faces Bernard Williams's charge that his moral psychology collapses into a moralizing psychology, assuming the very categories it seeks to vindicate. This paper examines the problem and proposes a way forward, namely, that Freudian psychoanalysis provides the (...) resources for the development of a satisfying Aristotelian moral psychology. (shrink)

Rationality within Modern Psychological Theory examines the rational and irrational dimensions of human nature and of the psyche and logos through the lenses of classical philosophy and modern psychology.

When we read, we do not fixate on each word! How does that work? By deep theory those sorts of decisions must be the result of complex decisions involving the specific “word,” the linguistic context in which it appears, and visual information. But is reading really all that difficult? After all, simple heuristics models of reading seem to do sort of okay by only considering the additive effects of word and context. Entropy measures do well at predicting word “skipping” and (...) suggest that “word frequency” may play the dominant role in the “decision” to skip or not skip! (shrink)

Whether it is fair to use personal responsibility of patients for their own health as a rationing criterion in healthcare is a controversial matter. A host of difficulties are associated with the concept of personal responsibility in the field of medicine. These include, in particular, theoretical considerations of justice and such practical issues as multiple causal factors in medicine and freedom of health behaviour. In the article, personal responsibility is evaluated from the perspective of several theories of justice. It (...) is argued that in a healthcare system based on both equality of opportunity and solidarity, responsible health behaviour can—in principle—be justifiably expected. While the practical problems associated with personal responsibility are important, they do not warrant the common knee-jerk refusal to think more deeply about responsibility for health as a means of allocating healthcare resources. In conclusion, the possibility of introducing personal responsibility as a fair rationing criterion is briefly sketched. (shrink)

We welcome and applaud Wilkinson’s impressive and subtle exploration of the possible considerations of frailty as a criterion for triage in times of pandemic-dr...

Bayes’ inference cannot reliably account for uncertainty in mental processes. The reason is that Bayes’ inference is based on the assumption that the order in which the relevant features are evaluated is indifferent, which is not the case in most of mental processes. Instead of Bayes’ rule, a more general, probabilistic rule of inference capable of accounting for these order effects is established. This new rule of inference can be used to improve the current Bayesian models of cognition. Moreover, it (...) should play an essential role in the search for artificial emotional intelligence. (shrink)

Significance testing is the primary method for establishing causal relationships in psychology. Meehl [1978, 1990a, 1990b] and Faust [1984] argue that significance tests and their interpretation are subject to actuarial and psychological biases, making continued adherence to these practices irrational, and even partially responsible for the slow progress of the ‘soft’ areas of psychology. I contend that familiar standards of testing and literature review, along with recently developed meta-analytic techniques, are able to correct the proposed actuarial and psychological biases. In (...) particular, psychologists embrace a principle of robustness which states that real psychological effects are (1) reproducible by similar methods, (2) detectable by diverse means, and (3) able to survive theoretical integration. By contrast, spurious significant findings perish under the strain of persistent tests of their robustness. The resulting vindication of significance testing confers on the world a role in determining the rationality of a method, and also affords us an explanation for the fast progress of ‘hard’ areas of psychology. *I would like to thank Dick Boyd and Phil Gasper for helpful comments on the ideas presented here. (shrink)

Morality and economic rationality: integrative economic ethics as the rational ethics of economic activity; Part II. Reflections on the Foundations of Economic ...

The paper argues against the polarisation of the health economics literature into pro- and anti-QALY camps. In particular, we suggest that a crucial distinction should be made between the QALY measure as a metric of health, and QALY maximisation as an applied social choice rule. We argue against the rule but for the measure and that the appropriate conceptualisation of health-care rationing decisions should see the main task as the integration of competing and possibly incommensurable normative claim types. We (...) identify the main types as consequences, rights, social contracts, individual votes and community values and note situations in which the contribution of each claim type is limited. We go on to show that the integration of (at least some of) these claim types can be formalised within the mathematical framework provided by non-linear programming. (shrink)

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, EarlyView.