Kevin T. Fitzgerald, S.J.; Knowledge Without Wisdom: Human Genetic Engineering Without Religious Insight, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical.

The ethics of human genetic engineering.

Genetic engineering technologies are a subclass of the biotechnology family, and are concerned with the use of laboratory-based technologies to intervene with a given organism at the genetic level, i.e., the level of its DNA. This class of technologies could feasibly be used to treat diseases and disabilities, create disease-resistant crops, or even be used to enhance humans to make them more resistant to certain environmental conditions. However, both therapeutic and enhancement applications of genetic engineering (...) raise serious ethical concerns. This paper examines various objections to genetic engineering (as applied to humans) which have been raised in the literature, and presents a new way to frame these issues, and to look for solutions. Specifically, this paper frames genetic engineering technologies within the ‘design turn in applied ethics’ lens and thus situates these technologies as covarying with societal forces. The value sensitive design (VSD) approach to technology design is then appropriated as the conceptual framework in which genetic engineering technologies can be considered so that they can be designed for important human values. By doing so, this paper brings further nuance to the scholarship on genetic engineering technologies by discussing the sociotechnicity of genetic engineering systems rather than framing them as value-neutral tools that either support or constrain values based on how they are used. (shrink)

A common worry about the genetic engineering of human beings is that it will reduce human genetic diversity, creating a biological monoculture that could not only increase our susceptibility to disease but also hasten the extinction of our species. Thus far, however, the evolutionary implications of human genetic modification remain largely unexplored. In this paper, I consider whether the widespread use of genetic engineering technology is likely to narrow the present range (...) of genetic variation, and if so, whether this would in fact lead to the evolutionary harms that some authors envision. By examining the nature of biological variation and its relation to population immunity and evolvability, I show that not only will genetic engineering have a negligible impact on human genetic diversity, but also that it will be more likely to ensure rather than undermine the health and longevity of the human species. (shrink)

There are many ways that biological theory can inform ethical discussions of genetic engineering and biomedical enhancement. In this essay, we highlight some of these potential contributions, and along the way provide a synthetic overview of the papers that comprise this special issue. We begin by comparing and contrasting genetic engineering with programs of selective breeding that led to the domestication of plants and animals, and we consider how genetic engineering differs from other contemporary (...) biotechnologies such as embryo selection. We go on to consider the implications of genetic engineering for human nature, human evolution, and persistence of the human species. Finally, we question whether genetic interventions warrant the extraordinary ethical scrutiny they are often given, and we show how the misleading “genetic blueprint” metaphor has imposed a faulty structure on the enhancement debate. We conclude by considering the nature of biological development and the sobering limits it places on what genetic engineering can reasonably hope to achieve. (shrink)

This paper describes some likely semiotic consequences of genetic engineering on what Gregory Bateson has called “the mental ecology” of future humans, consequences that are less often raised in discussions surrounding the safety of GMOs. The effects are as follows: an increased 1) habituation to the presence of GMOs in the environment, 2) normalization of empirically false assumptions grounding genetic reductionism, 3) acceptance that humans are capable and entitled to decide what constitutes an evolutionary improvement for a (...) species, 4) perception that the main source of creativity and problem solving in the biosphere is anthropogenic. Though there are some tensions between them, these effects tend to produce self-validating webs of ideas, actions, and environments, which may reinforce destructive habits of thought. Humans are unlikely to safely develop genetic technologies without confronting these escalating processes directly. Intervening in this mental ecology presents distinct challenges for educators, as will be discussed. (shrink)

It is tempting to argue that Kantian moral philosophy justifies prohibiting both human germ-line genetic engineering and non-therapeutic genetic engineering because they fail to respect human dignity. There are, however, good reasons for resisting this temptation. In fact, Kant’s moral philosophy provides reasons that support genetic engineering—even germ-line and non-therapeutic. This is true of Kant’s imperfect duties to seek one’s own perfection and the happiness of others. It is also true of the (...) categorical imperative. Kant’s moral philosophy does, however, provide limits to justifiable genetic engineering. (shrink)

Genetic engineering often generates fear of out of control scientists creating Frankenstein creatures that will terrorize the general populace, especially in the cases of human-animal chimeras. While sometimes an accurate characterization of some researchers, this belief is often the result of repugnance for new technology rather than being rationally justified. To facilitate thoughtful discussion the moral issues raised by human-animal chimeras, ethicists and other stakeholders must develop a rational ethical framework before raw emotion has a chance (...) of becoming the dominating justification for public opinion and policy. Derek Parfit’s work on lives worth living for human beings can provide valuable insight into the morality of creating chimeras. As long as their lives are overall good, then bringing them into existence does not harm them even if they are used for medical research or procedures, or they are created to carry on the homo sapiens’ “family” line. (shrink)

Genetic modification leads to several important moral issues. Up until now they have mainly been discussed from the viewpoint that only individual living beings, above all animals, are morally considerable. The standpoint that also collective entities such as species belong to the moral sphere have seldom been taken into account in a more thorough way, although it is advocated by several important environmental ethicists. The main purpose of this article is to analyze in more detail than often has been (...) done what the practical consequences of this ethical position would be for the use of genetic engineering on animals and plants. The practical consequences of the holistic standpoint (focused on collective entities) of Holmes Rolston, III, is compared with the practical consequences of the individualistic standpoints (focused on individual living beings) of Bernard E. Rollin and Philipp Balzer, Klaus Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber, respectively. The article also discusses whether the claim that species are morally considerable is tenable as a foundation for policy decisions on genetic engineering. (shrink)

(2008). Genetic Engineering and the Speciation of Superions from Humans. World Futures: Vol. 64, Postformal Thought and Hierarchical Complexity, pp. 436-443.

The advent of CRISPR has drastically moved the possibility of genetically modifying human genomes from the space of science fiction into nearby reality. Whether one considers the positive results f...

Many of the existing ethical analyses of genetic engineering technologies (GET) focus on how they can be used to enhance individuals—to improve individual well-being, health and cognition. There is a gap in the current literature about the specific ways enhancement technologies could be used to improve our populations and species, viewed as a whole. In this paper, I explore how GET may be used to enhance the species through improvements in the gene pool. I argue one aspect of (...) the species that may be desirable to enhance is ‘persistence’ or long-term viability. I then look at some of the ways in which GET could be used to improve human persistence and argue that the use of GET to secure benefits for individuals may compromise persistence. This suggests conflicts between uses of GET to enhance individuals and uses to promote the persistence of the species may occur. As GET are further developed, the likelihood that these conflicts will actually arise, and how we should resolve them if they do, will need to be considered. (shrink)

Genetically engineered (GE) insects, such as the GE OX513A Aedes aegypti mosquitoes, have been designed to suppress their wild-type populations so as to reduce the transmission of vector-borne diseases in humans. Apart from the ecological and epidemiological uncertainties associated with this approach, such biotechnological approaches may be used by individual governments or the global community of nations to avoid addressing the underlying structural, systemic causes of those infections... We discuss here key ethical questions raised by the use of GE mosquitoes, (...) with the aim of fostering discussion between the public, researchers, policy makers, healthcare organizations, and regulatory agencies at the local, national, and international levels. We affect that goal by outlining a procedural approach to decision-making about the use of the “biotechnology” that goes beyond “community engagement.” The protocol we advocate for entails informed deliberations and decision-making at the community level. It is designed to ensure that the voices of the marginalized and vulnerable groups that would be disproportionately affected by the decision are heard during the community-wide discussions. Moreover, we make the case that the values embedded in the risk assessment should be identified so that the community can make an informed decision about the use of GE insects. In addition, we advocate for the involvement of a variety of actors whose responsibility would be to ensure that the community has the opportunity to make an informed decision based on deliberations about the use of the “biotechnology.”. (shrink)

Using ideas from evolution and postformal stages of hierarchical complexity, a hypothetical scenario, premised on genetic engineering advances, portrays the development of a new humanoid species, Superions. How would Superions impact and treat current humans? If the Superion scenario came to pass, it would be the ultimate genocidal terrorism of eliminating an entire species, Homo Sapiens. We speculate about defenses Homo Sapiens might mount. The tasks to relate two species (systems) constitutes a postformal, Metasystematic task. Developing a system (...) of discourse to prevent destruction requires postformal Paradigmatic-stage tasks. Implications are twofold: species survival and sufficient evolution to survive. (shrink)

Human genetic enhancement, examined from the standpoint of the new field of political bioethics, displaces the age-old question of truth: What is human nature? This book displaces that question with another: What kind of human nature should humans want to create for themselves? To answer that question, this book answers two others: What constraints should limit the applications of rapidly developing biotechnologies? What could possibly form the basis for corresponding public policy in a democratic society? Benjamin (...) Gregg focuses on the distinctly political dimensions of human nature, where politics refers to competition among competing values on which to base public policy, legislation, and political culture. This book offers citizens of democratic communities a broad perspective on how they together might best approach urgent questions of how to deal with the socially and morally challenging potential for human genetic engineering. (shrink)

Human genetic engineering may soon be possible. The gathering debate about this prospect already threatens to become mired in irresolvable disagreement. After surveying the scientific and technological developments that have brought us to this pass, _The Ethics of Genetic Engineering_ focuses on the ethical and policy debate, noting the deep divide that separates proponents and opponents. The book locates the source of this divide in differing framing assumptions: reductionist pluralist on one side, holist communitarian on the (...) other. The book argues that we must bridge this divide, drawing on the resources from both encampments, if we are to understand and cope with the distinctive problems posed by genetic engineering. These problems, termed "fractious problems," are novel, complex, ethically fraught, unavoidably of public concern, and unavoidably divisive. Berry examines three prominent ethical and political theories – utilitarianism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics – to consider their competency in bridging the divide and addressing these fractious problems. The book concludes that virtue ethics can best guide parental decision making and that a new policymaking approach sketched here, a "navigational approach," can best guide policymaking. These approaches enable us to gain a rich understanding of the problems posed and to craft resolutions adequate to their challenges. (shrink)

(2002). On Being a Bioethicist: A Review of John H. Evans Playing God?: Human Genetic Engineering and the Rationalization of Public Bioethical Debate. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 65-69.

The Swiss expert report suggests thatthe inherent dignity of a living being be identifiedwith its inherent value. But the phrase ``inherentvalue of a living being'' seems to connote two conceptsof inherent value. One has a morally obligatingcharacter but is counterintuitive because of itsegalitarianism. The other is one of non-moral value.It is more compatible with considered intuitions butinsufficient for substantiating the expert report'sclaim that human beings have moral duties towardsanimals and plants. The paper discusses theseconcepts. Consideration is then given to (...) the problemof how discursive support can be generated for theexpert report's claim that human beings have the moralduty to abstain from impairing those functions andabilities of a nonuman being that members of itsspecies as a rule can practice. (shrink)

Imagine a world in which as part of their basic substances tomatoes contain fish and tobacco, potatoes contain chicken, moths and other insects, and corn contains fireflies. Is this science-fiction? No, these plant-animal hybrids already exist today and may soon be on your supermarket shelves without any special labeling to warn you. Furthermore, in a few years the types of these genetically engineered "vegetables" are sure to increase and may very possibly also include human genes. If you are a (...) vegetarian, do you want to be in the position of inadvertently eating vegetables that are part meat? Even if you are not a vegetarian, are you ready to become a cannibal and eat foods that are part human being? (shrink)

The use of genetic engineering is increasingly discussed for nature conservation. At the same time, recent animal ethics approaches debate whether humans should genetically engineer wild animals to improve their welfare. This paper examines if obligations towards wild sentient animals require humans to genetically engineering wild animals, while arguing that there is no moral need to do so. The focus is on arguments from animal ethics, but they are linked to conservation ethics, highlighting the often neglected overlap (...) between the two fields. The paper emphasizes that a) the benefits of genetic engineering are overestimated and at the same time harms from its development and use underestimated, b) the assumption that genetic engineering is an appropriate ‘last resort’ tool is wrong, c) many arguments in favor of genetic engineering are based on an inadequate understanding of ecology and biotechnological processes, and d) the debate downplays the importance of self-determination for wild animals. (shrink)

Transhumanism is a loosely defined movement that has developed gradually over the past two decades. It promotes an interdisciplinary approach to understanding and evaluating the opportunities for enhancing the human condition and the human organism opened up by the advancement of technology. Attention is given to both present technologies, like genetic engineering and information technology, and anticipated future ones, such as molecular nanotechnology and artificial intelligence.

The struggle over genetically-engineered (GE) maize in Mexico reveals a deep conflict over the criteria used in the governance of agri-food systems. Policy debate on the topic of GE maize has become “scientized,” granting experts a high level of political authority, and narrowing the regulatory domain to matters that can be adjudicated on the basis of scientific information or “managed” by environmental experts. While scientization would seem to narrow opportunities for public participation, this study finds that Mexican activists acting “in (...) defense of maize” engage science in multiple ways, using and producing scientific knowledge as well as treating scientific discussions as a stage for launching complex social critiques. Drawing from research in science and technology studies, this article assesses the impacts and pitfalls of three tactics used by maize activists that respond to the scientization of biotechnology politics: (1) using scientific information as a resource; (2) participating in scientific research; and (3) reframing policy problems as broadly social, rather than as solely scientific or technical. The obstacles that maize activists have faced in carrying out each of these efforts indicate that despite diverse and sophisticated engagements between social movements and the scientific field, scientization remains a significant institutional barrier to democratizing agricultural governance. (shrink)

When God gave humankind dominion over the earth he may not have known exactly what we would be able to do with it. The technical capacities to which the production and reproduction of our everyday life have given rise have grown at an astonishing and, it seems, ever-increasing rate. The instruments that we use to do work on the world have become sharper and more refined, and the implications of human interventions in the nonhuman environment are much more far-reaching (...) than could have been imagined even forty years ago. It has become something of a cliche to say that our technical abilities have outstripped the wisdom to know when, where, and how we should appropriately use them, but techniques such as genetic engineering invite the dusting-off of the cliche and the asking of the question implicit in it: We know we can splice genes, but should we splice them? We might of course come to the conclusion that we should only splice some of them some of the time, but even arriving at that conclusion presupposes that the ethical question has been asked and answered. (shrink)

Genetic engineering is a rapidly evolving field of research with potentially powerful therapeutic applications. The technology CRISPR-Cas9 not only has improved the accuracy and overall feasbility of genome editing but also has increased access to users by lowering cost and increasing usability and speed. The potential benefits of genetic engineering may come with an increased risk of off-target events or carcinogenic growth. Germ-line cell therapy may also pose risks to potential progeny and thus have an additional (...) burden of proof for safety. Persons responsible for evaluating the ethics of genetic-engineering research programs or clinical trials should do so in light of the nature, integrity, and totality of the human person. Recent news of the implantation and birth of genetically engineered human embryos is just one example of increased rogue science. Health care institutions should consider what steps can be taken to prevent or slow this trend. (shrink)

The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the SwissConstitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations onthe use of genetic material that take into account the dignity ofnonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we shouldunderstand what is meant by ``the dignity of nonhuman animals,'' andabout what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignitywith respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determiningwhat is meant is to clarify the difference between dignity when (...) appliedto humans and when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of humandignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the rightnot to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it have thecognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the caseof nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignityrequires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied totheir abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value isnot absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibitbreeding manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But itdoes restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard togenetic engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowedthe uninhibited development of species specific functions, a positionshared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purposeconception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of the Genetic Make-upposition proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity,as here defended, is what is meant in the Swiss Constitution article. (shrink)

This book describes specific, well-know controversies in the genetic modification debate and connects them to deeper philosophical issues in philosophy of technology. It contributes to the current, far-reaching deliberations about the future of food, agriculture and society. Controversies over so-called Genetically Modified Organisms regularly appear in the press. The biotechnology debate has settled into a long-term philosophical dispute. The discussion goes much deeper than the initial empirical questions about whether or not GM food and crops are safe for (...) class='Hi'>human consumption or pose environmental harms that dominated news reports. In fact, the implications of this debate extend beyond the sphere of food and agriculture to encompass the general role of science and technology in society. The GM controversy provides an occasion to explore important issues in philosophy of technology. Researchers, teachers and students interested in agricultural biotechnology, philosophy of technology and the future of food and agriculture will find this exploration timely and thought provoking. (shrink)

Genetic engineering in general, and human genetic editing in particular, is revolutionizing humankind’s self-understanding: an evolved organism taking ever greater control of its own evolution. This Anthropocenic phenomenon is deeply equivocal (Gregg B. Human genetic engineering: biotic justice in the anthropocene? In: DellaSala D, Goldstein M (eds) Encyclopedia of the Anthropocene, vol 4. Elsevier, Oxford, pp 351–359, 2018). While delivering humans from some risks, it renders them vulnerable to unintended consequences as well. Even (...) in the face of seemingly intractable differences of opinion about how best to understand genetic manipulation culturally, and how to evaluate it ethically, political communities and international organizations alike must address its possible future legal regulation. Governments and other elite institutions would do well to include the general public, to the extent possible, in deliberations about regulation, even as genetic engineering is based on highly specialized knowledge. (shrink)

Genes are the fundamental chemical codes that determine the physical nature of all living things, from the tiniest single-celled organism to human beings. Genes make up the DNA, the cell-level master plan which determines how the organism is going to develop in all ways that are not environmentally influenced.

Imagine a world where everyone is healthy, intelligent, long living and happy. Intuitively this seems wonderful, albeit unrealistic. However, recent scientific developments in genetic engineering, namely CRISPR/Cas bring the question into public discourse, how the genetic enhancement of humans should be evaluated morally.

The aim of this paper is to expose the unique muddle in which moral philosophy finds itself with regard to genetic engineering. The latter can be essentially defined as the correcting of nature's mistakes at their source, the DNA acid molecule of the gene. I shall discuss the moral nature of genetic engineering with respect to a single issue: the potential harm it may inflict upon the autonomous individual. I shall also consider the distinctions between (...) class='Hi'>genetic engineering and other activities affecting human existence, in order to establish that the moral issues presented by genetic engineering are unique to it. (shrink)

There are many risks involved in genetic engineering. The release of genetically altered organisms in the environment can increase human suffering, decrease animal welfare, and lead to ecological disasters. The containment of biotechnological material in laboratories and industrial plants contributes to the risk of accidental release, especially if the handling and storage are inadequate. The purely political dangers include intensified economic inequality, the possibility of large-scale eugenic programs, and totalitarian control over human lives. How should the (...) acceptability of these risks be determined? We argue that the assessment should be left to those who can be harmed by the decisions in question. Economic risks are acceptable, if they are condoned by the corporations and governments who take them. The risks imposed on laboratory personnel by the containment of dangerous materials ought to be evaluated by the laboratory personnel themselves. All other risks are more or less universal, and should therefore be assessed as democratically as possible. If risk-taking is based on the choices of those who can be harmed by the consequences, then, even if the undesired outcome is realized, the risk is acceptable, because it is embedded in their own system of ethical and epistemic values. (shrink)

Building on the evidence from the impact of hybrid technology on varietal diversity loss, this paper explores ex ante the possible effects of introduction of Bt eggplant on on-farm varietal diversity of eggplant. The public–private partnership involved in the development and introduction of Bt eggplant provides a great opportunity to develop locally-adapted Bt open-pollinated varieties (OPVs) instead of having a limited number of generic hybrid varieties. The study shows that introduction of multiple Bt OPVs by public institutions will reduce the (...) rate of replacement of OPVs by hybrids and thus help in conserving varietal diversity. However, the cost of developing multiple Bt OPVs is high; hence policy makers need to look at alternative measures to maintain the varietal diversity of crops such as eggplant in its centers of diversity. (shrink)

In recent years, genetically engineered (GE) mosquitoes have been proposed as a public health measure against the high incidence of mosquito-borne diseases among the poor in regions of the global South. While uncertainties as well as risks for humans and ecosystems are entailed by the open-release of GE mosquitoes, a powerful global health governance non-state organization is funding the development of and advocating the use of those bio-technologies as public health tools. In August 2016, the US Food and Drug Agency (...) (FDA) approved the uncaged field trial of a GE Aedes aegypti mosquito in Key Haven, Florida. The FDA’s decision was based on its assessment of the risks of the proposed experimental public health research project. The FDA is considered a global regulatory standard setter. So, its approval of the uncaged field trial could be used by proponents of GE mosquitoes to urge countries in the global South to permit the use of those bio-technologies. -/- From a public health ethics perspective, this paper evaluates the FDA’s 2016 risk assessment of the proposed uncaged field trial of the GE mosquito to determine whether it qualified as a realistic risk evaluation. -/- The FDA’s risk assessment of the proposed uncaged field trial did not proximate the conditions under which the GE mosquitoes would be used in regions of the global South where there is a high prevalence of mosquito-borne diseases. -/- Given that health and disease have political-economic determinants, whether a risk assessment of a product is realistic or not particularly matters with respect to interventions meant for public health problems that disproportionately impact socio-economically marginalized populations. If ineffective public health interventions are adopted based on risk evaluations that do not closely mirror the conditions under which those products would actually be used, there could be public health and ethical costs for those populations. (shrink)

Genetic engineering for purposes of human enhancement poses risks that justify regulation. I argue, however, that it is inappropriate to use human rights treaties to prohibit germ-line genetic engineering whether therapeutic or for purposes of enhancement. The scope and weight of human rights make them poor tools for regulating a rapidly developing technology such as genetic engineering. On the other hand, international treaties are appropriate regulatory tools as long as prohibitions are (...) not put in terms of human rights. (shrink)

When God gave humankind dominion over the earth he may not have known exactly what we would be able to do with it. The technical capacities to which the production and reproduction of our everyday life have given rise have grown at an astonishing and, it seems, ever-increasing rate. The instruments that we use to do work on the world have become sharper and more refined, and the implications of human interventions in the nonhuman environment are much more far-reaching (...) than could have been imagined even forty years ago. It has become something of a cliche to say that our technical abilities have outstripped the wisdom to know when, where, and how we should appropriately use them, but techniques such as genetic engineering invite the dusting-off of the cliche and the asking of the question implicit in it: We know we can splice genes, but should we splice them? We might of course come to the conclusion that we should only splice some of them some of the time, but even arriving at that conclusion presupposes that the ethical question has been asked and answered. (shrink)

In September of 2008, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith published Dignitas Personae, which addresses several newly emerging topics in thearea of biomedical ethics. One of these topics is genetic engineering, which we can define as the intentional manipulation of genetic material so as to produce some desired trait or characteristic. Genetic engineering is discussed in Dignitas Personae, but is done so relatively briefly. In this paper, I explore some of the metaphysical and (...) ethical questions that are key in assessing the morality of this practice by examining other Church documents as well as philosophical literature. Ultimately, I will argue that aside from some instrumental restrictions, questions about the moral permissibility of genetic engineering, the distinction between therapy and enhancement, and what it means to be human are not as easily answered from a Catholic perspective as one might think. (shrink)

Unlike (especially) the various Protestantisms, Orthodox Christianity recognizes no fundamentally different problems in the development and (future) application of human germ line genetic engineering (HGGE) than those raised by more traditional medicine. The particular challenges which frame the life of a traditional Christian arise not only in view of “groundbreaking” technological progress and its attendant increase in human power over nature, but permeate already his most simple daily routines. The diverse post-traditional Christianities have ceased confronting such (...) liturgical–ascetical challenges. The quite appropriately pious desire, among those committed to such Christianities, for some restraint in the face of such increase of power therefore gets refocused onto substitute concerns. The new challenge then arises to establish the universal validity of the moral norms underlying such concerns in order to ground the desired prohibition. The discussions of several such norms offered in this issue of Christian Bioethics illustrate the embarrassment presented by the unavailability of either theological or rational foundations needed for such a project. The attempt to prove that there is something in principle morally wrong about HGGE is thus not only unnecessary for the Christian conduct of life (and presents a distraction), but also doomed to fail. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged among science˗and˗theology thinkers – or at least desired – that we have left behind the era of conflict between science and religion. An approach which avoids conflict by pointing out that science and religion employ two different methodologies and therefore occupy two separate magisteria, is, however, unsatisfactory for both – the advocates of a fruitful dialogue between these two realms of human activity as well as the most vigorous opponents of possible conciliation, and the latter (...) still speak of unavoidable conflict. One of the most widely known examples of a conflict between science and religion is the Galileo's case. It can be shown that in the clash between Galileo and the theologians of the time, the latter were right from the point of view of scientific methodology while they were wrong as far as their theological views are concerned. Does this lesson from the history imply any solutions in contemporary disputes over certain scientific achievements? Is it – for instance – a theological fault to impose some constraints on scientific research in genetic engineering? The ‘typology’ of errors committed in the Galileo’s case, offered in the paper, serve as a basis for answering these questions. In the paper it is suggested that a meta-theoretical approach to the interdisciplinary research, which shows the difference between the merits of given disciplines (in this case: science and theology) and the worldview they contribute to together, allows the acknowledgement that contemporary reservations with regard to genetic engineering and techniques are not in danger of committing a 'Galileo case type' error. It is suggested, that such reservations may stem from other than purely ethical opinions, which opens up an interesting field for discussion between those who do not share the same ethics, by leaving ethical arguments aside in discussions about biotechnology. (shrink)

This article applies tools from argumentation theory to slippery slope arguments used in current ethical debates on genetic engineering. Among the tools used are argumentation schemes, value-based argumentation, critical questions, and burden of proof. It is argued that so-called drivers such as social acceptance and rapid technological development are also important factors that need to be taken into account alongside the argumentation scheme. It is shown that the slippery slope argument is basically a reasonable form of argument, but (...) is often flawed when used in ethical debates because of failures to meet the requirements of its scheme. (shrink)

In the past decade several international declarations have called for banning reproductive non-therapeutic and germ-line engineering. Article 11 of UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights states that practices that are contrary to human dignity such as cloning of human beings should not be permitted. Article 12 of the same declaration restricts genetic applications to the relief from suffering and the improvement of health. The European Council has also taken a strong (...) stand on germ-line genetic engineering in general and cloning in particular. Article 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine simply forbidsgerm-line engineering except for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes. The convention along with its explanatory report make it clear that the rationale for the decision is based, in large part, on the need to protect the dignity of persons.Several notions of dignity have been advanced to support bans on non-therapeutic germ-line engineering. I argue that they fail to provide a rationale for such a ban. I consider both secular and religious views of human dignity. In addition, I argue that there are forms of germ-line and non-therapeutic engineering that are compatible with human rights. (shrink)

This essay describes possible futures that may result from accelerating technological advances and the challenges these futures present to psychotherapists. In the next 100 years, human beings will be likely to increasingly use computers and artificial intelligence and become extremely dependent on this relationship. Chip and stem cell implants may provide people with greater memory capacity, computational capacity, and skill sets. Genetic engineering, cryonics, and cloning may allow dramatic increases in the human life span these developments (...) occur, they will challenge what it means to be a human being and have a soul. Although psychotherapists will acquire new tools for assessment and intervention, they will face the daunting task of addressing these changes and challenges to personhood with their clients. (shrink)