I argue that a capacity‐based account of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness is superior to an account based on quality of will. I focus on four types of cases about which the two accounts disagree and show that the capacity‐based view offers a better treatment. As part of my argument, I motivate the distinction between an assessment of a person's moral character, as reflected by her action, and an assessment of her blameworthiness or praiseworthiness for that action.

Epistemic consequentialism has been charged with ignoring the epistemic separateness of propositions and with (thereby) allowing trade-offs between propositions. Here, I do two things. First, I investigate the metaphor of the epistemic separateness of propositions. I argue that either (i) the metaphor is meaningfully unpacked in a way that is modeled on the moral separateness of persons, in which case it doesn’t support a ban on trade-offs or (ii) it isn’t meaningfully unpacked, in which case it really doesn’t support a (...) ban on trade-offs. Second, I consider the strategy of arguing against the trade-off permitting conception of epistemic rationality that is central to epistemic consequentialism on the basis of our intuitive verdicts about the permissibility of trade-offs in cases. I argue the execution of this strategy suffers a methodological mistake that, once corrected, vitiates the probative value of those intuitive verdicts. Hence the conclusion: the separateness of propositions provides no support for a ban on trade-offs, and an influential independent argument for such a ban is flawed. (shrink)

According to a view widely held in the media and in public discourse more generally, online hating is a social problem on a global scale. However, thus far there has been little scientific literature on the subject, and, to our best knowledge, there is even no established scholarly definition of online hating and online haters in the first place. The purpose of this manuscript is to provide a new perspective on online hating by, first, distinguishing online hating from the (...) phenomena it is often confused with, such as trolling, cyberstalking, and online hate speech, and, second, by proposing an operational definition of online hating and online haters based on ethnographic interviews and surveys of the existing scholarly literature. (shrink)

Central to the still-nascent normative literature on counterspeech is the widespread belief that citizens should engage discursively with haters and the effects of hate speech. It is also increasingly clear that discursive engagement with intolerant members of society should be understood as a continuous and extended series of different and connected actions. Much less has been said about the ways that attempts in persuasion and direct responses to hate speech relate to one another and about when specific counterspeech actions (...) should happen. This essay advances a more expansive and refined account of counterspeech, which is understood as a combination of continuous discursive engagement with intolerant members of society and acts of distancing from haters. After reconsidering discursive agency distribution around public hate speech, I show that continuous discursive engagement with intolerant members of society should be interrupted by visible acts of distancing when haters make hateful representative claims. (shrink)

The article starts from the question of where the theses that we are ruled by sadists today come from, both in conspiracy theories and in explanations of the prevalence of violence and cruelty in modern society. The article first highlights some important recent changes in politics, economics, and society (the fall of the Berlin Wall; victimisation; the crisis of politics and the rise of neoliberalism; the changing dynamics of capitalism, which appropriates and valorises affect and favours the bizarre; the new (...) social media; the shift of obscenity from the margins to the centre; the paradoxes of the “end of history” and historical stagnation; the pandemic; the change in the general mood from anxiety to nightmare, in which the main problem is the enjoyment of the Other). The article then looks at the historical changes in the term “sadism”, which in the 19 th and 20 th centuries reduced Sade’s work to a clinical category, defined the meaning of “sadism” as the pleasure of torturing others, and constructed the term “sadomasochism” in Freud, the Freudians, and the Frankfurt School. The latter was used to analyse Nazism, and was later rightly criticised by Deleuze as something that had nothing to do with Sade and Masoch. War propaganda, clichés, and other processes play a special role in this process of forming the general conception of sadism; they are also responsible for the fact that “sadomasochism” as a sexual practice and as a fashion has recently become something socially acceptable, although, on the other hand, it has played a part in the “pornification” of society and in the recent enforcement of extremely violent forms of pornography. Notwithstanding all these distortions of sadism and notwithstanding the uselessness of sadomasochism in a concrete analysis of the functioning of modern social bonds, a certain form of sadism in general, especially in the face of all the social and political changes mentioned above (trolls, haters), retains its power over society. To analyse this in more detail, one must include the ubiquitous but little analysed phenomenon of _schadenfreude_, especially on the part of the public, and cruelty as a phenomenon to which society is both distanced and fascinated. The third step is to explain what _schadenfreude_ and cruelty are and how they relate to Lacan’s concept of _objet petit a_. (shrink)

In the face of longstanding philosophical debates on the nature of hatred and an ever-growing interest in the underlying social-psychological function of group-directed or genocidal hatred, the peculiar affective intentionality of hatred is still very little understood. By drawing on resources from classical phenomenology, recent social-scientific research and analytic philosophy of emotions, I shall argue that the affective intentionality of hatred is distinctive in three interrelated ways: it has an overgeneralizing, indeterminate affective focus, which typically leads to a form of (...) collectivization of the target; short of a determinate affective focus, haters derive the indeed extreme affective powers of the attitude not in reaction to any specific features or actions of the targets or from some phenomenological properties of the attitude but, rather, from the commitment to the attitude itself; finally, in sharing this commitment to hate with others, hatred involves a certain negative social dialectics, robustly reinforces itself and becomes entrenched as a shared habitus. (shrink)

In the face of longstanding philosophical debates on the nature of hatred and an ever-growing interest in the underlying social-psychological function of group-directed or genocidal hatred, the peculiar affective intentionality of hatred is still very little understood. By drawing on resources from classical phenomenology, recent social-scientific research and analytic philosophy of emotions, I shall argue that the affective intentionality of hatred is distinctive in three interrelated ways: it has an overgeneralizing, indeterminate affective focus, which typically leads to a form of (...) collectivization of the target; short of a determinate affective focus, haters derive the indeed extreme affective powers of the attitude not in reaction to any specific features or actions of the targets or from some phenomenological properties of the attitude but, rather, from the commitment to the attitude itself; finally, in sharing this commitment to hate with others, hatred involves a certain negative social dialectics, robustly reinforces itself and becomes entrenched as a shared habitus. (shrink)

In thePhaedo, Socrates warns his listeners, discouraged by the objections of Simmias and Cebes, against becoming haters oflogoi. I argue that the ‘misologists’ are presented as a type of proto-skeptic and that Socrates in fact shows covert sympathy for their position. The difference between them is revealed by the pragmatic argument for trust in the immortality of the soul that Socrates offers near the end of the passage: the misologists reject such therapeutic uses oflogos. I conclude by assessing the (...) relationship of the positions of Socrates and the misologists in thePhaedoto those of later ancient skeptics. (shrink)

Aquinas's argument against the possibility of genuine self-hatred runs counter to modern intuitions about self-hatred as an explanatorily central notion in psychology, and as an effect of alienation. Aquinas's argument does not deny that persons experience hatred for themselves. It can be read either as the claim that the self-hater mistakes what she feels toward herself as hatred, or that, though she hates what she believes is her "self," she actually hates only traits of herself. I argue that the argument (...) fails on both readings. The first reading entails that all passions are really self-love, and so is incompatible with Aquinas's own "cognitivist" view of what it is that distinguishes specific passions in experience. The second reading entails that persons have no phenomenal access to "self," rendering self-reference--how it is that the self can be an intentional object of conscious mental states---a mystery. Augustine's claim, which Aquinas accepts on authority, that all sin originates in inordinate self-love seems to entail the impossibility of genuine self-hatred because both thinkers fail to distinguish between two distinct forms of self-love: amor concupiscentiae and amor benevolentiae. (shrink)

This article analyzes the position of Ibn Hilāl, who is regarded as nāsıbī and ghālī, in the science of Shia rijāl, his reports and the validity of the accusations against him. It is found that narrators are criticized for various reasons in the science of Shiʻa rijāl. Some of them are the Shiite followers that the imams cursed and wanted to be kept away from their adherence. It is seen that the narrations reported by some of the narrators are included (...) in the main sources of Shiite hadith, albeit these narrators were cursed by the innocent imams. Ahmed Ibn Hilāl (d. 267/880) is one of these narrators cursed by the imams and his name is found in the report (the isnād) of many early narrations. Ibn Hilāl, one of the close companions of Shia's 10th imam Ali b. Muḥammed al-Hādī (d. 254/868) and 11th imam Ḥasan al-ʻAskarī (d. 260/874), was first cursed by the letter of al-Askarī allegedly sent, and the Shiite followers were ordered to move away from him. Ibn Hilāl refused to accept the ambassadoriality of Muḥammed b. Osman (d. 305/918), the ambassador of the 12th Imam. Thus, he was cursed by Muḥammad al-Mahdī as well. In later periods, Ibn Hilāl was accused of being nāsıbī and ghālī. However, there are also some Shiite scholars who supported (tavthîk) Ibn Hilāl. In the Shi'a tradition, Nāsibism indicated the meaning of hating ʻAli and Ahl al-bayt or feeling anger towards them. Later on, this meaning has been changed into a meaning including the haters of ʻAli and then the Shiʻa Nāsibism is regarded as a position towards Shiʻa outside of Shiʻa. Ghulāt is a form of a belief generally found in the Shi'a tradition. In the belief of Ghulāt, holiness is attributed to the imams. When the Shiite sources are examined, it can be seeb that Ibn Hilāl represents neither a ghālī nor a nāsıbī position. In the Shiʻa, when the narrator leaves his sect, his narrations are evaluated differently. Therefore, among Ibn Hilāl's narrations only those which narrated before he left can be accepted. The likely reason for this attitude can be those narrators such as Ibn Hilāl brought in many narrations to the Shiite hadith literature. Ibn Bābeveyh and Sheikh Sadūk reported many narrations that includes Ibn Hilāl in their report chain (the isnad). Among these narrations, they criticized only one. Again, in the 4th century of Hijrī, Numānī, al-Hazzāz, Ibn Qavlaveyh and Mufīd reported many narrations transmitted by Ibn Hilāl. However, none of them mentioned about the negative perception on Ibn Hilāl in any of these narrations. This shows that Ibn Hilāl was not regarded as nāsıbī or ghālī in the eyes of the these scholars. As regards to, Tūsī, in the 5th century after Hijra, claimed that Ibn Hilāl was a ghālī and he was accused of being an adherent to this religion. He narrated in sum fifty narrations that included Ibn Hilāl in the report chain, but Tūsī criticized only three of them because of including Ibn Hilāl. The reason why Ibn Hilāl was accused of being nāsıbī and ghālī, which Shiʻa deemed the worst, was probably related to the political conditions of that period. On the other hand, there is no report that Ibn Hilāl shared a nāsıbī and ghālī thought or had a tendency towards them. It is obvious that if Ibn Hilâl, who has an important place in the eyes of the Shiite community, does not accept the second ambassador of al-Mahdī, and that this would cause discord among the followers. This complex situation was tried to be remedied by letters alleged to have been written by the imams, cursing Ibn Hilâl and ordering them to stay away from him. Later, Ibn Hilāl was accused of being a nāsıbî or ghālī who expressed the attitudes and thoughts that Shiʻa saw the most distant from him. Sadūk first reported the narration that Ibn Hilāl was Nāsıbî. Tūsī, on the other hand, described Ibn Hilāl as ghālī in the 5th century (after hijra). This study tries to reveal that there is no explicit evidence that proves Ibn Hilāl’s nāsıbī or ghālī position. (shrink)

L'envahissement de l'espace par la technique est un fait accompli. Non seulement l'espace physique et l'espace organisationnel, mais aussi l'espace du discours et celui de l'écriture sont déjà bien occupés. La technique est en effet devenue un sujet de conversation quotidien, remplit les colonnes de toutes sortes de journaux et de revues et fait l'objet d'un nombre considérable d'études monographiques. Alors pourquoi ce titre encore qui risque d'aggraver le resserrement des habitants des lieux et hâter leur étouffement?

There are, apparently, two inherited stories of intentional action. On the motivational story, intentional agents are pursuers of goals. On the evaluative story, intentional agents are pursuers of value. In a spirit of unification, we might try to supplement the motivational story with the evaluative one – or even collapse the former into the latter. The problem with such moves is that they cannot accomodate certain pathologies of agency. Thus, they convert apparently perverse agents – like Satan and self‐haters (...) – into closet lovers of the good. I argue that pathological agents like Satan and self‐haters are not lovers of the good. They are just lovers of success in action. We can make sense of such agents as practical reasoners because the cares that constitute us as practical reasoners are plural. (shrink)

Many feminist philosophers of education have argued that the teacher's pleasure plays an important role in the classroom. However, accessing such pleasure is often easier said than done. Given our current academic climate, how might teachers develop pedagogical practices that cultivate these delights? This article investigates the (rather surprising) response to this question offered in Augustine's De catechizandis rudibus. Despite his reputation as a pleasure-hater, Augustine spends the majority of his text defending the delights of teaching. In particular, Augustine argues (...) that if teachers wish to find pleasure in teaching, they would do well to study the pleasures of mothers. To this end, I analyse the nature of Augustine's maternal appeal. What insight does Augustine find in the experiences of mothers? In what way does he hope his colleagues will allow these experiences to shape their pedagogies? I conclude by exploring the benefits and the risks of Augustine's claim for those who teach in the contemporary feminist classroom. Augustine's defence of pedagogical pleasure suggests that he shares a common interest with feminist philosophers. But, the social/political limits of his account highlight the value of submitting such pleasures to the terms of feminist critique. (shrink)

La philosophie et la médecine ont depuis toujours entretenu des relations intimes et distantes. Elles veulent, l'une et l'autre, hâter notre connaissance de l'homme et de son destin, mais leurs chemins, bien souvent, ne furent que parallèles. Or, avec le prodigieux développement des sciences du vivant, cette indifférence réciproque apparaît non seulement navrante, mais encore dangereuse. Le médecin, soucieux du comment, a besoin de donner un sens à sa pratique. Le philosophe, soucieux du pourquoi, ne peut ignorer ce que la (...) biologie lui permet désormais de penser dans des termes radicalement nouveaux. Cet ouvrage se propose ainsi de confronter médecine et philosophie. Et d'en tirer toutes les conséquences. Qu'il s'agisse, alors, de la vie, de la mort, du langage, de la théorie de la connaissance, de la pensée, ou même de " l'âme ", le philosophe trouvera dans cet ouvrage tout ce que la biologie lui fournit - du clonage aux sciences cognitives. Et, inversement, le biologiste-médecin, y trouvera, à travers les catégories de l'ontologie traditionnelle, l'horizon conceptuel qui, trop souvent, fait défaut à sa techné. En rétablissant ce dialogue entre deux disciplines majeures, Philippe Meyer entend dépasser l'opposition entre matérialisme et spiritualisme. Il définit ici le cadre à l'intérieur duquel l'honnête homme pourra donner toute sa dignité, à la singularité interindividuelle sans pour autant renoncer aux exigences des sciences dures. Au passage, il esquisse ce que pourrait être un " matérialisme somptueux " et propice à un échange constant entre le philosophe et le médecin. (shrink)

This paper argues that hate differs from mere disliking in terms of its “depth,” which is understood via a notion of “othering,” whereby one rejects at least some aspect of the identity of the target of hate, identifying oneself as not being what they are. Fleshing this out reveals important differences between personal hate, which targets a particular individual, and impersonal hate, which targets groups of people. Moreover, impersonal hate requires focusing on the place hate has within particular sorts of (...) communities, enabling a further important distinction between “insider” and “outsider” hate in terms of whether the hater includes members of the targeted group within a particular community or rejects them as “beneath” membership in that community. (shrink)

This paper examines the figure of the hate-fighting digital vigilante as embodied through Aryan Queen, an online persona developed and depicted by self-proclaimed antifa member Talia Lavin in her book Culture Warlords. One chapter in the 2020 memoir relays Lavin’s pursuits to elicit and make known identifying information of Der Stürmer, an anonymous white supremacist online hater. I first locate Lavin’s undertaking in the porous policy landscape regulating online hate transnationally to make a case for its value as an entry (...) into the navigation of hate on Telegram, a platform that has become a popular enclave for hate, and one that remains otherwise impenetrable to state efforts at formal governance. I then introduce the digital vigilante as a cultural figure that has become increasingly distinguished from, but developed in relation to, the classical or analogue vigilante in academic literature, albeit with only limited attention paid to the seemingly boundless temporality that constitutes the virtual sphere. Attending to processes of temporalization, I argue, can well serve an analysis of the moral universe within which the digital vigilante operates, thereby enabling a critical engagement with the motivations, methods, and intentions of her justice pursuits online. With the support of anthropological theories of temporalization – namely, past presencing, un/doing futures, and affective justice – I show that justice pursuits by way of digital vigilantism for Lavin are entangled with an affective longing for revenge, and manifest a complex intermingling of open wounds from injustices that emerge from and produce entanglements of the past, present, and future. (shrink)

Readers of Nietzsche are not unfamiliar with the thought that his philosophical writings contain numerous at least apparent contradictions. We begin with one of them. On the one hand, Nietzsche takes pride of place in the canonical parade of theatre-haters. Indeed, he himself demands inclusion: ‘I am essentially anti-theatrical’. This antipathy appears to extend to the actor’s ‘inner longing for a role and mask’. On the other hand, Nietzsche is known as an advocate and admirer of the mask: ‘everything (...) profound loves masks’ reads one of his best-known lines. Mask-wearing, whatever that turns out to be, is not only a social strategy, but also a philosophical or intellectual one, as we shall see. The mask has a variety of associations, of course, but a salient one, for Nietzsche, was its relation to the actor, beginning with its use in Greek tragedy. Thus we seem to find a Nietzsche who on the one hand opposes the theatre and the actor’s role-playing and mask-wearing and, on the other hand, who encourages the mask, which he himself associates with acting and theatre. Of course, this tension has potential implications for our understanding of Nietzsche's antipathy to theatre. To take one example, he seems to connect theatre with lack of honesty, including to oneself (GS 368). And yet some have taken Nietzsche as ‘masking’ his own thoughts, as a means to avoid being honest with himself. This chapter looks in detail at the use of the mask in Nietzsche and at how it relates to questions of sincerity, interpretation and his later, naturalist project. (shrink)

L'évangélisation des Indiens du Mexique fut entreprise dans une perspective messianique et eschatologique, notamment par les missionnaires franciscains formés aux idéaux des 'spirituels' et influencés par les prophéties millénaristes de Joachim de Flore. Dans leur esprit, l'Église, en voie de dépérissement dans le 'Vieux Monde' corrompu, allait 'renaître' dans ce monde 'nouveau', dont les populations semblaient vivre en état d'innocence et qui se laissaient convertir avec tant de docilité. Il fallut bientôt déchanter : l'idolâtrie persistait, les Indiens se revoltaient, ils (...) étaient massacrés, et bientôt décimés par des épidémies de caractère 'apocalyptique'. Alors on s'interrogeait : la violence peut-elle être acceptée comme une nécessité pour extirper le culte des démons, hâter l'évangélisation, consolider la conversion de ces peuples? (shrink)

During the past four decades, four questions have shaped the debate over eating meat: (1) What hurts the most? (2) Are animal lovers nature haters? (3) Are vegetarians bigots? (4) Do animals have rights? The following conclusions are advocated: (1) Where general welfare is the issue, numbers count, and they will always count against a small minority profiting by repeatedly exploiting the majority. However, how most effectively to respond to this injustice is not obvious. (2) Despite disagreements about the (...) relationship between biology and morals, vegetarians and environmentalists agree that factory farming is immoral because of what it does either to suffering animals or to the natural order. (3) Whether humans using animals for food can be a respectful relation-especially when we humans make all the decisions-is the real question here. So far, this extension of fairness beyond our own species is one for which we have shown little capacity. (4) Whether or not animals have "rights," morally concerned Westerners should not partake of factory-farmed products and should work for the abolition of such farms. (shrink)

Bernard Schweizer explores a hitherto neglected strain of religious rebellion. Misotheism, or hatred of God, is more radical than atheism. God-haters do not question God's existence, but instead deny his competence and goodness. Sifting through centuries of evidence and uncovering fascinating networks of influences among writers and thinkers as diverse as Friedrich Nietzsche, Zora Neale Hurston, and Philip Pullman. Schweizer reveals deep undercurrents of misotheism in many acclaimed works of literature and philosophy.

We all have different “tastes” for different tastes: some of us have a sweet tooth, while others prefer more subtle flavors; some crave spicy foods, while others cannot stand them. As Bourdieu and others have pointed out, these varying judgments seem to be more than mere preferences; often they reflect (and partially constitute) differences of class and culture. But I want to suggest that we’ve possibly overlooked another important source of these divergent gastronomic evaluations, other than hierarchy and caste: mere (...) interpersonal variability with respect to brute gustatory sensations. After all, we all know about “supertasters and cilantro-haters”; how likely is it, though, that the interpersonal heterogeneity of gustatory sensation is limited to this one dimension? In this paper, I make the case that we should take this possibility more seriously, and offer some thoughts on how we might start getting a better handle on the nature and scope of interpersonal gustatory variability—including by suggesting some diagnostics that can help us get at (what I call) some of the “non-flavor dimensions” of our gustatory experience. I conclude by developing some implications for the prospects of an “alimentary aesthetics”: namely, that—should our gustatory experiences turn out to be quite heterogeneous—then they do not seem well-suited to serve as the basic ingredients of bona fide aesthetic judgment about food and drink. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On the Need for a New Ethos of White AntiracismShannon SullivanWhite people in this country will have quite enough to do in learning how to accept and love themselves and each other, and when they have achieved this—which will not be tomorrow and may very well be never—the Negro problem will no longer exist, for it will no longer be needed.—James Baldwin, The Fire Next TimeIn his classic manifesto (...) on race, The Fire Next Time, James Baldwin passionately urges black people not to retaliate against white people by attempting to debase or dominate them in return. The reason is that doing so would harm black people most of all. As Baldwin (1963, 113) assures his readers,I am very much concerned that American Negroes achieve their freedom here in the United States. But I am also concerned for their dignity, for the health of their souls, and must oppose any attempt that Negroes may make to do to others what has been done to them. I think I know—we see it around us every day—the spiritual wasteland to which that road leads.... I would not like to see Negroes ever arrive at so wretched a condition.Likewise, when Martin Luther King Jr., urged his black church members to love their white enemies rather than return their racial hate, he did so because he believed that “hate distorts the personality of the hater. We usually think of what hate does for the individual hated or the individuals hated or the groups hated. But it is even more tragic, it is even more ruinous and injurious to the [End Page 21] individual who hates” (King 1957). While Baldwin was an avowed atheist and King a Christian minister, both warned of the devastating effects of white racism on “the souls of white folk,” and they pleaded and preached that black people should not stoop to white people’s debased level.1 Out of all the damage that white racism has done to African Americans and other people of color, the most damaging of all would be for it to turn them into the debilitated, deplorable people that white folk generally are.We might say that on Baldwin’s (and perhaps also King’s) view, white people are the truly “wretched of the earth” (Fanon 1965). It has been argued that white racism has cost white people their capability for intimacy, their affective lives, their authenticity, their sense of connection to other people, and their spiritual selves (Segrest 2001, 65). These claims are not an attempt to trump or erase the enormous physical, psychological, economic, spiritual, and other types of pain that white people have caused people of color around the world. They instead are a recognition that white people’s attempts to gain material riches and political power through the domination of people of color have impoverished and depleted their own souls. White people qua white are ill in that their racial habits largely have been built out of greed, hatred, jealousy, fear, and cruelty. Their psychosomatic health has suffered and continues to suffer because of their toxic racial identities.So much the worse for white people, we might think. But although understandable, this response would be misguided since white people’s psychosomatic depletion has implications for the well-being of others. Put succinctly, white people’s unhealthiness helps fuel their abuse and domination of people of color. It thus matters to struggles for racial justice whether white people are psychosomatically healthy and strong. It matters which affects, emotions, and passions fund white people’s actions in general, and their work for racial justice in particular. In this paper, I will draw from Friedrich Nietzsche, Teresa Brennan, and other scholars to explain the ontological and power-full aspects of affect, touching briefly on the toxicity of white guilt and shame and focusing especially on the healthiness of what Nietzsche calls a bestowing self-love. I will argue that in the context of white people’s contributions to racial justice movements, a positive effect of their bestowing self-love is that white people will be more likely and better able to clean up their own house... (shrink)

Cet article aborde la question du temps dans l’institution judiciaire en prenant pour objet le contentieux familial. En considérant la dimension temporelle du règlement des conflits qui émergent lors des ruptures d’union, il met en évidence le changement radical de la vision du temps qui a touché le monde de la justice civile dans les dernières décennies. Le mouvement d’accélération qui touche l’ensemble de l’institution judiciaire se trouve redoublé dans ce champ par l’urgence qu’impose la réaction face à un contentieux (...) de masse : il s’agit de répondre sans délais aux conflits familiaux, selon des modalités adaptées aux besoins des intéressés. L’étude s’appuie sur une enquête réalisée dans cinq juridictions, en France et en Belgique. Dans ces deux pays, les dernières réformes intervenues ont eu pour projet de hâter les procédures de divorce. Dans la pratique, différentes modalités de l’accélération du traitement judiciaire sont observées. En France, le juge aux affaires familiales est un acteur central qui traite l’ensemble des ruptures de couple soumises à la justice. Les JAF font tout pour accélérer les décisions, en s’appuyant autant que faire se peut sur l’accord des parties et en cherchant à contrôler les avocats. En Belgique, l’accélération est particulièrement apparente s’agissant du procès en divorce, mais les décisions sur les effets accessoires de la séparation sont renvoyées à différentes instances ayant leur propre temporalité. Par-delà ces différences, la comparaison suggère que l’accélération du traitement du contentieux de la famille résulte de la coprésence des deux tendances majeures observées, la managérialisation de la justice et le renvoi des décisions relatives à la famille vers les intéressés eux-mêmes. L’accélération du traitement judiciaire du divorce n’est cependant pas sans conséquence : en particulier, elle rend plus apparente la disjonction du temps du procès et de celui que vivent les conjoints en rupture. (shrink)

Motivational self-help advice from President Donald Trump, covering everything from leadership and self-confidence to how to succeed in business. President Donald Trump knows about living the good life and achieving success. With his election to the presidency, he added to a life that already includes billions of dollars, worldwide celebrity, and a beautiful family, despite legions of haters. In The Art of the Donald, Daily Caller News Foundation editor-in-chief Christopher Bedford takes you inside the new president's unorthodox mind, unlocking (...) the genius of his approach to everything in life and offering you insight into navigating life the Trump way. Featuring personal campaign-trail anecdotes and lessons from Trump's long career as a businessman and politician, The Art of the Donald offers you life-changing pieces of advice, including Keeping your message simple and delivering it effectively; Using competition to govern yourself and chaos to confuse your opponents; Cutting out the middlemen and getting directly to the deal-makers; Redefining conflicts and transactions on your own terms; Solving problems with ingenuity instead of money; and Believing in yourself, no matter what your opponents try to say. Written in the style of Sun Tzu's The Art of War and The Tao of Warren Buffett, this is a must-read for every Trump fan (and even the haters). (shrink)

Excerpt from L'Esthétique du Mouvement Nous nous bornerons, dans cet essai, à l'étude esthétique du mouve ment. Nous le considérerons successivement dans son déterminisme, dans sa beauté mécanique, dans son expression et dans sa perception. Ce plan a l'avantage de porter d'abord notre attention sur ce qu'il y a le vraiment objectif dans nos jugements de goût. Dans les recherches scientifiques. Le meilleur moveu d'ar river rapidement au but, c'est de ne pas tmp se hâter. Long temps les esthéticiens se (...) sont imaginés qu ils allaient résoudre le problème du beau d'un coup, par un simple effort de ré flexion, en se prenant la tète à deux mains et en fronçant énergiquement les sourcils. A quoi ont-ils abouti Quels ser vices ont rendus, je ne dirai pas mème à l'art, mais seulement au goût, toutes ces dissertations sur le beau en soi On avait voulu aller trop vite, et la question n'avait pas fait un pas. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In the past few years, social and cultural theorists have pointed to the dynamic and performative character of forms of disparagement such as public shaming, humiliation, invective or hate speech. In this paper, I endorse a different route and focus on the distinctive affective and dialectical nature of what might be called the ‘politics of disparagement’. I will do so by elaborating on the affective intentionality of hatred, which can be seen as an affective attitude that paradigmatically encapsulates the dialectical (...) antagonism at play in the politics of disparagement. I argue that the affective intentionality of hatred is distinctive in three interrelated ways: First, it has an overgeneralising, indeterminate affective focus, which typically leads to a certain collectivisation of its target. Secondly, short of a determinate affective focus, haters derive the indeed extreme affective powers of the attitude not in reaction to any specific features or actions of the targets or from some phenomenological properties of the attitude but, rather, from the sheer commitment to the attitude itself. Finally, in sharing this commitment to hate with others, hatred involves a certain negative dialectics and becomes entrenched as a shared habitus. Ultimately, I suggest that we can only counteract the politics of disparagement if we understand how a shared commitment to disparagement and hatred establishes its own normative logic, which not only concerns their victims but also, dialectically, sanctions their enactors. (shrink)

It is a delicate task to write about libertarianism. Camps of both of its lovers and haters are vast. Within some not-so-narrow circles, one risks being considered an anti-intellectual even for cal...