This article seeks to clarify the concept of progress in philosophy. It treats progress as a kind of development. But not every development is a progress. When we talk about progress, what really matters is the direction of development. In some cases it is relatively easy to reach agreement about this direction. But not in the case of philosophy, if we abstract it from the obvious and the trivial, like the number of books on (...) philosophy. As a result, the article concludes that there cannot be progress in philosophy. Instead we see a continual multiplication of interpretations. (shrink)

Except for a patina of twenty-first century modernity, in the form of logic and language, philosophy is exactly the same now as it ever was; it has made no progress whatsoever. We philosophers wrestle with the exact same problems the Pre-Socratics wrestled with. Even more outrageous than this claim, though, is the blatant denial of its obvious truth by many practicing philosophers. The No-Progress view is explored and argued for here. Its denial is diagnosed as a form (...) of anosognosia, a mental condition where the affected person denies there is any problem. The theories of two eminent philosophers supporting the No-Progress view are also examined. The final section offers an explanation for philosophy 's inability to solve any philosophical problem, ever. The paper closes with some reflections on philosophy 's future. (shrink)

The work is an attempt to answer the transcendental question, "How is progress in philosophy possible?" The character of philosophical beliefs and doubts is examined, and it is argued that in the exigent context of philosophical practice in the agonistic analytic tradition, a certain limited doxastic voluntarism is possible. The role of both ordinary and ideal language intuitions is criticized; it is concluded that these cannot serve as uncontroversial pretheoretical givens of inquiry. As an extended example of the (...) covert adoption of strategies of prescriptive idealization, several theories of meaning are reviewed. A model of philosophical inquiry based upon the notion of transcendental arguments is profferred. This is derived from both Kantian and Peircean antecedents, via the synthesizing efforts of Karl-Otto Apel. Finally, three senses of "progress" are distinguished and several alternative models of philosophical inquiry are assessed in the light of these distinctions. It is concluded that the sort of progress appropriate to philosophy, seen collectively, is non-terminating and non-decidable, relying upon negative consensus generating mechanisms, thus assuring perpetual pluralism. (shrink)

This chapter raises various questions with regard to philosophy's relationship to the physical sciences and the issue whether we can mount an argument for the occurrence or possibility of progress in philosophy comparable to those raised in the scientific context. It examines cases made pro and contra the progressivist view with reference to recent debates in epistemology and philosophy of science, concluding with a qualified endorsement of the argument by analogy. This places the onus of proof (...) very squarely on the skeptics, relativists, anti‐realists, social constructivists, and other progress‐deniers. (shrink)

In response to widespread doubts among professional philosophers (Russell, Horwich, Dietrich, McGinn, Chalmers), Stoljar argues for a ‘reasonable optimism’ about progress in philosophy. He defends the large and surprising claim that ‘there is progress on all or reasonably many of the big questions.’ However, Stoljar’s caveats and admitted avoidance of historical evidence permits overlooking persistent controversies in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that are essentially unchanged since the 17th Century. Stoljar suggests that his claims are (...) commonplace in philosophy departments and, indeed, the evidence I adduce constitutes an indictment of the widely shared view among professional analytic philosophers. (shrink)

Is there progress in philosophy? A glass-half-full view is that there is some progress in philosophy. A glass-half-empty view is that there is not as much as we would like. I articulate a version of the glass-half-empty view, argue for it, and then address the crucial question of what explains it.

--Father Hart, by J.D. Collins.--The meeting of the ways, by J.A. McWilliams.--On the notion of subsistence, by J. Maritain.--Metaphysics and unity, by E.G. Salmon.--What is really real? By W.N. Clarke.--Professor Scheltens and the proof of God's existence, by F.X. Meehan.--On the mathematical approach to nature, by V.E. Smith.--The assimilation of the new to the old in the philosophy of nature, by L.A. Foley.--In seipsa subsistere, by I. Brady.--St. Thomas and the unity of man, by A.C. Pegis.--Law and morality, by (...) G.B. Phelan.--Thomistic thoughts on government and rulers, by I. Smith. (shrink)

This paper attempts to formulate specific criteria for measuring competence and progress in philosophy, specifically in children. In detailing these criteria, previous evaluation criteria for philosophical thinking in children are described and three main tendencies of philosophical thinking are identified: those involving analytical and reasoning qualities, those dealing with ambiguities or borderline explorations, and those stressing contact with real life experience. Finally, the authors address problems relating to the recognition of these qualities and catalogue seven groups of indicators (...) that help to identify (or exclude) them. (shrink)

Philosophy of the city has recently emerged as a new subfield, garnering global interest. While most inquiries in this area have ‘the city’ or an urban issue as common ground, particular approaches engage in a kind of study identified as ‘intra-disciplinary research.’ An intra-disciplinary approach draws from different areas of philosophy to address problems that extend beyond the limits of individual subfields. A close examination reveals that this practice challenges assumptions holding that definitively answering philosophical questions is the (...) only path to progress. Engaging in this kind of research adds to philosophy’s set of methods, and shows promise for philosophers wrestling with complex issues. (shrink)

We tend to think that philosophical progress, to the extent that it exists, is a good thing. I agree. Even so, it has some surprising unfortunate consequences for the rationality of philosophical belief.

Williamson rejects the stereotype that there is progress in science but none in philosophy on the grounds (a) that it assumes that in science progress consists in the discovery of universal laws and (b) that this assumption is false, since in both science and philosophy progress consists at least sometimes in the development of better models. I argue that the assumption is false for a more general reason as well: that progress in both science (...) and philosophy consists in the provision of better information about dependency structures. (shrink)

This chapter sets out an optimistic view of philosophical progress.The key idea is that the historical record speaks in favor of there being progress at least if we are clear about what philosophical problems are, and what it takes to solve them. I end by asking why so many people tend toward a pessimistic view of philosophical progress.

The epistemology of disagreement examines the question of how an agent ought to respond to awareness of epistemic peer disagreement about one of her beliefs. The literature on this topic, ironically enough, represents widespread disagreement about how we should respond to disagreement. I argue for the sceptical conclusion that the existence of widespread disagreement throughout the history of philosophy, and right up until the present day indicates that philosophers are highly unreliable at arriving at the truth. If truth convergence (...) indicates progress in a field, then there is little progress in philosophy. This sceptical conclusion, however, need not make us give up philosophizing: That we should currently be sceptical of our philosophical beliefs is a contingent fact. We are an intellectually immature species and given the existence of the deep future we have some reason to think that there will be truth-convergence in philosophy in the future. (shrink)

This article is in three parts. The first discusses trends in philosophy. The second defends reliance on intuitions in philosophy from some doubts that have recently been raised. The third discusses Philip Kitcher's contention that contemporary analytic philosophy does not have its priorities straight. While the three parts are independent, there is a common theme. Each part defends what is regarded as orthodoxy from attacks. Of course there are other reasonable challenges to philosophical methodology. The article's aim (...) is just to respond to some charges that have been made. (shrink)

This chapter sets out an optimistic view of philosophical progress. The key idea is that the historical record speaks in favor of there being progress at least if we are clear about what philosophical problems are, and what it takes to solve them. I end by asking why so many people tend toward a pessimistic view of philosophical progress.

Since its inception in 1926 the American Catholic philosophical Association has furthered the collective research of Catholic philosophers and has greatly stimulated their influence and individual competence in the process. It now reflects an independent thoroughness of thinking among American Christians, which respects philosophy as an autonomous study while fruitfully exemplifying its open relation to divine revelation for a fuller understanding of man and his life. Since December 1930 Doctor Hart has been the responsible secretary, who unselfishly dedicates his (...) precious time and talents to organizing the Association on both national and regional bases, the indefatigable editor of its annual Proceedings and special Studies and a constant contributor to its official quarterly journal. He has thus reared a full generation within the Association—apart from his thirty-four years of professorial service in Washington and elsewhere, and many other academic and religious activities. (shrink)

Since its inception in 1926 the American Catholic philosophical Association has furthered the collective research of Catholic philosophers and has greatly stimulated their influence and individual competence in the process. It now reflects an independent thoroughness of thinking among American Christians, which respects philosophy as an autonomous study while fruitfully exemplifying its open relation to divine revelation for a fuller understanding of man and his life. Since December 1930 Doctor Hart has been the responsible secretary, who unselfishly dedicates his (...) precious time and talents to organizing the Association on both national and regional bases, the indefatigable editor of its annual Proceedings and special Studies and a constant contributor to its official quarterly journal. He has thus reared a full generation within the Association—apart from his thirty-four years of professorial service in Washington and elsewhere, and many other academic and religious activities. (shrink)

Moderate scientism is the view that empirical science can help answer questions in nonscientific disciplines. In this paper, we evaluate moderate scientism in philosophy. We review several ways that science has contributed to research in epistemology, action theory, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. We also review several ways that science has contributed to our understanding of how philosophers make judgments and decisions. Based on this research, we conclude that the case for moderate philosophical scientism (...) is strong: scientific practice has promoted significant progress in philosophy and its further development should be welcomed and encouraged. (shrink)

The "Philosophy of the Mind" teachings of Lu [Jiuyuan] and Wang [Yangming] represented a major school of thought in the neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties. This school of thought can trace its sources and genealogy back to the notions of "fulfill the mind, know nature, and know Heaven" and "All Things are possessed within myself of Mencius in the pre-Qin period of Chinese philosophy, and was formed from these basic philosophical notions; further, it was a school (...) of subjective idealism unique to Chinese philosophy. It had a significant impact on the enlightenment thought both in the period between the Ming and Qing dynasties and in the modern era. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, and particularly in the last ten years, in the wake of the deepening of the studies on the scholarship of the Song and Ming periods on the part of people in our country, there has also been very great progress in the area of research of the Lu and Wang school of philosophy of the mind. In the following article, we shall attempt to discuss selectively the major developments of this school of thought. (shrink)

Many people believe that philosophy makes no progress. Members of the general public often find it amazing that philosophers exist in universities at all, at least in research positions. Academics who are not philosophers often think of philosophy either as a scholarly or interpretative enterprise, or else as a sort of pre-scientific speculation. And many well-known philosophers argue that there is little genuine progress in philosophy. Daniel Stoljar argues that this is all a big mistake. (...) When you think through exactly what philosophical problems are, and what it takes to solve them, the pattern of success and failure in philosophy is similar to that in other fields. In philosophy, as elsewhere, there is a series of overlapping topics that determine what the subject is about. In philosophy, as elsewhere, different people in different historical epochs and different cultures ask different big questions about these topics. And in philosophy, as elsewhere, big questions asked in the past have often been solved: Stoljar provides examples. Philosophical Progress presents a strikingly optimistic picture of philosophy - not a radical optimism that says that there is some key that unlocks all philosophical problems, and not the kind of pessimism that dominates both professional and non-professional thinking about philosophy, but a reasonable optimism that views philosophy as akin to other fields. (shrink)

Study of the history of Chinese philosophy has been in full swing in China over the recent years. The Society of the History of Chinese Philosophy has been set up, and in publication are two journals entitled Studies of the History of Chinese Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy, dedicated to publishing research results in this area. A number of books specializing in the subject have come off press and dozens of seminars have been held to discuss special (...) issues. Thus a variety of different views in regard to Chinese philosophers ranging from Confucius to Sun Yat-sen have come forth. All this signals the new progress made in the study of the history of Chinese philosophy. However, I do not propose to discuss here the concrete issues; rather, I would like to talk about the prevailing trends in the study. They can probably, I think, give a better picture of the new progress made in this area and project what new prospects will open up in the studies. In light of this, I would like to address myself to four mutually related issues. (shrink)

What is the epistemic significance of reflecting on a discipline’s past for making progress in that discipline? I assume that the answer to this question negatively correlates with that discipline’s degree of progress over time. If and only if a science is progressive, then what people think or argue in that discipline ceases to be up-to-date. In this paper, I will distinguish different dimensions of disciplinary progress and consequently argue that veritic progress, i.e. collective convergence to (...) truth, is the most important dimension for disciplines with scientific ambitions. I will then argue that, on the one hand, veritic progress in philosophy is more significant than many current philosophers believe, but that, on the other hand, it also has severe limitations. I will offer an explanation of these limitations that suggests that the history of philosophy should play some role, though only a minor one, in systematic philosophy. (shrink)

The 1994 US spectrum auction is now a paradigmatic case of the successful use of microeconomic theory for policy-making. We use a detailed analysis of it to review standard accounts in philosophy of science of how idealized models are connected to messy reality. We show that in order to understand what made the design of the spectrum auction successful, a new such account is required, and we present it here. Of especial interest is the light this sheds on the (...) issue of progress in economics. In particular, it enables us to get clear on exactly what has been progressing, and on exactly what theory has – and has not – contributed to that. This in turn has important implications for just what it is about economic theory that we should value. (shrink)

Crime is a serious social problem, but its causes are not exclusively social. There is growing consensus that explaining and preventing it requires interdisciplinary research efforts. Indeed, the landscape of contemporary criminology includes a variety of theoretical models that incorporate psychological, biological and sociological factors. These multi-disciplinary approaches, however, have yet to radically advance scientific understandings of crime and shed light on how to manage it. In this paper, using conceptual tools on offer in the philosophy of science in (...) combination with theoretical work represented in this special volume of Psychology, Crime and Law, I provide some perspective on why explanatory progress in criminology has remained elusive and evaluate some positive proposals for attaining it. -/- . (shrink)

Mizrahi (2017a) advances an argument in support of Weak Scientism, which is the view that scientific knowledge is the best (but not the only) knowledge we have, according to which Weak Scientism follows from the premises that scientific knowledge is quantitatively and qualitatively better than non-scientific knowledge. In this paper, I develop a different argument for Weak Scientism. This latter argument for Weak Scientism proceeds from the premise that academic disciplines that make progress are superior to academic disciplines that (...) do not make progress. In other words, other things being equal, it is generally better for an academic discipline to make progress than to make little or no progress, given that an academic discipline that is making little or no progress is an academic discipline that is failing to achieve its epistemic goals. Now, if there is no question among academic philosophers that science makes progress, and significantly so, but there is an open question among academic philosophers as to whether academic philosophy makes progress (and if so, how much), then academic philosophers would have to agree that science is superior to academic philosophy in terms of making progress. I develop this argument in this paper and provide empirical evidence suggesting that the premises would be acceptable to academic philosophers. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to the question of how aspects of science have been perceived through history. In particular, I will discuss how the contribution of axiomatics to the development of science and mathematics was viewed in 20th century philosophy of science and philosophy of mathematics. It will turn out that in connection with scientific methodology, in particular regarding its use in the context of discovery, axiomatics has received only very little attention. This is a rather surprising (...) result, since axiomatizations have been employed extensively in mathematics, science, and also by the philosophers themselves. (shrink)

Denis, Lara. Moral Self-Regard: Duties to Oneself in Kant's Moral Theory. New York: Garland Publishing. 2001. Engstrom, Stephen. “The Concept ofthe Highest Good in Kant's Moral The- ory.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, ...

Este artigo pretende, por meio da análise literária e da leitura de Freud , investigar a concepção de progresso em Sade, tomando como objeto de estudo o romance A filosofia na alcova . Defende-se que a ficção sadeana resulta de um conflito entre indivíduo e sociedade, de cujo resultado depende a felicidade humana. Esta seria alcançada com a superação dos obstáculos impostos pela educação, pela cultura e pela abertura da sociedade para a satisfação de todos os prazeres do sentido. The (...) goal of this article is to investigate the concept of progress in Sade's work through the analysis and reading of Freud's work, focusing here on the analysis of the novel Justine. It argues that Sadean fiction is the result of a conflict between each individual and society, and that the happiness of humankind depends on the outcome of this conflict. Happiness would consequently be reached by overcoming the accumulation of obstacles imposed by education and culture, and through the willingness of the society to satisfy every pleasure of the senses. (shrink)

David Chalmers has distinguished the “hard” and the “easy” problem of consciousness, arguing that progress on the “easy problem”—on pinpointing the physical/neural correlates of consciousness—will not necessarily involve progress on the hard problem—on explaining why consciousness, in the first place, emerges from physical processing. Chalmers, however, was hopeful that refined theorizing would eventually yield philosophical progress. In particular, he argued that panpsychism might be a candidate account to solve the hard problem. Here, I provide a concise stock-take (...) on both the empirical-neuroscientific and philosophical-conceptual progress on consciousness. It turns out that, whereas empirical progress is indisputable, philosophical progress is much less pronounced. While Chalmers was right, I argue, in distinguishing distinctive types of problems of consciousness, his prediction of progress on the hard problem was overly optimistic. Empirical progress and philosophical progress are essentially uncoupled; a more skeptical perspective on progress in philosophy in general is appropriate. (shrink)

Philosophy of science was once a much more socially engaged endeavor, and can be so again. After a look back at philosophy of science in the 1930s-1950s, I turn to discuss the current potential for returning to a more engaged philosophy of science. Although philosophers of science have much to offer scientists and the public, I am skeptical that much can be gained by philosophers importing off-the-shelf discussions from philosophy of science to science and society. Such (...) efforts will likely look like efforts to do applied ethics by merely applying ethical theories to particular contexts and problems. While some insight can be gained by these kinds of endeavors, the most interesting and pressing problems for the actual practitioners and users of science are rarely addressed. Instead, I recommend that philosophers of science engage seriously and regularly with scientists and/or the users of science in order to gain an understanding of the conceptual issues on the ground. From such engagement, flaws in the traditional philosophical frameworks, and how such flaws can be remedied, become apparent. Serious engagement with the contexts of science thus provides the most fruit for philosophy of science per se and for the practitioners whom the philosophers aim to assist. And if one focuses on contexts where science has its most social relevance, these efforts can help to provide the thing that philosophy of science now lacks: a full-bodied philosophy of science in society. (shrink)