The paper discusses one of the central problems of contemporary formal semantics — counterexamples to the predictions of the theory of binding (due to N. Chomsky). In particular, the author addresses cases of the so-called coreferential readings of reflexive pronouns which are standardly predicted to receive only the bound reading. The author examines theories of T. Reinhart and I. Heim and suggests an extension ofthe latter theory in order to enable it to account for the aforementioned readings (...) of reflexive pronouns. (shrink)

In order to handle presuppositions in the scope of attitude verbs, the binding theory allows presuppositions triggered in a subject's beliefs to be bound at the matrix level; and it allows presuppositions triggered in non-doxastic attitudes to be bound in the subject's beliefs (Geurts, 1999; Maier, 2015). However, we argue that this leads to serious overgeneration, for example it predicts that the unacceptable `Sue will come to the party, but Bill is sure that she won't and that only (...) Sue will come to the party' should be equivalent to the acceptable `Sue will come to the party, but Bill is sure that nobody will come to the party'. This is because the presupposition triggered by `only Sue will come to the party' should be able to be bound at the matrix level. We discuss some responses to this problem, but argue that they all have shortcomings. (shrink)

[Site set up thanks to A. Furmanska, A. Lima and V. Homer as part of the NSF Project ‘Formal Semantic and Pragmatic Approaches to Binding Theory’].

This paper provides a unification-based implementation of Binding Theory (BT) for the English language in the framework of feature-based lexicalized tree-adjoining grammar (LTAG). The grammar presented here does not actually coindex any noun phrases, it merely outputs a set of constraints on co- and contraindexation that may later be processed by a separate anaphora resolution module. It improves on previous work by implementing the full BT rather than just Condition A. The main technical innovation consists in allowing lists (...) to appear as values of semantic features. (shrink)

Although, in the literature, Principle C of Binding Theory is taken not to apply to copular sentences on the basis of English data alone, this study aims to show that this Principle applies to French copular sentences. French displays a dichotomy between predicational copular sentences and other subtypes of copular sentences : while the former use the verb est alone, the latter need an additional form, namely the neuter demonstrative pronoun ce. Evidence is given that, in French, the (...) two terms flanking the copula est cannot be referential because the post-copula term would be bound by the pre-copula one, in accordance with Principle C of Binding Theory. Thus, adding the pronoun ce modifies the structure of the sentence and gives rise to a Topic c’est Focus structure, which escapes Principle C. (shrink)

The paper discusses one of the central problems of contemporary formal semantics — counterexamples to the predictions of the theory of binding (due to N. Chomsky). In particular, the author addresses cases of the so-called coreferential readings of reflexive pronouns which are standardly predicted to receive only the bound reading. The author examines theories of T. Reinhart and I. Heim and suggests an extension ofthe latter theory in order to enable it to account for the aforementioned readings (...) of reflexive pronouns. (shrink)

The correct locus (or loci) of binding theory has been a matter of much discussion. Theories can be seen as varying along at least two dimensions. The rst is whether binding theory is con gurationally determined (that is, the theory exploits the geometry of a phrase marker, appealing to such purely structural notions as c-command and government) or whether the theory depends rather on examining the relations between items selected by a predicate (where by (...) selection I am intending to cover everything from semantic dependencies to syntactic subcategorization). The second is the level of grammar on which binding is de ned. Attempting to roughly equate levels across di erent theories, suggestions have included the semantics/lexical conceptual structure (Jackendo 1992), thematic structure (Jackendo 1972, Wilkins 1988), argument structure/D-structure/initial grammatical relations (Manning 1994, Belletti and Rizzi 1988, Perlmutter 1984), surface syntax/grammatical relations, logical form, linear order, pragmatics (Levinson 1991), and discourse (Iida 1992). The data is su ciently varied and complex that many theories end up as mixtures, variously employing a combination of elements along both dimensions (for instance, Chomsky (1986) relies purely on con gurational notions for the relationship between an anaphor and its antecedent, but uses concepts from selection in the de nition of the binding domain of an anaphor). LFG has always rejected a con gurational account of binding. For instancError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMape, Simpson (1991) argues that a con gurational theory of binding in Warlpiri cannot be maintained, among other reasons because nite clauses lack a VP.. (shrink)

In “Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding”, Arntzenius et al. (Mind 113:251–283, 2004 ) present cases in which agents who cannot bind themselves are driven by standard decision theory to choose sequences of actions with disastrous consequences. They defend standard decision theory by arguing that if a decision rule leads agents to disaster only when they cannot bind themselves, this should not be taken to be a mark against the decision rule. I show that this claim has surprising (...) implications for a number of other debates in decision theory. I then assess the plausibility of this claim, and suggest that it should be rejected. (shrink)

Nexuses such as exemplification are the fundamental ties that structure reality as a whole. They are “formal” in the sense of constituting the form, not the matter of reality and they are “transcendental” inasmuch as they transcend the categorial distinctions between the denizens of reality, including that between existents and non-existents. I shall advocate a moderately particularist view about (external) nexuses and argue that it provides not only the best solution to Bradley’s regress, but also an elegant account of symmetrical (...) relations (both formal and material), as well as of temporal and modal change. These advantages are illustrated by the reconstruction of an Aristotelian ontology of exemplification involving substances, kinds and material attributes. (shrink)

The general theory of variable binding term operators is an interesting recent development in logic. It opens up a rich class of semantic and model-theoretic problems. In this paper we survey the recent literature on the topic, and offer some remarks on its significances and on its connections with other branches of mathematical logic.

An interdisciplinary examination of the legacies of the global 1968 uprisings from the vantage point of the current crisis of neoliberal hegemony.

In a simple theory with elimination of finitary hyperimaginaries if tp(a) is real and analysable over a definable set Q, then there exists a finite sequence ( $a_{i}|i \leq n^{*}$ ) $\subseteq dcl^{eq}$ (a) with $a_{n}*$ = a such that for every $i \leq n*$ , if $p_{i} = tp(a_{i}/{a_{i}|j < i}$ ) then $Aut(p_{i}/Q)$ is type-definable with its action on $p_{i}^{c}$ . A unidimensional simple theory eliminates the quantifier $\exists^{\infty}$ and either interprets (in $C^{eq}$ ) an infinite (...) type-definable group or has the property that ACL(Q) = C for every infinite definable set Q. (shrink)

At first, despairing of justifying the Court's new-found rights as the products of interpreting the Constitution, many of the Court's supporters bit the bullet and proclaimed the legitimacy of "noninterpretivism." As an approach to justifying purportedly constitutional decisions, however, noninterpretivism's oxymoronic quality made it an easy target for the Court's detractors, who asserted that noninterpretivism was nothing more than rule by a federal judiciary unrestrained by any positive law.

ABSTRACTWhile metaphor researchers commonly use the word “mapping” in explanations of various types of figurative language, there is a lack of recognition that the term is itself metaphorical. In fact, the term has two metaphor-based working definitions, the more commonly cited being that relating to mathematical set theory and the less common definition originating in cognitive neuroscience. Perhaps not coincidentally, terminological inconsistencies relating to mapping have led to theoretical problems both for single-domain theories of metonymy and attempts to examine (...) Lakoff’s invariance hypothesis. This article will assert that expressing metonymic connectivity using the neuroscience term “binding” will both eliminate unnecessary theoretical confusion for cognitive linguists and provide common terminology to facilitate productive communication between cognitive linguists and cognitive neuroscientists. (shrink)

Agnes Heller was one of the first critical theorists to turn her attention to a contemporary theory of modernity. Yet her many writings on this topic remained fragments until the publication of her A Theory of Modernity (1999). This article focuses on the structural elements of this account. It traces the evolution of Heller's ideas in regard to logics, dynamic and social arrangement of modernity. It explains how these fit into her own development towards the standpoint she describes (...) as postmodern resignation and her notions of the `double bind' and `pendulum of modernity'. It argues that while Heller has modified her conception of the multiple logics of modernity to keep faith with a critical brief and an open-ended vision, some theoretical tensions remain. In particular, it explores the idea of modernity as a `steamroller' in conjunction with the question of its survival. It also questions whether Heller's emphatic normative vision of cultural modernity can easily be reconciled with the empirical trends of globalization that promise an increasing diversity of modernities. (shrink)

By formalizing recent syntactic theories for natural languages Stabler shows how their complexity can be handled without guesswork or oversimplification. By formalizing recent syntactic theories for natural languages in the tradition of Chomsky's Barriers, Stabler shows how their complexity can be handled without guesswork or oversimplification. He introduces logical representations of these theories together with special deductive techniques for exploring their consequences that will provide linguists with a valuable tool for deriving and testing theoretical predictions and for experimenting with alternative (...) formulations of grammatical principles. Stabler's novel approach allows results to be deduced with straightforward calculations and provides a systematic framework for tackling the problem of how speakers can infer the properties of an utterance from principles of the grammar. The special treatment of equality, induction principles, and inclusion of a general method for collecting structures from proofs means that sophisticated linguistic arguments can be carried out in detail, giving a rich perspective to issues in linguistic theory and parsing. (shrink)

Theories of binding have recently come into the focus of the consciousness debate. In this review, we discuss the potential relevance of temporal binding mechanisms for sensory awareness. Specifically, we suggest that neural synchrony with a precision in the millisecond range may be crucial for conscious processing, and may be involved in arousal, perceptual integration, attentional selection and working memory. Recent evidence from both animal and human studies demonstrates that specific changes in neuronal synchrony occur during all of (...) these processes and that they are distinguished by the emergence of fast oscillations with frequencies in the gamma-range. (shrink)

We show that if p is a real type which is almost internal in a formula φ in a simple theory, then there is a type p' interalgebraic with a finite tuple of realizations of p, which is generated over φ. Moreover, the group of elementary permutations of p' over all realizations of φ is type-definable.

This article offers a close reading of Hannah Arendt's book On Revolution. It exposes the ambivalence of Arendt with regard to tragedy and mimesis. This ambivalence is not just her own; it is inherent in the treatment of tragedy and mimesis throughout the history of political thought. In spite of Arendt's argument that privileges the limited American Revolution against the boundless French one, in her rhetoric and in her storytelling Arendt presents a unitary but dialectical picture of revolution, where suffering (...) and foundation are inseparably intertwined. The founding public action of revolutionaries implies a crisis of mimetic passions (of fear and pity) which threatens to undo, but also set the stage for, revolution. This negative, passionate and passive side of revolution helps us to come to terms with the non-productive but emancipatory revolutions in the Eastern Europe of 1989-91. (shrink)

Chapin reviewed this 1972 ZEITSCHRIFT paper that proves the completeness theorem for the logic of variable-binding-term operators created by Corcoran and his student John Herring in the 1971 LOGIQUE ET ANALYSE paper in which the theorem was conjectured. This leveraging proof extends completeness of ordinary first-order logic to the extension with vbtos. Newton da Costa independently proved the same theorem about the same time using a Henkin-type proof. This 1972 paper builds on the 1971 “Notes on a Semantic Analysis (...) of Variable Binding Term Operators” (Co-author John Herring), Logique et Analyse 55, 646–57. MR0307874 (46 #6989). A variable binding term operator (vbto) is a non-logical constant, say v, which combines with a variable y and a formula F containing y free to form a term (vy:F) whose free variables are exact ly those of F, excluding y. Kalish-Montague 1964 proposed using vbtos to formalize definite descriptions “the x: x+x=2”, set abstracts {x: F}, minimization in recursive function theory “the least x: x+x>2”, etc. However, they gave no semantics for vbtos. Hatcher 1968 gave a semantics but one that has flaws described in the 1971 paper and admitted by Hatcher. In 1971 we give a correct semantic analysis of vbtos. We also give axioms for using them in deductions. And we conjecture strong completeness for the deductions with respect to the semantics. The conjecture, proved in this paper with Hatcher’s help, was proved independently about the same time by Newton da Costa. (shrink)

How do separate brain processes bind to form unified, conscious percepts? This is the perceptual binding problem, which straddles neuroscience and psychology. In fact, two problems exist here: (1) the easy problem of how neural processes are unified, and (2) the hard problem of how this yields unified perceptual consciousness. Binding theories face familiar troubles with (1) and they do not come to grips with (2). This paper argues that neuroelectrical (electromagnetic-field) approaches may help with both problems. Concerning (...) the easy problem, standard accounts of neural binding by synchrony, attention, and convergence raise serious difficulties. These are avoided by neuroelectrical approaches in which the brain’s field binds distributed processes in myriad neurons. Concerning the hard problem, binding theories do not squarely address how to get from neural unity to unified consciousness. This raises metaphysical difficulties involving reductions, emergence, etc. Neuroelectrical (and Russellian) approaches may help avoid these difficulties too. These approaches may thus deserve further investigation as binding theories. (shrink)

Recent findings in neuroscience strongly suggest that an object’s features (e.g., its color, texture, shape, etc.) are represented in separate areas of the visual cortex. Although represented in separate neuronal areas, somehow the feature representations are brought together as a single, unified object of visual consciousness. This raises a question of binding: how do neural activities in separate areas of the visual cortex function to produce a feature-unified object of visual consciousness? Several prominent neuroscientists have adopted neural synchrony and (...) attention-based approaches to explain object feature binding. I argue that although neural synchrony and attentional mechanisms might function to disambiguate an object’s features, it is difficult to see how either of these mechanisms could fully explain the unity of an object’s features at the level of visual consciousness. After presenting a detailed critique of neural synchrony and attention-based approaches to object feature binding, I propose interactive hierarchical structuralism (IHS). This view suggests that a unified percept (i.e., a feature-unified object of visual consciousness) is not reducible to the activity of any cognitive capacity or to any localized neural area, but emerges out of the interaction of visual information organized by spatial structuring capacities correlated with lower, higher, and intermediate levels of the visual hierarchy. After clarifying different notions of emergence and elaborating evidence for IHS, I discuss how IHS can be tested through transcranial magnetic stimulation and backward masking. In the final section I present some further implications and advantages of IHS. (shrink)

Citizenship and residency are basic conditions for political inclusion in a democracy. However, if democracy is premised on the inclusion of everyone subject to collectively binding decisions, the relevance of either citizenship or residency for recognition as a member of the polity is uncertain. The aim of this paper is to specify the conditions for being subject to collective decisions in the sense relevant to democratic theory. Three conceptions of what it means to be subject to collectively (...) class='Hi'>binding decisions are identified and examined, referring to those subject to legal duties and legal powers or to those subject to legal duties and state institutions. The contrast between them is most clearly illustrated in relation to non-residents, those not present in the territory of the state. The extraterritorial dimension of the law thus highlights a fundamental ambiguity in the theory of democracy concerning the extension of political rights. (shrink)

Ulf Schmidt, writing on “Medical Ethics and Nazism” in the recently published Cambridge World History of Medical Ethics, states:In 1920, the lawyer Karl Binding and the psychiatrist Alfred Hoche published their tract Permission for the Destruction of Life Unworthy of Life. … Their positivistic theory was a combination of legal norms and medical arguments that granted the state fundamental rights while overriding the rights of individuals. The traditional moral belief system that advocated care and compassion for the weak (...) and unproductive was radically called into question. The book was written in the wake of World War I; readers were asked to compare the “battlefields littered with.. (shrink)

Since Kaplan’s "Demonstratives", it has become a common-place to distinguish between the character and content of an expression, where the content of an expression is what it contributes to "what is said" by sentences containing that expression, and the character gives a rule for determining, in a context, the content of an expression. A tacit assumption of theories of character has been that character is autonomous from content – that semantic evaluation starts with character, adds context, and then derives content. (...) One consequence of this autonomy thesis is that the rules for character can contain no variables bound by content-level operators elsewhere in the sentence. Tacit appeal to this consequence features essentially both in Jason Stanley’s recent argument that all contextual ambiguity must be linked to "elements in the actual syntactic structure of the sentence uttered" in his "Context and Logical Form" and in my arguments against character-based theories of complex demonstratives in my "Complex Demonstratives". However, I argue here that the autonomy thesis is unmotivated, and show that we can separate Kaplan’s notion of character into two independent components: an aspect of meaning which is context-sensitive, and an aspect of meaning that is exempted from scopal interactions with other operators. The resulting semantic framework allows constructions similar to Kaplan’s rejected notion of "monsters begat by elegance", but which are both more empirically adequate and more theoretically versatile. Having made the distinction between context-sensitivity and autonomy from scopal interaction, I show how it allows binding into the character of expressions and hence undermines the immediate success of both Stanley’s argument and my former argument against character-based theories of complex demonstratives, and discuss briefly the prospects for reinstating modified versions of those arguments. Finally, I show how that same distinction allows a defusing of Kripke’s modal argument against a descriptive theory of names. Once autonomy from semantic interaction is separated from context-sensitivity, the first of those two alone can be used to capture the modal rigidity of proper names.. (shrink)

The idea that a simple unilateral promise, until it is accepted, is not binding according to natural law is defended by Grotius in his major work with an argumentation drawn directly from Lessius, an important source of inspiration for the Dutch jurist, who in turn solves the dispute rooted in the tradition of ius commune. This article aims to reconstruct, in its essential stages, an itinerary through the main positions of medieval and early modern civil and canon lawyers about (...) this controversial issue. These sources constitute the background of early modern scholastics and Grotius as well. The paper analyses some of the principal texts of both bodies of law, highlighting arguments and adding new findings. Notably it is shown that Lessius’s and Grotius’s statements represent a turning point, as far as they react against the resumption of the theory of the binding force of simple unilateral promises in the sixteenth century. With Lessius and Grotius, on the other hand, acceptance became a necessary requirement for every transfer of rights and duties to be enforceable. (shrink)

Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer present a comprehensive and sophisticated theory of lexical access in production, but we question its reliance on binding-by-checking as opposed to binding-by-timing and we discuss how the timing of retrieval events is a major factor in both correct and errorful production.

Covaluation is the generalization of coreference introduced by Tanya Reinhart. Covaluation distributes in patterns that are very similar yet not entirely identical to those of binding. On a widespread view, covaluation and binding distribute similarly because binding is defined in terms of covaluation. Yet on Reinhart's view, binding and covaluation are not related that way: binding pertains to syntax, covaluation does not. Naturally, the widespread view can easily explain the similarities between binding and covaluation, (...) whereas Reinhart can easily explain the dissimilarities. Reciprocally, the widespread view finds it harder to explain the dissimilarities, whereas Reinhart finds it harder to explain the similarities. Reinhart and others have proposed more than one explanation of the similarities, but as I argue, these explanations do not work. Hence although I adopt Reinhart's view, I propose a new explanation of the similarities and dissimilarities between binding and covaluation: While Reinhart has invoked semantic structure only to explain dissimilarities, I do so to explain both similarities and dissimilarities at once. Finally, I examine in light of this approach the topics of language acquisition, only-constructions, the identity predicate, the Partee/Bach/Higginbotham problem, the Dahl puzzle and its recent versions by Roelofsen. (shrink)

Let T be simple, work in Ceq over a boundedly closed set. Let p ∈ S(θ) be internal in a quasi-stably-embedded type-definable set Q (e.g., Q is definable or stably-embedded) and suppose (p, Q) is ACL-embedded in Q (see definitions below). Then Aut(p/Q) with its action on pC is type-definable in Ceq over θ. In particular, if p ∈ S(θ) is internal in a stably-embedded type-definable set Q, and pC υ Q is stably-embedded, then Aut(p/Q) is type-definable with its action (...) on pC. (shrink)

This article sketches a theory of time-binding communication, which is to say communication that unifies widely separated times much as space-binding communication unifies widely separated places. Drawing from the work of Harold Innis, it first describes the function and character of time-binding communication as a means to social continuity. Then, following Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Oakshott, it explains the nature and necessary circumstances of this sort of time-binding communication, or tradition. It discusses the character, consequences, (...) and causes of decadence - radical discontinuity - as these have been described by Richard Weaver, C. E. M. Joad, and Jacques Barzun. Finally, it turns to David Lowenthal's notion of the past as a 'foreign country' in an effort to explain the relations between modernity and both tradition and decadence, as well as the geography of tradition and decadence in the modern world. (shrink)

Historically, philosophers have tended to see moral responsibility as a matter of having a certain metaphysical status. Strawson shifted the debate by defining responsibility as part of an interpersonal practice, but he did not discuss the relationship between interpersonal relationships and the politics of oppression. His view, in other words, was an example of ideal theory. This article adopts a non‐ideal theoretic framework to explore how ordinary responsibility practices uphold intersecting logics of oppression. It argues that the reactive attitudes (...) function to police double binds, creating situations of oppression for marginalized groups. (shrink)

Understanding the emergence of a tangible 4-dimensional space-time from a quantum theory of gravity promises to be a tremendously difficult task. This article makes the case that this task may not have to be carried. Space-time as we know it may be fundamental to begin with. I recall the common arguments against this possibility and review a class of recently discovered models bypassing the most serious objection. The generic solution of the measurement problem that is tied to semiclassical gravity (...) as well as the difficulty of the alternative make it a reasonable default option in the absence of decisive experimental evidence. (shrink)

The binding problem is fundamental to visual perception. It is the problem of associating an object's visual properties with itself and not with some other object. The problem is made particular difficult because different properties of an object, such as its color, shape, size, and motion, are often processed independently, sometimes in different cortical areas. The results of these separate analyses have to be combined before the object can be seen as a single coherent entity as opposed to a (...) collection of unconnected features. Visual bindings are typically initiated and updated in a serial fashion, one object at a time. Here, we show that one type of binding, location-identity bindings, can be updated in parallel. We do this by using two complementary techniques, the simultaneous-sequential paradigm and systems factorial technology. These techniques make different assumptions and rely on different behavioral measures, yet both came to the same conclusion. (shrink)

Philosophers and scientists seeking to conceptualize consciousness, and subjective experience in particular, have focused on sensation and perception, and have emphasized binding – how a percept holds together. Building on a constructivist approach to conception centered on separistic-holistic complexes incorporating multiple levels of abstraction, the present approach reconceptualizes binding and opens a new path to theorizing the emergence of consciousness. It is proposed that all subjective experience involves multiple levels of abstraction, a central feature of conception. This modifies (...) the prevalent idea of sequential development from sensation through perception to conception. Further, this approach to mind and consciousness links constructivist theory to artistic activity and suggests that conception, subjective experience, aboutness (intentionality), and agency are linked together through separistic-holistic complexes. It also argues for change in the prevailing constructivist view that regards the process of production of new levels of conception as inherently directed towards better fit with the external environment. Copyright © 2008 S. Karger AG, Basel. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Light That Binds: A Study in Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics of Natural Law by Stephen L. BrockBrian BesongThe Light That Binds: A Study in Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics of Natural Law by Stephen L. Brock (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2020), xv + 277 pp.Fr. Stephen L. Brock is arguably one of the most important contemporary contributors to the Thomistic understanding of natural law. Hence, the publication of his updated and (...) revised doctoral dissertation on the topic [End Page 289] of the metaphysics of natural law in St. Thomas will be gladly received by Thomistic scholars and moral theorists alike. In The Light That Binds, Brock's central task is to explain the metaphysics of the promulgation of natural law in man. Put differently although extant literature on natural law may be useful for action analysis—why lying is always wrong, say—less attention has been paid to the way in which natural law has been promulgated by God and is present in the human intellect. What literature is available, either as an explanation of St. Thomas or as criticism of the same, has failed to do Aquinas justice, so Brock argues.The book comprises seven chapters and an introduction. In the first chapter, Brock's central goal is to survey the ways in which (especially more recent) commentators of Aquinas have distorted the sense in which natural law constitutes genuine law, as well as the relationship between natural law and God. For, there is a line of thought on natural law, particularly prominent in the "new natural law" tradition, according to which the principles at the heart of the theory do not fully satisfy the four criteria of legitimate law given by Aquinas. Rival views have natural law constituting a real law, but in virtue of an epistemically explicit reliance on God as lawgiver, among other distortions. Figureheads surveyed in the chapter include Dom Odon Lottin, Ernest Fortin, and Francisco Suárez, among others.In the second chapter, Brock outlines and defends his positive view regarding the legal status of the natural law by way of continued discussion of Lottin, particularly Lottin's contention that St. Thomas was heavily influenced by a mid-thirteenth-century Franciscan tract, De legibus et praeceptis. Brock argues that St. Thomas conceives of natural law as having an even closer relationship to eternal law than is posited by the earlier Franciscan tract, and the rest of the chapter is largely focused on unpacking this close relationship. In sum, natural law is law because it involves a rational ordering by God of our intellect to the goods of our nature, a human participation in an eternal ordering of all things to their ends (i.e., the eternal law). We need not discover the source of the ordering—namely, God—in grasping the first principles of his ordering, as Brock explains here and elsewhere. But the strictly legal status of the principles requires that natural law comes from a legitimate authority, among other essential elements.Chapters 3 and 4 tackle the more human side of the metaphysics of natural law. More concretely, in these chapters, Brock explains the wheres and the whats of our possession of the natural law. For, not all ordering of objects to ends implies the sort of normativity we see in the natural law. Brute animals, among others, have natural inclinations too, and yet they are not governed through these instinctual drives by a natural law. Natural law [End Page 290] is present preeminently in the human intellect, Brock argues, and is not to be confused with the prerational drives that we share as part of our animal nature. God instills these rational drives—the light, as it were—into reason in such a way that an individual can grasp its force autonomously, as basic conceptional truths about what right and wrong consist in (72). Here it would have been nice for Brock to reflect briefly on how Aquinas's views on moral knowledge fit within his broader epistemological commitments, as the natural (conceptual) knowledge of right and wrong at first glance shares common ground with the Franciscan tradition on divine illumination as found in figures... (shrink)