In the past Boethius was primarily considered to be the author of the Consolatio, or a theologician or logician. But as a philosopher he was the first to reflect on the concept of person, while Augustinus and others only made use of this concept. It is the purpose of this article to show that it was exactly Boethius’ situation in the late antiquity with its many differing traditions that urged and enabled him to ask himself what person essentially is. His (...) new concept of person (: naturae rationabilis individua substantia) puts person first and strengthens - problematically - the position of substance. (shrink)

Boethius’s famous definition of “person” as naturae rationabilis individua substantia (an individual substance of a rational nature) is frequently cited without reference to the specific theological purpose of his formulation (an attempt to provide some clarification about the mysteries of Christ and the Trinity). This article elucidates some of the theological issues that required philosophical progress on the nature of “personhood.” It also considers some of the residual difficulties with the application of this definition to divine persons that (...) have been raised by subsequent theologians such as Thomas Aquinas who are otherwise sympathetic to Boethius’s definition of person when applied to human beings. (shrink)

The aim of J.-L. Marion’s article is to revisit the important debate on the place of Augustine in the history of metaphysics. Often, quibbles arise upon considering the use of substance (substantia) by Augustine, not only as approximative of essentia and as synonymous with ousia, but in deciding whether in so doing Augustine effectuates a ‘metaphysical turn’. While he elsewhere argues that Augustine is a pre-metaphysical thinker, in this article Marion focuses on showing the diverse range of usages of (...) the term substance in the Augustinian corpus. Marion observes: first, whenever substance seems a fixed definition, the term allows for equivocity; second, God is substance in an indeterminate sense or by negation; third, human beings are substances fundamentally to capture the mutability of human existence. As such, Marion concludes, the Augustinian use of substance is insufficient to inelude Augustine in the history of metaphysics. (shrink)

In medieval writers we find a distinction between body as a substance – corpus-substantia – and body as a quantity – corpus-quantitas (or quantum). One of the earliest uses of this distinction is in works written by Robert Grosseteste in the 1220s. In this paper I explore his use and understanding of this distinction. I argue that he understands corpus-substantia as such as a dimensionless composite of a first corporeal form, corporeity, and prime matter. Corporeity itself is an (...) active power for three dimensions. Through its infinite and necessary self-multiplication corporeity extends the prime matter it informs into three dimensions, thereby resulting in corpus-quantum. I explore how Grosseteste’s conception of corporeity, though probably based on ideas found in Avicenna, diverges from different understandings of Avicenna’s conception of corporeity proposed by medieval and modern commentators. (shrink)

This book consists in a collection of studies composed by different researchers; every study focuses on an author or on some authors of the history of philosophy who has/have analysed, endorsed or criticized the concept of substance. Both positions for and against the ontology of substance are presented in the book.

Stephen Schiffer’s paradox of meaning shows that both Fregean and Russellian explanations of the individuals in thoughts-propositions are questionable. The author argues that it is Pavel Tichý’s semantical system, which offers a viable middle way between the extremes of the above mentioned approaches, solving the Schiffer’s paradox.

This article explores the history of the prayer Deus qui humanae substantiae dignitatem as a contribution to the conceptualization history of human dignity. It is argued that the prayer can be traced back to pre-Carolingian times, that it forms part of an early tradition of reflection on human dignity, and that it was adapted to use at the offertory, such that an association was made between human dignity and the holy exchange of gifts. In this way, the prayer significantly shaped (...) the Christian concept of human dignity as the holy ‘place’ of commerce with God. (shrink)

​Al principio della Meditatio Sexta, tappa conclusiva del capolavoro di Descartes, si schiude una frattura fondamentale. È quella tra intelletto e immaginazione, autentica premessa per la dimostrazione – a cui l’opera cartesiana punta sin dal titolo – della distinzione reale di mente e corpo. Come d’altra parte Descartes sottolinea già nella Synopsis (sconfessando alcune interpretazioni odierne), la reciproca alterità ontologica tra le due res non viene garantita a seguito dell’approdo al punto archimedeo del cogito della Meditatio Secunda, ma solamente a (...) seguito di un complesso iter di abductio e subductio dei contenuti della mens che culmina nel capitolo conclusivo. Qui la mens, avendo già stabilito l’esistenza, la perfezione e la veracità di Dio, fa finalmente i conti con sé stessa, mettendo mano all’analisi dei disparati elementi che hanno composto, sino a quel momento, una definizione quasi fenomenologica dell’ego cogitans come un quid «dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens, imaginans quoque, et sentiens». (shrink)

Nei primi anni del XIV secolo si sviluppa in seno all'ordine francescano un dibattito sul ruolo da assegnare all'essenza divina nella generazione della Seconda Persona della Trinità, che vede come protagonisti principali Riccardo di Conington e Giovanni Duns Scoto.La disputa tra i due autori sulla generazione divina – in particolare sulla possibilità di considerare l'essentia dei come quasi materia dalla quale viene prodotto il Figlio − e l'influenza esercitata da Enrico di Gand e da Guglielmo di Ware è stata già (...) ricostruita da Stephen Dumont nel 1996. Dumont mostra le varie fasi di questo dibattito: la prima coincide con la Lectura dove Scoto fornisce una serie di obiezioni alla dottrina della quasi materia... (shrink)

On a souvent souligné que l’usage du concept de substance était problématique dans les Méditations, préférant l’exposé plus rigoureux des Principia. À l’encontre de cette interprétation, cet article affirme que le traitement analytique de la substance est non seulement conforme à l’ordre des raisons, mais que s’y développe une aventure révélatrice : si la réflexion sur l’ ego et la cogitatio tend à faire de celui-ci une quasi substance, la formule « ego autem substantia » accomplit dans la Troisième (...) Méditation une substantialisation qui n’est que transitoire. Car cette substantialisation, fondée sur la présomption de l’ ego se concevant comme author, est aussitôt contestée à la lumière de la relation que l’ ego entretient au Dieu infini. (shrink)

In February 1676, one of Leibniz's main concerns is with the problem of the seat of the soul and its relationship with the body, to which, in two very short papers, he provides two different solutions: the doctrine of the flos substantiae and the vortex theory. By analyzing the former, I suggest that, despite what other scholars claim, it is far from being an earlier exposition of the notion of monad. I argue that this doctrine is entertained by Leibniz only (...) for a period, but is rejected later on and excluded from the final monadic system. This hypothesis seems to be supported by the shift to the notion of a vortex, which – despite having some evident pantheistic and monistic implications – offers a different solution to the problem of mind-body union, by identifying the soul as the only cement of matter. In this article, by following the progress of such a shift, we discover some fascinating nuances in the young Leibniz's development. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende analizar un corto pasaje de la Ciencia nueva en el que Vico propone una interesante etimología para los conceptos de ser y sustancia. A lo largo de la discusión se pondrá en evidencia la importancia de este pasaje para la comprensión de la ontología de Vico y se reconstruirá la génesis e historia del texto en el desarrollo del pensamiento de Vico.

Objective: The dopamine hypothesis is one of the most influential theories of the neurobiological background of schizophrenia (SCZ). However, direct evidence for abnormal dopamine-related subcortical-cortical circuitry disconnectivity is still lacking. The aim of this study was therefore to test dopamine-related substantia nigra (SN)-based striato-thalamo-cortical resting-state functional connectivity (FC) in SCZ. Method: Based on our a priori hypothesis, we analyzed a large sample resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) dataset from first-episode drug-naïve SCZ patients (n = 112) and healthy controls (...) (n = 82) using the SN as the seed region for an investigation of striato-thalamo-cortical FC. This was done in the standard band of slow frequency oscillations and then in its subfrequency bands (Slow4 and Slow5). Results: The analysis showed in SCZ: (1) reciprocal functional hypo-connectivity between SN and striatum, with differential patterns for Slow5 and Slow4; (2) functional hypo-connectivity between striatum and thalamus, as well as functional hyper-connectivity between thalamus and sensorimotor cortical areas, specifically in Slow4; (3) correlation of thalamo-sensorimotor functional hyper-connectivity with psychopathological symptoms. Conclusions: We demonstrate abnormal dopamine-related SN-based striato-thalamo-cortical FC in slow frequency oscillations in first-episode drug-naive SCZ. This suggests that altered dopaminergic function in the SN leads to abnormal neuronal synchronization (as indexed by FC) within subcortical-cortical circuitry, complementing the dopamine hypothesis in SCZ on the regional level of resting-state activity. (shrink)

The author explains in the following paper the main ideas of the substratum and bundle theories of individuals and tries than to sketch some important features of the traditional Aristotelian first-substance theory.

The actualist position rests on the mistaken assumption that individuals can be referred to before they exist; the existentialist makes no such assumption. Plantinga's criticisms of existentialism founder on his claim that for a proposition the only possibility is possible truth. In fact, there is another kind of possibility, viz. possible predication. Hence, 'Socrates does not exist' is a possible predication, even though not possibly true. Plantinga's other putative counter examples are flawed in the same way.

The actualist position rests on the mistaken assumption that individuals can be referred to before they exist; the existentialist makes no such assumption. Plantinga's criticisms of existentialism founder on his claim that for a proposition the only possibility is possible truth. In fact, there is another kind of possibility, viz. possible predication. Hence, 'Socrates does not exist' is a possible predication, even though not possibly true. Plantinga's other putative counter examples are flawed in the same way.

The actualist position rests on the mistaken assumption that individuals can be referred to before they exist; the existentialist makes no such assumption. Plantinga's criticisms of existentialism founder on his claim that for a proposition the only possibility is possible truth. In fact, there is another kind of possibility, viz. possible predication. Hence, 'Socrates does not exist' is a possible predication, even though not possibly true. Plantinga's other putative counter examples are flawed in the same way.

The aim of this article is to present and analyze the argumentative structures which are decisive for Leibniz’s position regarding the issue of the ontological status of material things (or bodies) and matter. I reconstruct and thoroughly analyze (i) two different argumentative strategies of Leibniz’s – viz. an “epistemic” and a “realistic” one – for his general thesis that nothing material (and a fortiori no body) has rigore metaphysico the status of a substance, as well as (ii) the corresponding suggestions (...) of his as to how the material world is to be construed out of substances and their modes. Throughout, I lay special emphasis onpinpointing the real key elements of Leibniz’s arguments and on articulating them in such terms that would allow for their direct confrontation with other paradigmatic positions regarding the issue in Leibniz’s times. (shrink)

This small treatise--actually six separate "Questions"--on the substance of the spheres deals with issues which Averroes regards as critically important, since a proper understanding of them leads to an appreciation of God's governance of the entire world. The person who comprehends the nature and mechanics of the heavens is well on his way to intellectual perfection and felicity, Averroes believes; and felicity, as every medieval scholar knows, leads to immortality, if only of the Averroian kind.