Erratum to Using the context of controversies surrounding evolutionary developmental biology (EvoDevo) and the possibility of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, I provide an account of theory structure as idealized theory presentations that are always incomplete (partial) and shaped by their conceptual content (material rather than formal organization). These two characteristics are salient because the goals that organize and regulate scientific practice, including the activity of using a theory, are heterogeneous. This means that the same theory can be structured differently, (...) in part because theory presentations (as idealizations) intentionally depart from different features known to be present in a theory. Since there are diverse and potentially incompatible theory structures derived from heterogeneous goals found in scientific practices, a question arises about the absence of a unifying theory structure in the background. The notion of a “theory façade” offers a fruitful perspective on this potentially unsettling result. (shrink)

Erratum to: Found Sci DOI 10.1007/s10699-014-9364-0The author, Kun Wu’s name, affiliation and biography have been incorrectly published in the original article. The correct affiliation and biography are provided below.

Erratum to: Topoi DOI 10.1007/s11245-014-9252-9The affiliation of the second author was incorrectly published in the original article. The author’s correct affiliation appears in this erratum.

Erratum to: Synthese DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0705-5In line 3 of footnote 8 on page 4, ‘allow’ should be ‘disallow’.In line 8 of page 5, \ should be \ and \ should be \. Similarly for lines 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 13 and 14 of page 6.The entry in row 20 column 6 of the table on page 5 should be 1 rather than 0.The entry \ in row 30 column 5 of the table on page 5 should be \.In line (...) 27 of page 13, ‘it’ should be ‘them’.Four lines from the end of section 12.3 on page 20, ‘premisses’ should be ‘premiss sets’, and .. (shrink)

Erratum to: Philos Stud DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0226-3Dear Reader, due to production systems the following changes could not be made to this article:In the paragraph immediately preceding the case description (ford-iii), the sentenceHere we explicitly state that Smith’s inference is based only on his belief that Jones owns a Ford, and that this logical inference provides Smith’s only justification for believing that someone in his office owns a Ford (to make things fully precise, we also add a time index).should be replaced (...) withHere we explicitly state that Smith’s inference is based only on his belief that Jones owns a Ford (plus the justified background belief that Jones is in his office), and that this logical inference provides Smith’s only justification for believing that someone in his office owns a Ford (to make things fully precise, we also add a time index).The added part is highlighted in boldface.And within the case description (ford-iii), the sentenceFrom this belief alone. (shrink)

Erratum to: Int J Semiot Law DOI 10.1007/s11196-014-9376-7Dans la publication originale de cet article, l’auteur n’a pas cité le titre correct de la thèse de philosophie de Stefan Goltzberg.A la dernière phrase du premier paragraphe, il ne faut pas lire «il a écrit une thèse de philosophie intitulé Théorie et histoire de la philosophie du droit, philosophie du droit de Chaïm Perelman, de Theodor Viehweg, de Roscoe Pound» mais bien «il a écrit une thèse de philosophie intitulée Théorie bidimensionnelle (...) de l’argumentation. Définition, Présomption, Argument A fortiori». (shrink)

In this paper we develop a general representation theory for MV-algebras. We furnish the appropriate categorical background to study this problem. Our guide line is the theory of classifying topoi of coherent extensions of universal algebra theories. Our main result corresponds, in the case of MV-algebras and MV-chains, to the representation of commutative rings with unit as rings of global sections of sheaves of local rings. We prove that any MV-algebra is isomorphic to the MV-algebra of all global sections of (...) a sheaf of MV-chains on a compact topological space. This result is intimately related to McNaughton’s theorem, and we explain why our representation theorem can be viewed as a vast generalization of McNaughton’s theorem. In spite of the language used in this abstract, we have written this paper in the hope that it can be read by experts in MV-algebras but not in sheaf theory, and conversely. (shrink)

Both in the bibliography and in the citation in the text, Michelle Gibbons’ article below has been mistakenly attributed to “Gibson.” The proper reference to the article should be: Gibbons, M.. Reassessing discovery: Rosalind Franklin, scientific visualization, and the structure of DNA. _Philosophy of Science, 79_, 63–80.

Much recent work in virtue epistemology has focused on the analysis of such intellectual virtues as responsibility, conscientiousness, honesty, courage, open-mindedness, firmness, humility, charity, and wisdom. Absent from the literature is an extended examination of perseverance as an intellectual virtue. The present paper aims to fill this void. In Sect. 1, I clarify the concept of an intellectual virtue, and distinguish intellectual virtues from other personal traits and properties. In Sect. 2, I provide a conceptual analysis of intellectually virtuous perseverance (...) that places perseverance in opposition to its vice-counterparts, intransigence and irresolution. The virtue is a matter of continuing in one’s intellectual activities for an appropriate amount of time, in the pursuit of intellectual goods, despite obstacles to one’s attainment of those goods. In Sect. 3, I explore relations between intellectually virtuous perseverance and other intellectual virtues. I argue that such perseverance is necessary for the possession and exercise of several other intellectual virtues, including courage. These connections highlight the importance of perseverance in a comprehensive account of such virtues. (shrink)

_Erratum zu:_ _Ethik Med 2017_ https://doi.org/10.1007/s00481-017-0464-6 Im Tagungsbericht „Die klinische Translation humaner induzierter pluripotenter Stammzellen. Eine Stakeholder-Konferenz zur Evaluation innovativer Risikoforschung“ wurden einige Aussagen aus Herrn Wolfram-Hubertus Zimmermanns Vortrag.

Erratum to: Int J Semiot Law DOI 10.1007/s11196-015-9405-1Assurance de la qualité en traduction juridique: l’évaluation du processus, de la compétence et du produit dans la quête de l’équivalence.Le professeur Prieto Ramos propose un modèle holistique pour assurer la qualité de l’évaluation en traduction juridique. Fondée sur un cadre fonctionnaliste de la prise de décision, cette démarche passe par l’établissement d’une stratégie d’adéquation basée sur les paramètres juridiques et contextuels impliqués dans le processus de la traduction, de son produit au (...) stade de l’auto-révision et de l’évaluation, et dans la définition des critères d’évaluation et de la compétence attendus des traducteurs et des réviseurs. Ce modèle d’évaluation de la qualité devrait permettre d’améliorer la prédictibilité tout en réduisant la subjectivité et de hausser les standards de la pratique professionnelle de la traduction. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft Jahrgang: 26 Heft: 1 Seiten: 208-208.

This paper seeks to uncover and rationally reconstruct four theoretical prescriptions that H. L. A. Hart urged philosophers to observe and follow when investigating and theorizing about the nature of law. The four prescriptions may appear meager and insignificant when each is seen in isolation, but together as an inter-connected set they have substantial implications. In effect, they constitute a central part of Hart’s campaign to put philosophical investigations about the nature of law onto a path to a genuine research (...) program. The paper takes note of certain prevalent and robust trends in contemporary legal philosophy that detract its practitioners from the four prescriptions, and that have them revert to the some older modes of thinking from which Hart sought a decisive break. A number of contemporary legal philosophers’ views and commitments are taken up and assessed, and in particular those of John Gardner and Leslie Green. (shrink)

J Med Philos, 2020; 45: 28–41; doi:_ 10.1093/jmp/jhz031 _.

Erratum to: Axiomathes DOI 10.1007/s10516-014-9234-yIn the original publication of the article, some of the references were published incorrectly. Please find below the corrected version of these references.

Erratum to: Synthese 191:1925–1930 DOI:10.1007/s11229-013-0380-3 The authors were unaware that points in their article appeared in “Caveats for Causal Reasoning with Equilibrium Models,” by Denver Dash and Marek Druzdzel, published in S. Benferhat and P. Besnard : European Conferences on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty 2001, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2143, pp. 192–203. The authors were unaware of this essay and would like to apologize to the authors for failing to cite their excellent work.

In a circulated but heretofore unpublished 2001 paper, I argued that Leiter's analogy to Quine's 'naturalization of epistemology' does not do the philosophical work Leiter suggests. I revisit the issues in this new essay. I first show that Leiter's replies to my arguments fail. Most significantly, if — contrary to the genuinely naturalistic reading of Quine that I advanced — Quine is understood as claiming that we have no vantage point from which to address whether belief in scientific theories is (...) ever justified, it would not help Leiter's parallel. Given Leiter's way of drawing the parallel, the analogous position in the legal case would be not the Legal Realists' indeterminacy thesis, but the very different position that we have no vantage point from which to address whether legal decisions can ever be justified. I then go on to address the more important question of whether the indeterminacy thesis, if true, would support any replacement of important legal philosophical questions with empirical ones. Although Ronald Dworkin has argued against the indeterminacy thesis, if he were wrong on this issue, it would not in any way suggest that the questions with which Dworkin is centrally concerned cannot fruitfully be addressed. The indeterminacy thesis is a bone of contention in an ordinary philosophical debate between its proponents and Dworkin. Of course, if the determinacy thesis were true, no one should try to show that it is false, but this triviality lends no support to the kind of replacement proposal that Leiter proposes. I conclude with some general reflections on naturalism and philosophical methodology. (shrink)