During recent decades various researchers from health and social sciences have been debating what it means for a person to be disabled. A rather overlooked approach has developed alongside this debate, primarily inspired by the philosophical tradition called phenomenology. This paper develops a phenomenological model of disability by arguing for a different methodological and conceptual framework from that used by the existing phenomenological approach. The existing approach is developed from the phenomenology of illness, but the paper illustrates how (...) the case of congenital disabilities, looking at the congenital disorder called cerebral palsy (CP), presents a fundamental problem for the approach. In order to understand such congenital cases as CP, the experience of disability is described as being gradually different from, rather than a disruption of, the experience of being abled, and it is argued that the experience of disability is complex and dynamically influenced by both intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Different experiential aspects of disability— pre-reflective, attuned and reflective aspects—are described, demonstrating that the experience of disability comes in different degrees. Overall, this paper contributes to the debates about disability by further describing the personal aspects and experience of persons living with disabilities. (shrink)

The predominant model of the body in modern western medicine is the machine. Practitioners of the biomechanical model reduce the patient to separate, individual body parts in order to diagnose and treat disease. Utilization of this model has led, in part, to a quality of care crisis in medicine, in which patients perceive physicians as not sufficiently compassionate or empathic towards their suffering. Alternative models of the body, such as the phenomenological model, have been proposed to address this (...) crisis. According to the phenomenological model, the patient is viewed as an embodied person within a lived context and through this view the physician comes to understand the disruption illness causes in the patient’s everyday world of meaning. In this paper, I explore the impact these two models of the patient’s body have had on modern medical practice. To that end I first examine briefly the historical origins of the biomechanical and phenomenological models, providing a historical context for the discussion of each model’s main features in terms of machine-world and life-world. Next, I discuss the impact each model has had on the patient–physician relationship, and then I examine briefly the future development of each model. The meaning of illness vis-à-vis each model of the patient’s body is finally examined, especially in terms of how these two models affect the patient’s interpretation of illness. The paper concludes with a discussion of the biomechanical and phenomenological models, in terms of the quality of care crisis in modern western medicine. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:How Narrative Counts in Phenomenological Models of SchizophreniaThe author reports no conflicts of interest.Rosanna Wannberg (2024) offers an intriguing and novel critique of the predominant phenomenological model of schizophrenia, the ipseity disturbance hypothesis. According to this model, which was initially proposed by Sass and Parnas (2003), schizophrenia is best understood as arising from a disturbance or instability of minimal or basic self-hood, the sense of being (...) present to oneself and one's experiences (Henriksen, 2022). This disturbance appears as various experiential anomalies, sometimes termed "anomalous self (or world) experiences" or "self disorders," which include such phenomena as alienation from subjective processes, doubt in the existence of the world or one's own existence, fluidity of boundaries between self and others or self and world, and many other phenomena. Many of these have been captured in the Examination of Anomalous Self Experience (Parnas et al., 2005) and the Examination of Anomalous World Experience (Sass et al., 2017).At the same time, some research reveals the presence of self disorders in nonpsychotic conditions like panic disorder (Madeira et al., 2017) and depersonalization/derealization disorder (Sass et al., 2013). There are also competing phenomenological models that posit schizophrenia instead as a disturbance of dialogical self (Lysaker & Lysaker, 2002) or as a disruption of automatic perceptual processing (Uhlhaas & Mishara, 2007). Such works contain implicit critiques of the ipseity disturbance hypothesis that focus on the specificity of self disorders, or else on the specific nature of the underlying disturbance in schizophrenia.Wannberg's critique is distinct from these others: by considering the validity and function of recovery narratives, she raises crucial epistemological and ethical questions about the phenomenological approach to psychopathology, asking not only whose narrative counts, but how narrative counts. In particular, Wannberg questions a phenomenology that, she suggests, might find any ongoing symptoms as evidence of continued alterations of subjectivity, and that would then be dismissive of recovery narratives—a phenomenology that would prioritize the authority [End Page 71] of consciousness, as Wannberg puts it, over the authority of the person.It is worth stating here that the standard phenomenological response would not be to distrust or dismiss accounts of recovery. Ideally, phenomenological models, along with their ongoing theoretical developments and empirical work, are based on a deep respect for patients' experience and self-descriptions, striving to attend to experiences as they are lived without imposing pre-defined constructs that would limit or alter the experiences in a fundamental way (Nordgaard et al., 2013).Questions about the nature of recovery might be addressed within phenomenology by considering the difference between minimal (or basic) self and narrative (or extended) self, a more complex self-understanding or self-interpretation that is founded on the more basic, pre-reflective sense of being alive in the world (Gallagher, 2000; Parnas, 2007). According to proponents of the ipseity disturbance hypothesis, disturbances of basic self-hood can contribute to disturbances of narrative self, such as confusion about one's future goals or difficulties making sense of one's life history, though it is unlikely for disruptions that originate in the narrative self to trickle down to the minimal self (Henriksen, 2022). Such a view might similarly suggest that it would be unlikely for work on the level of the narrative self to lead to improvements in minimal self. Recovery, according to this approach, might best be viewed as an understanding of and compensation for alterations in basic self-hood, such that a person can develop a relatively solid narrative self that accounts for and manages disturbances of minimal self—while the minimal self may also grow more solid through various therapeutic interventions (Skodlar & Henriksen, 2019).Wannberg finds a more transformative possibility in Wittgenstein's grammatical approach, which is concerned with the function and rules of discourse. According to her grammar of recovery, recovery narratives are not only the product of a process of meaning-making and self-understanding, but they can create meaning and new realities. Furthermore, this process, according to Wannberg, has an inherently social and normative quality to it: the self-work that occurs in recovery and the recovery narrative involves the development of agency, autonomy, and responsibility in a social world... (shrink)

I have argued that the central Christian doctrine of general resurrection (with particular reference to the Pauline corpus) can and should be understood in a scientifically and philosophically informed context, and have proposed a personalist-phenomenological model of general resurrection as a personally continuous transformative re-embodiment by the grace of God within an interpretative framework that respects the methods and findings of science while rejecting scientism and associated physicalist metaphysical claims. I have considered and rejected the re-assembly model of resurrection (...) on theological, philosophical and scientific grounds. (shrink)

A distinction is made between theory-driven and phenomenological models. It is argued that phenomenological models are significant means by which theory is applied to phenomena. They act both as sources of knowledge of their target systems and are explanatory of the behaviors of the latter. A version of the shell-model of nuclear structure is analyzed and it is explained why such a model cannot be understood as being subsumed under the theory structure of Quantum Mechanics. Thus (...) its representational capacity does not stem from its close link to theory. It is shown that the shell model yields knowledge about the target and is explanatory of certain behaviors of nuclei. Aspects of the process by which the shell model acquires its representational capacity are analyzed. It is argued that these point to the conclusion that the representational status of the model is a function of its capacity to function as a source of knowledge and its capacity to postulate and explain underlying mechanisms that give rise to the observed behavior of its target. (shrink)

This eprint has been removed by the author's request.

Traditional nomological accounts of scientific explanation have assumed that a good scientific explanation consists in the derivation of the explanandum’s description from theory (plus antecedent conditions). But in more recent philosophy of science the adequacy of this approach has been challenged, because the relation between theory and phenomena in actual scientific practice turns out to be more intricate. This critique is here examined for an explanatory paradigm that was groundbreaking for 20th century physics and chemistry (and their interrelation): Bohr’s first (...) model of the atom and its explanatory relevance for the spectrum of hydrogen. First, the model itself is analysed with respect to the principles and assumptions that enter into its premises. Thereafter, the origin of the model’s explanandum is investigated. It can be shown that the explained “phenomenon” is itself the product of a host of modelling accomplishments that stem from an experimental tradition related to 19th century chemistry, viz. spectroscopy. The relation between theory and phenomenon is thus mediated in a twofold way: by (Bohr’s) theoretical model and a phenomenological model from spectroscopy. In the final section of the paper an account is outlined that nevertheless permits us to acknowledge this important physico-chemical achievement as a case of (nomological) explanation. (shrink)

This paper analyses the phenomenology and epistemology of chatbots such as ChatGPT and Bard. The computational architecture underpinning these chatbots are large language models (LLMs), which are generative AI (Artificial Intelligence) systems trained on a massive dataset of text extracted from the Web. We conceptualise these LLMs as multifunctional computational cognitive artifacts, used for various cognitive tasks such as translating, summarizing, answering questions, information-seeking, and much more. Phenomenologically, LLMs can be experienced as a “quasi-other”; when that happens, users anthropomorphise (...) them. For most users, current LLMs are black boxes, i.e., for the most part, they lack data transparency and algorithmic transparency. They can, however, be phenomenologically and informationally transparent, in which case there is an interactional flow. Anthropomorphising and interactional flow can, in some users, create an attitude of (unwarranted) trust towards the output LLMs generate. We conclude this paper by drawing on the epistemology of trust and testimony to examine the epistemic implications of these dimensions. Whilst LLMs generally generate accurate responses, we observe two epistemic pitfalls. Ideally, users should be able to match the level of trust that they place in LLMs to the degree that LLMs are trustworthy. However, both their data and algorithmic opacity and their phenomenological and informational transparency can make it difficult for users to calibrate their trust correctly. The effects of these limitations are twofold: users may adopt unwarranted attitudes of trust towards the outputs of LLMs (which is particularly problematic when LLMs hallucinate), and the trustworthiness of LLMs may be undermined. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a revival of a theory of conscious emotions as analogous in important ways to perceptual experiences. In the standard versions of this view emotions are construed as, potentially, perceptual disclosures of values. The model has been widely debated and criticized. In this paper I reconstruct an early, qualified version of the perceptual model to be found in the classical phenomenological approaches of Scheler and Sartre. After outlining this version of the theory, I examine (...) its prospects against objections prominent in the current debate. (shrink)

People suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) do things they do not want to do, and/or they think things they do not want to think. In about 10 percent of OCD patients, none of the available treatment options is effective. A small group of these patients is currently being treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). Deep brain stimulation involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain. These electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain area in which they are implanted. (...) It turns out that patients may experience profound changes as a result of DBS treatment. It is not just the symptoms that change; patients rather seem to experience a different way of being in the world. These global effects are insufficiently captured by traditional psychiatric scales, which mainly consist of behavioural measures of the severity of the symptoms. In this article we aim to capture the changes in the patients’ phenomenology and make sense of the broad range of changes they report. For that we introduce an enactive, affordance-based model that fleshes out the dynamic interactions between person and world in four aspects. The first aspect is the patients’ experience of the world. We propose to specify the patients’ world in terms of a field of affordances, with the three dimensions of broadness of scope (‘width’ of the field), temporal horizon (‘depth’), and relevance of the perceived affordances (‘height’). The second aspect is the person-side of the interaction, that is, the patients’ self-experience, notably their moods and feelings. Thirdly, we point to the different characteristics of the way in which patients relate to the world. And lastly, the existential stance refers to the stance that patients take towards the changes they experience: the second-order evaluative relation to their interactions and themselves. With our model we intend to specify the notion of being in the world in order to do justice to the phenomenological effects of DBS treatment. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce and defend the recurrent model for understanding bodily spatial phenomenology. While Longo, Azañón and Haggard (2010) propose a bottom-up model, Bermúdez (2017) emphasizes the top-down aspect of the information processing loop. We argue that both are only half of the story. Section 1 intro- duces what the issues are. Section 2 starts by explaining why the top- down, descending direction is necessary with the illustration from the ‘body-based tactile rescaling’ paradigm (de Vignemont, Ehrsson and Haggard, (...) 2005). It then argues that the bottom-up, ascending direction is also necessary, and substantiates this view with recent research on skin space and tactile field (Haggard et al., 2017). Section 3 discusses the model’s application to body ownership and bodily self-representation. Implications also extend to topics such as sense modality individuation (Macpherson, 2011), the constancy- based view of perception (Burge, 2010), and the perception/cognition divide (Firestone and Scholl, 2016). (shrink)

In this dissertation I develop a structural model of phenomenal consciousness that integrates contemporary experimental and theoretical work in philosophy and cognitive science. I argue that phenomenology must be “naturalized” and that it should be acknowledged as a major component of empirical research. I use this model to describe important phenomenal structures, and I then employ it to provide a detailed explication of tip-of-tongue phenomena. The primary aim of “structural phenomenology” is the creation of a general framework within which descriptions (...) of experiences may be organized. The work of Husserl, Gurwitsch, the Gestalt psychologists, and many contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists reveals several basic parameters underlying subjectivity. Chapter I argues that Husserlian methodology possesses problems both of praxis and of internal logic, and that its phenomenological descriptions cannot have the certainty he claimed. Consequently, an adequate phenomenology must incorporate empirical studies. This conclusion enables explicit transitions between empirical investigations and phenomenological insights. Chapter II introduces the theoretical framework underlying my model. I identify four parameters applicable to all experiences: 1) the degree of volitional emphasis with which something is experienced, i.e., the intensity of our focus on it, 2) the degree of non-volitional emphasis, i.e., the degree to which it is salient, 3) a variant of intentionality I term “directionality”, and 4) the property of recursion. Experiences are embedded within a complex set of relationships that unify and direct a layered phenomenal structure. I support these claims with evidence discovered over the past two centuries of research. Chapter III applies my model to the tip-of-tongue (TOT) state, in which difficulty remembering is accompanied by a sense of active searching. I show that a phenomenological description of the TOT experience is dependent on cognitive data, and that a phenomenological analysis is necessary to properly interpret these data. By showing how structural phenomenology offers a perspective from which to elucidate the results of experimental studies, I hope to clarify and establish the explicit role of introspection in empiricism, and of empiricism in phenomenology. (shrink)

A phenomenological model is developed as an alternative to current analyses of the imagination in sport philosophy, heirs to an Enlightenment notion that conceptualizes imaginings as abstract, eidetic, and representational. EC describes how Eidetic and Corporeal Imaginings phenomenologically structure our imaginative undertakings. EIs keep the ‘ideal’ aspect, but CIs—enacted, corporeal, non-representational—are more fundamental and foundational. Sports are particularly suited to express CIs’ muscular imaginings, which result in novel performances. An enactive framework theorizes CIs as non-representational interactions.

A phenomenological model is developed as an alternative to current analyses of the imagination in sport philosophy, heirs to an Enlightenment notion that conceptualizes imaginings as abstract, eidetic, and representational. EC describes how Eidetic and Corporeal Imaginings phenomenologically structure our imaginative undertakings. EIs keep the ‘ideal’ aspect, but CIs—enacted, corporeal, non-representational—are more fundamental and foundational. Sports are particularly suited to express CIs’ muscular imaginings, which result in novel performances. An enactive framework theorizes CIs as non-representational interactions.

In this contribution I propose a contemporary reading of the ontological dimension of Max Scheler’s early phenomenology of sense perception. My examination will start with a brief informal explanation of this theory, and his scientific and philosophical sources. The second step will be the introduction of some elements of Formal Philosophy : this piece of research will focus on N. B. Cocchiarella’s interpretation of FP and it will allow me to introduce the concept of a Philosophical Formal Ontology in comparison (...) with the computational one. Finally, the third step will be the construction of a semi-formalized model of Scheler’s early phenomenology of sense perception. Here I will use a dynamic-epistemic version of the modal calculus KT5. (shrink)

This chapter explores to what extent some core ideas of predictive processing can be applied to the phenomenology of time consciousness. The focus is on the experienced continuity of consciously perceived, temporally extended phenomena (such as enduring processes and successions of events). The main claim is that the hierarchy of representations posited by hierarchical predictive processing models can contribute to a deepened understanding of the continuity of consciousness. Computationally, such models show that sequences of events can be represented (...) as states of a hierarchy of dynamical systems. Phenomenologically, they suggest a more fine-grained analysis of the perceptual contents of the specious present, in terms of a hierarchy of temporal wholes. Visual perception of static scenes not only contains perceived objects and regions but also spatial gist; similarly, auditory perception of temporal sequences, such as melodies, involves not only perceiving individual notes but also slightly more abstract features (temporal gist), which have longer temporal durations (e.g., emotional character or rhythm). Further investigations into these elusive contents of conscious perception may be facilitated by findings regarding its neural underpinnings. Predictive processing models suggest that sensorimotor areas may influence these contents. (shrink)

This paper presents a version of neurophenomenology based on generative modelling techniques developed in computational neuroscience and biology. Our approach can be described as _computational phenomenology_ because it applies methods originally developed in computational modelling to provide a formal model of the descriptions of lived experience in the phenomenological tradition of philosophy (e.g., the work of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, etc.). The first section presents a brief review of the overall project to naturalize phenomenology. The second section presents and (...) evaluates philosophical objections to that project and situates our version of computational phenomenology with respect to these projects. The third section reviews the generative modelling framework. The final section presents our approach in detail. We conclude by discussing how our approach differs from previous attempts to use generative modelling to help understand consciousness. In summary, we describe a version of computational phenomenology which uses generative modelling to construct a computational model of the inferential or interpretive processes that best explain this or that kind of lived experience. (shrink)

A distinguishing characteristic of the biomedical model is its compartmentalized view of man. This way of seeing human beings has its origin in Greek thought; it was stated by Descartes and to this day it still considers humans as beings composed of distinct entities combined into a certain form. Because of this observation, one began to believe that the focus of a health treatment could be exclusively on the affected area of the body, without the need to pay attention to (...) patient’s subjectivity. By seeing pain as a merely sensory response, this model was not capable of encompassing chronic pain, since the latter is a complex process that can occur independently of tissue damage. As of the second half of the twentieth century, when it became impossible to deny the relationship between psyche and soma, the current understanding of chronic pain emerges: that of chronic pain as an individual experience, the result of a sum of physical, psychological, and social factors that, for this reason, cannot be approached separately from the individual who expresses pain. This understanding has allowed a significant improvement in perspective, emphasizing the characteristic of pain as an individual experience. However, the understanding of chronic pain as a sum of factors corresponds to the current way of seeing the process of falling ill, for its conception holds a Cartesian duality and the positivist premise of a single reality. For phenomenology, on the other hand, the individual in his/her unity is more than a simple sum of parts. Phenomenology sees a human being as an intending entity, in which body, mind, and the world are intertwined and constitute each other mutually, thus establishing the human being’s integral functioning. Therefore, a real understanding of the chronic pain process would only be possible from a phenomenological point of view at the experience lived by the individual who expresses and communicates pain. (shrink)

We contrast person-centered categories with objective categories related to physics: consciousness vs. mechanism, observer vs. observed, agency vs. event causation. semantics vs. syntax, beliefs and desires vs. dispositions. How are these two sets of categories related? This talk will discuss just one such dichotomy: consciousness vs. mechanism. Two extreme views are dualism and reductionism. An intermediate view is emergence. Here, consciousness is part of the natural order (as against dualism), but consciousness is not definable only in terms of physical mass, (...) length, and time (as against reductionism). There are several detailed theories of emergence. One is based on the Great Chain of Being and on organic evolutionary hierarchy. The theory here is based instead on the concept of relational holism in quantum mechanics. The resulting brain model has two interacting systems: a computational system and a quantum system (a Bose-Einstein condensate), perhaps interacting via EEG waves. Thus, we need both person-centered and matter-centered categories to describe human beings. Some possible experimental tests are discussed. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Suárez and Cartwright return to the example of London and London's construction of a model for superconductivity and raise a number of concerns against the account of this construction presented in French and Ladyman and elsewhere. In this discussion note, we examine the challenge they raised and offer our responses.

Cochlear implants electrically stimulate surviving auditory neurons in the cochlea to provide severely or profoundly deaf people with access to hearing. Signal processing strategies derive frequency-specific information from the acoustic signal and code amplitude changes in frequency bands onto amplitude changes of current pulses emitted by the tonotopically arranged intracochlear electrodes. This article first describes how parameters of the electrical stimulation influence the loudness evoked and then summarizes two different phenomenological models developed by McKay and colleagues that have (...) been used to explain psychophysical effects of stimulus parameters on loudness, detection, and modulation detection. The Temporal Model is applied to single-electrode stimuli and integrates cochlear neural excitation using a central temporal integration window analogous to that used in models of normal hearing. Perceptual decisions are made using decision criteria applied to the output of the integrator. By fitting the model parameters to a variety of psychophysical data, inferences can be made about how electrical stimulus parameters influence neural excitation in the cochlea. The Detailed Model is applied to multi-electrode stimuli, and includes effects of electrode interaction at a cochlear level and a transform between integrated excitation and specific loudness. The Practical Method of loudness estimation is a simplification of the Detailed Model and can be used to estimate the relative loudness of any multi-electrode pulsatile stimuli without the need to model excitation at the cochlear level. Clinical applications of these models to novel sound processing strategies are described. (shrink)

The problem of self-consciousness has been an essential one for philosophy since the onset of modernity. Both E. Tugendhat and the Heidelberg School represented by D. Henrich have reflected critically upon the traditional theory of self-consciousness, and both have revealed the circular dilemma of the “reflection-model” adopted by the traditional theory. In order to avoid the dilemma, they both proposed substitute formulas, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages. Husserl also paid particular attention to the traditional theory of self-consciousness (...) in his phenomenology. Through the distinctions of “primal consciousness” and “reflection,” Husserl explored the core problem of the traditional theory of self-consciousness in two different dimensions. In his critique, Husserl clarified the founding relation between primal consciousness and reflection, and in contrast to Tugendhat’s semantic approach, he developed a new reflection-model of self-consciousness which effectively avoids the circular dilemma of the traditional theory and does not narrow the problem domain of that theory. (shrink)

The long-standing tradition of phenomenological psychopathology has been historically concerned with the nature of mental disorders, with a special focus on their basic experiential core. In the same way, much of the recent phenomenologically-inspired work in psychopathology consists in providing precise and refined tools for diagnosis, classification, and nosology of mental disorders. What is striking, however, is the lack of therapeutic proposals in this tradition. Although a number of phenomenological approaches refer positively to psychotherapeutic practices, psychopharmacological intervention has (...) been mostly neglected as a relevant field of attention. This work aims to fill this gap. We maintain that the convergence of phenomenological psychopathology and psychopharmacology exhibit a rich potential for mutual enlightenment, which unfolds into a more adequate psychopharmacological practice. Initially, after discussing Joanna Moncrieff’s drug-centered model of drug action we review some of the major findings in phenomenological literature regarding psychopharmacological treatment. Next, we suggest that Moncrieff’s drug-centered model can be seen as an important tool for improving clinical decision-making, by elucidating its inherent epistemic advantage when compared to mainstream models of drug action. As a result, the drug-centered model proves to be also patient-centered, by focusing on experiential alterations and helping to improve treatment outcomes. (shrink)

Thomas Metzinger's self-model theory offers a framework for naturalizing subjective experiences, e.g. first-person perspective. These phenomena are explained by referring to representational contents which are said to be interrelated at diverse levels of consciousness and correlated with brain activities. The paper begins with a consideration on naturalism and anti-naturalism in order to roughly sketch the background of Metzinger's claim that his theory renders philosophical speculations on the mind unnecessary. In particular, Husserl's phenomenological conception of consciousness is refuted as uncritical (...) and inadequate. It is demonstrated that this critique is misguided. The main deficiencies of Metzinger's theory are elucidated by referring to the conception of phenomenal transparency which is compared to a phenomenological idea of transparency. The critical horizon is then enlarged by focusing on some implications of representationalism, including reification of consciousness, brain-Cartesianism and exclusion of the social dimension. Finally meta-theoretical reflections on the naturalism debate are taken up. (shrink)

While the richness of Heideggerian philosophy is attractive as a healthcare research framework, its density means authors rarely utilise its fullest possibilities as an hermeneutic analytic structure. This article aims to clarify Heideggerian hermeneutic analysis by taking one discrete element of Heideggerian philosophy (Being-towards-death), and using it’s clearly defined structure to conduct a meta-synthesis of Heideggerian phenomenological studies on the experience of living with a potentially life-limiting illness. The findings richly illustrate Heidegger’s philosophy that there is either an inauthentic (...) positioning towards death, or an authentic positioning towards death with a proposition that (1) death is certain; (2) death is indefinite; (3) death is non-relational; and (4) death is not-to-be-outstripped. None of the 29 included studies on the experience of a confrontation with death fully utilised this framework, despite claiming a grounding in Heideggerian thought. This demonstrates the value in modelling how Heideggerian existential structures can be used proactively as analytical ‘hooks’ for data in research claiming a basis in this philosophy and/or method. By modelling the potential application of an important Heideggerian philosophical construct to published qualitative data, this meta-synthesis has revealed new domains and more nuanced understandings of the temporal structure of Being-towards-death. Such an approach helps to more fully unveil the existential concerns of people at the core of interpretative phenomenological enquiry and may provide a blueprint to map either primary or synthesised data to other key ontological existentials. (shrink)

Analytic and continental philosophies of mind are too long divided. In both traditions there is extensive discussion of consciousness, the mind-body problem, intentionality, subjectivity, perception (especially visual) and so on. Between these two discussions there are substantive disagreements, overlapping points of insight, meaningful differences in emphasis, and points of comparison which seems to offer nothing but confusion. In other words, there are the ideal circumstances for doing philosophy. Yet, there has been little discourse. This paper invites expanding discourse between these (...) two philosophical traditions. The first part briefly describes the existing literature which works across the analytic- phenomenology divide, situating my work within it as a focus on analytic physicalism and phenomenal explanation. In the longer second part, I sketch a model for explanation embedded simultaneously in both traditions. Hopefully, a theoretical framework emerges that the unlikely combination of Maurice Merleau- Ponty and Patricia Churchland could accept. In the third part, I apply the three-tiered model to a discussion of plasticity and suggest that the model both reflects existing research across three levels of analysis and can be a fruitful way to approach future research. My suggestion for a three-tiered model is quite tentative. Much less tentative is my claim that constructive dialogue between phenomeno- logical and physicalist study of consciousness is long-overdue, illuminating, and practical. (shrink)

This thesis studies collider phenomenology of physics beyond the Standard Model at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). It also explores in detail advanced topics related to Higgs boson and supersymmetry - one of the most exciting and well-motivated streams in particle physics. In particular, it finds a very large enhancement of multiple Higgs boson production in vector-boson scattering when Higgs couplings to gauge bosons differ from those predicted by the Standard Model. The thesis demonstrates that due to the loss of (...) unitarity, the very large enhancement for triple Higgs boson production takes place. This is a truly novel finding. The thesis also studies the effects of supersymmetric partners of top and bottom quarks on the Higgs production and decay at the LHC, pointing for the first time to non-universal alterations for two main production processes of the Higgs boson at the LHC-vector boson fusion and gluon-gluon fusion. Continuing the exploration of Higgs boson and supersymmetry at the LHC, the thesis extends existing experimental analysis and shows that for a single decay channel the mass of the top quark superpartner below 175 GeV can be completely excluded, which in turn excludes electroweak baryogenesis in the Minimal Supersymmetric Model. This is a major new finding for the HEP community. This thesis is very clearly written and the introduction and conclusions are accessible to a wide spectrum of readers. (shrink)

This thesis provides an introduction to the physics of the Standard Model and beyond, and to the methods used to analyse Large Hadron Collider (LHC) data. The 'hierarchy problem', astrophysical data and experiments on neutrinos indicate that new physics can be expected at the now accessible TeV scale. This work investigates extensions of the Standard Model with gravitons and gravitinos (in the context of supergravity). The production of these particles in association with jets is studied as one of the most (...) promising avenues for researching new physics at the LHC. Advanced simulation techniques and tools, such as algorithms allowing the computation of Feynman graphs and helicity amplitudes are first developed and then employed. (shrink)

Mipam (‘ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912), an architect of the Nyingma (rnying ma) tradition of Tibet in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, articulates two distinct models of the two truths that are respectively reflected in Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Buddhist traditions. The way he positions these two models sheds light on how levels of description are at play in his integration of these traditions. Mipam positions one kind of two-truth model as the product of an ontological (...) analysis while another model can be seen as resulting from a phenomenological reduction. He accommodates both models into his systematic interpretation, and for him, each one has an important role to play in coming to understand the nature of the Buddhist truths of emptiness and Buddha-nature. Since each model reflects a different style of analysis, or a different perspective on truth, his presentation reveals how neither model alone has the last word on the nature of what is and how it is experienced. This paper analyzes the means by which he lays out these two models of the two truths, and explores the implications of their integration in his philosophical works. A primary concern for Mipam, and a factor that guides his attempt to integrate these two approaches to truth, is his aim to both induce authentic experience and true knowledge on the one hand, and represent reality and the experience of it on the other. These competing and complimentary objectives are a central focus around which both styles of critical reflection, and both models of the two truths, revolve. (shrink)

Many commonly accepted models for understanding disability use a vertical method in which disability is defined as a category into which people are slotted based on whether or not they fit its definitional criteria. This method, and the models of disability developed in accordance with it, inevitably homogenizes the experiences of disabled people to preserve the integrity of the definition of disability that a given model provides. A hermeneutic investigation and critique of commonly accepted models for understanding (...) disability will provide an epistemological tool that makes it possible both to critique and to augment contemporary models of disability. (shrink)

Thomas Metzinger’s self-model theory offers a frame¬work for naturalizing subjective experiences, e.g. first-person perspective. These phenomena are explained by referring to representational contents which are said to be interrelated at diverse levels of consciousness and correlated with brain activities. The paper begins with a consideration on naturalism and anti-naturalism in order to roughly sketch the background of Metzinger’s claim that his theory renders philosophical speculations on the mind unnecessary . In particular, Husserl’s phenomenological conception of consciousness is refuted as (...) uncritical and inadequate. It will be demonstrated that this critique is misguided. . The main deficiencies of Metzinger’s theory will be elucidated by referring to the conception of phenomenal transparency which will be compared to a phenomenological idea of transparency . Then we shall enlarge our critical horizon by focusing on some implications of representationalism, including reification of consciousness, brain-Cartesianism, and exclusion of the social dimension . Finally, we shall take up our meta-theoretical reflections on the naturalism debate. (shrink)

The article explores the use of the “ChatGPT” artificial intelligence language model in the Human Sciences field. ChatGPT uses natural language processing techniques to imitate human language and engage in artificial conversations. While the platform has gained attention from the scientific community, opinions on its usage are divided. The article presents some conversations with ChatGPT to examine ethical, relational and linguistic issues related to human-computer interaction (HCI) and assess its potential for Human Sciences research. The interaction with the platform recalls (...) the “uncanny valley” phenomenon still known to Social Robotics. While ChatGPT can be beneficial, it requires proper supervision and verification of its results. Furthermore, new research methods must be developed for qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods. (shrink)

This paper provides a philosophical evaluation of the concept of handedness prevalent but largely unspoken in the scientific literature. This literature defines handedness as the preference or ability to use one hand rather than the other across a range of common activities. Using the philosophical discipline of phenomenology, I articulate and critique this conceptualization of handedness. Phenomenology shows defining a concept of handedness by focusing on hand use leads to a right hand biased concept. I argue further that a (...) class='Hi'>phenomenological model based in spatial orientation rather than hand use provides a more inclusive concept of handedness. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the use of scientific models that attribute intentional content to complex systems bears a striking similarity to the way in which statistical descriptions are used. To demonstrate this, I compare and contrast an intentional model with a statistical model, and argue that key similarities between the two give us compelling reasons to consider both as a type of phenomenological model. I then demonstrate how intentional descriptions play an important role in scientific methodology (...) as a type of phenomenal model, and argue that this makes them as essential as any other model of this type. (shrink)

This paper aims to highlight the life of computer technologies to understand what kind of ‘technological intentionality’ is present in computers based upon the phenomenological elements constituting the objects in general. Such a study can better explain the effects of new digital technologies on our society and highlight the role of digital technologies by focusing on their activities. Even if Husserlian phenomenology rarely talks about technologies, some of its aspects can be used to address the actions performed by the (...) digital technologies by focusing on the objects’ inner ‘life’ thanks to the analysis of passive synthesis and phenomenological horizons in the objects. These elements can be used in computer technologies to show how digital objects are ‘alive.’ This paper focuses on programs developed through high-order languages like C++ and unsupervised learning techniques like ‘Generative Adversarial Model.’ The phenomenological analysis reveals the computer’s autonomy within the programming stages. At the same time, the conceptual inquiry into the digital system’s learning ability shows the alive and changeable nature of the technological object itself. (shrink)