The book treats the compelling question of war and personal responsibility in contemporary America. Cheyney Ryan examines how Americans often support modern warfare but have zero interest in fighting themselves . Ryan seeks to show how we must come to terms with our understanding and valuing of war when we ourselves are not committed to fighting in it.

We emerge from certain activities with an altered sense of self. Whether returning from a warzone or from an experience as common as caring for an aging parent, one might remark, “I’m not the same person I was.” I argue that such transformations are relevant to debates about what morality requires of us. To undergo an alteration in one’s self is to make a special kind of sacrifice, a sacrifice of self. Since projects can be more or less (...) morally obligatory to the extent that they require more or less sacrifice, we must incorporate these unique sacrifices into any accounting of the contours and limits of moral obligation. But sacrifices of self pose a special difficulty for any such accounting, precisely because of their transformative nature. Unlike most other sacrifices, they cannot be analyzed entirely in terms of wellbeing. Using real-world case studies and examples, I argue for the existence of two types of sacrifice of self, involving changes in identity and moral agency. I argue that sacrifices of self require particular attention because they may be extra difficult to compare with other costs and with moral gains. (shrink)

Utilitarianism seems to require us to sacrifice a person if doing so will produce a net increase in the amount of utility. This feature of utilitarianism is extremely unattractive. The puzzle is how to reject this requirement without rejecting the plausible claim that we are often wise to trade lesser amounts of utility for greater amounts. I argue that such a position is not as paradoxical as it may appear, so long as we understand the relationship between the value (...) of utility and the value of persons in a certain way. I argue that the traditional utilitarian position assumes an inadequate view of this relationship. I suggest a more plausible view of this relationship, one which implies that we may not sacrifice a person merely in order to produce a net gain in utility, where that utility does not result from the saving of any other persons' lives. (shrink)

When a person gives up an end of crucial importance to her in order to promote a moral aim, we regard her as having made a moral sacrifice. The paper analyzes these sacrifices in light of some of Bernard Williams’ objections to Kantian and Utilitarian accounts of them. Williams argues that an implausible consequence of these theories is that that we are expected to sacrifice projects that make our lives worth living and contribute to our integrity. Williams’ arguments (...) about integrity and meaning are shown to be unconvincing when the content of projects is left open. However, a look at his later arguments suggests a reason to be concerned about defensible ethical projects as understood through what he refers to as “the morality system”. The problem for theories of this type turns out to be not merely conflicts between ethical projects and moral demands but making sense of some of the ethically relevant features of these projects. Accommodations to moral theories that leave room for ethical projects may be insufficient to explain such features, for example in cases where agents demand more of themselves than the theories require. Making the theories more demanding is also problematic. Williams’ view about the role ethics plays in our conception of the life we want to lead provides a better account of these cases. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that the achievement of one's goals can contribute to one's welfare apart from whatever independent contributions that the objects of those goals or the processes by which they are achieved make. Call this the Achievement View, and call those who accept it achievementists. In this paper, I argue that achievementists should accept both that one factor that affects how much the achievement of a goal contributes to one’s welfare is the amount that one has invested in that (...) goal and that the amount that one has invested in a goal is a function of how much one has personally sacrificed for its sake, not a function of how much effort one has put into achieving it. So I will, contrary to at least one achievementist, be arguing against the view that the greater the amount of productive effort that goes into achieving a goal, the more its achievement contributes to one's welfare. Furthermore, I argue that the reason that the achievement of those goals for which one has personally sacrificed matters more to one’s welfare is that, in general, the redemption of one's self-sacrifices in itself contributes to one’s welfare. Lastly, I argue that the view that the redemption of one's self-sacrifices in itself contributes to one's welfare is plausible independent of whether or not we find the Achievement View plausible. We should accept this view so as to account both for the Shape of a Life Phenomenon and for the rationality of honoring "sunk costs.". (shrink)

Impartial moral theories must deal with the Problem of the Demandingness of Morality—the worry that impartial moral requirements will be so demanding upon an agent’s time and resources that she will not be able to pursue her own flourishing, a good human life as she conceives it. Proponents of eudaimonistic virtue ethics must confront an inverted form of the demandingness objection, namely that their theory is not demanding enough, does not require that agents ever sacrifice their own good. Of (...) course, the requirements of virtues such as justice, generosity, and courage frequently call for much to be sacrificed, but never for agents to sacrifice their pursuit of the good life as they see it. Everything is done for the sake of eudaimonia, so whatever sacrifices agents do make are made for the sake of eudaimonia—and thus, it seems, for the sake of a greater good for the agents themselves. After considering and finding inadequate a range of responses that are analogous to common responses to the problem of demandingness, I outline what I take to be the correct response to the inverted demandingness objection, which is to make clear that the pursuit of eudaimonia is itself a sacrifice; it is indeed the sacrifice of the agent’s whole life. The word “sacrifice” derives from Latin words meaning to make holy, to dedicate something to the divine. More generally, we can say that it is to dedicate something to the good—to a person, community, or cause insofar as it is good. I argue that to live a life of virtue is to sacrifice oneself, is to dedicate oneself to the good. Eudaimonistic virtue ethics never requires of a virtuous agent that she sacrifice by turning aside from her pursuit of flourishing for moral reasons, because this pursuit already is the sacrifice of herself for moral reasons. Eudaimonistic virtue ethics, of course, is not a theory but a family of theories, and not all of them are amenable to this response to the inverted demandingness objection. But for those that are—if they are vulnerable to a demandingness objection, it is not the objection in its inverted form. (shrink)

Theories of economic justice are characteristically based on abstract ethical concerns often unrelated to practical distributive results. Two decades ago, Rawls's theory of justice began as a reaction against the alleged ‘sacrifices’ condoned by utilitarian theory. One variant of this objection is that utilitarianism permits gross inequalities, severe deprivations of individual liberty, or even the enslavement of society's least well-off individuals. There are, however, more subtle forms of the objection. In Rawls, it is often waged without any claim that utilitarianismdoesin (...) fact imply such gross deprivations in actual realworld circumstances. A second variant hinges, rather, on the milder claim that utilitarianismcouldcondone such deprivations or sacrifices in somepossibleworld—the objection being that utilitarianism improperly makes justice contingent, or uncertain, in this way. A third, still more abstract, variant would be that utilitarianism is flawed—not because of any practical distributive result, actual or hypothetical, but intheory—due to the way it treats individuals' interests, or the ‘concept of persons’ it presupposes. (shrink)

Stephen Darwall has recently suggested (following work by Mark Overvold) that theories which identify a person’s good with her own ranking of concerns do not properly delimit the ‘scope’ of welfare, making self-sacrifice conceptually impossible. But whether a theory of welfare makes self-sacrifice impossible depends on what self-sacrifice is. I offer an alternative analysis to Overvold’s, explaining why self-interest and self-sacrifice need not be opposed, and so why the problems of delimiting the scope of welfare and (...) of allowing for self-sacrifice are distinct. If my analysis is correct, desire theories may allow for self-sacrifice however they delimit the scope of welfare. (shrink)

ABSTRACTMost authors who discuss the normative impact of sacrifices do so with regards to the impact that a sacrifice can have on the practical reasons of the agent who makes it. A different and underappreciated phenomenon of sacrifices is their other-regarding normative impact: the sacrifice of person A can have an impact on the practical reasons of person B, either by generating practical reasons for B to act in certain ways or by intensifying existing reasons of B for (...) specific courses of action. This paper asks when and why sacrifices have such other-regarding normative impact and argues that sacrifices can have other-regarding normative impact because sacrifices can be intrinsically good. The intrinsic value of sacrifices is explained by the recursive account of value: sacrifices are intrinsically good if and because they are appropriate responses to intrinsic values, and appropriate responses to intrinsic values are themselves intrinsically good. Furthermore, sacrifices are difficult to make, and successful pursuit in difficult activities can also be intrinsically good. (shrink)

There is no doubt that a person's gender could make a difference to their role in Greek sacrifices. But did it normally make a difference in Greece? And why did it make a difference? Two inscriptions from the island of Thasos neatly illustrate the problem. First, one dated to around 440 and found in the sanctuary of Herakles: [ρα]κλε Θασωι [αγ]α ο θμισ, ο– [δ] χορον οδ γ– [υ]ναικ; θμισ ο– [δ]' νατεεται ο– δ γρα τμνετα– ι οσ' θλται1.

How much are we morally required to do to aid others? After articulating some of the main contributions to this debate, I defend the position that we are sometimes morally permitted to spend our time and resources satisfying our own interests and needs rather than using them to aid others who are in desperate need. I argue that the duty to aid the needy should not always take priority over every other end we have. Whatever else we value, we most (...) highly value the ability and opportunity to live our lives on our own terms; this grounds both our obligation to aid others and places limits on how far these obligations ought to extend. Persons ought to respect others and fulfill their moral obligations but they must also be given the moral space to set ends and pursue those ends just because they are theirs. (shrink)

Religious, philosophical, and theological views on the self vary widely. For some the self is seen as the center of human personhood, the ultimate bearer of personal identity and the core mystery of human existence. For others the self is a grammatical error and the sense of self an existential and epistemic delusion. This volume documents a debate between Eastern and Western critics and defenders of the self or of the no-self that explores the intercultural dimensions of this important (...) topic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.1 (2003) 17-21 [Access article in PDF] Self-Injury:Symbolic Sacrifice/Self-Assertion Renders Clinicians Helpless Christa Krüger Keywords feminism, iconic communication, moral conflict, oppression, psychiatrist/psychologist roles, societal norms. POTTER'S PAPER CONSIDERS self-injury in women diagnosed with borderline person ality disorder (BPD) to be a form of body modification where the body is used to communicate meaning. She touches on symbolism as a possible explanatory theory for this (...) sort of self-injury. She also refers to the culture of body commodification as underlying self-injury. She then argues that clinicians have a duty to give uptake to the patient's own interpretations about the meaning of the self-injury. Giving uptake is a virtuous approach for ethical interactions with people diagnosed with BPD who self-injure, and it aims to preserve the communicator's integrity, along with other benefits. Potter offers five maxims for giving uptake properly. However, I shall argue that giving uptake can be very difficult for clinicians, and that an appreciation of this difficulty depends on an expansion and linkage of some of the theories that she touched on. Self-injury is revisited experimentally as a double-edged sword of symbolic sacrifice and iconic-symbolic self-assertion. This revisiting aims to illustrate how clinicians might be caught in a double bind, where giving uptake properly might be very difficult if not more or less doomed to fail.Potter's paper starts by situating self-injury in a broader discourse of body modifications. In this discourse the body is being used as a text, a tool to communicate meaning. The meaning that is communicated might be difficult or impossible to articulate otherwise (by using words, for example). The meaning of the communication is embedded in a context of social, cultural, religious, political, and other norms. Potter explores possible interpretations of the meaning of self-injury in women with BPD, including an interpretation of self-injury as symbolic sacrifice. She suggests that a cultural understanding/nonunderstanding of the meaning of a particular instance of self-injury is an important determinant of whether such self-injury is considered pathological/nonpathological. She then shifts the focus to the present-day culture in which women's bodies are commodified and objectified, and where women become alienated from their bodies. Self-injury might then be interpreted as an attempt to re-own one's body as a part of oneself. This re-owning is a socially transgressive act that violates repressive norms for the bodies of women. [End Page 17]Notwithstanding these possible significations of self-injury, Potter then argues that clinicians have a duty to give uptake to the patient's own interpretations, instead of jumping to conclusions (my oversimplification) about the meaning of the self-injury. Giving uptake, then, constitutes a framework for ethical interactions with people diagnosed with BPD who self-injure, and it aims to preserve the communicator's integrity. Potter offers five maxims for giving uptake properly.At the risk of losing their essence, I translate the five maxims for practicing psychiatrists as involving the following: critical self-reflection about one's own conceptual framework and cultural context; being receptive to the patient's conceptual framework and cultural context; giving the patient the benefit of the doubt; being open to the emergence of new meanings of self-injury; and keeping a range of possible interpretative options open, rather than insisting on having the final word. We should try to understand what the world looks like from the patient's position. All of this requires some moral effort.Potter describes a number of benefits that result from giving uptake. Giving uptake is a crucial corrective to the human tendencies of becoming overly committed to prevailing societal norms and conceptual schemes (stuck in our ways), of imposing our views on others, and of silencing or distorting the communications of our patients. Giving uptake allows clinicians to be dialogically responsive and to treat patients with respect and dignity. Giving uptake fosters trust in a therapeutic relationship where clinicians do not exploit their patients' vulnerabilities. Giving... (shrink)

Some modern Christian notions of ‘self-sacrifice’ and ‘cruciformity’ abstract an ethic of self-negation from its larger theological and teleological frame. A distinctively modern and Western trajectory has shaped an ‘exclusive altruism’ where the interests of the self and of the other stand in a competitive relationship. Although Paul's letter to the Philippians has often been cited as a prime example of such an ethic, closer scrutiny reveals a larger narrative frame, for both Christ and believers, that is oriented towards (...) fullness, not kenosis. Within a community of solidarity and reciprocal asymmetry in Christ, each person's work in looking to the concerns of others is balanced and framed by a communal concern to safeguard the interests of each person in the interests of conjoint benefit. Pauline resources thus enable us to replace the modern polarity with an alternative: the proper opposite to being selfish is not to be ‘selfless’ but to be ‘self-with’. (shrink)

The diagnosis of bipolar disorder has been linked to giftedness of various sorts and this raises a special problem in that it is likely that the condition has a genetic basis. Therefore it seems possible that in the near future we will be able to detect and eliminate the gene predisposing to the disorder. This may mean, however, that, as a society, we lose the associated gifts. We might then face a difficult decision either way in that it is unclear (...) that we are preventing an unalloyed bad when we diagnose and eliminate bipolar disorder through prenatal genetic testing and yet if we allow the individual to be born we are condemning that person to being an unwitting sacrifice in that they might well suffer considerable net distress as a result of our need to keep our gene pool enriched in the relevant way. (shrink)

The main purpose of the paper is to examine the question as to whether self-sacrifice is intrinsic to moral action. The conclusion is that though some moral deeds can be free of appreciable self-sacrifice, most of the time some degree of self-sacrifice is called for. The necessity is not conceptual but built into the lives of most people. The paper is especially interested in a person's refusal to go along with or actively cooperate with wrongdoing, even when (...) there is some risk; and positively giving assistance to those who are oppressed or persecuted, and again when there is some risk. Abstaining from violating the rights and entitlements of others is not enough to be moral, indispensable as it is. An important issue is what degree of self-sacrifice is called for, which, when not risked or endured, allows us to think that immorality has been committed. I follow the standard practice of distinguishing between moral heroism and moral obligation. Moral heroism is exemplified by Socrates who at risk to his life refused to cooperate with the unjust command of the Thirty to seize an innocent man and hand him over for execution. The paper holds that one's basic rights set the limits to the extent of self-sacrifice that one can be obliged to risk or endure. The first part of the paper is devoted to Socrates and to the way in which his moral heroism is not a model for the moral person's action, but rather an inspiration to think hard about what self-sacrifice is demanded, short of his. I locate in the golden rule, the precept that urges us "always to treat others as you would like them to treat you" , the best single moral precept. The second part of the paper is on the golden rule. But the precept must be revised somewhat in accordance with the limits on self-sacrifice set by the preservation of one's basic rights. The consequences of the golden rule for political involvement is also discussed. The paper also looks at self-denial, especially as it is taught by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. Self-denial in its most extreme form counsels martyrdom or passive non-resistance and even cooperation with one's oppression. Thus, extreme self-denial is perhaps not a moral phenomenon at all, though in its less extreme forms, it is one of the best aspects of civilized life. There are undeniable affinities between self-sacrifice and self-denial. (shrink)

Fiona Woollard argues that when one is personally involved in an emergency, one has a moral requirement to make substantial sacrifices to aid others that one would not otherwise have. She holds that there are three ways in which one could be personally involved in an emergency: by being physically proximate to the victims of the emergency; by being the only person who can help the victims; or by having a personal encounter with the victims. Each of these factors (...) is claimed to be defeasibly sufficient to ground personal involvement, and thus a requirement of substantial sacrifice to aid. Woollard defends this view on the basis of a number of cases. We show that Woollard’s cases contain various confounding factors. In view of the more precisely drawn cases offered here, it is clear that neither proximity nor uniqueness nor personal encounter is intuitively defeasibly sufficient in the way Woollard claims. (shrink)

The main purpose of the paper is to examine the question as to whether self-sacrifice is intrinsic to moral action. The conclusion is that though some moral deeds can be free of appreciable self-sacrifice, most of the time some degree of self-sacrifice is called for. The necessity is not conceptual but built into the lives of most people. The paper is especially interested in a person's refusal to go along with or actively cooperate with wrongdoing, even when (...) there is some risk; and positively giving assistance to those who are oppressed or persecuted, and again when there is some risk. Abstaining from violating the rights and entitlements of others is not enough to be moral, indispensable as it is. An important issue is what degree of self-sacrifice is called for, which, when not risked or endured, allows us to think that immorality has been committed. I follow the standard practice of distinguishing between moral heroism and moral obligation. Moral heroism is exemplified by Socrates who at risk to his life refused to cooperate with the unjust command of the Thirty to seize an innocent man and hand him over for execution. The paper holds that one's basic rights set the limits to the extent of self-sacrifice that one can be obliged to risk or endure. The first part of the paper is devoted to Socrates and to the way in which his moral heroism is not a model for the moral person's action, but rather an inspiration to think hard about what self-sacrifice is demanded, short of his. I locate in the golden rule, the precept that urges us "always to treat others as you would like them to treat you", the best single moral precept. The second part of the paper is on the golden rule. But the precept must be revised somewhat in accordance with the limits on self-sacrifice set by the preservation of one's basic rights. The consequences of the golden rule for political involvement is also discussed. The paper also looks at self-denial, especially as it is taught by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. Self-denial in its most extreme form counsels martyrdom or passive non-resistance and even cooperation with one's oppression. Thus, extreme self-denial is perhaps not a moral phenomenon at all, though in its less extreme forms, it is one of the best aspects of civilized life. There are undeniable affinities between self-sacrifice and self-denial. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper I argue that a remotely piloted aircraft pilot’s act of killing remotely, when it is done in the defense of another person, can be viewed as an act of sacrifice. This argument concludes from two premises. First, the RPA pilot faces psychological risk to self by carrying out such an action; second, the RPA pilot is motivated to some significant degree by something other than self-interest. Moreover, I challenge both the view that RPA represent merely an (...) incremental development in technology yielding an incremental expansion of the distance between the war-fighter and the target and the view that RPA is revolutionary in some fundamental sense. I instead argue that, based upon the natural geometric boundary imposed by the earth’s shape, RPA have maximized the physical distance between the war-fighter and the target and, over time, this fact will change, not only the psychological effects on the RPA pilot, but also the way we view killing and distance in general. When taken togethe... (shrink)

This essay introduces some of the key topics at stake in the ongoing controversies about the place of eudaimonism in Christian ethics and theology. Whether and in what way a person should seek her or his own happiness and flourishing has been a central question in ethics for centuries. Here I summarize the contributions the essays in this focus issue make to that conversation, and conclude by briefly sketching a Neoplatonist approach to eudaimonism that may offer a way to build (...) on the insights and concerns articulated in the focus essays. (shrink)

Altruistic self-sacrifice is rare, supererogatory, and not to be expected of any rational agent; but, the possibility of giving up one's life for the common good has played an important role in moral theorizing. For example, Judith Jarvis Thomson (2008) has argued in a recent paper that intuitions about altruistic self-sacrifice suggest that something has gone wrong in philosophical debates over the trolley problem. We begin by showing that her arguments face a series of significant philosophical objections; however, (...) our project is as much constructive as critical. Building on Thomson's philosophical argument, we report the results of a study that was designed to examine commonsense intuitions about altruistic self-sacrifice. We find that a surprisingly high proportion of people judge that they should give up their lives to save a small number of unknown strangers. We also find that the willingness to engage in such altruistic self-sacrifice is predicted by a person's religious commitments. Finally, we show that folk-moral judgments are sensitive to agent-relative reasons in a way that diverges in important ways from Thomson's proposed intuitions about the trolley problem. With this in mind, we close with a discussion of the relative merits of folk intuitions and philosophical intuitions in constructing a viable moral theory. (shrink)

A long tradition of research in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) countries has investigated how people weigh individual welfare versus group welfare in their moral judgments. Relatively less research has investigated the generalizability of results across non-WEIRD populations. In the current study, we ask participants across nine diverse cultures (Bali, Costa Rica, France, Guatemala, Japan, Madagascar, Mongolia, Serbia, and the USA) to make a series of moral judgments regarding both third-party sacrifice for group welfare and first-person sacrifice (...) for group welfare. In addition to finding some amount of cross-cultural variation on most of our questions, we also find two cross-culturally consistent judgments: (1) when indi- viduals are in equivalent situations, overall welfare should be maximized, and (2) harm to individuals should be taken into account, and some types of individual harm can trump overall group welfare. We end by discussing the specific pattern of variable and consistent features in the context of evolutionary theories of the evolution of morality. (shrink)

[Newspaper opinion] If you’re like most people, you’ve been taught that climate action is a sacrifice. Cutting emissions from fossil fuels, you’ve probably been told, is the economy-squeezing price we must pay for a livable planet. But our research explains why we should look at this issue through a different frame. -/- Frames help us think about complex issues. They suggest starting assumptions, problems to be solved and point towards possible solutions. Sacrifice frames begin with the assumption that (...) climate action is a burdensome cost. Given that assumption, it naturally follows that climate action is all about convincing people to make sacrifices. But scholars have criticized sacrifice frames for being bad at motivating action. Tell a person to sacrifice, and they’re likely to give you a list of reasons why they shouldn’t have to do it. -/- We suggest a different approach. Instead of explaining why you should sacrifice for the climate, we explain why climate action isn’t a sacrifice. We also suggest an alternative, more hopeful frame that fits with current science. [Open access]. (shrink)

:The bulk of Mel Gibson's output as filmmaker consists of a trilogy on historical subjects: Braveheart, The Passion and Apocalypto. This article points to a degree of imaginative consistency underlying Gibson's work. It seeks to acknowledge a personal vision of the nature and significance of human events – a vision articulated through the choice of recurring cinematic techniques and visual-thematic motifs. All three films inculcate a sense of history as fundamentally dependent on acts of ritualization, at the centre of (...) which lies the sacrifice of the individual. They share an authorial vision which hinges upon the question of death and transcendence. Gibson's oeuvre foregrounds the conviction that human experience is patterned in accordance with archetypal narratives whose seemingly universal validity is suggested by the presentation of cross-cultural analogues in successive films. (shrink)

Catholic legal and doctrinal tradition defined two main cases for the canonization of saints: until very recently, sainthood was related either to martyrdom or to the heroic practice of virtues, ascertained through a well-defined judicial procedure. In 2017, Pope Francis renewed this ancient tradition by introducing a third case, consisting in the “offering of life”, namely the sacrifice of one’s life in the name of charity, intended as Christian love for the others. The “offering of life” is placed at (...) the center of an ongoing process of mediation between papal authority, the judicial praxis of the causes for canonization, and ecclesiastic law. The introduction of this new type of sainthood can be explained in light of the growing difficulty to apply the two traditional grids of behavior established by the Church in the evaluation of the life of new kinds of persons who enjoy a widespread fame of sanctity, but are not conform to the strict jurisprudential criteria of martrydrom and heroicity. Therefore, the debate surrounding the “offering of life” entails a dialectics between the necessity of a rationalized set of models, providing precise—and thus evaluable—“narrative programs” and defining a circumscribed number of canonizable human types, and the unprecedented multiplication of instances of sanctity in the contemporary world. (shrink)

This paper responds to Gui and Nelson's separate comments on our paper ‘Fraternity’, which analysed sociality in markets as joint commitment to mutual assistance. We argue that our analysis is fundamentally different both from Nelson's analysis and from that provided by theories of warm glow or guilt aversion, as discussed by Gui. We agree with Gui that, in initiating and maintaining cooperative relationships, individuals sometimes incur personal costs to benefit others without any certainty of reciprocation, but we argue that (...) the intentions underlying such actions are cooperative rather than self-sacrificing. (shrink)

In order to explain the idea that sacrifice involves voluntary diminution of the agent’s well-being, “well-being” must be explained. The thesis that an agent’s well-being just consists in the occurrence of events wanted is rejected. Overvold replaces it by the view that the motivating desires involve the existence of the agent, alive, at the time of their satisfaction. This view seems counterintuitive. The whole desire-satisfaction theory is to be rejected partly because we dont’t think an event worthwile if it (...) is not liked when it occurs, and partly because the theory cannot give a sensible account of what is good for an individual when his desires change. A more satisfactory view is that the goodness of an event for a person is fixed by his total gratifications as a result of its occurrence, provided they would occur if the person were fully informed about facts knowledge of which would change them if it existed. But self-sacrifice seems to involve not only voluntary diminution of well-being in this sense, but belief that the action is taken for the benefit of someone else. Overvold’s view leaves open the possibility that acting morally is never contrary to self-interest, if one of the agent’s major interests is that he act morally. This is an ingenious suggestion, but seems a bit counterintuitive. (shrink)

In order to explain the idea that sacrifice involves voluntary diminution of the agent’s well-being, “well-being” must be explained. The thesis that an agent’s well-being just consists in the occurrence of events wanted is rejected. Overvold replaces it by the view that the motivating desires involve the existence of the agent, alive, at the time of their satisfaction. This view seems counterintuitive. The whole desire-satisfaction theory is to be rejected partly because we dont’t think an event worthwile if it (...) is not liked when it occurs, and partly because the theory cannot give a sensible account of what is good for an individual when his desires change. A more satisfactory view is that the goodness of an event for a person is fixed by his total gratifications as a result of its occurrence, provided they would occur if the person were fully informed about facts knowledge of which would change them if it existed. But self-sacrifice seems to involve not only voluntary diminution of well-being in this sense, but belief that the action is taken for the benefit of someone else. Overvold’s view leaves open the possibility that acting morally is never contrary to self-interest, if one of the agent’s major interests is that he act morally. This is an ingenious suggestion, but seems a bit counterintuitive. (shrink)

Stephen Darwall has recently suggested that theories which identify a person's good with her own ranking of concerns do not properly delimit the ‘scope’ of welfare, making self‐sacrifice conceptually impossible. But whether a theory of welfare makes self‐sacrifice impossible depends on what self‐sacrifice is. I offer an alternative analysis to Overvold's, explaining why self‐interest and self‐sacrifice need not be opposed, and so why the problems of delimiting the scope of welfare and of allowing for self‐sacrifice (...) are distinct. If my analysis is correct, desire theories may allow for self‐sacrifice however they delimit the scope of welfare. (shrink)

The question of personal immortality is a central one for Gabriel Marcel. Early in his life he took part in parapsychological experiments which convincedhim that one could, rarely and with great difficulty, communicate with the dead. In a philosophical vein he argued that each self has an eternal dimension which isof eternal worth. This dimension is particularly manifest in self-sacrifice, where I find it meaningful to give my life for another and when I unconditionally commitment myself in love (...) to another self. Marcel also cites the experience of trust or hope, and the experience that life is not an absurd freak accident of nature destined for eternal extinction but rather possesses absolute meaning and value. Yet, none of the above experiences involves certitude; one remains free to accept or reject them and what they claim to involve. (shrink)

In his two works from the 1970s, Patočka proposes a very personal way that the spiritual crisis, which manifests itself as a techno-scientific reality of Gestell, can be overcome. Patočka argues that the only way to escape spiritual decline is through sacrifice. This study examines how the ethical is represented in Patočka’s philosophy. It focuses on his two main concepts of sacrifice and care for the soul and explores the relationship between them. Through a close reading of (...) Plato and Europe, ‘Four Seminars’, and his essay ‘The dangers of technicization’, this study reveals how Patočka proposes that the ethical can be implemented within the realm of the political. Drawing a parallel between Socrates’ and Patočka’s lives and fates, this study points to the significance of ethics in political life – both in the ancient Greek polis of Socrates’ time and in communist Czechoslovakia in Patočka’s time. This approach highlights the influence that the philosophy of Socrates had on Patočka’s thinking. (shrink)

Owing to a genral dissatisfaction with hedonistic theories of value, a number of recent discussions have sought to identify an agent's selfinterest, individual utility, or personal welfare with what the agent most wants to do, all things considered. Two features of these accounts merit special attention for the argument in this paper. First, on such accounts any desire or aversion which persists in the face of complete information is logically relevant to the determination of an agent's self interest. This (...) includes apparently altruistic desires like a desire for another's happiness as well as more narrow and self-regarding desires like a desire to eat a good meal. Second, when the agent finds himself in a situation where he must choose between incompatible desires, his informed preference determines the act which is most in his self-interest. (shrink)

ABSTRACTFor obvious reasons sentimentalists have been hesitant to offer accounts of moral reasons for action: the whole idea at least initially smacks of rationalist notions of morality. But the sentimentalist can seek to reduce practical to sentimentalist considerations and that is what the present paper attempts to do. Prudential reasons can be identified with the normal emotional/motivational responses people feel in situations that threaten them or offer them opportunities to attain what they need. And in the most basic cases altruistic/moral (...) reasons involve the empathic transfer of one person’s prudential reasons and emotions to another person or persons who can help them. Practical/moral reasons for self-sacrifice also depend on empathic transfer and can vary in strength with the strength of the transfer. (shrink)

Business is generally viewed as a means to generate personal or corporate wealth, but business transactions can also sacrificially serve the common good. In conversation with contemporary social theorists, Joshua S. Nunziato in this book critically evaluates the spiritual significance and aims of economic exchange. Inspired by Augustine's vision of the Church as a 'universal sacrifice', he explores how Augustine's approach teaches us detachment - both personal and collective - which releases us from illusory claims of ownership (...) and reframes business as an exercise in loving and letting go. Nunziato's volume engages with the big questions of economic life and considers both why and how we acknowledge people through business in a way that results in collective well-being. It will be of interest to scholars and students of Augustinian studies, philosophy of exchange, and economic ethics. (shrink)

Kierkegaard raises many issues in his account of the near sacri­fice of Isaac by his father. Responding to and critiquing Hegelian and Kantian depictions of Abraham, Kierkegaard moves to elevate Abraham into a position as a knight of faith. The Sunnī perception of the incident in the exegetical tradition is far more ethically unequivocal than that of the Latin philosophical tradi­tion. The ubiquitous Sufi theorist, Ibn ʿArabī, however, in a single act of interpretive ingenuity, managed to extirpate the central root (...) of contention raised by the philosophers when he alleges that Abraham was only ever commanded to sacrifice a ram. Despite his abiding commitment to spiritual unveiling and his insistence on the personal nature of God, Ibn ʿArabī advo­cates the employment of a Kantian criterion of universal ratio­nality to adjudicate between literal and metaphorical dreams. (shrink)

Paternalism has attracted new defenders in recent years. Such defenders typically either downplay the normative significance of autonomy or deny that we are sufficiently rational for paternalistic interventions to be objectionable.1 Both of these argumentative strategies constitute challenges to John Stuart Mill’s influential anti-paternalistic ‘harm principle’, which states that coercive interference with the liberty of competent adults is justifiable only if such interference prevents harm to non-consenting third parties (Mill, p. 23).2 In this journal, Wilkinson has provided a novel, provocative (...) defence of paternalism in the medical context—one that (provisionally) accepts rather than challenges Mill’s harm principle.3 Wilkinson’s argument is complex. But he begins with Parfit’s influential account of personal identity.4 According to Parfit, Alice at T1 can be the same person as Alice at T2, but the extent to which Alice at T1 and Alice at T2 are similar depends on the extent to which there are ‘chains’ of strong psychological connections between Alice at T1 and Alice at T2. Strong psychological connections, in turn, are mental states such as intentions or beliefs, or psychological traits. For example, if Alice at T2 remembers very little about herself the day before, and the day before that, all the way to Alice at T1, Alice at T2 has completely different psychological traits than Alice at T1—for example, Alice at T1 was courageous, whereas Alice at T2 is cowardly—then Alice at T1 and Alice at T2 are distinct persons. If the harm principle is correct and Alice is autonomous, it is permissible to interfere with Alice’s liberty only if it prevents harm to some non-consenting third party. But if we accept Parfit’s view on personal identity, then a novel defence of paternalistic intervention emerges: Alice at T2 may well be a distinct person from Alice at T1. So, …. (shrink)

This paper offers a way to construe personality as the relatively stable hierarchy of one's desires: the fact that one prefers solitude to competition , finds dishonesty more aversive than arrogance , and so on. Several measures of the intensity of a desire are discussed: the alacrity with which one seeks to satisfy it, the persistence in one's efforts to do so, and other displays of one's willingness to sacrifice for its satisfaction. A method is offered for distinguishing preferences (...) which are features of personality from others which are insufficiently stable or otherwise to be explained. Finally the usefulness of this conception for moral theory is explored. Specifically, I argue that those attracted to utilitarianism have here an unusually congenial way of thinking about moral character, and a way to meet certain leading objections to their view. (shrink)

In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person’s life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent’s intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively “direct” (...) or “personal”. Here we integrate these two classes of findings. Two experiments examine a novel personalness/directness factor that we call personal force, present when the force that directly impacts the victim is generated by the agent’s muscles (e.g., in pushing). Experiments 1a and b demonstrate the influence of personal force on moral judgment, distinguishing it from physical contact and spatial proximity. Experiments 2a and b demonstrate an interaction between personal force and intention, whereby the effect of personal force depends entirely on intention. These studies also introduce a method for controlling for people’s real-world expectations in decisions involving potentially unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas. (shrink)

One cannot deny that the person of Christ is present in the Eucharist, on a Catholic interpretation, but the term ‘person’ is rarely, if ever, used in formulas or theology describing the Eucharist. Moreover, the understanding conveyed by Scriptural imagery of the Eucharist, such as the Passover Lamb or our spiritual food, is rather sub-personal. In this chapter, I argue instead that the role of the person of Christ is most clearly perceived in the sacrificial action within which the (...) Eucharist is embedded in every Mass. I argue that the Mass is related to Calvary in a specifically second-personal sense, in which we are equipped to love with God what God loves, and sacrifice with God what God sacrifices. On this account, the focus of the Eucharist is not on communicating the incommunicable person of Christ but being formed as an adopted divine person. Also on this account, salvation is not about becoming slightly better human beings but being formed as children of God. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility”Stephen R. L. Clark (bio)Theaitetos sleeping is not quite “the same” as Theaitetos waking, any more than Alcibiades drunk is Alcibiades sober. Nor am I, at fifty, quite “the same” as Stephen was when he was five. In one way, my sober fifty-year-old waking self can reasonably disclaim responsibility for what Stephen did or seemed to do when he was dreaming, drunk, or (...) five years old. Those other Stephens were not “fully responsible,” were not doing what they freely chose because they chose it—though it would be odd to deny that they were acting willingly. Nor am I now very likely to do the things that—drunk, asleep, or five years old—“I” did: in that sense I can disown those actions and never fully “owned” them anyway. Maybe now I can even disown such actions as I once really owned: once I thought them the right thing, and now I do not.On the other hand, as Stephen Braude says, even children (even, he might have added, dogs) are treated “as if” they are “responsible”: as if, that is, they know what they were doing and may be deterred from doing it again. Should Alcibiades sober be made accountable for what “he” did when drunk? Why not, if this deters him from getting drunk again? Perhaps, as Aristotle suggested, those who do wrong when they are drunk should be fined double the amount. Perhaps those who find it difficult not to drink habitually should be fined ten times the amount. What matters is the amount of money that will put them off, that will force them to “take responsibility” for their own future lives. People who know that they can’t trust themselves when they are drunk, sexually excited, or driving a fast car must put it out of their own power to be in those positions—and if they can’t do that, then others must do it for them. Free men and women “take responsibility,” take charge of their own lives, and wish to be held responsible for what they do and have done. Those who cannot “take control” must, technically, be slaves.There is no point expecting “natural slaves” to take control of their own lives; to measure what they want against what is allowed by society. Such “slaves,” at best, can be controlled by an immediate threat or prize. In a way, it is pointless to punish them, though it may be necessary to imprison, maim, or kill them. Much the same thing may be said of some who are not, strictly, slavish. Should eighty-year-olds be “held responsible” for what they did in their forgotten youth, a world away? They will not be doing it again, and may not, even now, have any greater understanding than the rest of us as to why they did it in the past. “Punishment” in such a case can only [End Page 55] be used to deter others who might follow the same path, to help them to control their lives in ways that do not injure others. Otherwise, we are not strictly speaking of “punishment” at all: perhaps more often than we like to admit, public condemnation, incarceration, or execution is a symbolic elimination of a perceived evil, whether or not we think, or have good grounds for thinking, that the victim is really guilty. The sacrificial victim carries away our anger or unhappiness.Pragmatically, in other words, we punish people for things that—even at the time of the action—they did not control, or which they have long forgotten. For punishment to deter them, they must understand what they are being punished for. For it to reform them, they must accept that the punishment inflicted is just. Those who neither understand nor accept punishment may still be treated harshly, for the sake of others—maimed, or killed, or simply (if we choose to be humane) imprisoned. There are some acts, so Aristotle said, below the level of humanity: such bestiality cannot be punished. It does not follow that the perpetrators should be “free.” Pragmatism permits us to retain the rites of sacrifice, even... (shrink)

Nicholas Agar argues that it is possible, and even likely, that radically enhanced human beings will turn out to be ‘post-persons’, that is, beings with a moral status higher than that of mere persons such as us.1 This would mean that they will be morally justified in sacrificing our lives and well-being not merely in cases of emergency, but also in cases of ‘supreme opportunities’ , that is, whenever such a sacrifice leads to ‘significant benefits for post-persons’. For this (...) reason, Agar believes, it would be morally wrong to allow any cognitive enhancement of people that might entail the risk of moral status enhancement.However, neither are there sufficient grounds to expect radically enhanced human beings to have a higher moral status than unenhanced human beings, nor would it, even if they did, be morally wrong to bring about their existence. We use moral status ascriptions mostly as a convenient shorthand to indicate a difference in capacities that strikes us as morally relevant. Rocks have zero moral status because they cannot feel or think, so we cannot hurt or kill them. Whatever we do to them, it does not affect them. Animals, on the other hand, …. (shrink)

The inspiring true stories in this book will warm the heart of any animal lover.

Look inside this book to meet the everyday heroes who found ways to save animals from Hurricane Katrina and the floods that followed.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Living the Truth: Is Aquinas’s Ethical Theory a “Personal” One?John HofbauerThere is treasure to be mined from the philosophy of St. Thomas Aqui-nas and, in particular, from his ethical insights. It is my contention that, at its very roots, Aquinas’s ethical theory is eminently personal, and that today’s generation of college students would benefit greatly from a close reading of it. At their deepest levels, the youth (...) of today do not want to be coddled: they desire a challenge, a “call to arms” so to speak—something that will inspire them and lead them out of the sometimes suffocating circle of self-interest and self-pity that surrounds so many of them. Aquinas’s ethical theory is different from most modern and contemporary ethical theories. For he roots it in the real, in a real “person,” and I think that today’s youth should at least be made aware of the existence of such a deeply personal ethic. They deserve to be made aware of a real option for a way of life that offers the realistic possibility of deliverance from themselves, and one which, as well, offers definite answers to specific questions that they encounter as their life’s story plays itself out.As long as our youth are made aware of this uniquely personalist option which Aquinas offers them, they can choose to take it or leave it at their own good pleasure. And many of them will leave it, for the time being, as they search for other (typically more hedonistic) ways to find personal self-satisfaction and self-fulfillment. But at least they will know that it is out there (“it” has been called the “maximalist view,” the “path of greatest resistance”), waiting for them to heed its unique call to them on a personal level. Additionally, they will have the consolation of knowing that there really is a distinctly different way of life which, while it does not coddle them, offers them a meaningful opportunity for self-sacrifice and, ultimately, self-fulfillment, as long as the initially difficult choices are made.In this paper, we will concentrate, initially, on the personal “transcendence” [End Page 17] that takes place in Aquinas’s ethical theory. We will be looking at the ways in which this focus on the “other” can empower the moral agent to keep inordinate “selfishness” out of her primary motivation for acting. Afterward, we will look at those specific moments of a moral action which facilitate and give meaning to this personal “selflessness.” The last section of this paper will take a more “selfish” turn by focusing on the qualities of that lasting state of happiness which becomes the reward for the person whose primary focus has been on a transcendent personal “Good,” a “Good” which also happens to be what Aquinas considers as the “Greatest Good” (the “Good” which, from every viewpoint, is subjectively perceived by the person as the greatest objective good).If our students were to become acquainted with some of Aquinas’s ideas regarding ethics as a means to the end of possessing the greatest Good and the greatest happiness, they might be surprised to find themselves open to the possibility of adopting these ethical insights as their own. They may find in them the challenge and the inspiration to become who they really are, that noble “true self” that lies beneath the surface of self-indulgence and self-pity. They may also find in Aquinas some answers to the many questions they often ask about the destiny of the human person. Indeed, they may discover the reasons why some definitions linking success to eternal happiness are superior to definitions that are tied solely to “self-fulfillment,” “self-realization,” and the attainment of worldly possessions. And finally, they might realize that there is at least one philosopher who does not “pull any punches”—for Aquinas claims that we can know not only reality (what “is” the case), but he claims, as well, that we can know what obligations (what “ought” to be done) can be derived from that knowledge of reality. Let us now look at some of the specific ways in which Aquinas... (shrink)

When do you have to sacrifice life and limb, time and money, to prevent harm to others? When must you save more people rather than fewer? These questions might arise in emergencies involving strangers drowning or trapped in burning buildings, but they also arise in our everyday lives, in which we confront opportunities to donate time or money to help distant strangers in need of food, shelter, or medical care. With the resources available, we can provide more help--or less. (...) -/- In The Rules of Rescue, Theron Pummer argues that we are often morally required to engage in effective altruism, directing altruistic efforts in ways that help the most. Even when the personal sacrifice involved makes it morally permissible not to help at all, he contends, it often remains wrong to provide less help rather than more. Using carefully crafted examples, he defends the view that helping distant strangers is more morally akin to rescuing nearby strangers than most of us realize. The ubiquity of opportunities to help distant strangers threatens to make morality extremely demanding, and Pummer argues that it is only thanks to adequate permissions grounded in considerations of cost and autonomy that we may pursue our own plans and projects. He ultimately concludes that many of us are required to provide no less help over our lives than we would have done if we were effective altruists. (shrink)

We question whether altruistic motivation links identity fusion and extreme self-sacrifice. We review two lines of research suggesting that the underlying motivation is plausibly egoistic.