This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Elements of Tragedy and Its Definition Plot and Character Simple and Complex Plots Good and Bad Tragic Plots Conclusion Notes Bibliography.

The ongoing duel between realist and anti-realist tendencies in film theory usually positions the ideas of André Bazin unambiguously on the realist side. Whatever else we expect to find in his writing – and the current resurgence is finding more and more – we should find this: realism, cinematic realism. But what type of realism? Is it ontological, and, if so, is it based on a claim for the primacy of photography's “analogical” relation to the world, even to the point (...) of a “direct contact” with the physical existence of nature? Is it aesthetic, celebrating depth of field? Unaffected mise-en-scène? The documentary impulse in preference to fantasy or artifice? In this article, however, I want to argue that we must expand the definition of Bazinian realism through its sensitivity to the non-human. The terrain of the cinematic “Real” is inhabited by a singular complex, one that includes physical space, animality, and material objects, as well as persons and events. To shift our attention to these elements and their effects – intimate as well as alienating, familiar as well as jarring and unexpected – offers another way to glimpse the Real. Which is not to say that the socially constituted world drops out. Of course, language, gender and culture are inescapable mediations. Yet they are, in a certain sense, all wrought by a transcendent human hand. Bazin's conception of realism provides access to a space that is less anthropocentric and testifies to an immanence of the Real, such that non-human, objective realism is not about capturing reality in toto but registering the fact that the human is only a part of reality. There are realities beyond human subjectivity – in space, in objects, in animality – realities that we are put in contact with by cinema. Ideally, what cinema makes possible is an equality, a democratic freedom, not merely for the human spectator – to view and explore film worlds – but for the viewed “object” too: a democracy of the viewer-viewed that installs intersubjectivity in the Real. (shrink)

This paper challenges the first Gettier counterexample to the tripartite account of knowledge. Noting that 'the man who will get the job' is a description and invoking Donnellan's distinction between their 'referential' and 'attributive' uses, I argue that Smith does not actually believe that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's ignorance about who will get the job shows that the belief cannot be understood referentially, his ignorance of the coins in his pocket (...) shows that it cannot be understood attributively. An explanation for why Smith appeared to have justified true belief is given by distinguishing between 'belief' and 'belief in truth'. Smith believes the sentence 'the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket' to be true (he mistakenly believes that Jones will get the job, of whom he knows that he has ten coins in his pocket) (hence his 'belief'), the sentence is true (hence 'truth'), and he has sufficient reason to assent to it (hence his 'justification'). But he does not believe the proposition expressed. Hence he does not know it either. (shrink)

In this essay I look at The Birth of Tragedy in order to explore two related issues. First, beginning with Nietzsche’s own later critical look back at the book, I argue that in lamenting both the influence of Schopenhauer, and the inclusion of an extended discussion of contemporary German culture, Nietzsche underplayed the interdependence of these elements and his analysis of tragedy and its significance in the book. Second, I argue that to understand Nietzsche's Schopenhauerian concept of (...) tragedy we may begin from the perspective of the term's common usage, attending to phenomena often labelled tragic, and glimpsing what holds sway just beneath their surfaces. Ultimately, although Nietzsche's expressed understanding of tragedy in these early years drew heavily on Schopenhauerian pessimism, it nevertheless exceeded that influence. (shrink)

Proclus' Elements of Theology is a concise summa of the Neoplatonic system in its fully developed form; and for the student of late Greek thought second in importance only to the Enneads of Plotinus. Professor Dodds has provided a critical text based on a personal examination of some forty manuscripts, together with an English translation and a philosophical and linguistic commentary. First published in 1933, this second edition includes an Appendix of Addenda et Corrigenda and is widely regarded and (...) respected as the definitive edition of the text today. (shrink)

Proclus' Elements of Theology is a concise summa of the Neoplatonic system in its fully developed form; and for the student of late Greek thought second in importance only to the Enneads of Plotinus. Professor Dodds has provided a critical text based on a personal examination of some forty manuscripts, together with an English translation and a philosophical and linguistic commentary. First published in 1933, this second edition includes an Appendix of Addenda et Corrigenda and is widely regarded and (...) respected as the definitive edition of the text today. (shrink)

While the definitions employed by different governmental agencies and scientific societies differ somewhat, the term “nanotechnology” is generally understood to refer to the manufacturing, characterization, and use of man-made devices with dimensions on the order of 1-100 nanometers. Devices that comprise a fundamental functional element that is nanotechnological are also frequently comprised within nanotechnology, as are manufactured objects with dimensions less than one micrometer. The differences in definition lead to occasional paradoxes, such as the fact that the most widely (...) used nanodrug is labeled a “nanopharmaceutical” by governments of European countries, Canada, and Australia, but it is not a nanotechnology for the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. It is also common in scientific domains to restrict the term “nanotechnology” to objects that possess special, “emerging” properties that only arise because of their nanoscale dimension. (shrink)

There are eleven known manuscripts of Hobbes’s Elements of Law. As they divide on textual grounds into two groups, they are effectively two separate editions, employing two different texts. While two of the manuscripts apparently were Hobbes’s working copies, it also seems clear that he never definitively established the text of the Elements. There are reasons for thinking it unlikely that, as has been suggested, Hobbes intended the work to influence debate in the Short Parliament. More likely, he (...) hoped his patron, Newcastle, would transmit his principles to the monarch and his chief advisors. (shrink)

Internal protection alternative (further—IPA) as the element of refugee definition is interpreted very differently in the practice of the State Parties to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (further—Geneva Convention). Thus it is important to regulate this concept clearly in the EC directive 2004/83/EB (further—Qualification directive) and its coming amendments. The definition of the IPA concept does not contain adequate criteria for assessing the level and effectiveness of protection required, in line (...) with the Geneva Convention and the ECHR, thus allowing Member States to reject claims and return applicants to their country of origin despite the lack of effective protection. Moreover, this concept is defined in a broad and vague manner which creates a risk of diverse recognition practices. (shrink)

Proclus' Elements of Theology is a concise summa of the Neoplatonic system in its fully developed form; and for the student of late Greek thought second in importance only to the Enneads of Plotinus. Professor Dodds has provided a critical text based on a personal examination of some forty manuscripts, together with an English translation and a philosophical and linguistic commentary. First published in 1933, this second edition includes an Appendix of Addenda et Corrigenda and is widely regarded and (...) respected as the definitive edition of the text today. (shrink)

Every order lies on the claim or pretension to give itself as an accomplished realm, i.e. as a closed scene which is capable to give shape, orientation and sense to the totality of elements embraced by it. Yet, from the same operation of ordering, a paradox soon arises, in that no order can avoid its contingent genealogy, that means: it cannot avoid the fact that, in enclosing and including something, it must simultaneously exclude something else, which, therefore, can always (...) challenge and threaten its stability or total “delimitation”. In this sense, that which is excluded can be seen as an alien element, which structurally prevents order from a definite closure and thus keeps it in a permanent movement. Now, what I would like to convey in my following reflections is that this dynamics of impossible closure of order, given to a non-appropriable alienness, is exactly the one operative in the realms of translation and tragedy, so that, once we carefully investigate these realms, we may dare to affirm that saying that orders are unclosed scenes is as much true as to say that they are constantly “in translation”, always “in tragedy”. (shrink)

Moral philosophy is the study of what morality is and what it requires of us. As Socrates said, it's about "how we ought to live"-and why. It would be helpful if we could begin with a simple, uncontroversial definition of what morality is. Unfortunately, we cannot. There are many rival theories, each expounding a different conception of what it means to live morally, and any definition that goes beyond Socrates's simple formula-tion is bound to offend at least one (...) of them. This should make us cautious, but it need not paralyze us. In this chapter, I will describe the "minimum conception" of morality. (shrink)

“Elements of reality” are defined as in the work of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. It is further assumed that the sum or product of twocommuting elements of reality also is an element of reality. An algebra contradiction ensues.

This book offers a unique interpretation of tragic literature in the Western tradition, deploying the method and style of Analytic philosophy. Richard Gaskin argues that tragic literature seeks to offer moral and linguistic redress for suffering. Moral redress involves the balancing of a protagonist's suffering with guilt : Gaskin contends that, to a much greater extent than has been recognized by recent critics, traditional tragedy represents suffering as incurred by avoidable and culpable mistakes of a cognitive nature. Moral redress (...) operates in the first instance at the level of the individual agent. Linguistic redress, by contrast, operates at a higher level of generality, namely at the level of the community: its fundamental motor is the sheer expressibility of suffering in words. Against many writers on tragedy, Gaskin argues that language is competent to express pain and suffering, and that tragic literature has that expression as one its principal purposes. The definition of tragic literature in this book is expanded to include more than stage drama: the treatment stretches from the Classical and Medieval periods through to the early twentieth century. There is a special focus on Sophocles, but Gaskin takes account of most other major tragic authors in the European tradition, including Homer, Aeschylus, Euripides, Virgil, Seneca, Chaucer, Marlowe, Shakespeare, Corneille, Racine, Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, Kleist, Büchner, Ibsen, Hardy, Kafka, and Mann; lesser-known areas, such as Renaissance neo-Latin tragedy, are also covered. Among theorists of tragedy, Gaskin concentrates on Aristotle and Bradley; but the contributions of numerous contemporary commentators are also assessed. Tragedy and Redress in Western Literature: A Philosophical Perspective offers a new and genuinely interdisciplinary perspective on tragedy that will be of considerable interest both to philosophers of literature and to literary critics. (shrink)

The definition of love given by Descartes in the Passions of the Soul has never stopped puzzling commentators. If the first Cartesian textbooks discreetly evoke or even fail to discuss Descartes’s account of love, Spinoza harshly criticizes it, pointing out that it is ‘on all hands admitted to be very obscure’. More recently several scholars have noticed the puzzling character of the articles of the Passions of the Soul on love and hate. In this paper, I would like to (...) propose a reassessment of the definition of love provided by the Passions of the Soul and the Letters to Elisabeth and Chanut. By tracing back Descartes’s scholastic sources, I will demonstrate how Descartes builds up his definition of love by displacing or subverting the meaning of several major elements of the thomistic vulgata on love. Hence, a significant part of the obscurity of the definition given by the Passions of the Soul possibly finds its ultimate rationale in this attempt to recover some traditional questions of the scholastic debate on love, while advancing new answers to them. (shrink)

The Kleinian psychoanalyst Hanna Segal argues for the reparative nature of art, and especially of the genre of classical tragedy. According to Kleinian theory, healthy psychological development requires that early infantile aggressive and destructive emotions are worked through; such “working through” is necessary for the development of conscience, for feelings of empathy, as well as for cognitive development. It is also a necessary condition for creative activity. Segal examines the roots of the impulse to create by looking specifically at (...) the genre of classical tragedy; she argues that the pleasure we derive from tragedy is non-contingently related to the distressing elements of the drama. Thus not only are the formal and aesthetic elements important for the containment of powerfully distressing emotions, but the distressing emotions themselves are a necessary ingredient of the aesthetic pleasure This paper will examine Segal’s discussion of tragedy in the light of her commitments to Kleinian theory, and it will attempt to explore more fully the contributions of difficult or painful emotions towards aesthetic pleasure. (shrink)

More and more these days it is asked whether aesthetics is still possible. A question that, given the context and phrasing, seems to direct us towards its answer. Conferences and meetings, books and journal specials examine the issue of aesthetics, talk about rediscovery or return of aesthetics. Well known philosophers and aestheticians underscore the need to reconsider the foundations of aesthetics and set new directions for aesthetics today (Berleant, 2004) or attempt to expand aesthetics beyond aesthetics–like Welsch, for example who (...) tries to extend aesthetics beyond art to society and the life-world (Welsch, 1997). Others underline the need to revisit the aesthetic experience (Shusterman, 1999; Iseminger, 2002, Fenner, 1996) and examine the relevance or irrelevance of the aesthetic with art (Carroll, 2001). It seems that it is strongly recommended to turn to aesthetics on the condition however to carefully re-approach the meaning and import of the term in the present situation. The aesthetic that Passmore condemned as “dreary”(Passmore, 1954), the one Sparshott considered a formless conception, vague and loose in application (Sparshott, 1982), the same that Danto emphatically argues that has nothing to do with the definition of art or arts in general (Danto, 1981) returns to claim its rightful place in the fields of philosophy and critical theory (Levine, 1994, Michaud, 1999), as well as artistic creation. And one cannot but wonder: what does this return mean? What was the degree of aesthetics decline that we need to discuss about recovery or for new implementations of aesthetics? (shrink)

If we consider the field of argumentation studies, we notice that many approaches consider argumentation in a pragmatic manner and define it as a verbal activity oriented towards the realization of a goal . The idea that subtends—in an explicit or implicit way—most of these approaches is that argumentation fundamentally aims to produce an effect upon an addressee, and that this effect consists in a change of attitude with respect to a viewpoint : argumentation theories inevitably confront the issue of (...) persuasion. In this article, I defend, on the contrary, the hypothesis that it is not necessary to have recourse to the notion of persuasion, nor even to speak of an attempt to provoke a change of attitude in the addressee , in order to develop a general definition of argumentation. It seems to me that there are serious reasons to uncouple, insofar as a definition is concerned, argumentation and persuasion. I will look to identify these reasons, to formulate them and to evaluate their strength. In the same vein as recent works by Christian Plantin and Marc Angenot, I will try to contribute to the development of a non - persuasive conception of argumentation. Such a conception bases the definition of argumentation on the pragmatic aims of “justification” and “positioning”, as well as on the articulation of a discourse and a counter-discourse. I argue that such a conception might offer a better empirical adequacy than those that link, insofar as a definition, the argumentative activity and the persuasive aim. (shrink)

The article delves into the conceptual frameworks surrounding artificial intelligence (AI) by juxtaposing it with natural intelligence and delineating the correlated notions. It enumerates the issues propelling the discourse on the explored topics. The author proposes a bifurcation between two polar concepts of artificial intelligence. The first is dubbed “imitative,” where AI is perceived in relation to natural intelligence as its technical recreation, capable of not only emulating but significantly outstripping its natural counterpart. A prerequisite for embodying this concept is (...) understanding natural intelligence; three approaches are examined: (a) acknowledging the lack of a precise understanding of natural intelligence, (b) exploring it from a biological perspective, and (c) analyzing it from a psychological perspective. The author articulates their own interpretation of natural intelligence, portraying it as a multifaceted amalgam of cultural, historical, social, and anthropological elements. From this vantage point, natural intelligence emerges not merely as a natural formation (thereby, discussions about the laws governing its function and evolution are warranted), but also as an “extra-natural” formation, its existence dictated by randomness and uniqueness, meaning natural intelligence evolves in a “singular” manner. In the context of comparing natural and artificial intelligence, the discussion encompasses several issues: the feasibility of the control of natural intelligence processes, the structure of neural networks, the superiority of computer programs in chess, the use of neural networks to write academic papers, and so forth. The conclusion posits that given artificial intelligence, despite its complexity, remains a technical invention orchestrated and brought to fruition by humans as a tool; society, if inclined to bestow AI with autonomy for tackling specific tasks, ought to do so prudently to prevent self-detriment and retain the ability to curtail or utterly revoke such autonomy. (shrink)

The literary criticism of the Greeks and Romans furnishes some of the most baffling documents which have come down to us from antiquity. Nor could it be otherwise. Few elements of language can be at once so ephemeral and so elusive as the overtones of words used in aesthetic contexts; even in our own language it is only with a conscious effort that the appropriate overtones of words used by quite recent critics can be recalled. Such recall must be (...) much more difficult where the reader is concerned with a dead language; in the case of some terms it may well be virtually impossible; but where the ancient critic is discussing ethical criteria for literature, as Aristotle does in Poetics 13, the modern interpreter is in a somewhat better position, for ethical terms are used in wider contexts, contexts which involve action, and there is more opportunity for studying their usage and endeavouring to recapture their elusive overtones. (shrink)

This paper explores the truism that people think about what they say. It proposes that, to satisfy their own goals, people often plan their speech acts to affect their listeners' beliefs, goals, and emotional states. Such language use can be modelled by viewing speech acts as operators in a planning system, thus allowing both physical and speech acts to be integrated into plans. Methodological issues of how speech acts should be defined in a planbased theory are illustrated by defining operators (...) for requesting and informing. Plans containing those operators are presented and comparisons are drawn with Searle's formulation. The operators are shown to be inadequate since they cannot be composed to form questions (requests to inform) and multiparty requests (requests to request). By refining the operator definitions and by identifying some of the side effects of requesting, compositional adequacy is achieved.The solution leads to a metatheoretical principle for modelling speech acts as planning operators. (shrink)

The literary criticism of the Greeks and Romans furnishes some of the most baffling documents which have come down to us from antiquity. Nor could it be otherwise. Few elements of language can be at once so ephemeral and so elusive as the overtones of words used in aesthetic contexts; even in our own language it is only with a conscious effort that the appropriate overtones of words used by quite recent critics can be recalled. Such recall must be (...) much more difficult where the reader is concerned with a dead language; in the case of some terms it may well be virtually impossible; but where the ancient critic is discussing ethical criteria for literature, as Aristotle does in Poetics 13, the modern interpreter is in a somewhat better position, for ethical terms are used in wider contexts, contexts which involve action, and there is more opportunity for studying their usage and endeavouring to recapture their elusive overtones. (shrink)

The subject of the research is utopian discourse, which unites all the variety of concepts related in one way or another to utopia, utopian dimension of reality and understanding of the Future (utopian element, utopian impulse, utopian optics, utopianism, utopian consciousness, utopian thinking, dystopia, etc.). Special attention is paid to the study of the explanatory and predictive potential of utopian discourse, identifying its boundaries and analysis of the relationship with ideological discourse. The conceptualization of utopian discourse is based on an (...) instrumental approach to utopia, which is complemented by the communicative approach and the interpretive concept of culture by K. Geertz, which justifies the possibility of considering utopian discourse as a semantic and symbolic matrix. The novelty of the research is to identify and substantiate the exaggerated dichotomy of thinking and otherness as the structure-forming elements of utopian discourse. This contributed to the assessment of utopian discourse as a peculiar but viable form of reflection of political reality and the construction, consolidation and comprehension of values. The proposed algorithm of thinking with dichotomies made it possible to trace the process of constructing utopian discourse on the basis of a pyramid of dichotomies, consisting of system-forming, key and peripheral dichotomies. The article clarifies that the otherness of utopian discourse is manifested in the historicity, radicality and inextricable connection of utopian discourse with the Present. The indicated specificity of utopian discourse has led to the clarification of the reasons for the negative and/or skeptical attitude towards utopia and utopian discourse, as well as to the definition of its strengths and weaknesses. The authors conclude that despite the identified shortcomings, which often lead utopias to periodic displacement from the framework of actual political life, utopian discourse can have a significant impact on the change and development of society. (shrink)

In this essay, I discuss Kames' aesthetic theory, as presented in his essay, ‘Our Attachment to Objects of Distress’ (concerning the problem of tragedy), and in Elements of Criticism. I argue that Kames' (non-)response to the problem of tragedy – that we find tragedies painful (not pleasing), yet are ‘attracted to them through the workings of the “blind instinct” of sympathy’ – is intended to call the standard formulation of the problem of tragedy (‘why do we (...) find such painful things pleasing?’) into question. This standard formulation, on Kames' view, mistakenly assumes that we cannot be attracted to anything but pleasure, whereas tragedy (among other phenomena) shows that human nature is considerably more complex than this. I argue, further, that Kames' treatment of tragedy exemplifies the character of his aesthetics more broadly: aesthetic values are explained by reference to general laws governing human nature (we are attracted to this sort of thing, averse to that, etc.) – or explanatory naturalism. But Kames also argues that we can, upon reflection, judge that this instinct and this exercise of it is good (as in the case of tragedy, which is, Kames argues, morally educative because it strengthens our sympathy), by contrast to other cases where instincts may not achieve their ends. Thus Kames also proposes a normative aesthetic naturalism, according to which we should educate our instinctual affective responses so that they will be appropriate to their objects and beneficial for the human goods that they are meant to promote. (shrink)

Nietzsche writes that the 'real task' of The Birth of Tragedy is to 'solve the puzzle of Wagner's relation to Greek tragedy'. The 'puzzle', I suggest, is the intermingling in his art and writings of earlier socialist optimism with later Schopenhauerian pessimism. According to the former the function of the 'rebirth of Greek tragedy' in the 'collective artwork' is to 'collect', and so create, community. According to the second the function of the artwork is to intimate a (...) realm 'beyond' this world of pain and death. The audacity of The Birth is that it attempts to show that Wagner can have his cake and eat it: the 'Dionysian', musical, element provides a 'metaphysical comfort', while the 'Apollonian', verbal, element draws a 'veil of oblivion' over the metaphysical, thereby allowing the artwork to solidify community. Contrary to the standard Anglophone view, this perspective on The Birth shows that Nietzsche's intimate association with Wagner during the period of its creation lies at the heart of its philosophical content. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Elements of Eleatic Ontology' MONTGOMERY FURTH THE TASKOF AN INTERPRETERof Parmenides is to find the simplest, historically most plausible, and philosophically most comprehensible set of assumptions that imply (in a suitably loose sense) the doctrine of 'being' set out in Parmenides' poem. In what follows I offer an interpretation that certainly is simple and that I think should be found comprehensible. Historically, only more cautious claims are possible, (...) for several portions of the general view from which I 'deduce the poem' are not clearly stated in the poem itself; my explanation of this is that they are operating as tac/t assumptions, and indeed that the poem is best thought of as an attempt to force these very assumptions to the surface for formulation and criticism -that the poem is a challenge. To be sure, there are dangers in pretending, as for dramatic purposes I shall, that ideas are definite and explicit which for Parmenides himself must have been tacit or vague--that Parmenides knew what he was doing as clearly as I represent him; I try to avoid them, but the risk must be taken. I even believe that not to take it, in the name of preserving his thought pure from anachronous contamination, actually prevents us from seeing the extent to which he, pioneer, was ahead of his timc the argument works both ways. So let me hedge my historical claim in this way: the view I shall discuss could have been an active-indeed a controlling---element of Eleaticism; to suppose that Parmenides held it not only explains the poem, but also helps explain the subsequent reactions to Eleaticism of Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Plato (though there is not space to elaborate this here). In addition, it brings his thought astonishingly close to some contemporary philosophical preoccupations. In the first of the following sections, I lay down some sketchy but necessary groundwork concerning the early Greek concept of 'being.' Then in Section 2 an interpretation is given of what I take to be the central Parmenidean doctrine, that 'it cannot be said that anything is not.' This section is the lengthiest and most involved, but it also contains all the moves that appear to be important. Of the remaining sections, Section 3 exp]Mn.qthe principle: 'of what is, all that can be said is: it is,' Section 4 deals briefly with the remaining cosmology of "The Way of Truth," and Section 5 considers the question whether Parmenides himself believed the fantastic conclusions of his argument. There is a short postscript on a point of methodology. 1. A Word on 6v If we are to examine Parmenides' reasoning profitably, an indispensable pre1This paper wasprepared while the author was beneficiary of a Grant-in-Aid of Research from the American Council of Learned Societies, hereby gratefully acknowledged. [111] 112 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY liminary is to estabhsh at least a provisional reading for the Greek words translated "is" or "it is" (tar,v), "what is" or "being" (Sv,rb 5v), "to be" (alva0. For while it is evident enough that in his poem Parmenides purports to be delivering an insight of the utmost significance concerning rb tbv (as he calls it), still the construction which he puts upon the term and its cognates, and the understanding which he expects of his listener, are not so clear and have been topics of dispute. Especially notable, and often noted, is the fact that Parmenides' discussion of 'being' shows no sign of the conceptual distinction considered elementary nowadays, between the "is" linking subject and predicate and the "is" of existence; and in fact it needs no documentation here that this distinction was not reflected in either ordinary or philosophical Greek idiom until, at least, a much later date than his, the word tare expressing both concepts. Also highly visible in the poem is the abundance of occurrences of tare used absolutely, unaccompanied by any predicate expression. As a result of this last, the poem can create in the contemporary reader the impression that r5 tSv is being used to mean what is in the existential sense only, to mean what there is; indeed some students of the poem conclude not only that Parmenides... (shrink)

The paper presents, according to the dialectical metaphysics of choice, arguments in favor of the proposition that the biblical story of creation is a philosophical construct, within which the religious message (obedience, disobedience, sin) is abrogated in the philosophical perspective of the Absolute (equality of the subjects in the definition of good and evil); it has been stated that the story of creation contains an antinomian perception of God as a symbol of man (both a hierarchical and non-hierarchical relationship (...) between the parties, the latter being preferred and ascribed the status of a “divine image”); the paper proposes that the Old Testament is a literary work, rather than religious scripture, and contains a broad range of cultural experience, including elements of a philosophical outlook, which religion and theology subject to a simplified and biased interpretation, groundlessly universalizing a traditional culture based on domination andobedience. (shrink)

While it has perhaps always accompanied philosophical thought – one immediately thinks of Plato’s Dialogues – the problem of the communication of that thought, and therefore of its capacity to be taught, has acquired a new insistence in the work of post-Kantian thinkers. As evidence of this one could cite Fichte’s repeated efforts to formulate a definitive version of his Wissenschaftslehre, the model of the Bildungsroman that Hegel adopts for his Phenomenology of Spirit, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works, Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, (...) and Heidegger’s uncompleted Being and Time. Certainly each of these thinkers, as well as their projects, are quite distinct from the others, but their works are also signposts. It is not a question here of reducing the puzzles and difficulties of these works to some single element, some trace of a philosophical zeitgeist. Rather, it is enough to indicate this preoccupation with the problem of the communicability of thinking in order to raise the question of the modality of such a communication. How has thinking come to be so fundamentally troubled by its own expression? That Kant’s Critical philosophy has precipitated this preoccupation ought to come as no surprise, for it was Kant, most famously in the Critique of Pure Reason, who sought to definitively set the limits of philosophical thinking. In doing so, however, Kant is unable to remain utterly silent about what he himself sets outside the bounds of meaningful thought and speech: things-in-themselves. The mere fact that this meaningless element is an essential component of Kant’s philosophical exposition is an indication of the paradoxical logic of the limit: to postulate a limit is simultaneously to set out its obverse side. In Kant’s case, then, the demarcation of what can be thought carries with it the implicit thinking of what is ruled out of bounds for thought. Beginning with Fichte, the philosophical project of Kant’s successors and inheritors is then largely determined by an effort to incorporate or at least accommodate this alien element within thinking. The initial phase of this effort is marked by a tragic motif, a conjoining of thought with the experience of loss and suffering that is characteristic of Romanticism, that culminates in the dialectic of Hegel’s Absolute Knowing. In Absolute Knowing, thought has not vanquished its limitations, it has instead discovered the resources with which it can perpetually surmount them. This first phase is followed by a reaction or response to this seeming completion and overcoming of the Kantian limitation. Now, the tragic movement of thought comes to be understood as itself limited, and necessarily so according to the logic of the limit that imposes itself upon every gesture of closure. Tragedy thereby gives way to comedy insofar as the limitation that is incorporated as an obstacle to be overcome by tragic thought is shown to be the external condition of that very thought. Finally, if the comic is the fate of the limitations of tragedy, the thought of comedy itself demands a third mode of thinking, one capable of something more than the mere reiteration of the limit between comedy and tragedy that troubles them both. This third form of expression is parody, an expression appropriate to a thinking that repeats and completes the threefold movement of tragic thought while, in this very repetition, creating a limitless domain of thoughtful expression. (shrink)

At every point of transition in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit each shape of consciousness becomes a seemingly irreconcilable contradiction. It is just at these points, however, that the shape of consciousness in question shows itself as a 'higher' or more adequate shape of consciousness that is able to suspend or move beyond [aufheben] these seemingly irreconcilable differences. The transitions in Hegel's systematic works are complicated and often bewildering. One element is constant in all of them, however: a type of one-sided (...) abstraction which Hegel calls Verstand. It expresses itself as the unyielding manner in which the shapes of consciousness or categories of thought adhere to the certainty of their truth claims. This certainty inevitably expresses itself in antinomies; antinomies that the logic of Verstand itself is unable to reconcile; only reason can achieve this. Verstand cannot be conflated with the dialectical movement as a whole; nevertheless, Verstand has a central and important role to play in the dialectical logic of both the PhG and the Science of Logic. It is a limited way of thinking which abstracts and isolates, but it is powerful, initiating and sustaining the dialectical mechanic of conceptual development in Hegel's systematic works. (shrink)

This work renews the basic questions and principles of philosophical ethics and provides a thorough account of how being oneself presupposes freedom and responsibility. _Elements of Ethics_ focuses on the descriptive and conceptual analysis of the experiences through which human lives become aware of themselves and shows how we are provoked to respond appropriately to the various dimensions and phenomena of the universe. Operating on the provocative thesis that "if the ethical is real, it cannot be proved, because it is (...) either nothing at all or an irreducible origin," this book pursues the question that defines ethics: "How should I live?" After setting out a preliminary definition of terms, _Elements of Ethics_ gives insight into the relation of human individuals and the world by showing that the traditional separation between "is" and "ought" overlooks their profound coincidence, and by clarifying the determining, though often overlooked, role of _affectivity _ and _katharsis_ in all ethical experiences. (shrink)

본고의 목표는 『시학』의 비극 정의에서 정의항의 두 부분, 즉 ‘완결성’과 ‘감정 효과’에 초점을 맞춰, “극 바깥(exō tou dramatos)”이 이 둘과 직결되는 용어임을 밝히는 것이다. 이를 위해 본고는 다음의 순서를 취한다. 먼저 “극 바깥”이란 배우의 간략한 말을 통해 관객에게 전달될 뿐 현재형의 행동으로 연출되지는 않는 과거사나 미래사가 놓이는 곳으로서, 표현은 공간이지만 실제 의미는 시간에 관련됨을 서술한다. 다음으로, “묶기”란 주인공의 운의 전환에 필요한 사건들을 설계하는 작업인데, 여기서 비중 있게 사용되는 것은 극 안의 현재사보다는 극 바깥의 과거사임을 보인다. 마지막으로, 비극 정의에 언급된 ‘행위의 (...) 완결성’은 ‘극의 통일성’을 뜻함을 설명하고, 극이 통일성을 갖추게 하기 위해서는 ‘플롯의 통일성’부터 마련해야 함을 짚은 후, 다음을 보인다. 첫째, 극 바깥의 과거사는 극 안의 현재사가 일어날 만한 이유를 제공하여 사건들을 인과적으로 밀착시켜 주기 때문에 통일적 플롯 구성에 필요하고, 특히 알아보기가 포함된 플롯 제작에서는 그 적극적 사용이 필수적이다. 둘째, 극 바깥의 과거사는 관객에게 인과적 정보를 제공하긴 하지만 이 정보를 덜 생생하고 덜 상세하게 제공하여 관객 인지 상태의 명료한 정도를 낮추기 때문에, 극 안의 중대 사건의 예기치 않은 발생을 준비하는 데 효과적이고, 특정 과거사의 불합리한 요소가 관객의 의식에 포착되지 않도록 감추는 데에도 활용될 수 있다. 이상의 논의를 통해 본고는 “극 바깥”이 플롯의 통일성 마련에 필요하다는 점에서 ‘완결성’과 직결되고, 놀라움의 규모 확대에 기여한다는 점에서 ‘감정 효과’와 직결됨을 밝히고자 한다. (shrink)

Although much recent work in Anglo-American aesthetics on tragedy has focused exclusively on the ‘problems’ of tragic pleasure, in the long tradition of reflection on tragedy philosophers have focused more on tragedy as a genre of particular moral and political-philosophical significance. In this paper, we investigate the tragedy of our day in light of these latter concerns in order to determine what works of this genre reveal about the sense of the terrible necessities or near-necessities with (...) which our contemporary Western culture must grapple. We do this by focusing on cinematic tragedies since film is a medium that has become more popular than theatre. Surprisingly, contemporary aestheticians do not have a good definition of tragedy as it has developed to the present. Thus, we start with some definitional work taking Aristotle as a base. After adumbrating some plausible necessary conditions for tragedy, we note that there are not many films today that are genuine cinematic tragedies. Many contemporary films partially court a tragic structure but operate much more in the mode of melodrama. We shall categorize such films that share the pathos and suffering protagonists of the tragic genre but which generally eschew the tragic ending as part of what we call the ‘silver-lining genre’, a sub-genre of melodrama. Finally, we turn to a film that constitutes a genuine, contemporary cinematic tragedy, Into the Wild (dir. Sean Penn, 2007) and offer an analysis that reveals what this film says about our culture’s most serious and possibly intractable ethical and political problems. (shrink)

ArgumentHistorians have accorded a privileged status to the analytic ideal of elements as a distinctive marker of “modern” chemistry. Boyle’s and Lavoisier’s have been used to characterize their modernity, which has in turn justified their status as the founding fathers of modern chemistry. It has been difficult, however, to establish a viable connection between these two fathers or the genealogy of their definitions. I argue in this paper that French didactic tradition gave rise to the definition Boyle stated (...) in the Sceptical Chymist, or the analytic/philosophical ideal of elements. He did not endorse the definition he gave, but criticized its lack of analytic rigor and philosophical sophistication. His critique served as a negative heuristic, leading to Nicolas Lemery’s analytic ideal of “chemical principles” as distinct from “natural principles.” Lemery’s definition survived in French didactic tradition, as is evidenced in Macquer’s and Guyton’s textbooks which provided direct precedents for Lavoisier’s analytic ideal of “elements or principles.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Cynthia Willett HEGEL, ANTIGONE, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ECSTATIC DIALOGUE In his lectures on aesthetics, Hegel argues that drama is the highest form of art. Only drama can resolve, or sublate (auflieben), an opposition between objective and subjective poles ofaesthetic experience.1 This opposition takes its penultimate form in the difference between epic and lyric poetry. Subjective feelings expressed in lyric and the objective representation ofevents in epic are sublated (...) in classical drama as ethical character and action. In this article I will examine both what Hegel does and does not say about the structure and function ofclassical drama in order to determine its role in the education of humanity, or what Hegel calls the "phenomenology of spirit." As it turns out, drama is not only a climactic moment in the development of spirit. The structure ofdrama also traces a paradigm and an historical origin for Hegel's dialectic. The ironic reversals and discoveries that emplot tragic drama also constitute dialectic. An immediate consequence of this parallel is mat, in accordance with Aristode's definition of tragic drama, dialectic demands the catharsis, or purging, of emotion from educated spirit.2 After establishing the analogy between dialectic and cathartic drama, I turn to the exemplary role that is played by Sophocles' Antigone in the Phenomenology ofSpirit. A reinterpretation of the play suggests that Hegel fails to see that emotional engagement, or the unsublated subjective feeling relegated to die lower art of lyric, in fact orients the dramatic action of Antigone. The resemblance between drama and dialectic suggests that desire can no more be purged from dialectic than from classical tragedy. As a consequence, Hegelian dialectic should be reconceived in terms of a notion of tragedy that is not cathartic but ecstatic. Philosophy and Literature, © 1990, 14: 268-283 Cynthia Willett269 In the AesUietks, Hegel places drama after epic and lyric as the third and final moment of the highest stage of art. Drama presents actions that are ethical and thus differs from the lyrical expression of feelings as well as the adventures narrated in epic (A, pp. 1158; 474). Hegel's definition of epic in terms of narration and description suggests that the language of epic functions as representation. Representational language externalizes, or objectifies, spirit's movement in a series ofevents which are related by the epic poet. This narration functions without the mediation ofa subject, which is to say without an "agent's inner will and character" (A, pp. 1160; 476). Lyric poetry, on the other hand, concerns feelings or "the inner life alone" (A, pp. 984; 254). In accordance with its subject matter, the language oflyric is not representational but expressive. Drama presents actions before an audience, such actions occurring primarily in the mode of speech (A, pp. 1159; 475). What we can characterize as the "speech-acts" performed in drama carry out intentions of, or ends soughtby, the main character. Drama advances dialectic because, as Hegel writes, "drama does not fall apart into a lyric inner life and an external sphere as its opposite, but displays an inner life and its external realization" (A, pp. 1 160; 476). First, events which occur episodically in epic attain the unity of a single action that comprises dramatic plot. Secondly, a "cleaned-up" version ofthe "chaotic" feelings expressed in lyric poetry develops into the intention of a character to adher to a universal ethical principle. It is important to emphasize that, according to Hegel, drama should not draw any of its effect from subjective emotions. Drama sublates lyrical feeling into ethical law. Only thus does drama bring together the epic-making events and lyrical subjectivity, notby wayofa mechanical synthesis, but in a metamorphosis enabling elements initially opposed to give rise to an original whole. The proximity ofdrama to dialectical thought appears in the contrast Hegel draws between dramatic action and action which is prosaic, or philosophically insignificant (A, pp. 1159; 475). Dramatic action, Hegel explains, "is notconfined to the simple and undisturbed accomplishment ofa specific aim; on the contrary, it rests entirely on collisions ofcircumstances, passions, and characters... which in turn necessitate a resolution of the conflict and discord" (A, pp. 1159; 475). On the other hand, a prosaic, or ordinary... (shrink)

A brief review of the attempts to define “elements of reality” in the framework of quantum theory is presented. It is noted that most definitions of elements of reality have in common the feature to be a definite outcome of some measurement. Elements of reality are extended to pre- and post- selected systems and to measurements which fulfill certain criteria of weakness of the coupling. Some features of the newly introduced concepts are discussed.

It is often said that the term rhythm has as many meanings as the number of people who use it. This essay tries to argue to the contrary. Nowadays, the most common definition relies on a metric basis that spread and became dominant in our culture during the 19th century. A previous essay has dealt with the history of rhythm in Antiquity. It has uncovered the intricate and conflictive development of three theoretical prototypes: the Democritean physical, the Platonic metric, (...) and the - Sur le concept de rythme – Nouvel article. (shrink)

It is somewhat striking that two interrelated elements of Hume's account of causation have received so little attention in the secondary literature on the subject. The first is the distinction of causation into the natural and the philosophical relations: Although many have tried to give accounts of why Hume presents two definitions of causality, it is often not clear in these accounts that the one definition is of causality as a natural relation and the other is of causality (...) as a philosophical relation, where to make the contrast between these two kinds of relations we need to give a naturalistic account of natural relations and a normative account of philosophical relations. (That Hume intends this to be the contrast will be defended in more detail below.) The second element is that, in many cases of our inferences from cause to effect, "we must follow our taste and sentiment" (A Treatise of Human Nature [T], 103), where the appeal to taste here, as in morality and aesthetics, is not to be understood as up to the individual. Rather, Hume makes it clear both in Book 3 of the Treatise and in "Of the Standard of Taste" that there are standards to which our individual judgments (in morality, aesthetics, or causality) must conform. My purpose in this paper is to attempt to provide an interpretation of Hume's account of causality that brings these two elements explicitly into the foreground. This interpretation is, to a greater extent than usual, a reconstruction of Hume's account of our causal inferences, drawing, as I have indicated above, from a range of texts not normally associated with Hume's discussion of causality. As such, this interpretation should be considered as exploratory in nature, perhaps focussing too single-mindedly on these two elements in an attempt to make out as strong a case as possible for their relevance in understanding Hume's account of causal inference. (shrink)

Tarski 1968 makes a move in the course of providing an account of ?definitionally equivalent? classes of algebras with a businesslike lack of fanfare and commentary, the significance of which may accordingly be lost on the casual reader. In ?1 we present this move as a response to a certain difficulty in the received account of what it is to define a function symbol (or ?operation symbol?). This difficulty, which presents itself as a minor technicality needing to be got around (...) especially for the case of symbols for zero-place functions (for ?distinguished elements?), has repercussions?not widely recognised?for the account of functional completeness in sentential logic. A similarly stark comment in Church 1956 reveals an appreciation of this difficulty, though not every subsequent author on the topic has taken the point. We fill out this side of the picture in ?2. The discussion of functional completeness in ?2 is supplemented by some remarks on what is involved in defining a connective, which have been included in an Appendix. The emphasis throughout is on conceptual clarification rather than on proving theorems, and the main body of the paper may be regarded as an elaboration on the remarks just mentioned by Tarski and Church. The Appendix (?3) is intended to be similarly clarificatory, though this time with some corrective intent, of remarks made in and about Makinson 1973. (shrink)

We draw on Short’s work on Peirce’s theory of signs to propose a new general definition of interpretation. Short argues that Peirce’s semiotics rests on his naturalised teleology. Our proposal extends Short’s work by modifying his definition of interpretation so as to make it more generally applicable to putatively interpretative processes in biological systems. We use our definition as the basis of an account of different kinds of misinterpretation and we discuss some questions raised by the (...) class='Hi'>definition by reference to parallel problems in the field of teleosemantics. We propose that interpretative responses fulfilling the criteria of our definition may be made by relatively simple molecular entities and we suggest two specific empirical applications of the definition to experimental work in the field of origin of life research. Our wider aim is to suggest that a well formulated naturalistic definition of interpretation will allow a re-evaluation of the role of semiotic phenomena in biological systems, including the generation of empirically testable hypotheses. (shrink)

When we start with a scientific view of the world, we are at a loss when we try to deal with notions such as value, beauty, or meaning -- or more down to earth: anger, fear, joy, colour, smell, and other ‘secondary’ qualities whose putative reduction seems today as difficult as ever. Do these qualities then have to be put in by hand, so to speak? Or could it mean that the scientific view itself fails to capture aspects of reality (...) at least as fundamental as basic physical notions such as space, time, energy? These were some of the questions that came up in conversations between an astrophysicist and a philosopher that began two years ago, as they met, often by accident, usually in a cafe for breakfast. What happens if a philosopher and a scientist discuss such questions? Well, this was an experiment, and here is the outcome. We still think of it as an experiment, an exploration, without any definite conclusion. (shrink)

Places have very different faces. My place can be the home where I live, the country where I was born, the town where I work, the garden I cultivate, the continent of our shared past or even the cosmos as a whole. If we look at the history of modern economic thought, land as a scarce resource has played an important role. For the school of Physiocrats in the eighteenth century, land was the main if not the only source of (...) value creation. With modern industrialization and the rise of classical economics labor became the creator and measure of monetary worth. Later on, neoclassical economists considered utility (pleasure, happiness) as the measure of value creation and price formation.In today’s economics ‘place’ only becomes relevant when it is perceived as a scarce good. An economist is not interested in the uniqueness of a specific locale, nor in its memories and stories. The laws of economics apply to every place and hence to no specific place. Space and place are considered factors in a production function or elements of consumption and entertainment. From the moment scarcity arises, opportunity cost, competition and price formation and regulation become part of the game. When, e.g., the oceans become the subject of intensive human exploitation and competition, they need political and economic regulation. All these features can be subsumed under the umbrella of ‘economics of place’. However, by place-based economics we mean something altogether different. While the economics of place primarily envisage place as an instrumental good used for the maximization of human utility, the proposed alternative views place as an existential good that creates meaning and identity for people.In a first section I will now explore the existential meaning of ‘place’ starting from Martin Heidegger’s definition of the human being as Da-sein which means literally being-there, being rooted in a specific place. In the second section I will reconstruct a well-known theorem in economics called the tragedy of the commons. It explains how places can be degraded from communal property where relations matter to instrumental goods for individual profit maximization. The third section revisits the first theoretical model of place-based economics in Western philosophy developed by Aristotle in the fourth century BC. It is fascinating to see how this Aristotelian model of oiko-nomia gradually lost its grip in subsequent centuries. In the last section I reflect on some proposals of E.F. Schumacher to recontextualize the Aristotelian model of place-based economics. (shrink)

There is currently no consensus from the relevant stakeholders regarding the operational and construct definitions of child assent for research. As such, the requirements for assent are often construed in different ways, institutionally disparate, and often conflated with those of parental consent. Development of a standardized operational definition of assent would thus be important to ensure that investigators, institutional review boards, and policy makers consider the assent process in the same way. To this end, we describe a Delphi study (...) that provided consensus from a panel of expert stakeholders regarding the definitions of child assent for research. Based on current guidelines, a preliminary definition of assent was generated and sent out for review to a Delphi panel including pediatric bioethicists and researchers, Institutional Review Board members, parents, and individuals with regulatory/legal expertise. For each subsequent review, the process of summarizing and revising responses was repeated until consensus was achieved. Panelists were also required to rank order elements of assent that they believed were most important in defining the underlying constructs of the assent process. In providing these rankings, panelists were asked to frame their responses in the contexts of younger and adolescents/older children in non-therapeutic and therapeutic trials. Summary rankings of the most important identified elements were then used to generate written construct definitions which were sent out for iterative reviews by the expert panel. Consensus regarding the operational definition was reached by 14/18 of the panel members. Seventeen panelists agreed with the definitions of capacity for assent, elements of disclosure for younger children, and the requirements for meaningful assent, respectively. Fifteen members agreed with the elements of disclosure for adolescents/older children. It is hoped that this study will positively inform and effect change in the way investigators, regulators, and IRBs operationalize the assent process, respect children’s developing autonomy, and in concert with parental permission, ensure the protection of children who participate in research. (shrink)