The aim of the article is to discuss the legal language transformations from a diachronic perspective taking into account the following factors: (i) spatial and temporal, (ii) linguistic norm changes, (iii) political, (iv) social (customs), and (v) globalization as well as (vi) EU-induced. Spatial and temporal factors include legal relations influenced by climate and the cycles of nature. Linguistic factors include spelling reforms and grammatical changes each language undergoes, for example, as a result of usage. As (...) far as the law is concerned, normative changes can be observed when laws are amended. Other factors such as customs, usage, etc. cannot be neglected when discussing the language of the law. Analogously political correctness and usage can be observed in gender sensitive language and the introduction of such terms as chairperson instead of chairman. Social factors should not be overlooked. As a result of social changes, numerous terms have been introduced to legal lexicons in many countries starting with same-sex unions or same-sex-marriages. The so-called political correctness enforces some language changes and leads to the introduction of new terms and at the same time the abandonment of others. Consequently, some terms cease to be used and consequently become archaic. The aim of the article is to focus on diachronic changes in legal languages and present the communication problems resulting from them from intra- and inter-lingual perspectives. (shrink)

Legal texts are in the focus of both lawyers and translators. This paper discusses the binary opposition of these two views especially in the light of contract law. There is one crucial epistemic difference between the point of view of the translator and the lawyer when it comes to the interpretation of legal texts. In the translator’s view legal text is traditionally conceived as static as to its nature; something that already exists in the form of text. (...) Traditionally, the translator is interested in the text itself as it was written down in a document, i.e. the translator needs to go back to the frozen moment when a legal document was constructed and finalised. The lawyer, in contrast, is very much interested not only in the text of the legal document but also in the contextual surroundings of the text. In fact, for legal interpretation, sometimes the key-elements for the interpretation come from outside of the text itself. This paper concludes that legal translation is in many cases closer to transcreation than it is to traditionally understood translation. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to explore some of the main pragmatic aspects of communication within the legal context. It will be argued that in some crucial respects, the pragmatics of legal language is unique, involving considerations that are not typically present in ordinary conversational contexts. In particular, certain normative considerations that are typically settled in a regular conversational context are unresolved and potentially contentious in the legal case. On the other hand, the essay also (...) argues that a careful distinction between various pragmatic aspects of language use enables us to offer some generalizations about types of pragmatic enrichment that could be taken to form, or not to form, part of what is actually determined by legal expressions. (shrink)

By its central terms, the language of the culture of death sends signals that produce life-accepting associations and at the same time mask its intentions against life. On the one hand, the culture of death includes certain behaviors. On the other hand, it includes those social and legal structures that strive to make killing socially acceptable by camouflaging it as a medical service or a social assistance. The culture of death wants to remove killing from condemnation, so that (...) it is no longer cursed as a crime. In the center of the culture of death is the battle for the legalization of abortion, euthanasia, and embryonic stem cell research. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14.4 : 647–657. (shrink)

In this article I explore the ways in which legal language, discourses, and narratives construct new dominant identities for women who kill their children. These identities are those of the ‘bad’, ‘mad’, or ‘sad’ woman. Drawing upon and critiquing statutes, case law, and sentencing remarks from England and Wales, I explore how singular narrative identities emerge for the female defendants concerned. Using examples from selected cases, I highlight how the judiciary interpret legislation, use evidence, and draw upon gender (...) stereotypes in carefully constructing macro-narratives which produce gendered identities for filicidal women, thus nullifying the challenge these women pose to appropriate femininity and the motherhood mandate. Each of the narrative identities discussed deny the agency of the female defendants that they are attached to, albeit in subtly different ways, by denying their ability to make any degree of choice in relation to their filicidal actions. Although such identity construction and agency denial may not always be damaging to these filicidal women per se, its pervasiveness within legal discourse reinforces and reproduces damaging gender stereotypes surrounding women and femininity. (shrink)

This book proposes a novel, descriptive theory that unveils the linguistic mechanisms lurking behind judicial decisions. It offers a comprehensive account of the ongoing debate, as well as a novel solution to the problem of understanding legal pragmatics. Linguistic pragmatics is based on a theory created by Paul Grice, who observed that people usually convey more than just the amalgam of the meaning of the words they use. He labeled this surplus of meaning a “conversational implicature.” This book addresses (...) the question of whether implicatures occur in the legal language, firstly illustrating why the classic Gricean theory is not applicable to the description of legal language and proposing a novel approach based on a modification of Andrei Marmor’s “strategic speech.” Subsequently, it analyzes neo-Gricean theories and their limited use for describing the mechanisms of legal interpretation, and discusses the possibility of pragmatic enrichment of legal content as well as the notion of completeness of a legal proposition. Lastly, it illustrates how the developed theory works in practice, with examples from penal and civil law cases. The book is helpful to legal practitioners, since it provides insights into the reasons for and linguistic mechanisms behind courts’ decisions, but also to philosophers of law, philosophers of language, linguists and non-experts wishing to better understand the mechanisms of legal decision making. (shrink)

I will suggest, in this article, a possible explanation of the fact that legal language appears incoherent to the general public. I will present one legal text (an indictment), explaining why it appears incoherent to legal laypersons. I will argue that the traits making this particular text appear incoherent are, first, that a specialized legal meaning is conveyed implicitly and, second, that there are no key-words that could direct laypersons to the knowledge making this meaning (...) obvious to legalists. I will conclude that any legal text having these traits is likely to appear incoherent to the general public and suggest that the traits making my example appear incoherent might be rather common among the various texts of the various legal systems. On this suggestion there is no need to assume any causal relation between lawyers’ social interests and the apparent incoherence of legal language as it entails that this incoherence is inevitable. (I will argue that it is a result of the facts that legal language is ordinary language used, in the ordinary way, in the special context of the legal discourse.). (shrink)

One of the most striking experiences of my early days as a postgraduate student of medieval Scots law was an encounter with a twelfth-century charter which, apart from being written in Latin, might have served as a model or template for the land transfer documents which I had learned how to draft the previous year in the undergraduate class called Conveyancing. Alliterative thoughts came into my head—conveyancing, conservatism, consistency, continuity—but also the question of when this seeming stability was first achieved, (...) and how it crossed from Latin into the formal Scots-law English of my own day. Joanna Kopaczyk’s fascinating study of legal language in Scottish towns from the late middle ages to the Reformation in Scotland does not address the conveyancing question but it raises similar issues about legal and administrative record-keeping, addressing them from the perspective of historical linguistics. She is interested in the tendency of both law and language towa .. (shrink)

This paper argues that the concerns and methodology of the recently completed Report of the International Law Commission (ILC) over the fragmentation of international law presuppose a particular way of understanding legal language which tends to separate the understanding of rules from their factual adaptability to certain recurring social problems faced within specific institutional contexts. The paper argues that separating rules from their factual adaptability focuses the analysis on surface coherence - coherence at the level of abstract terms (...) and phrases. It is the argument of this paper that this presupposition is not warranted, and that the understanding of rules cannot be thus separated. An alternative model of the understanding of legal language is developed on the basis of the work of Bernard Jackson and Geoffrey Samuel. This is further supplemented by the approach to the study of institutional contexts in the recent work of Robert Summers and John Bell. Together, these resources can lead to the analysis of the deep coherence of the international legal order, that being one that prioritizes not the unity of that order, but its responsiveness. The ideal of responsive law is elaborated upon by reference to the work of Philip Selznick and Philippe Nonet. Finally, a different agenda for the ILC is offered on the basis of the methodology of deep coherence. The upshot is that the paper calls for a reorientation of international legal theory, away from concerns about 'the law itself' and towards an engagement with the responsiveness of legal work performed in international legal institutions. (shrink)

This paper discusses the difference between the factual and the legal, both as to terms and as to statements, on the analogy of the methodologists' distinction of the observational and the theoretical. No absolute distinction exists, and pure ‘brute facts’ do not exist in law because of the socialisation of physical world and juridification of the social world.; also, the effect of evidentiary constraints. Law/fact distinction depends on ‘applicability rules’. The problem of ‘mixed terms’ is partly a matter of (...) judicial pragmatics, partly to do with the character of applicability rules, and their extensiveness. Semantic realism versus semantic instrumentalism in respect of legal terms -- the latter preferred. Tendency to abstract terms in advanced legal orders. (shrink)

Many legal theorists and linguists have addressed the notion of legal language from different perspectives. Despite that, the definitions of legal language vary. Almost all of the approaches conclude that legal language entails several types of communication. Nevertheless, not all of these categories are sufficiently researched. Some types of legal communication seem to be neglected. This lack of interest might be rooted in the uncertainty of whether these texts or utterances even fall (...) under the scope of the concept of legal language. In order to avoid this superficiality in subsequent research, it is first necessary to come to a clear determination of which communicative acts can be considered a part of legal language and which cannot. Accordingly, in this search for the definition of legal language, we should not neglect the fact that language is executed in concrete communicative acts, and the only means to grasp the language is through communication. The aim of this article is therefore to clearly delineate the boundaries of this concept. Based on analysis of how the given term is currently defined, I draw out the common features and trace the characteristics in which they differ. Taking into account these findings, I propose a novel comprehensive demarcation of legal language. This concept argues that the ‘legal’ nature of language should be determined by the context and function of the particular statement or exchange, in connection with the role of participants in the communication. This means that a particular act may be considered a part of legal language not in accordance with a certain form or lexicon used, but mainly by extralinguistic circumstances in the context of which it is being performed. (shrink)

Against the assumption that legal and normative systems are coextensive with geopolitical units and national spaces, the article advocates for the need to study how different legal and normative semiospheres, within the same geopolitical unit and national space, often give rise to ‘normolects’ that are transversal to socio-economic classes, ethnicities, and cultural lifestyles. The concept of legal and normative ‘imaginaries’ is useful to come to terms with the legal and normative semiotic ideology of such normolects, including (...) their non-verbal dimension and legal-normative semiotic ideologies. More generally, the article prompts legal scholars, and particularly semioticians of law, not to focus exclusively on inter-cultural awareness in legal-normative language but to concentrate also on intra-cultural awareness. As a case study, the article analyses a drawing through which the former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi visualized and advertised for a bill of reform of the Italian judicial system by his Minister of Justice, Angelino Alfano. The semiotic analysis of this visual artifact casts new light on the controversial political and judicial figure of Mr Berlusconi. The drawing is read as a visual embodiment of the conflict between two different legal and normative ideologies within the present-day Italian political and judicial arena. The paradoxes that underpin this iconography of law and mar a rational confrontation of legal-normative arguments in contemporary Italy are uncovered. (shrink)

The author moves from the consideration of law as a set of rules serving as a means of socially regulating human conduct. He focuses on the fact that in order to fulfil its function, the law must be seen as a type of information. In this perspective law is a particular language and therefore gives rise to linguistic problems, linked to the technical character of juristic discourse. The author deals with some of the linguistic and sociological aspects of (...) class='Hi'>legal language and attempts to pinpoint some trends of interlingual development. (shrink)

This paper discusses the difference between the factual and the legal, both as to terms and as to statements, on the analogy of the methodologists' distinction of the observational and the theoretical. No absolute distinction exists, and pure `brute facts' do not exist in law because of the socialisation of physical world and juridification of the social world.; also, the effect of evidentiary constraints. Law/fact distinction depends on `applicability rules'. The problem of `mixed terms' is partly a matter of (...) judicial pragmatics, partly to do with the character of applicability rules, and their extensiveness. Semantic realism versus semantic instrumentalism in respect of legal terms -- the latter preferred. Tendency to abstract terms in advanced legal orders. (shrink)

Abstract.One of the theses of the present work is that, at the strictly logical and methodological level, practical logic has neither made, nor can it make any contribution to the philosophy of law, since none of the three branches of practical logic that have been taken into account, namely, the logic of norms, deontic logic and legal logic, seems to be theoretically possible. The contribution of practical logic to the analysis of legal language is assessed in terms (...) of both the instruments of analysis elaborated by practical logic, the artificial languages, and the results obtained in two capital subjects, the negations of norms and the permissions. (shrink)

This paper explores the possibility of a standard legal language (e.g. English) for a principled evolution of law in line with technological development. In doing so, reference is made to blockchain networks and smart contracts to emphasise the discontinuity with the liberal legal tradition when it comes to decentralisation and binary code language. Methodologically, the argument is built on the underlying relation between law, semiotics and new forms of media adding to natural language; namely: code (...) and symbols. In what follows, I will concentrate on the study of factors that explain why such approach can be fruitful for the future of law and innovation. I have three reasons for selecting this topic. The first is a more pragmatic reason, based on my current research of law as a linguistic phenomenon. Secondly, the topic does also touch the matter on binary code language, rivalrous to legal alphabetic language. Lastly, the study aims at emphasizing the pivotal role of the jurist as an interpreter in a changing society accommodating diverging realms of reality. The study is structured as follows. Firstly, a quick exam of the traits of blockchain networks would provide the contextual link to establish the arguments in support of the need of a standard legal language. Secondly, a comparison between liberal legal institutions and theory of semiotics is set to perceive their functioning and ascertain their limits in the light of todays unprecedented changes. Thirdly, a summary on blockchain networks’ legal features would constitute the thrust behind the idea of a uniform legal language. Methodologically, the argument does also establish some relations with classical laws of physics and philosophy of media. Its aim is to demonstrate how the suggested legal interpretation and semiotic-based approach can contribute to overcome existing stumbling blocks including, but not limited to, the lack of cooperation at the international level as well as the gap in State norms when it comes to innovation. In this sense, the proposed strategies do not intend to replace current advances in the legal thought. In contrast, it seeks to harmonise their results providing a methodical approach that can concur to inform a new technique to address new controversial issues. In practice, the proposed method regarding the adoption of a uniform legal language would lower transactive costs in terms of normative coordination in the matter of international cooperation and in the definition of applicable law among different legal systems. Alternatively, it might contribute to the convergence of legal systems and/or their underlying concepts. Differently put, article’s contribution can be envisaged in fostering juridical consistency with regards to different forms of languages’ coexistence. (shrink)

This article probes the usefulness of selected theories from Cognitive Linguistics in the context of statutory interpretation. The presumption of legal language is a well-established rule of statutory construction in Polish legal practice that comes from the internationally recognised theory by Jerzy Wróblewski. It rests on a controversial assumption that there are different levels of generality in legal language (i.e. the language of statutes) and a single term may be given different meanings depending on (...) the level of generality that is referred to. The authors use the notion of basic level categorisation from the cognitive theory of prototypes to explain this mechanism. Legal concepts, not unlike ordinary concepts, form hierarchical taxonomies. A single term may denote concepts that are situated at different levels in different conceptual taxonomies. In the absence of special circumstances, a legal term should be given the meaning that resides at a higher level of categorisation in the respective legal taxonomy. This way, the presumption of legal language is found to be justified on both linguistic and psychological grounds. (shrink)

The relationship between legal interpretation and ordinary understanding has raised growing interest among legal scholars. According to the mainstream view, law is a communicative phenomenon and, therefore, the best theory of ordinary communication should also explain and guide legal interpretation. Certainly, it is very controversial which theory is the best one, but, even if there are many candidates, Grice’s conversation model has attracted a lot of attention. Some legal scholars claim that Grice’s theory of conversational maxims (...) should be applied in legal domain, while others dispute this claim. Izabela Skoczeń’s book, Implicatures within legal language provides an original contribution to this ongoing debate. Through an interdisciplinary approach that engages with the most recent advances in Pragmatics as well as with the most popular legal approaches, Skoczeń recasts Grice’s theory of conversational implicatures in order to explain the mechanisms behind court decisions. This review article provides a critical examination of Skoczeń’s book, highlighting its strengths as well as its problems. (shrink)

In this paper, we will survey the different uses of the term algorithm in contemporary legal practice. We will argue that the concept of algorithm currently exhibits a substantial degree of open texture, co-determined by the open texture of the concept of algorithm itself and by the open texture inherent to legal discourse. We will substantiate our argument by virtue of a case study, in which we analyze a recent jurisprudential case where the first and second-degree judges have (...) carved-out contrasting notions of algorithm. We will see that, thanks to our analysis of the open texture of the notion of algorithm in legal language, we can make sense of the different decisions taken by the judges as different contextually-determined sharpenings of the concept of algorithm. Finally, we will draw some general conclusions concerning the use of technical terms in legal instruments that address new technologies, such as the EU AI Act. (shrink)

This essay opens the Special Issue of the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law entitled “Legal Languages and Legal Communication” devoted to issues in translating, interpreting and teaching legal languages and legal communication. This volume of the International Journal of the Semiotics of Law comprises twelve articles which might be grouped into three categories of problems i.e. culture in legal translation and interpretation, legal discourse and/in legal communication and teaching legal languages (...) and legal communication. The first section refers to issues connected with legal terminology and the impact legal culture has on the quality of translation and interpretation (Kordić in Int J Semiot of Law 36 (4); Janigova in Int J Semiot of Law 36 (4); Matulewska and Oh in Int J Semiot of Law 36 (4)). The second part focuses on the question of legal discourse with a special emphasis on its role in legal communication (Więcławska in Int J Semiot of Law 36 (4); Alwazna in Int J Semiot of Law 36 (4); Hadryan and Rutecka-Góra in Int J Semiot of Law 36 (4); Orts in Int J Semiot of Law 36 (4); Cudowska in Int J Semiot of Law 36 (4); Górska and Juzaszek in Int J Semiot of Law 36 (4) and Grieshofer in Int J Semiot of Law 36 (4)). The third and last section of the special issue is dedicated to question of instructing legal languages and legal communication and, mainly tackles the problem of designing curricula of English for Legal Purposes in such a way so as to equip legal professionals with such linguistic competences, knowledge and skills that are most valuable for their work (Bhatia in Int J Semiot of Law 36 (4); Chiknaverova in Int J Semiot of Law 36 (4)). (shrink)

The paper addresses the question how descriptive language is used to express legal norms. Sentences we find in legislative acts, i.e. statutes, constitutions and regulations, express legal norms. Linguistically speaking, there are various grammatical and lexical ways of expressing norms, such as imperative mood, modal verbs, deontic verbs, etc. However, norms may also be expressed by descriptive sentences, namely sentences in present or future tense and indicative (declarative) mood (i.e. _The minister determines the tax rate_). In many (...) civil law countries (including Poland), this is a very common, if not the default, form of expressing norms in legislative texts. Often presented as a legal peculiarity, this phenomenon has yet to draw much academic attention. The normative meaning of descriptive sentences is usually attributed to purely pragmatic factors stemming from our shared assumptions about the legal system. However, a closer look reveals that similar grammatical constructions are ubiquitous in everyday communication and in different languages. We tend to utter various sorts of directives using descriptive sentences (_Now we add a spoon of salt to the sauce_; _credit cards are not accepted_). This suggests the possibility for a linguistic (as opposed to exclusively legal) explanation. This paper aims to offer such an explanation. Rather than resorting to formal semantics, so prevalent in legal theory, it borrows from Cognitive Linguistics to reveal the cognitive underpinnings of our surprising tendency to express normativity in descriptive terms. This involves four different, yet complementary, theories. Firstly, the theory of conceptual metaphor by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson which explains the phenomenon in question in terms of the metaphor “ ought is is ”; with “ ought ” as the more abstract target domain and “ is ” as the more concrete, cognitively simpler source domain. Secondly, the theory of speech act metonymy by Panther and Thornburg which presents descriptive legal sentences as referring to various components of the underlying cognitive scenario of obligation. Thirdly, Ronald Langacker’s notion of the virtuality of language as the explanation for non-present, including future, perpetual and directive, uses of the present tense. Fourtly, the notion of normative generics which points to the nominal, as opposed to verbal, structure of descriptive legal sentences as the source of their normativity. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to investigate the impact of the Greek language on modern legal languages in the United Kingdom and United States of America. The focus is placed on terms with the prefix cyber- of Greek origin that have recently enriched the English legal languages in connection with the fact that certain new phenomena have been regulated by laws as a result of the development of new technologies. Therefore, the authors have investigated the occurrence (...) of terms with the prefix cyber- in legislation and other legal texts. Apart from the analysis of borrowings in the English legal languages, the authors have also investigated the occurrence of equivalent terms in Greek and Cypriot legislation and other genres of legal texts. Furthermore, the analysis involved the investigation of the occurrence of terms with the analysed prefix cyber- in European Union legislation and terminological databases to find out whether the borrowings may become internationalisms of Greek origin. Furthermore, the authors have also investigated whether for those terms with a prefix of Greek origin there are synonyms in the languages under scrutiny of non-Greek origin. (shrink)

[full article, abstract in English; only abstract in Lithuanian] This paper proposes a new pragmatic interpretation of the Frege–Geach problem and presents a possible solution using a model of ascriptive legal language. The first section includes the definition of the Frege–Geach problem. In the second section, I analyze the content of Geach’s critical argument against prescriptivism in ethics. I discuss what Geach means by ascriptivism, why he mixes it with prescriptivism, and why a particular article by Herbert Hart (...) became the subject of criticism by Geach. The third section proposes a possible solution to the Frege–Geach problem based on the explication of the assertoric force of ascriptive legal utterances and the performativity of legal language. (shrink)

The Spanish future subjunctive demonstrates how linguistics can inform modern language policy. The FS is described as an archaism to be eliminated from contemporary legal texts. We analyze a corpus of over 3000 tokens of the FS in Spanish legal texts dated between the 13th and 16th century. The FS has two functions in legal discourse. The casuistic function allows for indicating paradigmatic subordination; the forwarding function introduces new information. Our quantitative results suggest an increase in (...) the usage frequency of the FS in legal discourse, where an inverse trend appears in other genres. As shown by a linear regression analysis, the FS started appearing significantly closer to the beginning of the law article, indicating an increase in the forwarding function in time. In view of our results, reformers of legal Spanish should consider the functions of the FS in legal discourse when advising its suppression. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2016 Heft: 209 Seiten: 187-208.

_ Source: _Volume 23, Issue 2, pp 127 - 160 This article illuminates rabbinic concepts of temporality through examining metaphorical uses of the root qbʿ. The root has both concrete and metaphorical meanings, describing the physical attachment of objects as well as temporal ideas of permanence, stability, and endurance. While it has been argued that rabbinic texts do not display concepts of time in the modern sense, a combination of philological and conceptual analysis shows how rabbinic images of temporal themes (...) can be elicited from rabbinic texts. Moreover, attention to the multivalence of words can clarify complex Bavli passages that engage overlapping but distinctive metaphorical meanings of the root. (shrink)

The volume presents a set of invited papers based on analyses of legal discourse drawn from a number of international contexts where often the English language ...

Access to legal information is fundamental to access to justice. Yet accessibility refers not only to making legal documents available to the public, but also rendering legal information comprehensible to them. A vexing problem in bringing legal information to the public is how to turn formal legal documents such as legislation and judgments, which are often highly technical, to easily navigable and comprehensible knowledge to those without legal education. In this study, we formulate a (...) three-step approach for bringing legal knowledge to laypersons, tackling the issues of navigability and comprehensibility. First, we translate selected sections of the law into snippets (called CLIC-pages), each being a small piece of article that focuses on explaining certain technical legal concept in layperson’s terms. Second, we construct a Legal Question Bank, which is a collection of legal questions whose answers can be found in the CLIC-pages. Third, we design an interactive CLIC Recommender. Given a user’s verbal description of a legal situation that requires a legal solution, CRec interprets the user’s input and shortlists questions from the question bank that are most likely relevant to the given legal situation and recommends their corresponding CLIC pages where relevant legal knowledge can be found. In this paper we focus on the technical aspects of creating an LQB. We show how large-scale pre-trained language models, such as GPT-3, can be used to generate legal questions. We compare machine-generated questions against human-composed questions and find that MGQs are more scalable, cost-effective, and more diversified, while HCQs are more precise. We also show a prototype of CRec and illustrate through an example how our 3-step approach effectively brings relevant legal knowledge to the public. (shrink)

The contract review process can be a costly and time-consuming task for lawyers and clients alike, requiring significant effort to identify and evaluate the legal implications of individual clauses. To address this challenge, we propose the use of natural language processing techniques, specifically text classification based on deontic tags, to streamline the process. Our research question is whether natural language processing techniques, specifically dense vector embeddings, can help semi-automate the contract review process and reduce time and costs (...) for legal professionals reviewing deontic modalities in contracts. In this study, we create a domain-specific dataset and train both baseline and neural network models for contract sentence classification. This approach offers a more efficient and cost-effective solution for contract review, mimicking the work of a lawyer. Our approach achieves an accuracy of 0.90, showcasing its effectiveness in identifying and evaluating individual contract sentences. (shrink)

Wszalek offers a detailed examination of the challenges involved in assisting people with language and communication impairments in the comprehension of legal language and concepts (LLC). If we settle for a minimum threshold of LLC comprehension, we are likely to observe that some people will not meet this threshold due to personal choices, such as not having practiced reading sufficiently or having avoided intellectually stimulating social interactions.

Can there be a non-reductivist, source-based explanation of the use of normative language in statements describing the law and legal situations? This problem was formulated by Joseph Raz, who also claimed to have solved it. According to his well-known doctrine of ‘detached’ statements, normative legal statements can be informatively made by speakers who merely adopt, without necessarily sharing, the point of view of someone who accepts that legal norms are justified and ought to be followed. In (...) this paper I defend two theses. I argue, first, that the notion of a detached statement cannot be made to work, and that Raz’s problem is thus not thereby solved. But the problem itself, I also suggest, is a false one. (shrink)

. A new approach to the formalization of concepts used in legal reasoning such as obligation and cause is presented. The formalization is based on the linguistic use of the concepts both in legal language and in ordinary language, and has been motivated by work on a legal expert system with a natural language interface. Particularly for the concept of obligation this yields quite different results from those obtained by the usual approach of deontic (...) logic: So‐called paradoxes are avoided, quantification over obligations becomes possible, no restriction to a “single‐agent system” is required, and collisions of obligations can be formulated. (shrink)

Analyzing and evaluating legal case reports are labor-intensive tasks for judges and lawyers, who usually base their decisions on report abstracts, legal principles, and commonsense reasoning. Thus, summarizing legal documents is time-consuming and requires excellent human expertise. Moreover, public legal corpora of specific languages are almost unavailable. This paper proposes a transfer learning approach with extractive and abstractive techniques to cope with the lack of labeled legal summarization datasets, namely a low-resource scenario. In particular, we (...) conducted extensive multi- and cross-language experiments. The proposed work outperforms the state-of-the-art results of extractive summarization on the Australian Legal Case Reports dataset and sets a new baseline for abstractive summarization. Finally, syntactic and semantic metrics assessments have been carried out to evaluate the accuracy and the factual consistency of the machine-generated legal summaries. (shrink)