In this essay I advance major criticisms of recent work on the concept of liberty by, Among others, I berlin, G maccallum, H j mccluskey, S I benn, And f oppenheim. Emerging from these critical analyses is a new definition of 'liberty, In the spirit of negative liberalism', Which differentiates it from the related but distinct goods of human autonomy, Opportunity, Ability, Power, And self-Development.

Consider four elite female runners who trained hard for a 1500‐meter race. Runner 1 took extra‐strength aspirin before the race. Runner 2 has a genetic condition that results in greater levels of testosterone in her body than the typical range for a woman. Runner 3 has been on a carefully scheduled regimen of the hormone erythropoietin (EPO), which has increased her red blood cell count. Runner 4 has a team of diet, sleep, and exercise experts who ensured that she coordinated (...) the exactly right balance of carbs and protein with her rest and workouts. Which of them cheated? Thomas Murray's Good Sport: Why Our Games Matter—and How Doping Undermines Them does not answer this question, but it provides tools to figure it out, and it argues that trying to answer is important. (shrink)

In this paper, we provide a new characterization of Keisler’s order in terms of saturation of Boolean ultrapowers. To do so, we apply and expand the framework of ‘separation of variables’ recently developed by Malliaris and Shelah. We also show that good ultrafilters on Boolean algebras are precisely the ones which capture the maximum class in Keisler’s order, answering a question posed by Benda in 1974.

BackgroundYouth are increasingly aware of the negative effects of climate change on the planet and human health, but this knowledge can often come with significant affective responses, such as psychological distress, anger, or despair. Experiencing major “negative” emotions, like worry, guilt, and hopelessness in anticipation of climate change has been identified with the term eco-anxiety. Emerging literature focuses on adults' experience; however, little is known about the ways in which children and youth experience eco-anxiety.ObjectivesThe aim of this review was to: (...) identify the available evidence on the topic of eco-anxiety in children, clarify the mental health consequences brought by the awareness of climate change in this population, and identify knowledge gaps in the literature and considerations for future research.MethodsGiven that the research on the topic of eco-anxiety in children is limited, that there are very few randomized controlled trials, and that the goal is not to analyze individual studies in-depth, a scoping review was used. Keywords pertaining to the themes of eco-anxiety, climate change and children were used as search terms in five databases. Journal articles using qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as gray literature were examined by two independent reviewers. A descriptive-analytical method was used to chart the data that emerged from the literature. Eighteen articles were considered in the final analysis.ResultsEvidence confirms that children experience affective responses and eco-anxiety in reaction to then awareness of climate change. Mental health outcomes include depression, anxiety, and extreme emotions like sadness, anger, and fear. Youth from vulnerable communities, like indigenous communities, or those who have strong ties to the land are often identified as being emotionally impacted by climate change. The literature analyzed also describes how children and youth are coping with eco-anxiety, including maladaptive and adaptive responses. Preliminary considerations for parents, teachers and educators, mental health care providers, school systems, adults and people of power include adding age-appropriate climate education to the school curriculum, considering youth's emotions, and promoting healthy coping through empowerment. Important gaps exist in the definition of eco-anxiety in youth, as various characterizations of this emerging concept are found across articles. (shrink)

Paediatric research in low-income countries is essential to tackle high childhood mortality. As with all research, consent is an essential part of ethical practice for paediatric studies. Ethics guidelines recommend that parents or another proxy provide legal consent for children to participate, but that children should be involved in the decision through providing assent. However, there remain uncertainties about how to judge when children are ready to give assent and about appropriate assent processes. Malawi does not yet have detailed (...) guidelines on assent. Understanding perspectives among children and their parents can assist in developing contextually-appropriate assent guidance. Qualitative research was conducted with children and parents in three settings in Southern Malawi, to take account of any variations between socioeconomic and cultural contexts. In each setting, interviews were conducted with parents and their children who had participated in paediatric research to understand their experiences of assent and views on appropriate assent practice. Focus groups were also conducted with children and parents, to understand broader social perspectives. We found widespread support for involving children in decisions on research participation. Participants identified a range of factors that affect children’s capacity to give assent, including intellectual capacity, emotional development, life experience and cultural norms. Age was often mentioned as a consideration, but deemed an unreliable sole indicator of capacity to assent. In relation to appropriate assent processes, participants emphasised considerations such as supporting effective understanding and minimizing harms. Views on how to achieve these aims varied; for example, there were different ideas about the appropriate order in which to approach children and parents, and about whose decision to respect in the event of disagreement. Parents and children agreed about the value of involving children in decisions on research, and about the need to promote children’s decision-making capacity while respecting parents’ interests in children’s welfare. Developing practical guidance that meets these principles is challenging, particularly given the need for flexible approaches that suit different study types, children’s capacities and family environments. Further discussion within the Malawi research and ethics community will help develop contextually-appropriate guidelines. (shrink)

This paper offers a two dimensional variation of Standard Deontic Logic SDL, which we call 2SDL. Using 2SDL we can show that we can overcome many of the difficulties that SDL has in representing linguistic sets of Contrary-to-Duties (known as paradoxes) including the Chisholm, Ross, Good Samaritan and Forrester paradoxes. We note that many dimensional logics have been around since 1947, and so 2SDL could have been presented already in the 1970s. Better late than never! As a detailed case (...) study illustrating the power of 2SDL, we examine the system DL of Deontic Logic of Andrew Jones and Ingmar Pörn offered in 1985 to solve the Chisholm paradox of Contrary to Duties. The critical examination is done using logics and methods available in 1985 and solutions are proposed using what was available in 1985. (shrink)

This paper offers a two dimensional variation of Standard Deontic Logic SDL, which we call 2SDL. Using 2SDL we can show that we can overcome many of the difficulties that SDL has in representing linguistic sets of Contrary-to-Duties (known as paradoxes) including the Chisholm, Ross, Good Samaritan and Forrester paradoxes. We note that many dimensional logics have been around since 1947, and so 2SDL could have been presented already in the 1970s. Better late than never! As a detailed case (...) study illustrating the power of 2SDL, we examine the system DL of Deontic Logic of Andrew Jones and Ingmar Pörn offered in 1985 to solve the Chisholm paradox of Contrary to Duties. The critical examination is done using logics and methods available in 1985 and solutions are proposed using what was available in 1985. (shrink)

This paper is an empirical inquiry into the nature of human communication and understanding. It is organized into three sections. First, there is an overview of the ethnomethodological critique of mainstream social scientific research methodology and the relevance of this critique to clinical behavioral research. Second, the details of an ethnomethodological study of communication practices in a family with an alingual, deaf-blind child are provided. Third, implications of the case study are presented.

This paper offers a two dimensional variation of Standard Deontic Logic SDL, which we call 2SDL. Using 2SDL we can show that we can overcome many of the difficulties that SDL has in representing linguistic sets of Contrary-to-Duties (known as paradoxes) including the Chisholm, Ross, Good Samaritan and Forrester paradoxes. We note that many dimensional logics have been around since 1947, and so 2SDL could have been presented already in the 1970s. Better late than never! As a detailed case (...) study illustrating the power of 2SDL, we examine the system DL of Deontic Logic of Andrew Jones and Ingmar Pörn offered in 1985 to solve the Chisholm paradox of Contrary to Duties. The critical examination is done using logics and methods available in 1985 and solutions are proposed using what was available in 1985. (shrink)

The emergence and development of convergent technologies for the purpose of improving human performance, including nanotechnology, biotechnology, information sciences, and cognitive science (NBICs), open up new horizons in the debates and moral arguments that must be engaged by philosophers who hope to take seriously the question of the ethical and social acceptability of these technologies. This article advances an analysis of the factors that contribute to confusion and discord on the topic, in order to help in understanding why arguments that (...) form a part of the debate between transhumanism and humanism result in a philosophical and ethical impasse: 1. The lack of clarity that emerges from the fact that any given argument deployed (arguments based on nature and human nature, dignity, the good life) can serve as the basis for both the positive and the negative evaluation of NBICs. 2. The impossibility of providing these arguments with foundations that will enable others to deem them acceptable. 3. The difficulty of applying these same arguments to a specific situation. 4. The ineffectiveness of moral argument in a democratic society. The present effort at communication about the difficulties of the argumentation process is intended as a necessary first step towards developing an interdisciplinary response to those difficulties. (shrink)

How are we to understand the fact that the philosophical debate over nanotechnologies has been reduced to a clash of seemingly preprogrammed arguments and counterarguments that paralyzes all rational discussion of the ultimate ethical question of social acceptability in matters of nanotechnological development? With this issue as its starting point, the study reported on here, intended to further comprehension of the issues rather than provide a cause-and-effect explanation, seeks to achieve a rational grasp of what is being said through the (...) appeals made to this or that principle in the range of arguments put forward in publications on the subject. We present the results of the study’s analyses in two parts. In the first, we lay out the seven categories of argument that emerged from an analysis of the literature: the arguments based on nature, dignity, the good life, utility, equity, autonomy, and rights. In the second part, we present the background moral stances that support each category of argument. Identifying the different categories of argument and the moral stance that underlies each category will enable a better grasp of the reasons for the multiplicity of the arguments that figure in discussions of the acceptability of nanotechnologies and will ultimately contribute to overcoming the tendency towards talking past each other that all too often disfigures the exchange. Clarifying the implications of the moral arguments deployed in the debate over nanotechnologies may make it possible to reduce the confusion observable in these exchanges and contribute to a better grasp of the reasons for their current unproductiveness. (shrink)

Definition of the problemThe options of reproductive medicine are expanding. In some cases, it is unclear whether there is a medical indication for applying procedures of assisted reproduction or whether this application is wish-fulfilling. The distinction between medical indication and wish fulfilment depends on the concept of indication. Thus, the concept of indication has a special status in reproductive medicine. The distinction between medical indication and wish-fulfilling treatment is mostly based on implicit or explicit normative judgements, rather than on mere (...) clinical facts. The use of “indicated” suggests a purely empirical-clinical judgment, whereas the normative judgements behind the concept are concealed. The aim of this paper is to analyze the normative implications of indication in reproductive medicine. Therefore, the concept of indication and its special status within reproductive medicine is scrutinized.ArgumentsThe analysis shows that the normative implications of indication are tied to a sociocultural script of parenthood, which manifests in the regulations of reimbursement. This script encompasses societal views, norms, and role models, and can be described as “good parenting”. The script of good parenting acts as a regulatory instance that determines the access to procedures of assisted reproduction. It is based on traditional heteronormative concepts of marriage and family, and reserves reproduction exclusively for heterosexual, married couples.ConclusionThe sociocultural script of good parenting in reproductive medicine implies a contradiction: Assisted reproduction technologies provide the opportunity of reproduction for individuals outside the heteronormative frame, yet they are legitimized and limited by this exact frame. (shrink)

This study is a contribution to the bioethical debate about new and possibly emerging reproductive technologies. Its point of departure is the intuition, which many people seem to share, that using such technologies to select non-disease traits – like sex and emotional stability - in yet unborn children is morally problematic, at least more so than using the technologies to avoid giving birth to children with severe genetic diseases, or attempting to shape the non-disease traits of already existing children by (...) environmental means, like education. The study employs philosophical analysis for the purpose of making this intuition intelligible and judging whether it is justified. Different ways in which the moral problems posed by reproductive technologies are often framed in bioethical debates are criticised as inadequate for this task. In particular, it is argued that the intuition cannot fully be made sense of in terms of harm to the children that such technologies help create. The study attempts to elaborate an alternative to that broadly consequentialist approach, by drawing on Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, Hans Jonas’s ethics, and Aristotle’s practical philosophy, as it has been received and developed in the hermeneutical tradition. It is suggested that reproductive choices, unlike decisions for already born children, are characterised by a peculiar one-sidedness: the future child appears to the parents as something wholly theirs to decide about, not as a concrete other with whom they must interact in a responsive and attuned way. This is problematic because it means that such choices cannot call upon the particularised moral understanding only gained in interpersonal encounters. In particular, it makes them easily shaped by various tendencies, to which parents are always susceptible, to relate to children in instrumentalising ways, and at risk of reinforcing such tendencies. However, this does not mean that all uses of reproductive technologies are equally troubling. When selecting against severe disease the parents can rely on a widely shared illness experience to escape the dangers that one-sidedness involves. It is concluded that the intuition under discussion, thus explicated and in some ways qualified, makes sense morally. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to unveil the incompleteness of John Harris' view that parents have a moral obligation to genetically enhance their unborn children. Specifically, here two main conclusions are proposed: (1) at present there exist insufficient empirical data for determining whether prenatal genetic enhancement (PGE) is a moral obligation on prospective parents. Although the purpose of PGE research would be to determine the extent to which PGE is safe and effective, the task of determining the (...) veracity of Harris' premises is impossible to achieve without begging the question; we would be forced to assume the moral permissibility of PGE in order to generate the data that are required for determining its moral standing. So, given this empirical blindness, consequence-based normative frameworks like that of Harris cannot determine the moral standing of PGE, but merely push the question of the moral standing of PGE back a step, without offering any plausible and morally endorsable recourse for how to answer it; (2) even if PGE research were legal, which it is not, parents nevertheless have good reason not to consent to it for their children, especially as participants in the first wave(s) of such research. (shrink)

A number of authors have objected to potential parents' use of reproductive genetic technologies on the grounds that the use of these technologies reflects a morally problematic attitude toward parenting. More specifically, proponents of this view have argued that such a choice is inconsistent with the unconditional acceptance that lies at the heart of praiseworthy parental attitudes. This paper offers a rebuttal of this view by arguing that it is possible for a parent to exhibit unconditional acceptance of the (...) child herself without accepting each of that child's traits. If this is true, the use of reproductive genetic technologies does not inherently undermine appropriate parental attitudes. Further, by working to change some of a child's specific traits, a parent may instead exemplify an aspirational aspect of praiseworthy parenting and so demonstrate appropriate parental attitudes. (shrink)

This paper explores contact disputes in England and Wales. We discuss the legal background as well as separating parents' experiences of contact disputes. Contact has been high on the agenda since the U.K. Government report, Making Contact Work, examined various means for facilitating contact between non-resident parents and their children. More recently, the issue has featured prominently in the headlines, largely as a result of the campaigning efforts of fathers' rights groups who complain of injustice and demand changes (...) in the law. The idea that contact is necessary for children's well-being seems to have acquired the status of uncontestable truth. This paper examines the ways in which these ideas about children's interests have become embodied in adominant welfare discourse that is embedded in law and informs policy thinking. Family law has long abhorred parental conflict, particularly that which involves the children. It is frequently assumed that conflict can be reduced if parents could be persuaded to accept the premises of the welfare discourse. In this paper, we consider how parents themselves, in talking about their experiences of contact disputes, makes sense of family law. We found that parents regularly invoke the welfare discourse in their talk, but they interpret it in unexpected ways. Often these interpretations fuel conflict rather than reducing it. (shrink)

The article presents a theory of the basis and nature of parents’ rights that appeals to the goods distinctively produced by intimate-but-authoritative relationships between adults and the children they parent. It explores the implications of that theory for questions about parents’ rights to raise their children as members of a religion, with particular attention to the issue of religious schooling. Even if not obstructing the development of their children’s capacity for autonomy, parents exceed the bounds of their (...) legitimate authority in so far as they aim deliberately to influence their children’s religious views. Healthy familial relationships involve some identification of child with parent and require a sphere of spontaneous interaction between parent and child that are in any case likely to influence those views and constitute a standing threat to autonomy. Correcting over-deferential understandings of parents’ rights enables schools better to promote not only children’s autonomy but also other legitimate civic goals. (shrink)

This paper explores contact disputes in England and Wales. We discuss the legal background as well as separating parents' experiences of contact disputes. Contact has been high on the agenda since the U.K. Government report, Making Contact Work, (2002) examined various means for facilitating contact between non-resident parents and their children. More recently, the issue has featured prominently in the headlines, largely as a result of the campaigning efforts of fathers' rights groups who complain of injustice and demand (...) changes in the law. The idea that contact is necessary for children's well-being seems to have acquired the status of uncontestable truth. This paper examines the ways in which these ideas about children's interests have become embodied in adominant welfare discourse that is embedded in law and informs policy thinking. Family law has long abhorred parental conflict, particularly that which involves the children. It is frequently assumed that conflict can be reduced if parents could be persuaded to accept the premises of the welfare discourse. In this paper, we consider how parents themselves, in talking about their experiences of contact disputes, makes sense of family law. We found that parents regularly invoke the welfare discourse in their talk, but they interpret it in unexpected ways. Often these interpretations fuel conflict rather than reducing it. (shrink)

Digital parenting tools, such as child-tracking technologies, play an ever-increasing role in contemporary child rearing. To explore opinions and experiences related to the use of such tracking devices, we conducted Q methodology and a semi-structured individual interview-study with Estonian parents and their 8- to 13-year-old pre-teens. Our aim was to study how such caring dataveillance was rationalized within the families, and to explore the dominant parenting values associated with the practice. Relying upon communication privacy management theory, the issues of (...) privacy related to such intimate surveillance were also studied. Three factors relating to the use of tracking technologies were extracted from both parents and pre-teens. Tracking technologies were viewed as parental aids that made it possible to ease anxieties and provide assurance to parents and children alike. Although children did not associate the use of tracking technologies with intrusion on privacy, they expected to have a chance to coordinate their privacy boundaries. (shrink)

What gives someone a moral right to parent? What role should the liberal state play in the creation of families? Are prospective parents allowed to create a child in a world facing a changing climate and full of parentless children? -/- In this book, Luara Ferracioli defends a new theory of the moral right to parent by focusing on the special role of parents in creating the conditions for the flourishing of their children irrespective of whether there is (...) a biological connection between them, and by explaining why the parent-child relationship remains valuable even after the child reaches the age of majority. Ferracioli also argues that although procreative and adoptive parenting enjoy equal moral standing, justice towards children requires that the liberal state make adoption more desirable and feasible for its citizens. Finally, the book provides a partial theory of childrearing which focuses on the goods of childhood that parents are primarily responsible for fostering: carefreeness, enjoyment-driven or curiosity-driven achievement, and friendship. (shrink)

People are using innovative internet of things technologies to gain individualised management of their type 1 diabetes. The #WeAreNotWaiting movement supports them to build their own hybrid closed loop systems and access their real time blood sugar data via any web connected device. A small number of parents in Australia use such DIY looping systems to manage their child’s type 1 diabetes, but these systems have not been approved by the Therapeutic Goods Administration in Australia, creating ethical dilemmas for (...) clinicians about how to respond to the use of medical devices that are not registered on the Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods. This article considers whether the use of DIY looping is in the best interests of the child and, if not, whether intervention in parental decision making is justified to prevent harm to the child. It addresses the ongoing duty of healthcare professionals to provide care to children who are ‘looping.’ Reference is made to findings from a study, Personalised Closed Loop Systems for Childhood Diabetes, to illustrate stakeholders’ perceptions of benefits and harms of DIY looping systems. I conclude that the decision of parents to use DIY looping technology could be considered to be in a child’s best interests, broadly defined, and falls within the Zone of Parental Discretion, however healthcare practitioners who support parents may have professional concerns in doing so. (shrink)

Prior to agriculture, human societies were small, with little variation for good genes sexual selection (GGSS) to work on. Across cultures, variation in paternal care makes the benefits of GGSS highly variable. Despite these caveats, female preferences for traits like male body symmetry suggest one reason for female short-term mating is gene shopping.

Almost everyone accepts that parents must provide a good enough upbringing in order to retain custodial rights over children, but little has been said about how that level should be set. In this paper, I examine ways of specifying a good enough upbringing. I argue that the two dominant ways of setting this level, the Best Interests and Abuse and Neglect Views, are mistaken. I defend the Dual Comparative View, which holds that an upbringing is good (...) enough when shortfalls from the best alternative upbringing in terms of the child's interests are no more significant than the parents' interest. (shrink)

Two practical measures that have been introduced in an effort to stop sports parents from behaving badly will be critically discussed. The first measure is known under the slogan quiet weekends'. These prohibit parents from attending games in which their child is participating. Although this strategy calls attention to an important issue, it is unfair. The second, and far more elaborate, measure is to have a set of ethical guidelines informing parents how they should behave towards their (...) child and others in the context of sport. Two central values tend to run through these guidelines: namely parental concern for the child's autonomy and parental concern for the child's well-being. These values are discussed as I apply them to cases in what can be called a grey area, where it is not obvious what is morally right or wrong. In the concluding discussion a tentative checklist will be presented which good sports parents can use when they are confronted with ethical issues. (shrink)

This book offers a novel theory of childhood well-being as a social good. It re-examines our fundamental assumptions about parenting, parental authority, and a liberal society's role in the raising of children. The author defends the idea that the good of a child is inexorably linked to the good of society. He identifies and critiques the problematic assumption that parenting is an extension of individual liberty and shows how we run into problems in medical decision-making for children (...) because of this assumption. He develops an objective conception of what is good for a child in liberal society, drawing on the assumptions of liberty, and from here constructs a set of things that society and its members owe children. There are ways in which society should support and intervene in parental decisions to guarantee a child's well-being. Ultimately, raising children is a social activity that requires input from society. The author then applies this theory of childhood well-being to develop a framework for medical decision-making for children. He also uses practical examples, such as vaccinations, parental leave, and healthcare access, to demonstrate the implications of his theory for public policy. The Limits of Parental Authority: Childhood Wellbeing as a Social Good will be of interest to research and advanced students working in bioethics, political philosophy, and public health policy. (shrink)

Using historical data from the Utah Population Database, this analysis finds significant, consistent, but small adverse mortality effects for mothers after age 50 who had mostly sons. Examination of age-dependent effects indicates that this association increases with mother’s age. Additionally, mothers who had mostly daughters faced mortality risks that increased with age. Offspring sex composition did not have a significant effect on paternal mortality. Interaction analyses were conducted to examine the effect of offspring sex composition with regard to historical period, (...) residential location, socioeconomic status, and childhood survival. No other interactions were found to be statistically significant. Having mostly boys remained detrimental to maternal mortality regardless of childhood survival. (shrink)

Contemporary official parenting advice about disciplining children can be boiled down to ‘Be nice’. I first expand on this claim, drawing on primarily Birth to Five and secondarily Parentchannel.tv, showing that ‘Be nice’ breaks down into the absence of punishment and the expansion of both positive reinforcement and leading by example, these three components comprising an approach that is popularly described as positive parenting. Second, I examine the ways in which such apparently innocuous advice could be damaging: positive parenting is (...) arduous if not impossible, thereby setting parents up to fail, and partly because of this onerousness, it is arguably destructive of the spontaneity of the parent–child relationship. However, the difficulties of upholding a whole-heartedly spontaneous approach to parenting have led critics to endorse a model of the good parent as the reflective parent, and in conclusion I warn that this is just as coercive as the positive parenting model that it is designed to replace. (shrink)

The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority’s recent restrictive recommendations on sex selection have highlighted the need for consideration of the plausibility of ethical arguments against sex selection. In this paper, the author suggests a parental virtues approach to some questions of reproductive ethics as a superior alternative to an exclusively harm focused approach such as the procreative liberty framework. The author formulates a virtue ethics argument against sex selection based on the idea that acceptance is a character trait of the (...) good parent. It is concluded that, because the argument presented posits a wrong in the sex selecting agent’s action that is not a harm, the argument could not function as a justification of the HFEA’s restrictive position in light of their explicit commitment to procreative liberty; it does, however, suggest that ethical approaches focused exclusively on harm fail to capture all the relevant moral considerations and thus that we should look beyond such approaches. (shrink)

Modu wa tabaLegae ke karolo ye botlhokwa ya setshaba. Tabakgolo mo taodishong ye ke go araba potjisho ye: na ke tshwanelo gore bana ba ishe batswadi ba bona kgole kua madulong a batsofe? Re araba potjisho ye ka go ganetja bana ba ba phedilego gabotse basa babjwe go isha batswadi mafelong a botsofe. Re tloga re bontsha le gore kgale-kgale gona mafatsheng a Bodikela gobe go na le motlhalefi bare ke Cicero. Le yena o kwana le kganetjo ye moka le (...) moreti mogolo John Milton. Botee magareng ga bao ba phelago, badimo le bao ba sa tlo belegwa bo a senyega ge bana ba isha batswadi madulong a batsofe.AbstractTaking the African conception of community as our point of departure, we argue that the advancing age of parents is no justification for their children to transfer the responsibility of caring for their parents to others, such as to nursing homes. Usefulness is not the defining feature of the worth of an elderly human being, especially a parent. We will show by appeal to Cicero that this understanding was alive in Western antiquity and was upheld in the modern period by, for example, John Milton the poet. To send one’s parents to a nursing home when one is in good health is to destroy and kill the triangular relationship between parents and children. (shrink)

According to the parent analogy, as a caretaker’s goodness, ability and intelligence increase, the likelihood that the caretaker will make arrangements for the attainment of future goods that are unnoticed or underappreciated by their dependents also increases. Consequently, if this analogy accurately represents our relationship to God, then we should expect to find many instances of inscrutable evil in the world. This argument in support of skeptical theism has recently been criticized by Dougherty. I argue that Dougherty’s argument is incomplete, (...) for there are two plausible ways of construing the parent analogy’s conclusion. I supplement Dougherty’s case by offering a new argument against the parent analogy based on failed expectations concerning the amount of inscrutable evils encountered in the world. Consequently, there remains a significant empirical hurdle for skeptical theism to overcome if it is to maintain its status as a defeater for our reliability when tracking gratuitous evils. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the potential of virtue ethical ideas to generate a new way of thinking about the ethical questions surrounding the creation of children. Applying ideas from neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics to the parental sphere specifically, I develop a framework for the moral assessment of reproductive actions that centres on the concept of parental virtue. I suggest that the character traits of the good parent can be used as a basis for determining the moral permissibility of a (...) particular reproductive action. I posit three parental virtues and argue that we can see the moral status of a reproductive action as determined by the relationship between such an action and (at least) these virtues. Using a case involving selection for deafness, I argue that thinking in terms of the question ‘would a virtuous parent do this?’ when morally assessing reproductive action is a viable and useful way of thinking about issues in reproductive ethics. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to unveil one problem that surrounds the debate over the moral standing of prenatal genetic enhancement (PGE) and to outline a solution to it. The problem is that we have no way to test our speculations about the consequences of prenatal enhancement without begging the question about the moral permissibility of enhancing unborn children. The only way to empirically support our speculations about the consequences of prenatal enhancement is to resort to ethically worrisome (and (...) radical) experimental genetic research. The suggested solution to this problem is to focus on the character of good parents. The virtue of parental wisdom is introduced and used as a basis for evaluating PGE. It is argued that good parents have good reason not to condone PGE for their children (in very many cases), especially as part of the first wave of genetically altered humans. (shrink)

Although the philosophical literature on the ethics of human prenatal genetic alteration purports to inform us about how to act, it rarely explicitly recognizes the perspective of those who will be making the PGA decision in practice. Here I approach the ethics of PGA from a distinctly virtue-based perspective, taking seriously what it means to be a good parent making this decision for one’s child. From this perspective, I generate a sound verdict on the moral standing of human PGA (...) : given the current state of the art, good parents have compelling reason not to consent to PGA for their child, especially as part of the first wave of PGA research participants and especially for non-medically oriented purposes. This is because doing otherwise is inconsistent with a plausible and defensible understanding of virtuous parenting and parental virtues, founded on a genuine concern for promoting the overall flourishing of the eventual child. In essence, given the current and foreseeable state of the art, parents who allow prenatal genetic alteration of their children are less-than-virtuous parents to those children, even in cases where they have a right to do so and even if PGA turns out to be beneficial to the eventual child. (shrink)

In my paper “Parental Love and the Ethics of Sex Selection,” published in the previous issue of the Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, I set out to determine whether a plausible argument could be constructed in support of a common intuition about the ethics of sex selection. The intuition in question is that sex selection for nonmedical reasons is incompatible with a proper parental love: that is, with the sort of love that a parent ought to have for her child (...) or, equivalently, with the sort of love that someone accurately describable as a good parent will have for her child. I concluded that there is a prima facie compelling argument that fits the bill, though I did little more than introduce and set that argument out. In the current paper, my aim will be to subject it to closer scrutiny, by considering a number of possible objections to it. I will start by asking why the argument should be thought to apply only to sex selection for nonmedical reasons and not to cases in which selection is employed in order to prevent the birth of children with serious sex-linked genetic conditions. (shrink)

In a recent paper published in this journal, Giubilini, Douglas and Savulescu argue that we have given insufficient weight to the moral importance of fairness in our account of the best policies for non-medical exemptions to childhood immunization requirements. They advocate for a type of policy they call Contribution, according to which parents must contribute to important public health goods before their children can receive NMEs to immunization requirements. In this response, we argue that Giubilini, Douglas and Savulescu give (...) insufficient weight to the moral importance parental liberty in ways that count against their preferred type of NMEs policy and threaten public support for mandatory vaccination laws and public health initiatives generally. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 7, Page 809-811, September 2022.

Legitimate parental interests need to be distinguished from any putative rights parents qua parents may be said to possess. Parents have no right to insulate their children from conceptions of the good at variance with those of their own. Claims to the right to faith schools, private schools, home-schooling or to withdraw a child from any aspect of the curriculum designed to enhance a child’s capacity for autonomous decision-making, are refuted.