En este artículo, expondré el concepto heideggeriano de phýsis entre los años 1927-30. Este concepto aparece en la doctrina de la Welteingang des Seienden, en el marco de una ‘radicalización de la ontología’, proyecto metafísico que luego hará crisis y llevará a Heidegger a reinterpretar la pregunta por el sentido del ser como pregunta por la verdad del Ser. Mostraré que la cuestión de la phýsis aporta elementos en esa crisis y posterior cambio de enfoque, en el ámbito filosófico-histórico y (...) en el fenomenológico. Mi hipótesis es que el empleo del concepto de phýsis en el contexto de la doctrina de la Welteingang des Seienden es un recurso especulativo que pretende aclarar el sentido en que el ente natural es, pero sin aparecer dentro del mundo, en términos de ‘tránsito’ desde el completo ocultamiento (phýsis) al desocultamiento (alétheia). Esto tendrá consecuencias respecto a la evaluación de la tradición metafísica, entendida como un preguntar por la phýsis en el doble sentido de ente en totalidad y ser de lo ente o esencialidad. (shrink)

O conceito de phýsis no Corpus hippocraticum parece ter dois níveis: um mais e outro menos específico. Nas passagens em que o termo phýsis não apresenta qualquer determinante ou adendo, o conceito é menos específico. Ele é mais específico, no entanto, quando o termo leva consigo adjuntos como “do homem”, “da criança”, “da mulher”, etc. Apesar de parecer esta uma questão dicotômica, há razões para crer que ela possui maior complexidade. Isto nos motivou a apresentar algumas questões que expõem um (...) espectro bem mais amplo do conceito de phýsis, em detrimento da mera abordagem binária. Para além da complexidade conceitual que ronda a ideia de phýsis, o artigo leva em conta ainda o nível discursivo (talvez mesmo retórico). Neste âmbito, o conceito de phýsis é problematizado a partir da fricção entre enunciação e enunciado. Abstract The concept of phýsis in the Hippocratic corpus seems to have two levels: one of them more and the other less specific. In the passages in which the term phýsis does not show any determiner or addition, the concept is less specific. It is more specific, however, when the term take complements as “of man”, “of child”, “of women” etc. Though it seems a dichotomic issue, there are reasons to believe that it bears more complexity. It has instigated us to present some issues that expose a much wider spectrum of the concept of phýsis rather than the binary account. Beyond the conceptual complexity which surrounds the idea of phýsis, this article considers the discursive (perhaps even rhetoric) level. In this account, the concept of phýsis is examined out of friction between enunciation and enunciated. (shrink)

It is often claimed that classification, on Locke’s view, proceeds by attending to similarities between things, and it is widely argued that nothing about the sensible similarities between things determines how we are to sort them, in which case sorting substances at the phenomenal level must be arbitrary. However, acquaintance with the “internal” or hidden qualities of substances might yet reveal objective boundaries. Citing what I refer to as the Watch passage in Locke’s Essay (henceforth Watches), many commentators claim that (...) classification at the microphysical level must also be arbitrary. They conclude that sorting is arbitrary at any level of description. I refer to this as the standard reading of Locke on classification. In this paper I argue that Locke does not claim that sorting is arbitrary, either at the phenomenal level, or at the microphysical level. First, Locke does not claim in Watches that sorting is arbitrary at the microphysical level. The existence or nonexistence of objective boundaries at the microphysical level is not Watches’ topic and the passage is in fact silent on that question. Here, the standard reading mistakes a claim about the nature of the task of locating “specific differences” for a claim about the nature of the task of classification. This diagnosis proves instructive, for I argue that a similar conflation underwrites the standard reading’s claim that sorting at the phenomenal level must be arbitrary. Far from arbitrarily choosing how to sort things in terms of their phenomenal similarities, Locke thought that the mind simply follows nature’s lead. This characterization of the mind’s activity, I go on to argue, accords well with Locke’s claim that species are the workmanship of the understanding. (shrink)

Este artigo se divide em duas partes. Na primeira seção, após a introdução, mapeamos as diversas ocorrências de “phýsis” ao longo das Hipotiposes Pirrônicas de Sexto Empírico, dividindo-as em 5 categorias: “natureza” como o real, em posição à “aparência”; o “natural” como aquilo que parece próprio, pertencente a algo ou alguém; a “Natureza”, como uma dimensão criadora e regente; o “natural” em oposição ao “antinatural”; a “natureza dos homens”. A forma como esses diversos usos aparecem na obra é invariavelmente crítica, (...) como elementos da argumentação contra os dogmáticos, especialmente os estoicos. Na segunda parte do trabalho, entretanto, mostramos como a “phýsis” aparece também de maneira positiva no início das Hipotiposes com a função de guia para a vida, como parte da resposta à célebre objeção da apraxía. Além disso, defendemos a hipótese de que a “natureza”, da perspectiva de Sexto, não se opõe nem ultrapassa as convenções e os costumes; pelo contrário, a natureza é o que é reconhecido por todos e é mesmo determinada pelas convenções e pelos costumes. (shrink)

The relationship between nature and normativity in Aristotle’s practical philosophy is problematic. On the one hand, Aristotle insists that ethical virtue arises through the habitual repetition of ethically good actions, and thus no one is good or virtuous by nature. Phusikê aretê or “natural virtue” is more like cleverness (demotes) than prudence (phronêsis) and it can result in wrong actions. Yet on the other hand, at times Aristotle appears to use nature to justify normative claims. Thus the problem with Aristotle’s (...) use of the notion of nature in his practical philosophy is that in some instances what is natural seems to be ethically neutral, but in other instances it seems to set the standard for human perfection. Modern Aristotle exegetes have sometimes argued that Aristotle must, consciously or not, be using the term “nature” in at least two different senses here. To use the language of Julia Annas, when Aristotle talks about “natural virtue” in the sense of the talents or abilities which one possesses from birth, he has in mind the notion of “mere nature,” but when he discusses the perfections which a virtuous individual enjoys by his or her nature, Aristotle has in mind the notion of nature as an “ethical ideal.” I would like to suggest an alternative solution to the problem of reconciling Aristotle’s different senses of nature in his Ethics. In Nicomachean Ethics V.7, Aristotle claims that political justice {to dikaion politikon) possesses a “natural” {phusikon) part and a “conventional” {nomikori) part. Aristotle claims that both nature and convention admit of variation, and his language suggests that the two are ultimately parts which need to be interwoven or combined. Scholars who have struggled with Aristotle’s apparently disparate senses of the idea of nature have assumed that nature is an ethical ideal which can be separated from and serve as a guide for that which is merely conventional. I argue that when Aristotle invokes what is “natural” as a norm, he does so under the assumption that the natural component of a norm is ultimately separable from its conventional part only in abstraction. Just like the syllable “BA” is not reducible to the letters “b” and “a,” but instead is a whole greater than its two parts, political justice is a composite unity of nature and convention which, in unifying the two parts, transforms them. (shrink)

The relationship between the physical world and technology is fraught with complications; and yet both physis and techne are necessary to create the environment in which humanity may flourish. Approaching the issue from a philosophical standpoint, this article introduces a series of papers that deal with the interface between philosophy and technology, the critical discussion of the challenges posed by technologies, and their impact or implications.

Threatening the whole of nature, the climate crisis puts us on the verge of self-destruction. But what can philosophy contribute to considering this problem? It can take up the task of thinking nat...

The main aim of this paper is to discuss the meaning of Lacan's uses of the structural paradigm. The investigation will emphasize the function of this use in terms of relations between psychoanalysis and history of sciences. Freud, in order to establish the epistemological identity for psychoanalyses was impelled to choose between Naturwissenschaften or Geisteswissenschaften. By assuming the natural sciences model Freud has created what one can call a certain epistemological discomfort: model and object seems not to fit each other. (...) The influence of Koyre's work is here remarkable. Lacan's uses of structural paradigm may be seemed as a strategy to create a new space for psychoanalysis in science. Only a structuralist science could formulate a conception of the subject that is nor naturalistic, nor psychological. This is showed particularly in what concerns the category of cause. (shrink)

Resumen En la historia de la filosofía, la oposición entre episteme y téchne ha sido convencional. Ya sea que se interprete a Platón o Aristóteles, o se revisen las invenciones de Arquímedes, Ctesibio, Filón de Bizancio o Herón de Alejandría, hay una marginalidad temática de la téchne frente a la jerarquía epistémica de un pensamiento puro (logis-mós). En este artículo se propone una interpretación diferente, de carácter arqueológico y genealógico, según la cual se podría postular una episteme en la téchne (...) y una téchne en la episteme. La indagación inicia con una lectura de fuentes, recurriendo a la etimología como téchne hermenéutica (o método hermenéutico). Como fuente primaria principal se utilizan los Tratados hipocráticos.In the history of philosophy, the opposition between episteme and téchne has been conventional. Whether Plato or Aristotle is interpreted, or whether Archimedes, Ctesibius, Philo of Byzantium or Heron of Alexandria are revised, there is a margi-nalization of the téchne as compared to the epistemic hierarchy of pure thought (logismós). I propose a different interpretation of an archaeological and genealogical nature, according to which an episteme in the téchne and a téchne in the episteme could be postulated. The inquiry begins with a reading of sources making use of ety-mology as a hermeneutic téchne (or hermeneutic method). The Hippocratic treatises have been used as the principal primary source. (shrink)

In the history of philosophy, the opposition between epistēmē and téchnē has been conventional. Whether Plato or Aristotle is interpreted, or whether Archimedes, Ctesibius, Philo of Byzantium or Heron of Alexandria are revised, there is a marginalization of the téchnē as compared to the epistemic hierarchy of pure thought . I propose a different interpretation of an archaeological and genealogical nature, according to which an epistēmē in the téchnē and a téchnē in the epistēmē could be postulated.The inquiry begins with (...) a reading of sources making use of etymology as a hermeneutic téchnē . The Hippocratic treatises have been used as the principal primary source. (shrink)

In EN II.1, Aristotle claims that our nature is inadequate for moral virtue. We are not, he says, in the same relation to virtue as a stone falling to earth; moral excellence is neither by nature nor contrary to our nature but reached by habituation . Other texts such as Pol. I.13 and Pol. VII.12 about natural capacities, as well as those like Phys. II.1 and Meta. V.4 about physis in general, complicate the picture concerning the bases for moral (...) excellence in EN. This essay considers the range of applications of physis, focusing on the practical works, so as to examine the extent to which Aristotle thinks moral and political nature is amenable to external determinants such as cultural education. (shrink)

El concepto de _physis_ y sus derivados aparecen cientos de veces en los diálogos de Platón. Dado el carácter poco sistemático de su autor y los muchos años que dedicó a la escritura filosófica, no debe sorprender la diversidad de sentidos en que emplea un término ya de por sí complejo y polisémico. Por otra parte, Platón recoge, sintetiza y reelabora algunas de las concepciones fundamentales de la _physis_, siendo de especial relevancia las de los filósofos pluralistas, interesándose por los (...) elementos constitutivos del mundo físico y tomando partido en la discusión en torno a su carácter, bien mecánico, bien teleológico. En este estudio se analiza tanto la asimilación platónica de la física presocrática, como la influencia ejercida en el planteamiento aristotélico, especialmente por lo que respecta a la causalidad final y al principio del movimiento. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty, já ligado, em A fenomenologia da percepção, ao Lebenswelt do último Husserl e ao ser-no-mundo de Heidegger, procurará manter com a ontologia deste, em sua última e inacabada obra O visível e o invisível, mais estreita ligação, mormente em trono da questão da linguagem. Não obstante com a generalidade da noção de carne, aplicada à Natureza, e também ao corpo humano, enquanto fundante de novo Cogito, uma categoria que repele a antecedência do Dasein, sem o qual não haverá mundo (...) atual.Merleau-Ponty, already connected in The Phenomenology of Perception, to the Lebenswelt of the late Husserl and the Being - in - the - World of Heidegger, seeks to closely maintain his ontology in his final and unfinished work The Visible and the Invisible, principally in terms of the question of language. Nonetheless, there is the generality of the notion of flesh, applied to Nature, as well as to the human body, as the basis for the new Cogito, a category that repels the precedence of Dasein, without which there would be no world. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz umreißt eine alternative Herangehensweise an das Leib-Seele-Problem, indem er aufzeigt, wie sich im Übergang von einem vorwissenschaftlich-lebensweltlichen zu einem wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt überhaupt ein Leib-Seele-Problem stellen kann und wie sich dabei die überkommenen Schwierigkeiten aus zwei Typen von zu vermeidenden ("naturalistischen") Fehlschlüssen ergeben.

Contemporary Western thinkers recognise the destructive effects of long-standing attitudes of mastery over nature and the dualistic and hierarchical thinking that informs them. Heraclitus’ metaphysical position is ideal for reframing these traditional stances for several reasons: first, Heraclitus’ concept of identity is dynamic and relies on a sophisticated understanding of opposites that recognises ambiguity; secondly, his philosophical position produces a model of truth as multiple rather than univocal; and finally, in Heraclitus’ self-making kosmos, human beings are not separate from the (...) processes of physis but inextricably entangled in them. Heraclitus’ philosophy offers relevant avenues for reimagining contemporary philosophical issues, particularly theories of identity, the multiplicity of truth, and the proper ethical human relation to nature. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band umfasst Beitrage zu einem zentralen Thema bei Platon: 'Physis' kann bei Platon im naturwissenschaftlichen Sinne als physische, biologische, materielle Natur oder im ubertragenen Sinne als eigenes Wesen, etwa hinsichtlich Seele, Kosmos oder Gottlichem, verstanden werden. So werden in diesem Band medizinische, biologische und kosmologische Ansatze ebenso wie ontologische, epistemologische und padagogische Themen zu Platons 'Physis'-Konzept fokussiert. Die zeitgenossische Nomos-Physis-Diskussion Platons mit den Sophisten sowie seine sprach- und kulturphilosophischen Uberlegungen spielen hier eine wichtige Rolle. Die (...) anspruchsvolle literarische Gestaltung der Platonischen Dialoge ist fur die genannten Fragestellungen hochst relevant, ebenso die Auseinandersetzung spaterer platonischer Philosophen mit Platons Physis-Konzept. Mit Beitragen von:Michele Abbate, Christian Brockmann, Ramon Cornavaca, Diego De Brasi, Pantelis Golitsis, Julia Knauss, Dietmar Koch, Mai Oki-Suga, Irmgard Mannlein-Robert, Oliver Primavesi, Mario Regali, Carlos Steel, Angela Ulacco. (shrink)

Questo studio investiga quali siano i punti di contatto tra il filosofo tedesco Friedrich Nietzsche e lo scrittore svedese Hjalmar Söderberg nel romanzo di quest’ultimo Doktor Glas. L’articolo prende in esame due testi nietzschiani finora poco messi in relazione con l’opera söderberghiana, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne e Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, evidenziando gli influssi che il pensiero del filosofo tedesco ha esercitato sulla concezione del Doktor Glas. L’analisi prende le mosse dai concetti di menzogna e conoscenza così come (...) formulati in Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne e dal concetto di “morte di Dio”, identificando in quest’ultimo il crollo della metafisica nel pensiero filosofico europeo a partire dalla rivoluzione copernicana. Il saggio illustra come a questo cambiamento sia sopraggiunto lo svilupparsi di una nuova sensibilità tecnico-scientifica legata alla physis, cambiamento che vede nella figura del medico il suo massimo esponente. L’articolo mette dunque in luce come nel Doktor Glas il passaggio dalla metafisica alla physis venga rappresentato come un momento di crisi esistenziale, non avendo il medico la capacità di superare il trauma della perdita della metafisica. Quest’incapacità è causata dalla conoscenza, la quale se offre la possibilità di scoprire le menzogne usate dalla società, non consente però di trovare lo stimolo per superare la condizione di vuoto causata dalla “morte di Dio”. Söderberg fornisce dunque nel suo romanzo un’interpretazione pessimistica della crisi di Fin de siècle, inquadrando nella paralisi interiore del dottor Tyko Gabriel Glas e l’omicidio inconcludente del pastore Gregorius il fallimento del passaggio dal paradigma metafisico al paradigma della physis e l’impossibilità di superare la crisi tramite una metamorfosi nella condizione di Übermensch. (shrink)

The ontological turn in Castoriadis' thought is exemplified in The Imaginary Institution of Society (IIS). Castoriadis did not stop there, however, but was drawn to enquire into more general ontological questions. In turn, this line of questioning made its presence felt significantly in Castoriadis' intellectual trajectory, such that, as I argue in this article, we can speak of a shift from a regional ontology of the social-historical (as developed in the IIS) to a later transregional ontology of physis as (...) creative emergence. Castoriadis' ontology of physis occurs at the convergence of three intertwined threads in his thought: the rethinking of the idea - and regions - of nature, his growing onto-epistemic critique of `objective' knowledge and his theorization of the creativity of being via time. This leads him to develop an (unfinished) philosophical cosmology that, although placing more emphasis on continuity between anthropic and non-anthropic modes of being, can still highlight the autonomy and uniqueness of the social-historical. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende mostrar que, não obstante as diversas observações do cosmos por diferentes povos antigos, a ciência, enquanto discurso teórico e generalizante da natureza, nasce entre os milésios. A razão para tal gênese se dá devido à conjunção entre o conceito grego de phýsis, o que pressupõe a busca de uma ordem metafísica para submeter o caos, e da geometria grega, uma ferramenta matemática estruturada sob generalizações permanentes. Mediante redução e ordem, o discurso generalizante e teórico dos físicos (...) milésios, deu origem a um dos maiores legados da humanidade: o conhecimento científico. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo nos proponemos analizar el uso que Aristóteles hace en el Protréptico de la analogía entre phýsis y téchne centrándonos para ello en su concepción de la naturaleza como principio de movimiento presentada en la Física. La tesis que intentaremos defender es que el uso de la analogía obedece a la metodología aristotélica de ir de lo más conocido para nosotros a lo más conocido en sí y, por lo tanto, al intento de develar a través de (...) los procesos técnicos cómo llegan a ser los procesos de generación en el caso de los entes naturales. Para probar nuestra tesis, dividiremos el trabajo en dos secciones. En la primera, nos centraremos en el análisis del uso de la analogía y en los supuestos conceptuales que implica. En la segunda parte, nos detendremos en la limitación que esta analogía presenta y, por lo tanto, en la restricción explicativa que supone. (shrink)

The physis and nomos controversy first emerged in ancient Greek thought. This article explores Castoriadis' reactivation of the issues concerned; in particular, his radicalization of Aristotle's conception of physis and nomos. It suggests that nomos appears as multifaceted in his work. However, three key variations may be identified: empirical nomos, normative nomos and generic nomos. Empirical nomos signifies the human creation of laws. It challenges the notion, long held in western philosophy, that Being = being determined. Although all (...) laws are by humans created and thus in one sense autonomous, Castoriadis further distinguishes normatively between those societies which embrace their self-creating and self-transformative capacity and those which obscure it. Normative nomos, then, refers to the autonomous or heteronomous institution of society. The third sense of nomos refers to the creation of form. In this generic sense, it is argued that the debate shifts from the human to the non-human realm; that nomos also manifests itself in the realm of physis. (shrink)

Il saggio tratta della figura di Empedocle – pensiero e uomo insieme, per­fettamente coerenti uno con l’altro – considerandolo come un pensatore di confine, un symbolon, nel quale s’incontrano senza fondersi e senza pre­varicarsi due universi, quello del mythos e quello del logos, con tutte le lo­ro rispettive e complesse implicazioni. Tutto ciò è necessario per com­prendere la lettura che Empedocle presenta della physis, processo naturale e modo di essere ad un tempo, che si esplicita nelle quattro radici – (...) acqua, aria, terra e fuoco – che costituiscono il tutto, relazionandosi attraverso Philia e Neikos, le due forze contrarie e polari che tengono insieme l’es­sere uno e molteplice. The essay deals with the Empedocle’s figure – both man and mind per­fectly acting consistently each other – considering him like a border thin­ker, a symbolon, in wich two universes, one of the mythos and one of the logos with their respective and complex implications, meet without mixing and without prevaricating. All this is necessary to understand the Empe­docle’s reading about the physis, either a natural process or a way of being at the same time expressing itself in four roots – water, air, land and fire – which consisted the whole reporting each other through Philia and Neikos, two opposite and polar forces that keep together the one and various being. (shrink)