Dissatisfied with the descriptive and speculative methods of evolutionary biology of his time, the physiologist Jacques Loeb , best known for his “engineering” approach to biology, reflected on the possibilities of artificially creating life in the laboratory. With the objective of experimentally tackling one of the crucial questions of organic evolution, i.e., the origin of life from inanimate matter, he rejected claims made by contemporary scientists of having produced artificial life through osmotic growth processes in inorganic salt solutions. According to (...) Loeb, the answer to the question of whether or not life could be created artificially had to come from macro-molecular chemistry, in particular from the research on the recently discovered DNA. He was convinced that a prerequisite for making living matter from inanimate substances was the chemical synthesis of nuclear material capable of self-replication. Moreover, Loeb, experimentally refuting some vitalistic explanations as well as colloidal chemists’ far-reaching claims that biologically relevant macromolecules follow colloidal rather than chemical laws, pioneered research on the physical and chemical explanations of biological phenomena. (shrink)

OUTSTANDING PAPER AWARD, Division of the History of Chemistry, American Chemical Society.

The goal of constructing artificial photosynthetic assemblies is to use sunlight for the generation of hydrogen from water; the hydrogen obtained should be an ideal energy source. The use of surfactant vesicle entrapped‐catalyst coated colloidal semiconductors and sacrificial electron donors for photosensitized water reduction illustrates how chemists mimic photosynthesis.

Today, the lipid bilayer structure is nearly ubiquitous, taken for granted in even the most rudimentary introductions to cell biology. Yet the image of the lipid bilayer, built out of lipids with heads and tails, went from having obscure origins deep in colloid chemical theory in 1924 to being “obvious to any competent physical chemist” by 1935. This chapter examines how this schematic, strictly heuristic explanation of the idea of molecular orientation was developed within colloid physical chemistry, (...) and how the image was transformed into a reflection of the reality and agency of lipid molecules in the biological microworld. Whereas in physical and colloid chemistry these images considered secondary to instrumental measurement and mathematical modeling of surface phenomena, in biology the manipulable image of the lipid on paper became an essential tool for the molecularization of the cell. (shrink)

The article recalls the anti-molecular transformation of biology 100 hundred years ago. The author recounts protein chemist Wolfgang Pauli’s announcement of a new era of biomedical research in 1905. Colloidal chemistry was supposed to be the center of the era described by Pauli. The author discusses the aspects that remained from the three decades in which colloidal science exerted a great influence on biological and biochemical research.

Between 1900 and 1930 colloid chemistry, a branch of physical chemistry, gained crucial importance for the understanding of vital phenomena. To many it seemed that the properties of colloids would differ from those of ordinary matter, paralleling the specific properties of protoplasm, the living substance . The application of theoretical concepts and experimental models of colloid chemistry to biological problems shaped Biocolloidology as a new research program, which appeared promising for the exploration of organic processes (...) such as mitotic cell division, growth, muscle contraction and movement. Biocolloidology could simultaneously absorb the quest for a physical-chemical explanation of life and the (post)-romantic notion of organic nature as a container of creative and vital forces that was central to life-philosophy. At least until the late 1920s, it is argued, the merging of different scientific and philosophical metaphors made Biocolloidology and the concept of protoplasm highly appealing in a broad cultural context. (shrink)

Since the early nineteenth century a membrane or wall has been central to the cell’s identity as the elementary unit of life. Yet the literally and metaphorically marginal status of the cell membrane made it the site of clashes over the definition of life and the proper way to study it. In this article I show how the modern cell membrane was conceived of by analogy to the first “artificial cell,” invented in 1864 by the chemist Moritz Traube (1826–1894), and (...) reimagined by the plant physiologist Wilhelm Pfeffer (1845–1920) as a precision osmometer. Pfeffer’s artificial cell osmometer became the conceptual and empirical basis for the law of dilute solutions in physical chemistry, but his use of an artificial analogue to theorize the existence of the plasma membrane as distinct from the cell wall prompted debate over whether biology ought to be more closely unified with the physical sciences, or whether it must remain independent as the science of life. By examining how the histories of plant physiology and physical chemistry intertwined through the artificial cell, I argue that modern biology relocated vitality from protoplasmic living matter to nonliving chemical substances—or, in broader cultural terms, that the disenchantment of life was accompanied by the (re)enchantment of ordinary matter. (shrink)

This paper discusses the operations meant to act on situations of ontological uncertainties for chemicals. Using examples related to substances developed as part of nanotechnology programs, it analyses technical and social instruments meant to define the existence of these substances, as « new » or « existing » chemicals. Carbon nanotubes developed by a French company offer an illustration of containment, while the legal disputes about nano silver in the U.S. display oppositions about whether or not these compounds are equivalent (...) to colloïdal silver. The operations meant to deal with the ontological uncertainty of these substances define categories and craft political organizations. As such, they suggest developing an analytical approach able to jointly examine the ontologies of material objects and the forms of political ordering. (shrink)

In Goethe's Faust, the poet refers to alchemists' widespread ideas on artificial creation of life in the laboratory. In Faust, such an attempt was not successful: the little man,Homunculus, created by the scholar Wagner through crystallization, was a pure spirit; his form and light disappeared in an attempt to become real life. According to Goethe, life was obviously not a crystal, and he pointed to decisive differences between crystals and organic beings, the latter for example elaborating their food into clear-cut (...) organs and unable to be reconstituted from their ingredients, once destroyed. Thus Goethe's "sensitivity to the 'Gestalt' of the entire complicated organism and his general philosophical attitude .. (shrink)

This book reflects on the significant and highly original scientific contributions of Hans Primas. A professor of chemistry at ETH Zurich from 1962 to 1995, Primas continued his research activities until his death in 2014. Over these 50 years and more, he worked on the foundations of nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy, contributed to a number of significant issues in theoretical chemistry, helped to clarify central topics in quantum theory and the philosophy of physics, suggested innovative ways of addressing (...) interlevel relations in the philosophy of science, and introduced cutting-edge approaches in the flourishing young field of scientific studies of consciousness. His work in these areas of research and its continuing impact is described by noted experts, colleagues, and collaborators of Primas. All authors contextualize their contributions to facilitate the mutual dialog between these fields. (shrink)

By a close examination of changes in analytical chemistry between the years 1920 and 1950, I document the case that natural science has undergone and continues to undergo a major revolution. The central feature of this transformation is the rise in importance of scientific instrumentation. Prior to 1920, analytical chemists determined the chemical constitution of some unknown by treating it with a series of known compounds and observing the kind of reactions it underwent. After 1950, analytical chemists determined the (...) chemical constitution of an unknown by using a variety of instruments which allow one to discriminate chemicals in terms of their physical properties. This transformation involved changes in the practice of analytical chemistry. It involved the development of a new family of scientific instrument-making companies, and a new level of capital expenditure necessary to do analytical chemistry. It involved the development of new means to disseminate information about scientific instruments. While I do not document the broader case, these changes have been widespread throughout the natural sciences. It is the rise in the importance of instrumentation which is the key conceptual change in what has been identified as the fourth big scientific revolution. (shrink)

Chemistry and physics are two sciences that are hard to connect. Yet there is significant overlap in their aims, methods, and theoretical approaches. In this book, the reduction of chemistry to physics is defended from the viewpoint of a naturalised Nagelian reduction, which is based on a close reading of Nagel's original text. This naturalised notion of reduction is capable of characterising the inter-theory relationships between theories of chemistry and theories of physics. The reconsideration of reduction also (...) leads to a new characterisation of chemical theories. This book is primarily aimed at philosophers of chemistry and chemists with an interest in philosophy, but is also of interest to the general philosopher of science. (shrink)

Along with exploring some of the necessary conditions for the chemistry of our world given what we know about quantum mechanics, I will also discuss a different reductionist challenge than is usually considered in debates on the relationship of chemistry to physics. Contrary to popular belief, classical physics does not have a reductive relationship to quantum mechanics and some of the reasons why reduction fails between classical and quantum physics are the same as for why reduction fails between (...) chemistry and quantum physics. However, a neoreductionist can accept that classical physics has some amount of autonomy from quantum mechanics, but still try to maintain that classical+quantum physics taken as a whole reduces chemistry to physics. I will explore some of the obstacles lying in the neoreductionist’s path with respect to quantum chemistry and thereby hope to shed more light on the conditions necessary for the chemistry of our world. (shrink)

Livings things are so very strange -- The quest for a theory of life -- Understanding 'understanding' -- Stability and instability -- The knotty origin of life problem -- Biology's crisis of identity -- Biology is chemistry -- What is life?

Chemistry laboratories, as buildings, have been surprisingly little studied by historians of science; interest has been focused on them more as sites of specific scientific activity, with particular emphasis on the personalities who worked within them. This has overshadowed aspects of laboratories such as their specification, design, construction, fitting-out, adaptation, replacement, status as civic and academic structures, and so on. Systematic study of them would be aided by an agreed taxonomy of laboratory types, according to their purpose, and a (...) scheme is proposed here. Practically no pre-1800 chemical laboratories survive, and there are very few dating from earlier than 1900, at least in their original state. Encouragingly, there have been several recent archaeological excavations which have turned up interesting evidence of early examples from various cultures. Little interest has been shown in the preservation of laboratories as significant architectural or historical structures, certainly when compared with other building types. The paper closes by considering those English laboratories which enjoy some level of legal protection but questioning the criteria adopted in deciding the programme of preservation. (shrink)

In 1931 eminent chemist Fritz Paneth maintained that the modern notion of “element” is closely related to (and as “metaphysical” as) the concept of element used by the ancients (e.g., Aristotle). On that basis, the element chlorine (properly so-called) is not the elementary substance dichlorine, but rather chlorine as it is in carbon tetrachloride. The fact that pure chemicals are called “substances” in English (and closely related words are so used in other European languages) derives from philosophical compromises made by (...) grammarians in the late Roman Empire (particularly Priscian [fl. ~520 CE]). When the main features of the constitution of isotopes became clear in the first half of the twentieth century, the formal (IUPAC) definition of a “chemical element” was changed. The features that are “essential” to being an element had previously been “transcendental” (“beyond the sphere of consciousness”) but, by the mid-twentieth century the defining characteristics of elements, as such, had come to be understood in detail. This amounts to a shift in a “horizon of invisibility” brought about by progress in chemistry and related sciences. Similarly, chemical insight is relevant to currently-open philosophical problems, such as the status of “the bundle theory” of the coherence of properties in concrete individuals. (shrink)

Are there circumstances under which scientists and engineers doing their ordinary jobs can be thought of as participants in a social movement? The technoscientists analyzed in this article are at the forefront of a new way of doing chemistry; they are attempting to redesign chemical products and synthesis pathways to significantly reduce health effects and environmental damage from industrial chemicals. Green chemistry practitioners and entrepreneurs now constitute a small minority of chemists and chemical engineers in the university, government, (...) and corporate sectors, but the innovators gradually are institutionalizing their efforts and winning converts. Drawing on concepts from social movement theory, the authors argue that examining green chemistry as a social movement sheds light on the intentional social organization of emerging scientific and engineering disciplines, advances thinking about the role of expertise in social change, and uncovers a possible pathway toward reconstructing chemical technologies on a more environmentally sustainable basis. The article closes with questions about potential coalitions among green chemists and engineers, regulators, and activist sectors of civil society. (shrink)

Summary Opinion is divided as to whether chemistry is reducible to physics. The problem can be given a satisfactory solution provided three conditions are met: that a science not be identified with its theories; that several notions of theory dependence be distinguished; and that quantum chemistry, rather than classical chemistry, be compared with physics. This paper proposes to perform all three tasks. It does so by analyzing the methodological concepts concerned as well as by examining the way (...) a chemical rate constant is derivable with the help of the quantum atomic theory. The conclusion is that chemistry, and in particular quantum chemistry, is not a part of physics although it is certainly based on the latter. (shrink)

Crossing the boundaries - between nature and artifact and between inanimate and living matter - is a major feature of the convergence between nanotechnology and biotechnology. This paper points to two symmetric ways of crossing the boundaries: chemists mimicking nature's structures and processes, and synthetic biologists mimicking synthetic chemists with biological materials. However to what extent are they symmetrical and do they converge toward a common view of life and machines? The question is addressed in a historical perspective. Both biomimetic (...) chemistry and synthetic biology can be described as descendants of an ambitious program developed by Stéphane Leduc who coined the phrase 'synthetic biology' in the early twentieth century. The main intention of this genealogy is to emphasize that although making life in a test tube is a recurrent project there are subtle nuances in the underlying metaphysical assumptions. This comparison is meant to contribute to a better understanding of the cultural issues at stake in the convergence between nano and biotechnologies. It suggests that the demarcation line between life and inanimate matter remains a hot issue, and that all traffics across the borders do not proceed from the same metaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

It is often assumed that chemistry was a typical positivistic science as long as chemists used atomic and molecular models as mere fictions and denied any concern with their real existence. Even when they use notions such as molecular orbitals chemists do not reify them and often claim that they are mere models or instrumental artefacts. However a glimpse on the history of chemistry in the longue durée suggests that such denials of the ontological status of chemical entities (...) do not testify for any specific allegiance of chemists to positivism. Rather it suggests that the dilemma positivism vs realism is inappropriate for characterizing the ontology of chemistry. This alternative shaped at the turn of the twentieth century in the context of controversies about atomic physics does not take into account the major concern of chemists, i.e. making up things. Only by considering what matters for chemists, their matters of concern rather than their matter theories, can we expect to get an insight on their ontological assumptions. The argumentation based on historical data is twofold. It is wellknown that generating new substances out of initial ingredients which is the raison d'être of chemistry raised a vexing puzzle which has been alternatively solved with the Aristotelian notion of mixt and the Lavoisieran notion of compound. I argue that an essential tension remains intrinsic in chemistry between the two conceptual frameworks. The second section tries to make sense of the long tradition in chemistry of ontological noncommitment. I argue that what is usually considered as a denial of the existence of the basic units of matter would be better characterized as a focus on more important actors on the chemical stage. (shrink)

At first glance twentieth-century philosophy of science seems virtually to ignore chemistry. However this paper argues that a focus on chemistry helped shape the French philosophical reflections about the aims and foundations of scientific methods. Despite patent philosophical disagreements between Duhem, Meyerson, Metzger and Bachelard it is possible to identify the continuity of a tradition that is rooted in their common interest for chemistry. Two distinctive features of the French tradition originated in the attention to what was (...) going on in chemistry.French philosophers of science, in stark contrast with analytic philosophers, considered history of science as the necessary basis for understanding how the human intellect or the scientific spirit tries to grasp the world. This constant reference to historical data was prompted by a fierce controversy about the chemical revolution, which brought the issue of the nature of scientific changes centre stage.A second striking—albeit largely unnoticed—feature of the French tradition is that matter theories are a favourite subject with which to characterize the ways of science. Duhem, Meyerson, Metzger and Bachelard developed most of their views about the methods and aims of science through a discussion of matter theories. Just as the concern with history was prompted by a controversy between chemists, the focus on matter was triggered by a scientific controversy about atomism in the late nineteenth-century.Keywords: France; Epistemology; Chemistry; Revolution; Atomism; Realism. (shrink)

Recently, philosophers have come forth with approaches to chemistry based on its actual practice, imparting to it a proper aim and character of its own. These approaches add to the currently growing movement of pluralist philosophies of science. We draw on recent pluralist accounts from chemistry and analyse three notions from modern chemical practice and theory in terms of these accounts, in order to complement the so far more general pluralist approaches with specific evidence. Our survey reveals that (...) the concept of element indicates conceptual pluralisms in chemistry. that electronegativity illustrates methodological pluralism in determining one and the same concept, and that acidity is an instance of plurality hidden behind ‘one notion’. (shrink)

Using the Public Value Mapping framework, I address the values successes and failures of chemistry as compared to the emerging field of green chemistry, in which the promoters attempt to incorporate new and expanded values, such as health, safety, and environmental sustainability, to the processes of prioritizing and conducting chemistry research. I document how such values are becoming increasingly public. Moreover, analysis of the relations among the multiple values associated with green chemistry displays a greater internal (...) coherence and logic than for conventional chemistry. Although traditional chemistry research has successfully contributed to both economic and values gains, there have been public values failures due to imperfect values articulations, failure to take a longer-term view, and inertia within a system that places too much emphasis on science values. Green chemistry, if implemented effectively, has potential to remedy these failures. (shrink)

This is an attempt to take a look at chemistry from the point of view of practical realism. Besides its social–historical and normative aspects, the latter involves a direct reference to experimental research. According to Edward Caldin chemistry depends on our being able to isolate pure substances with reproducible properties. Thus, the very basis of chemistry is practical. Even the laws of chemistry are not stable but are subject to correction. At the same time, these statements (...) do not necessarily make Edward Caldin a predecessor of practical realism. The latter has other predecessors, like Rom Harré’s policy realism or Sami Pihlström’s pragmatic realism. Chemistry is an experimental science. The experiment is a purposeful and critically theory-guided constructive, manipulative, material interference with nature according to Rein Vihalemm, the founder of practical realism. Chemistry is physics-like science but just partly so. This is an important point in the context of the current paper. (shrink)

This chapter shows that the combination of mathematical and chemical thinking in particular, as evidenced by Charles Sanders Peirce’s chemical training at Harvard, formed a solid conceptual basis for his account of diagrams. The connection between the Lawrence school and the chemical tradition established by Justus von Liebig in Giessen is of crucial importance to understand the context of Peirce’s own chemistry training. A completely different picture emerges if one pays greater attention to the nature of the chemistry (...) curriculum in Harvard at the time, and in particular to the pedagogical innovations introduced by Peirce’s chemistry teacher, Josiah Parsons Cooke. Historians of science have investigated the rise of institutional scientific laboratories from a range of perspectives. The chapter concludes with some suggestions for further investigation into the role of chemistry in Peirce’s philosophical system more broadly and the potential this new avenue of inquiry might have for the direction of Peirce scholarship. (shrink)

This comprehensive volume marks a new standard in scholarship in the still emerging field of the philosophy of chemistry. With selections drawn from a wide range of scholarly disciplines, philosophers, chemists, and historians of science here converge to ask some of the most fundamental questions about the relationship between philosophy and chemistry. What can chemistry teach us about longstanding disputes in the philosophy of science over such issues as reductionism, autonomy, and supervenience? And what new issues may (...) chemistry bring to the forefront now that it has joined physics and biology as a serious topic for philosophical reflection? This newest addition to the prestigious Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science series marks the true arrival of philosophy of chemistry within the corpus of the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Chemistry and dynamics are closely related in G.W. Leibniz's thinking, from the corpuscularism of his youth to the theory of conspiracy movements that he proposes in his later years. Despite the importance of chemistry and chemical thought in Leibniz's philosophy, interpreters have not paid enough attention to this subject, especially in the recent decades. This work aims to contribute to filling this gap in Leibnizian studies. In this first part of the work I will expose the theory of (...) matter that the young Leibniz conceives under the influence of chemical corpuscularism. Leibniz uses R. Boyle's interpretation of the Aristotelian idea of form in order to give an explanation of the unity and cohesion of bodies. As opposed to the Cartesians, Leibniz puts forth the idea of a dependence between the variables of extension, movement and figure, without losing analytical clarity and with the aim of extending the explanatory power of physics to natural phenomena difficult to approach by Cartesian mechanics. (shrink)

This chapter first evokes the objects of chemistry and the role played by experimentation in the constitution of its objects. It then studies how chemists set up experimental protocols to deal with the dependence of chemical bodies on the inert or living environments in which they are found. To this end, its pays particular attention to the preparation of reference matrices for measurement and for the validation of results. In so doing, it stresses the fact that chemists use a (...) dizzying pluralism of instruments, procedures, reasonings, and methods in order to characterize and quantify substances, which are never truly detachable, except in the case of approximations satisfying particular objectives, from the empirical complex {apparatus-methods-chemical substances-associated medium} in which they are scrutinized. (shrink)

In the 1940s and 1950s, nuclear magnetic resonance , one of the most important analytical techniques in chemistry, grew to maturity in the intermediate research field of chemical physics. Chemists and physicists adapted the new technology to the experimental culture of molecular spectroscopy which was based on a pragmatic experimental style. In molecular spectroscopy, the purpose of experiments was the establishment of methods that suited both the physicists' quest for precision and theoretical model building and the chemists' longing for (...) empirical data and understanding of structural formulae and reaction courses. In this process, an experimental style emerged that can be characterized as reliance on self‐built instrumentation, theoretical foundation in quantum mechanics, and proof of utility in the solution of structural and dynamical questions. This article focuses on the early development of NMR at Harvard University, with particular emphasis on the contributions of the first chemist working in the field of NMR, Herbert S. Gutowsky. (shrink)

During the second half of the nineteenth century, electronegativity has been one of the most relevant chemical concepts to explain the relationships between chemical substances and their possible reactions. Specifically, EN is a property of the substances that allows them to attract external electrons in bonding situations. The problem arises because EN cannot be measured directly. Indeed, the only way to measure it is through different properties that do can be directly measured, for instance enthalpy, ionization energies or electron affinities. (...) What is particularly troubling about this case in quantum chemistry is that the different models used to describe and quantify EN are incompatible but, in a certain sense, equivalent because the same EN scale results in all of them. By analyzing Linus Pauling’s and Robert Mulliken’s models of EN, it will be argued that, if we remain cling to a traditional representative conception of models, we cannot understand the meaning of the information provided by those models. Indeed, if we do not want to adopt an instrumentalist point of view concerning chemical knowledge, we should reconsider by virtue of what a model represents the system, or, in other words, which the factors that determine the representative power of a model are. I will propose a new perspective that incorporates the role of experimental techniques in the very notion of representation; this perspective allows us to understand how supposedly incompatible models of the same target system can be both simultaneously representative. (shrink)

We analyze the connections of Lavoisier system of nomenclature with Leibniz’s philosophy, pointing out to the resemblance between what we call Leibnizian and Lavoisian programs. We argue that Lavoisier’s contribution to chemistry is something more subtle, in so doing we show that the system of nomenclature leads to an algebraic system of chemical sets. We show how Döbereiner and Mendeleev were able to develop this algebraic system and to find new interesting properties for it. We pointed out the resemblances (...) between Leibniz program and Lavoisier legacy, particularly regarding the lingua philosophica for understanding and thinking Nature, in this particular case, chemistry. In the second part we discuss, from the linguistic viewpoint, how Lavoisian algebraic system may be taken further to build a language. We study the constituents of such a chemical language. Finally, we formalize some of the ideas here presented by using elements of network theory and discrete mathematics. (shrink)

In 1931 eminent chemist Fritz Paneth maintained that the modern notion of “element” is closely related to (and as “metaphysical” as) the concept of element used by the ancients (e.g., Aristotle). On that basis, the element chlorine (properly so-called) is not the elementary substance dichlorine, but rather chlorine as it is in carbon tetrachloride. The fact that pure chemicals are called “substances” in English (and closely related words are so used in other European languages) derives from philosophical compromises made by (...) grammarians in the late Roman Empire (particularly Priscian [fl. ~520 CE]). When the main features of the constitution of isotopes became clear in the first half of the twentieth century, the formal (IUPAC) definition of a “chemical element” was changed. The features that are “essential” to being an element had previously been “transcendental” (“beyond the sphere of consciousness”) but, by the mid-twentieth century the defining characteristics of elements, as such, had come to be understood in detail. This amounts to a shift in a “horizon of invisibility” brought about by progress in chemistry and related sciences. Similarly, chemical insight is relevant to currently-open philosophical problems, such as the status of “the bundle theory” of the coherence of properties in concrete individuals. (shrink)

Mechanisms are the how of chemical reactions. Substances are individuated by their structures at the molecular scale, so a chemical reaction is just the transformation of reagent structures into product structures. Explaining a chemical reaction must therefore involve different hypotheses about how this might happen: proposing, investigating and sometimes eliminating different possible pathways from reagents to products. One distinctive aspect of mechanisms in chemistry is that they are broken down into a few basic kinds of step involving the breaking (...) and making of bonds between atoms. This is necessary for chemical kinetics, the study of how fast reactions happen, and what affects it. It draws on G.N. Lewis’ identification of the chemical bond as involving shared electrons, which from the 1920s achieved the commensuration of chemistry and physics. The breaking or making of a bond just is the transfer of electrons, so a chemical bond on one side of an equation might be balanced on the other side by the appearance of a corresponding quantity of excess charge. A bond is understood to have been exchanged for a pair of electrons. Since reaction mechanisms rely on identities, doesn’t the establishment of a reaction mechanism explain away the chemical phenomena, showing that they are no more than the movement of charges and masses? In one sense yes: these mechanisms seem to involve a conserved-quantity conception of causation. But in another sense no: the ‘lower-level’ entities can do what they do only when embedded in higher-level organisation or structure. There need be no threat of reduction. (shrink)

In his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (MAN), Kant claims that chemistry is an improper, though rational science. The chemistry to which Kant confers this status is the phlogistic chemistry of, for instance, Georg Stahl. In his Opus Postumum (OP), however, Kant espouses a broadly Lavoiserian conception of chemistry. In particular, Kant endorses Antoine Lavoisier's elements, oxygen theory of combustion, and role for the caloric. As Lavoisier's lasting contribution to chemistry, according to some histories of the (...) science, was his emphasis on quantitative methods, Kant's assimilation of the chemical revolution raises the question: did Kant continue to think of chemistry as an improper, though rational, science in OP? In this paper, I answer this question affirmatively. I explain that a proper science requires a priori laws for the mathematical construction of its objects: the mere use of quantitative measurements is insufficient for the satisfaction this requirement. Further, I argue, contra Burkhard Tuschling, that in OP Kant retains a central role for mathematical construction in the foundations of proper natural science. Finally, I contend that the prominent a priori components of chemistry discussed in OP—the aether and the enumeration of the elements—do not make chemistry into a proper science. (shrink)

Chemistry, especially its historical practice, has in the philosophy of science in recent decades attracted more and more attention, influencing the turn from the vision of science as a timeless logic-centred system of statements towards the history- and practice-centred approach. The problem of pluralism in science has become a popular topic in that context. Hasok Chang’s “active normative epistemic pluralism” manifested in his book Is water H2O? Evidence, realism and pluralism, pursuing an integrated study of history and philosophy of (...) science, has provoked quite a widespread debate. It provides a good opportunity to discuss the topical philosophical issue of the nature of disagreements. The differences among disagreements in different domains have been pointed out in the disagreement literature. It has been noticed that in mathematics and science consensus is established more clearly than in philosophy where it remains largely unachievable. However, this conclusion is derived in the context of traditional logic-centred view of science. The aim of this paper is to consider the different nature of disagreements in science and in philosophy in the context of the history- and practice-centred approach. The analysis is focused on the critique of the received view of the Chemical Revolution which played quite a central role in Chang’s becoming a pluralist about science. Unlike Chang, however, a modified Kuhnian paradigm-conception of science and scientific revolutions is defended. (shrink)

It is often assumed that chemistry was a typical positivistic science as long as chemists used atomic and molecular models as mere fictions and denied any concern with their real existence. Even when they use notions such as molecular orbitals chemists do not reify them and often claim that they are mere models or instrumental artefacts. However a glimpse on the history of chemistry in the longue durée suggests that such denials of the ontological status of chemical entities (...) do not testify for any specific allegiance of chemists to positivism. Rather it suggests that the dilemma positivism vs realism is inappropriate for characterizing the ontology of chemistry. This alternative shaped at the turn of the twentieth century in the context of controversies about atomic physics does not take into account the major concern of chemists, i.e. making up things. Only by considering what matters for chemists, their matters of concern rather than their matter theories, can we expect to get an insight on their ontological assumptions. The argumentation based on historical data is twofold. Generating new substances out of initial ingredients which is the raison d’être of chemistry raised a vexing puzzle which has been alternatively solved with the Aristotelian notion of mixt and the Lavoisieran notion of compound. I will argue that an essential tension remains intrinsic in chemistry between the two conceptual frameworks. But how are we to make sense of the long tradition of ontological non-commitment in chemistry? I argue that what is usually considered as a denial of the existence of the basic units of matter is better characterized as a focus on more important actors on the chemical stage. (shrink)

This is an attempt to take a look at chemistry from the point of view of practical realism. Besides its social–historical and normative aspects, the latter involves a direct reference to experimental research. According to Edward Caldin chemistry depends on our being able to isolate pure substances with reproducible properties. Thus, the very basis of chemistry is practical. Even the laws of chemistry are not stable but are subject to correction. At the same time, these statements (...) do not necessarily make Edward Caldin a predecessor of practical realism. The latter has other predecessors, like Rom Harré’s policy realism or Sami Pihlström’s pragmatic realism. Chemistry is an experimental science. The experiment is a purposeful and critically theory-guided constructive, manipulative, material interference with nature according to Rein Vihalemm, the founder of practical realism. Chemistry is physics-like science but just partly so. This is an important point in the context of the current paper. (shrink)