This article is concerned with one of the notable but forgotten research strands that developed out of French nineteenth-century positivism, a strand that turned attention to the study of scientific discovery and was actively pursued by French epistemologists around the turn of the nineteenth century. I first sketch the context in which this research program emerged. I show that the program was a natural offshoot of French neopositivism; the latter was a current of twentieth-century thought that, even if implicitly, (...) challenged the positivism of first-generation positivists such as Comte. I then survey what French epistemologists—including Ernest Naville, Élie Rabier, Pierre Duhem, Édouard Le Roy, Abel Rey, André Lalande, Théodule-Armand Ribot, Edmond Goblot, and Jacques Picard, among others—had to say about the logic, psychology, and sociology of discovery. My story demonstrates the inaccuracy of existing historical accounts of the philosophical study of scientific discovery. (shrink)

The paper is a discussion of the idealizational interpretation of the dialectical Marxist methodology of science which has been worked out and applied in a diversity of ways by L. Nowak and the other members of the so-called Pozna school. I examine the sense in which, and the extent to which, this methodology is or can be said to be dialectical. Subsequently, I discuss and criticize Nowak's claim that this methodology can function at the same time as a meta-methodology; I (...) do this in connection with a corresponding and equally questionable claim put forward by I. Lakatos, and with one of Nowak's concrete examples, which is meant to show that certain developments in neopositivist methodology of science followed his (meta-)methodology. Lastly, I comment on the normative-descriptive character of Nowak's methodology, examine its adequacy as a comprehensive account of science, compare it with alternative accounts of the place and role of idealizations in science, and raise the question of whether Nowak's idealizational theory of socio-economic formation is a refutation or a dialectical negation of Marx's historical materialism. (shrink)

The paper is a discussion of the idealizational interpretation of the dialectical Marxist methodology of science which has been worked out and applied in a diversity of ways by L. Nowak and the other members of the so-called Poznań school. I examine the sense in which, and the extent to which, this methodology is or can be said to be dialectical. Subsequently, I discuss and criticize Nowak's claim that this methodology can function at the same time as a meta-methodology; I (...) do this in connection with a corresponding and equally questionable claim put forward by I. Lakatos, and with one of Nowak's concrete examples, which is meant to show that certain developments in neopositivist methodology of science followed his methodology. Lastly, I comment on the normative-descriptive character of Nowak's methodology, examine its adequacy as a comprehensive account of science, compare it with alternative accounts of the place and role of idealizations in science, and raise the question of whether Nowak's idealizational theory of socio-economic formation is a refutation or a dialectical negation of Marx's historical materialism. (shrink)

The nrst of the people to be thanked for their help during the composition of this work is Professor I.M. Bochenski, under whom I had the good fortune to study for an extended period of time. Without his help, it is doubtful that this work would have been writt"l1 at all. Among the other professors who helped along the way, I would like to cite in particular Professors A.F. Utz, M.D. Philippe and N. Luyten of the University of Fribourg. Many (...) friends were present at the birth of the ideas contained in this book. By naming K.G. Ballestrem, T.l. Blakeley and M.F. Gagern, I do not want to slight any of the rest. It was A. Spiekermann in Hollinghofen who saw to it that other preoccupations did not rob me of all the time needed for the study of the subject-matter and to the composition of this treatise. Of particular help in getting sources from the libraries of the world were Miss Lifschitz of the Institute of East-European Studies and Mr. Uldry of the Cantonal Library in Fribourg, Switzerland. Finally, my patient typist, Mrs. Frey in Munster, deserves special mention for her beautiful work. (shrink)

The paper analyses the development of some themes in the contemporary philosophy of science in Italy. Section 1 reviews the dabate on the legacy of neopositivism. The spread of the philosophy of Popper is outlined in Section 2, with particular regard to the problem of the vindication of induction. Section 3 deals with the debate on the incommensurability thesis, while Section 4 examines its consequences on the possible relationships between historical and epistemological studies of science. The last section is (...) devoted to one of the most recent trends in the Italian philosophy of science: the resumption of Aristotelian dialectics. (shrink)

E.V. Ilyenkov is widely considered to be the most important Soviet philosopher in the post-Stalin period. He is known largely for his original conception of the ideal, which he deployed against both idealist and crude materialist forms of reductionism, including official Soviet Diamat. This conception was articulated in its most developed form in ‘Dialectics of the Ideal’, which was written in the mid-1970s but prevented from publication in its complete form until thirty years after the author’s death. The translation before (...) you provides for the first time the complete, unabridged and unedited text of ‘Dialectics of the Ideal’ in English translation, including the author’s own subsequent comments on the text. (shrink)

En 1869, le jeune Brentano (1838-1917) consacre une étude à Auguste Comte (1798-1857), dans laquelle il rend un vibrant hommage au fondateur du positivisme. La question de la métaphysique mise à part, l’étude fait apparaître des affinités profondes entre le positivisme comtien et la philosophie de Franz Brentano : chez les deux penseurs on rencontre en fait le même refus de séparer la philosophie de la science. Au-delà de ces affinités qui existent au départ, la lecture de Comte aura durablement (...) marqué la pensée de Brentano. Tout ceci explique pourquoi l’héritage de Brentano a pu jouer un rôle certain dans l’avènement du néo-positivisme dans la Vienne des premières décennies du XX e siècle. La position particulière que Brentano occupe aussi bien par rapport au positivisme ancien qu’au néo-positivisme soulève deux problèmes majeurs. Le premier a trait au rôle que Brentano a pu jouer dans la transmission de l’idéal positiviste. Le second, plus fondamental, se rapporte aux liens généralement sous-estimés qui existent entre le néo-positivisme et la philosophie positiviste de Comte. (shrink)

У статті досліджується проблема достовірності наукового знання в контексті верифікації. Розглянуто основні аргументи критики філософії і метафізики у представників неопозитивізму. Показано, що тест на науковість проходить логіка, положення якої узгоджені між собою (критерій когерентної істини). Розкрито смисл «квазісинтаксичних висловлювань» та «атомарних фактів», за допомогою яких концептуалізуються метод логічного аналізу та система нової аргументації.

In this article, I argue that there is philosophy of science since philosophy existed. Thus, the idea that the philosophy of science was born with neopositivism is historically wrong and detrimental to the development of the philosophy of science itself. Neopositivism tried to found the philosophy of science as an anti-philosophical discipline, as a field of study that came to replace simple philosophy. The attempt was maintained for thirty years, but failed. Now, this does not mean that we (...) cannot make good philosophy of science today, but that the philosophy of science has returned to the common house of philosophy, it is gradually recovering the connection that it should never have lost with the main philosophical traditions and disciplines. (shrink)

Auguste Comte (1798–1857) is the founder of positivism, a philosophical and political movement which enjoyed a very wide diffusion in the second half of the nineteenth century. It sank into an almost complete oblivion during the twentieth, when it was eclipsed by neopositivism. However, Comte's decision to develop successively a philosophy of mathematics, a philosophy of physics, a philosophy of chemistry and a philosophy of biology, makes him the first philosopher of science in the modern sense, and his constant (...) attention to the social dimension of science resonates in many respects with current points of view. His political philosophy, on the other hand, is even less known, because it differs substantially from the classical political philosophy we have inherited. -/- Comte's most important works are (1) the Course on Positive Philosophy (1830-1842, six volumes, translated and condensed by Harriet Martineau as The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte); (2) the System of Positive Polity, or Treatise on Sociology, Instituting the Religion of Humanity, (1851-1854, four volumes); and (3) the Early Writings (1820-1829), where one can see the influence of Saint-Simon, for whom Comte served as secretary from 1817 to 1824. The Early Writings are still the best introduction to Comte's thought. In the Course, Comte said, science was transformed into philosophy; in the System, philosophy was transformed into religion. The second transformation met with strong opposition; as a result, it has become customary to distinguish, with Mill, between a “good Comte” (the author of the Course) and a “bad Comte” (the author of the System). Today's common conception of positivism corresponds mainly to what can be found in the Course. (shrink)

1 Logic in philosophy The century that was Logic has played an important role in modern philosophy, especially, in alliances with philosophical schools such as the Vienna Circle, neopositivism, or formal language variants of analytical philosophy. The original impact was via the work of Frege, Russell, and other pioneers, backed up by the prestige of research into the foundations of mathematics, which was fast bringing to light those amazing insights that still impress us to-day. The Golden Age of the (...) 1930s deeply affected philosophy, and heartened the minority of philosophers with a formalanalytical bent. As Brand Blanshard writes in Reason and Analysis (1964) – I quote from memory here, to avoid the usual disappointment when re-reading an original text. (shrink)

The investigation of the social and epistemological context of the rejection of ontology makes György Lukács’s critique of neopositivism an important moment of his late work, Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins . This article argues, on the one hand, that Lukács’s critique of neopositivism can be regarded as an indispensable contribution to understand the social roots of realist attitudes towards ontology, and, on the other hand, that the target of Lukács’s marxist critique of neopositivism is indeed a (...) special, neutral epistemological position between realism and instrumentalism, which became explicit only in a later period of history of neopositivism. To prove this assumption, I investigate some components of Lukács’s critique of neopositivism-critique by showing inter alia that Lukács fails to distinguish clearly between the two different forms of realism—scientific and moderate—which lead to the rejection of ontology. (shrink)

The book introduces to the analytic philosophy of language by presenting the main classical authors and texts of the XX Century, as well as the key problems and concepts of this discipline in their historical context. Ch. I: general introduction to the philosophy of language. Ch. II: Frege. Ch. III: Russell. Ch. IV: Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Ch: V: Neopositivism and verificationism. Ch. VI: Carnap's intensional semantics. Ch. VII: Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Ch. VIII: Quine. Ch. IX: theories of direct reference. Everything (...) is explained in plain but precise language, with many examples. Thus, the reader realizes how each author addresses the problems set by earlier investigations, in turn opening new problems for discussion and advancing the state of the art. The critical comparison among different positions raises possible objections and answers, introducing to the rational debate in the style of analytic philosophy. Whenever required the book also introduces basic notions of logics, metaphysics, philosophy of science, foundations of mathematics, epistemology and philosophy of mind. Each argument is dealt with on three distinct levels: introductory, intermediate, advanced. Therefore, the book can be helpful to beginners, to graduate students, and to researchers. (shrink)

The title of the following essay echoes one of Bobbio’s most famous books, and emphasizes one of its main issues: that of providing a “foundation” for the idea of rights. This essay summarizes what Bobbio means by “the age of rights” and presents his principal criticisms of any supposedly “absolute foundation” for rights. In exploring the notion of an age of rights without foundations Bobbio raised a number of crucial issues that effectively anticipated the contemporary debate around problems concerning the (...) historical transformation of rights and the origin of these rights in specific social processes, the deontological status of rights and the connection between rights and duties, the contrast between universalism and relativism, the relationship between different “generations of rights” and social rights, and the international protection of rights in relation to the idea of “institutional pacificism.” To pursue further reflection and enquiry along these lines would be a way of remaining faithful to the spirit of Bobbio’s teaching. But in order to do so it would also be necessary to question some of the methodological assumptions of Bobbio’s work: normativism in the area of jurisprudence, neopositivism in the field of epistemology, and the analytical approach in the history of ideas. (shrink)

Édouard Le Roy as early as 1901 observed the existence of an intellectual movement seeking to break from traditional positivism and set for himself the task of drawing up the program of this new positivism. Noting that this program precedes the Vienna Circle, I endeavor to determine its nature and to evaluate its impact on logical positivism. Viewed in this light, the discussions between Le Roy, Poincaré and Duhem appear more prolonged and substantial than is usually thought. What we have (...) here is perhaps not a homogeneous doctrine but a vigorous intellectual movement, from which logical positivists were able to borrow specific theses in their attempts to mitigate Mach's strict positivism; more important still, they had before them an example of neopositivism. History is not the only concern: among the issues debated, one encounters the claim that facts are theory-laden. This claim still stirs controversy today. An inquiry into the origins of the claim is one way of clarifying the arguments involved. (shrink)

The author offers a new look at one of the most influential books in the history of philosophy: Ludwig Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". He presents the Tractatus as expressing the intellectual anxietes of its modernist epoch. The most intruiging but usually unanswered question concerning the Tractatus is why Wittgenstein had to think that only propositions of natural science have meaning. The author reviews the most popular interpretations of the Tractatus and comes to the conclusion that the early Wittgenstein was an ethical (...) subjectivist. With this insight, he solves the tension between Tractarian theses that influenced neopositivism and its mystical part. (shrink)

This paper is intended to be a homage to the philosopher Ludovieo GEYMONAT, deceased in Milano the 29-XI-1991. It presents his contribution to the introduction of the neopositivism in Italy, in the thirties; the posterior planning of an epistemology strongly influenced by the History of Science; and the continous dialogue with the neopositivism, behind that GEYMONAT has embraced the dialectic materialism, as a philosophic general frame.

SummaryReferring to my previous publications on the European philosophy of science , this paper presents my views, as a historian of epistemology, concerning the scope of a certain programme of research into the development of the philosophy of science and reception of some of its conceptions, against limitations of Anglo‐Saxon historiographic perception. Calling for a revaluation of various marginalized conceptions I oppose the hitherto dominating interpretations of epistemological novelty of Popper's conception and present my own approaches to Gonseth, Bachelard, Enriques, (...) Brunschvicg and Piaget. I oppose also the predominant and false picture of the 1920s and 1930s in the European philosophy of science based on the exceptional authority and validity of the Vienna Circle climate. 1 apply the views of M. Foucault and J. Der‐rida to demonstrate the significance of studies on the cases from the margin of the history of epistemological evolution. The basic point is that some post‐neopositivistic achievements in epistemology were chronologically prior to the internal evolution of neopositivism under Popperian influence. (shrink)

This paper focuses on some issues where the process of convergence between analytical and hermeneutic perspectives, with respect to their general philosophical grounds, mainly turns out to be clear. On the analytical side, the overcoming of logical Neopositivism and radical formalism and the rejection of the atomistic theory of reference by holistic theories of meaning have been the core shifts. On the side of the continental philosophical tradition, the main theoretical change lies in replacing the centrality of the subject (...) with the centrality of language, with its links to the dimension of intersubjectivity. Furthermore, the importance given to concepts such as action and intention, mainly due to the Wittgensteinian connection between language and forms of life, has led to recognising the active role of the subject in the world and the ability of language to be a means for doing things and not just a system of signs representing the world. Such a convergence, though it has not yet been reached, seems to be particularly fertile in the legal domain. Here, for example, some outcomes of speech acts theory fit the hermeneutic view of law. (shrink)

Some philosophers argue that many contemporary debates in metaphysics are “illegitimate,” “shallow,” or “trivial,” and that “contemporary analytic metaphysics, a professional activity engaged in by some extremely intelligent and morally serious people, fails to qualify as part of the enlightened pursuit of objective truth, and should be discontinued” (Ladyman and Ross, Every thing must go: Metaphysics naturalized , 2007 ). Many of these critics are explicit about their sympathies with Rudolf Carnap and his circle, calling themselves ‘neo-positivists’ or ‘neo-Carnapians.’ Yet (...) despite the fact that one of the main conclusions of logical positivism was that metaphysical statements are meaningless, many of these neo-positivists are themselves engaged in metaphysical projects. This paper aims to clarify how we may see a neo-positivist metaphysics as proceeding in good faith, one that starts with serious engagement with the findings of science, particularly fundamental physics, but also has room for traditional, armchair methods. (shrink)

From the very beginning of ancient Greek philosophy up to the present day a puzzling correlation is found between rationality and reality. In this study this relation is examined with emphasis on the philosophical tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas. A comparison is made with the virtual reality created by computers and actual reality of our universe. The view expressed in the scientific neopositivism of Jordan and Mach is found to be an adequate approach to avoid contradictions in the interpretation (...) of modern physics. A challenging hypothesis is made by updating the Laplacian Demon by a powerful creative intellect in line with Judeo-Christian tradition. With this hypothesis a new light is shed on several fundamental issues in modern science. (shrink)

This book explores the epistemology and the methodology of political knowledge and social inquiry. What can we know, and how do we know? Friedrich V. Kratochwil and Ted Hopf question all foundational claims of inquiry and envisage science as a self-reflective practice. Brian Pollins and Fred Chernoff accept their arguments to some degree and explore the implications for logical positivism. David A. Waldner, Jack Levy, and Andrew Lawrence address the purpose and methods of research. They debate the role of explanation (...) versus prediction, the relationship of theory to evidence, and their implications for the Democratic Peace research program. A concluding chapter by Mark Lichbach offers a pluralistic reformulation of neopositivism. An alternative conclusion by Steven Bernstein, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and Steven Weber contends that social science should be modeled on medicine and reformulated as a set of case-based diagnostic tools. The distinguishing feature of the book is the inclusion of authors who represent different approaches to social science and their willingness to engage with one another in a constructive debate. (shrink)

In his ethical considerations famous Polish philosopher Henryk Elzenberg proposes an authentic cognition of moral values. He discerns a conflict between two ways of thinking, scientific and evaluating. According to Elzenberg the more often a statement is rational the less it grasps reality. Therefore he considers intuitive cognition of value as the most effective one. His attitude towards neopositivism and scientism is definitely negative. In his new epistemology of values attention should be paid primarily to a method of evaluation (...) since a cognitive effect is strictly dependent on this method. Elzenberg’s ascetics, approached as concentrating on higher aims, necessity of universal cognition of a subject of evaluation and confronting newly formulated judgments with the ones by competent people, can our imperfect intuitions of perfect values make trustworthy. Our image of the world defines the boundaries of our evaluations. Utilitarian values constitute just a prelude to entering the world of perfect values. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education When reliability and validity were introduced as validation criteria for empirical research in the human sciences, quantitative research methods prevailed, and theory of science relied on neopositivism (Vienna Circle) or postpositivism (scientific realism). Within this worldview, notions of reliability and validity as criteria of scientific goodness were introduced. Reliability and validity were associated with the correspondence theory of truth, which is mostly ill-suited to the needs of qualitative research. For that reason, qualitative research must (...) look for other kinds of validation criteria. The article elaborates the problems arising when the correspondence theory of truth is used as an ultimate criterion in evaluating qualitative research and proposes Heidegger's hermeneutical or alethetical idea of truth as a more suitable approach. (shrink)

This book explores the epistemology and the methodology of political knowledge and social inquiry. What can we know, and how do we know? Friedrich V. Kratochwil and Ted Hopf question all foundational claims of inquiry and envisage science as a self-reflective practice. Brian Pollins and Fred Chernoff accept their arguments to some degree and explore the implications for logical positivism. David A. Waldner, Jack Levy, and Andrew Lawrence address the purpose and methods of research. They debate the role of explanation (...) versus prediction, the relationship of theory to evidence, and their implications for the Democratic Peace research program. A concluding chapter by Mark Lichbach offers a pluralistic reformulation of neopositivism. An alternative conclusion by Steven Bernstein, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and Steven Weber contends that social science should be modeled on medicine and reformulated as a set of case-based diagnostic tools. The distinguishing feature of the book is the inclusion of authors who represent different approaches to social science and their willingness to engage with one another in a constructive debate. (shrink)

Finality places us at the intersection of biology and philosophy. We begin from the questioning of Jacques Monod in Le Hasard et la nécessité. Teleonomy is recognized as an essential characteristic of living beings; but it is the product of chance and necessity. It should however be reinserted into a more expansive context, to the extent of the anthropic principle that has emerged from contemporary cosmology. In opposition to this, we envisage the anti-finalist conception of the positive sciences, from the (...) «Appendix» to the first part of Spinoza's Ethics to the «postulate of objectivity» of Neopositivism, likewise formulated by Monod. In order to go beyond this aporia, a realist critique is necessary: we consider here the contribution of Maréchal on the finality of intelligence, completed by that of Scheuer on the metaphysics that is «immanent per modum formae to scientific knowledge» and finally the justification of the induction and the metaphysical interpretation of the sensible proposed by Isaye. A critical interaction unfolds between science and philosophy, which enables us to reformulate in a new manner the question of finality in nature. (shrink)

It is a characteristic of neopositivism that the pursuit of its effort in theoretical cognition, the attempt to discover the "given" content of knowledge, the "empirical significance" of its elements — concepts and assertions — is associated, with the employment of the method of logical analysis of knowledge. On the one hand, this gives logical analysis a distinctly philosophical, epistemological emphasis, while on the other it converts the theory of knowledge of neopositivism into "applied logic," engaged in establishing (...) the relations between the elements of knowledge by means of the procedures of contemporary formal logic — mathematical or symbolic logic. (shrink)

First, there are some striking similarities in the history of reception of Fleck’s and Neurath’s ideas. Due to the style of their writings they were not or often not well welcome in their national philosophical communities, i.e., the Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School. This is especially true in the case of Fleck. On the other hand, some prominent logical positivists, like Hempel, are to some extent guilty of making of Neurath a clumsy thinker whose ideas needed to be clear (...) by a more mature philosopher, i.e. Carnap. So their work was often considered as non-scientific. With a lack of response their theories were forgotten for many years, and even if not forgotten they were habitually ridiculed by critics. After a long period of seven thin years they have their renaissance. They are even quite popular. In the last 20 years a number of excellent books and papers on Neurath and Fleck have apperared. But one can hardly find a line of comparison. One might say that this is not surprising at all, as there is nothing to compare there. Neurath was a radical positivist while Fleck’s writing were aimed only against neopositivism. Accordingly, these are poles, and all we can say is that they are completely different. But even if Neurath was a follower of radical neopositivism that Fleck was fighting with, there are some common points in their programmes and I will try to show that even if they are in opposition, their paths intersected at certain points. (shrink)

Hermann Cohen hat mit seiner wissenschaftslogischen Kantinterpretation und programmatischen Orientierung der Erkenntnislehre am ‚Faktum der Wissenschaft‘ das Verständnis von transzendentaler Logik bis in die Gegenwart maßgeblich mitgeprägt. Der zentrale Punkt seiner Kantinterpretation ist die Identifikation der „transzendentalen Methode“ mit der „regressiven Lehrart“ der Prolegomena und damit die Ersetzung der metaphysischen Deduktion der Kategorien durch eine wissenschaftstheoretische Rekonstruktion der synthetischen Grundsätze der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz wird versucht im Anschluss an grundlegende Arbeiten von Kurt Walter Zeidler, die von Cohen in (...) Kants Theorie der Erfahrung entwickelten Argumente für diese Interpretation und die ihr zugrundeliegenden Motive darzulegen und sowohl mit Blick auf Kants eigene methodologische Ausführungen in den Prolegomena und der Kritik der reinen Vernunft als auch mit Blick auf das von Cohen in der Logik der reinen Erkenntnis als „härtestes Problem der Logik“ bezeichnete Problem der Vermittlung von Einzelnem und Allgemeinem kritisch zu hinterfragen. (shrink)

Recent research has brought to light numerous facts that go against received views of the development of philosophy of science. One encounters several concepts, claims, or projects much earlier than is generally acknowledged. Auguste Comte was careful to distinguish each major science with respect to method and object, speaking of mathematical philosophy, biological philosophy, sociological philosophy, and so forth. He thereby in a sense anticipated the regionalist turn: philosophical analysis should be carried out with respect to a specific body of (...) knowledge. He also adopted a general perspective, a scientific philosophy. In the light of new discoveries, later thinkers such as Pierre Duhem, Gaston Milhaud, and Abel Rey endeavored to reformulate Comte’s doctrine as a neopositivism, a logical positivism, or an absolute positivism. The aim of this article is to examine the constitutive concepts mentioned and the controversies that hinge on them, in an effort to reach a precise understanding of the aim, scope, and import of philosophy of science in the context of nineteenth-century France. (shrink)

Este trabajo trata de probar la incompatibilidad entre el principio de verificación neopositivista, y las ideas de Wittgenstein acerca del método de verificación como criterio de significatividad. Se muestra que el concepto wittgensteineano de verificación apunta a un saber moverse en un espacio lógico que, en virtud de su multiplicidad, resulta ser pertinente para una proposición dentro de un contexto determinado. Así, un "método de verificación" es -para Wittgenstein- una manera de localizar un camino para ver conexiones pertinentes, y no (...) una estrategia deductiva que se supone garantice, en su último paso, un contacto decisivo con la realidad.Palabras llave: Verificación; método; espacio lógico; multiplicidad; Wittgenstein; Neopositivismo.This essay attempts to prove the incompatibility between the neopositivist verification principle and Wittgenstein’s ideas concerning the method of verification as a criterion of significance. It is shown that the Wittgensteinian concept of verification points to an ability to move in a logical space which, by virtue of its multiplicity, turns out to be pertinent for a proposition within a certain context. Thus, a "method of verification" is -according to Wittgenstein- a way of locating a path to see pertinent connections, and not a deductive strategy which is supposed to guarantee, in its last phase, a decisive contact with reality.Palabras llave: Verification; method; logical space; multiplicity; Wittgenstein; Neopositivism. (shrink)

The author sets forth that, especially in later Platonism, some aspects should be noted different from those which are usually considered as being characteristic of Plato's philosophy : in later Platonism the stress is laid on the fact that the visible world is an image of the invisible as perfect as it could possibly be ; soul is superior to body, but not separated from it ; and in the visible world an element of identity is fundamentally admitted. In Parm. (...) and Soph, motion is introduced into the intelligible world. The main theses of Platonism as a whole are : the existence of a transcendent intelligible world, the existence of an analogy between this intelligible world and ours. It neither can be said that modern philosophy as a whole rejects these theses, nor that Antiquity as a whole accepted them. Aristotle and the schools after him rejected the (first thesis, sceptics denied the second ; Neoplatonism restored them both. During the Middle Ages they were generally accepted ; only Occam denied the principle of analogy. So did Kant, and neopositivism seems to have accepted this heritage, when it holds that metaphysics have no sense. On the other hand, the « existentialism » of the school of Sartre denies that an eternal essence of things would precede their concrete existence ; and by this doctrine the first point of Platonism is denied as well. Against these modern philosophers others do accept the first principles of Platonism, and Plato's own attitude towards the materialistic philosophy of nature of his time authorizes the opinion that, on the point in question, Plato would not change his position if he lived in our days. (shrink)

The paper concerns life and scientific achievements of Maria Kokoszyńska-Lutmanowa who was a significant logician, philosopher of language and epistemologist belonging to the second generation of the Lvov-Warsaw School. She is mostly known as the author of the important argumentation against neopositivism of the Vienna Circle as well as one of the main critics of relativistic theories of truth. The article is divided into five sections: 1. Life, 2. Main papers, 3. Views, 4. Pupils, 5. Summary, 6. References.

One of the important tasks of Marxist ethics at the present stage of its development is research into the principal forms of moral consciousness - values, norms, categories. Combination of sociological with logical and epistemological analysis will make possible a deeper disclosure of the rational content of moral values and the mechanism of their genesis and reproduction, and will show the untenability of the theoretical foundations both of intuitivism and apriorism in bourgeois ethics and of various forms of neopositivism.

‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ has quickly become a classic of analytical philosophy and has invoked the since lasting discussion about possibility of analytic/synthetic distinction. It has been also considered a nail to the coffin of logical positivism. Accordingly, Quine tried to show that logical positivism was possible solely due to assumptions taken without justification in terms of standards preached by neopositivism itself. Quine aimed to point out that since they functioned as dogmas, the rescuing of empiricism was possible only (...) if another approach was accepted, the one characterized as holism. (shrink)

Today it is well known that the philosophical and methodological concepts of K. Popper, which became the basis for the latest theories in the logic of science, constituted, at one stage in their evolution, an attempt to save neopositivism under the pretense of criticizing it. The militant anti-Marxist nature of Popper's sociological views and his intense anticommunism created considerable popularity for him in reactionary circles not only as a sociologist and political scientist but as a philosopher. British Conservatives and (...) German right-wing Social Democrats, who previously had had nothing to do with his methodology of science, now flaunted it. Ultimately, the opinion of I. Lakatos that Popper's methodology is the most significant phenomenon in twentieth-century philosophy found many proponents, and was applied to Popper's philosophy of history as well . In 1965 Karl Popper was elevated to knighthood, and the teaching of Sir Karl became the world-view doctrine of the right wing of the German Social Democrats. His methodology was taken into the arsenal of many anticommunists of the West. Popper is hailed as "the most influential" of the philosophers of our day. (shrink)

Starting from a suggestion of Stephen Toulmin and through an interpretation of the criticism to which Neurath, one of the founders of the Vienna Circle, submits Descartes’ views on science, the paper attempts to outline a pattern of modernity opposed to the Cartesian one, that has been obtaining over the last four centuries. In particular, it is argued that a new alliance has to be established between science and education, overcoming Descartes’ banishment against education. In a Neurathian perspective education is (...) a key-moment of the scientific enterprise without which science itself is in danger of going astray and no scientific outlook is promoted in the society at large. Such an anti-Cartesian attitude is a leitmotiv of the whole Neurath’s production and characterizes his fundamental approach to the sense of modernity. For this reasons, despite all its shortcomings, Neurath’s proposal represents a very promising option for a new agenda of the modernity away from Descartes’ spell. By elaborating on Neurath’s (and Dewey’s) insights, the paper puts forward the idea that philosophy of science (such as it was originated by neopositivism in its Reichenbachian version) should give way to an educational philosophy of science which could allow us “to bring the genuine modern into existence”. (shrink)

The volume describes a virtual tour of the cities in which Franz Brentano and his pupils worked and lived, with a reconstruction of the intellectual climate of their time. After the Introduction, the intellectual life of Wurzburg, Munich, Vienna, Prag, Lvov, Warsaw, Cambridge, Florence and Milan is presented and analyzed. The papers collected in this volume propose several answers to the following question: to what do we refer when we speak of Central European philosophy?. Interpretations of Central European philosophy have (...) developed in at least two broad directions. An interpretation fashionable during the 1970s lumps specific philosophical achievements, especially those of Mach and Wittgenstein, characterized by research into and development of new languages, of new philosophical, scientific and artistic grammars. In this situation, literature was seen as the exploration of meanings moving towards frontiers in which reality and possibility, science and metaphor, meet and merge. On the other hands, the theme of a Central European philosophy, connected with but independent of literature, has recently been given more thorough development. The two outstanding figures to have emerged from this inquiry are those of Bernard Bolzano and Franz Brentano. With reference to Brentano in particular, it is almost as if the collapse of the Empire also erased awareness of the common origin of many diverse components of Central European philosophical and scientific thought. The Polish logical school, logical neopositivism, phenomenology, the Prague school of linguistics, analytic philosophy, Gestalt psychology, the Vienna economics school - as well as a number of individual thinkers - are all movements and groups connected in some manner with Brentano's work and teaching. Although in some respects these are movements still at the centre of interest, the overall effect, the pattern of their common and unifying aspects have been neglected if they have not entirely disappeared. It seems that the unity of this philosophical tradition was lost with the end of the geographical and political unity of the Danubian empire and with the events that accompanied its downfall. After 1918 the centres of that tradition - Vienna, Prague, Lvov, Graz - belonged to different states, and its rich network of exchanges, contacts and relationships was dismantled forever. However, there still remained something of its philosophical style in each individual school; traits which enable us to speak, as the Authors have done in this volume, of Central European philosophy.". (shrink)

In Alfred Ayer's article, philosophy is sharply counterposed to science, is denied the status of a science. This is the leitmotif of his entire paper. Moreover, the defense of this conception is characteristic of many representatives of neopositivism who go along with Ayer. However, Ayer has certain distinctive ideas of his own, which require critical analysis. Fundamental among them is his acknowledgment of the extremely general character of the concepts and principles with which philosophy, as distinct from the special (...) sciences, operates. This universality which is the distinguishing characteristic of philosophy is then transformed into an argument against the recognition of philosophy as a science. In replying to Ayer we shall attempt to demonstrate that his acknowledgment by no means necessitates the elimination of philosophy from the list of the sciences, but merely emphasizes its distinctive, that is, its general character, in contrast to all other sciences, which are particular in nature. This is the theme of the present article. (shrink)

Otto Neurath is well known as a founding member of the Vienna Circle, one of several points of origin of logical empiricism or neopositivism. While Neurath’s distinctive contribution to the philosophy of science and epistemology in general has come to be recognised after long neglect, his economic thought remains relatively unexplored. A striking fact has thus remained long obscured: Neurath is not the “positivist” economist one might expect. To throw this point into further relief, the question I want to (...) explore here is whether and to what extent, if any, it makes sense to look at Neurath as an “Austrian” economist. Aware of the danger of treading a thin line between blatant absurdity and Pickwickian banality, my hope is that this way of proceeding will unlock some of the still topical originality of Neurath’s economics.What would seem to render my leading thought absurd is, of course, the acrimonious debate between Ludwig von Mises and Neurath . This early phase of the socialist calculation debate pitched Neurath very much against thirdgeneration representatives of the so-called Austrian School of Theoretical Economics. And what seems to render my leading thought Pickwickian is the unspectacular fact that Neurath was of Austrian nationality. It is true, of course, that he was a self-consciously “Austrian philosopher”, but that does not make him an Austrian economist in the relevant sense. Yet when we delve into the depths of the debate with Mises, things begin to look quite different. (shrink)

Critics from the Nordic countries played a significant role in the development of the philosophies of the Vienna Circle. By the time the first English-language monograph-length critical study of Viennese neopositivism was published—as well as A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic —several critical studies by philosophers from Sweden and Finland were already gathering dust: Eino Kaila’s Der logische Neupositivismus , Åke Petzäll’s Logistischer Positivismus and his Zum Methodenproblem der Erkenntnislehre . With their authors having participated in the meetings (...) of the Circle, these early monographs mirror the development of Viennese neopositivism as few other critical monographs do. Kaila focussed on the philosophical methodology and the doctrines adopted in Carnap’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt . His arguments were discussed in the Circle’s meetings and Carnap published a friendly review in which he nevertheless rejected Kaila’s criticisms, in particular of the method of quasi-analysis. Petzäll also seems to have regarded an Aufbau-style Konstitutionssystem as the ideal type of Viennese neopositivism, but he rather focussed on the difficulties to find a version of the empiricist meaning criterion that not only all members of the Vienna Circle could agree to, but also was able to withstand critical attention. His first monograph reached the sceptical conclusion that verificationism was caught in a paradox. (shrink)

The Uppsala School in philosophy and the Vienna Circle are prima facie similar currents in contemporary philosophy. Both reject metaphysics, claim that reality is a spatio­‑temporal realm and adhere to noncognitivism in terms of values. However, justifications of these assumptions are quite different. In the following article we reconstruct main theses of both mentioned currents and then we indicate their impact on one of the major jurisprudential movements, namely Scandinavian Legal Realism. We focus on Alf Ross’ legal philosophy, as it (...) was an attempt to accommodate both: the philosophy of the Uppsala School and of the Vienna Circle. We trace those two sources of inspiration in Ross’ theory of legal validity and of legal concepts. (shrink)